Opinion
No. 3D19-0487
02-26-2020
Nelson Ricardo DIAZ and Agueda Perez Diaz, Appellants, v. Ignacio NAVAJAS, Appellee.
Rafael A. Castro, III, for appellants. The Orlofsky Law Firm, P.L., and Meghan E. Rovner, for appellee.
Rafael A. Castro, III, for appellants.
The Orlofsky Law Firm, P.L., and Meghan E. Rovner, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellants, Nelson Ricardo Diaz and Agueda Perez Diaz, challenge an order granting specific performance of a contract for the sale of a parcel of vacant land to appellee, Ignacio Navajas. The record amply supports the conclusion rendered by the lower tribunal that the buyer was "ready, willing, and able to close" under the terms of the agreement, as amended, and, the sellers, motivated solely by manifestations of sellers' remorse, attempted to extricate themselves from the negotiated terms of the sale, without any persuasive legal or factual basis. Mirzataheri v. FM E. Developers, LLC, 193 So. 3d 19, 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (finding specific performance was appropriate as buyer was "ready, willing, and able to close" and the contract "provide[d] for specific performance"); see Smith v. Crissey, 478 So. 2d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) ("To obtain specific performance, it is unnecessary to physically tender the purchase price so long as the purchaser establishes that he was ready, willing and able to do so or that he has been excused from so doing.") (citation omitted). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the decree under review. See Muniz v. Crystal Lake Project, LLC, 947 So. 2d 464, 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ("The decision whether to grant or withhold a judgment for specific performance is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court which will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.") (citation omitted); see also Invego Auto Parts, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 34 So. 3d 103, 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) ("In light of the overwhelming evidence that [appellant] was ready, willing, and able to perform, the trial court erred in not awarding specific performance."); Hogan v. Norfleet, 113 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) ("Our Florida courts have held that specific performance of a contract is a matter of equitable cognizance as applied both to real and personal property, and where, in the case of personal property, it is of peculiar character and value, specific performance will be granted.") (citation omitted).
Affirmed.