Opinion
Case No. C2-03-513
November 24, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant North American Van Line's ("NAVL") Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss ("Motion to Dismiss") and Memorandum In Support (Docs. #7 and #8); Plaintiffs' Motion to Convert Defendant NAVL's Motion to Dismiss Into a Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (Doc. #18); Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant NAVL's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 19); Defendant NAVL's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs' Memo in Opposition to NAVL's Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's Memorandum Contra to Plaintiffs' Motion to Convert Defendant's Motion to Summary Judgment (Doc. #25); Defendant NAVL's Motion to Dismiss Defendant Watts Bros. Amended Cross-Claim (Doc. #26); Defendant Watts Bros. Amended Answer to Complaint and Amended Cross-Claim Against Defendant NAVL's (Doc. #27); and, Defendant Watts Bros.'s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant NAVL's Motion to Dismiss Amended Cross-Claim (Doc. #30).
For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' motion to convert NAVL's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment (doc. #18) is DENIED. Defendant NAVL's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims (doc. #7) is GRANTED. Defendant NAVL's motion to dismiss Defendant Watts Bros.'s amended cross-claim (doc. #26) is GRANTED. Defendant North American Van Lines is hereby DISMISSED from the above captioned case.
I. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that Defendants Watts Bros, and NAVL failed to deliver all of Plaintiffs' household goods and items and damaged many of their household goods. (pls.' Compl.) Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, or in the alternative, in the amount of one hundred and thirteen thousand eight hundred dollars ($113,800.00) in actual losses or injuries to the property caused by Defendants. Defendant Watts Bros, has asserted a cross-claim against Defendant NAVL, alleging that at the time NAVL retrieved the goods from Watts Bros.'s storage facility, the goods were undamaged and no goods were missing. Defendant NAVL moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against NAVL, arguing Plaintiffs' failed to timely submit a claim to NAVL as required by law. Defendant NAVL additionally moves the Court to dismiss the cross-claim asserted against NAVL for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. FACTS
On or about June 18, 2001, Plaintiffs hired Watts Bros, to move and relocate their household goods from their residence at 3100 Sherwood Court, in the City of Flatwoods, Kentucky to the Watts Bros, moving and storage facility at 1301 Seventh Avenue, in the city of Huntington, West Virginia. (Pls.'Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs paid Watts Bros, for the services. Compl. ¶ 9.) Thereafter, on or around May 9, 2002, Plaintiffs hired NAVL to move all of their household goods and items from Watts Bros, storage facility to their new home residence at 8639 Craigston Court in the city of Dublin, Ohio. (PI. Compl. ¶ 11).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a Complaint should be dismissed if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that might be proved consistent with the pleadings. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). The rule permits courts to dismiss meritless cases which would otherwise waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary discovery. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989). When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded material allegations as true. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993).
A complaint need not set down in detail all the particularities of a plaintiff's claim against a defendant. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The function of a complaint is to afford the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 125 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983). However, the complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). Bare assertions of legal conclusions are insufficient. See id.; Allard v. Weitzman (In reDeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993).
That said, the Court will grant a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if there is an absence of law to support a claim of the type made, or of facts sufficient to make a valid claim, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief indicating that the plaintiff does not have a claim.
IV. DISCUSSION
The Court is cognizant of the Stipulation of Partial Voluntary Dismissal of Claims Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(A)(1) (Doc. #20). Plaintiffs dismissed, without prejudice, claims II, III, IV, and VII alleged in their complaint against Defendant NAVL, and claims II, III, IV, V, and VI alleged in their complaint against Defendant Watts Bros. The sole claim remaining before the Court is Plaintiffs' allegation that defendants violated 49 U.S.C. § 11707-14706 (The Interstate Commerce Act). The Court need only address NAVL's motion to dismiss in the context of this claim.
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs' motion to convert NAVL's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment (doc. #18) is DENIED. Plaintiffs argue that such a conversion is necessary because NAVL's motion to dismiss attached a portion of the Uniform Household Goods Bill of Lading Freight Bill ("Bill of Lading") between plaintiffs and NAVL which was not attached to plaintiffs' complaint. It is well settled that motions made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(B)(6) are automatically converted into motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 if materials outside of the pleadings are used by the Court to determine the motion. Plaintiffs' claim that by attaching this document, NAVL asks the Court to consider a document outside of the pleadings in ruling on its motion to dismiss.
NAVL argues, and the Court agrees, that where materials are central to the claims asserted, a defendant may introduce these materials if the plaintiff fails to do so. See Weirner v. Klais Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997). The Weirner Court adopted the Seventh Circuit's approach; "[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiffs complaint and are central to her claim." Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993). Consideration of such materials does not convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Fidel v. AK Steel Holding Corp., 2002 WL 31545952, *22 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 111 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999).
Here, the Bill of Lading between NAVL and Plaintiffs is integral to Plaintiffs' claim that NAVL violated 49 U.S.C. § 14706. In order for there to be a cause of action under § 14706, there must bo a Bill of Lading. Indeed, the very title of § 14706 is "Liability of carriers under receipts and Bills of Lading." 49 U.S.C. § 17706 (2003). The bill of lading creates NAVL's duty to Plaintiffs, its terms are absolutely essential to the issue of whether NAVL is liable to Plaintiffs for violating the bill.
Moreover, Plaintiffs attached part of the contract between Plaintiffs and NAVL, the Order for Service and the Household Goods Descriptive Inventory, to their complaint. (pls.' Compl. Exhibit B.) Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, NAVL may reference all parts of the Bill of Lading, as the Bill is deemed to be incorporated into the complaint by reference. Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c); see Butler v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 109 F. Supp.2d 856, 859 (S.D. Ohio 2000) ([a]lthough [the plaintiff] did not attach the full document to her Complaint, the Court notes that it may rely upon the full plan document, as opposed to the summary plan description, without converting the pending Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.) The Court may consider NAVL's attachment, a portion of the Lading Bill between NAVL and Plaintiffs, without converting NAVL's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' motion (doc. #18) is DENIED. A. NAVL's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' claim
Plaintiffs' remaining claim against NAVL, that NAVL violated the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11707-14706, arises out of a contract for the transportation of household goods consigned to NAVL, and shipped in interstate commerce under a Bill of Lading Freight Bill from West Virginia to Ohio. 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (a)(1) sets forth the conditions of general liability for common carriers. Pursuant to § 14706(a)(1), all carriers "shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation under this part." This receipt or bill of landing signifies the carrier's liability for the property to any person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. See 49 U.S.C. § 1470; see also W. D. Lawson Co. v. Perm Cent. Co., 456 F.2d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1972) (carrier's liability to any holder of the bill of lading which the primary carrier is required to issue for any loss, damage or injury to such property caused by it, or by any connecting carrier to whom the goods are delivered.)
In the case sub judice, NAVL issued to Plaintiffs a bill of lading for household goods to be transported from Huntington, West Virginia to Dublin, Ohio by NAVL. (Pls.' Compl. Exhibit D.) Under § 14706(a)(1), NAVL was liable to the holder of the bill of lading (the Plaintiffs) for any loss or damage to the property NAVL received for interstate transportation (the household goods transported from West Virginia to Ohio).
Defendant NAVL does not dispute this theory of liability. Rather, NAVL argues that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy a condition precedent to their claim for relief, and that the claim is now time barred. Section 7 of NAVL's Bill of Lading states:
Section 7: As a condition precedent to recovery, a claim for any loss or damage, injury or delay, must be filed in writing with carrier within nine (9) months after delivery to the consignee as shown on the face hereof . . . Where a claim is not filed . . . in accordance with the foregoing provisions, carrier shall not be liable and such a claim will not be paid.
NAVL submits that Plaintiffs did not file a written claim for any loss or damage with NAVL within nine (9) months from the date of delivery, thus Plaintiffs claim pursuant to the Bill of Lading is barred.
The Court first determines whether Section 7 of NAVL's Bill of Lading is enforceable against Plaintiffs. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(c)(1) allows a carrier to set a minimum time period for filing claims of liability against a carrier under receipts and bills of lading. The provision states that a carrier may not provide by rule, contract, or otherwise, a period of less than nine (9) months for filing a claim against it under this section. Id. NAVL's Bill of Lading clearly comports to this provision, it allows persons nine months to file a written claim against the carrier. NAVL's Bill of Lading requires persons to file a written claim with NAVL prior to bringing a civil action against NAVL. This requirement is provided by NAVL's Bill of Lading and tariff. It is binding upon Plaintiffs. See Ford Motor Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 795 F.2d 538, 547 (6th Cir. 1986) (analyzing a nine month filing provision of the Uniform Bill of Straight Lading and finding it stemming from 49 U.S.C. § 11707(e)(1982) and holding that compliance with the requirements of the predecessor to Section 11707(e), 49 U.S.C. § 20(11)(1976), repealed by Revised Interstate Commerce Act, Pub.L. No. 95-473, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1337, 1454 (1978), are prerequisites to the bringing of an action under the bill of lading and are not subject to waiver or estoppel.)
NAVL's Bill of Lading specifically notifies the shipper that the transportation is subject to all of NAVL's tariffs and that such tariffs are available to the shipper upon request.
Plaintiffs argue that they substantially complied with the requirements for filing a written a claim by signing the NAVL's Household Goods Description Inventory ("Inventory") form at delivery. First, it is important to note that the thirty-five (35) page inventory form does not constitute a "claim" under the Code of Federal Regulations. See 49 F.C.R. § 1005.2 (2002). 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(c) lists the following as documents not constituting claims:
Bad order reports, appraisal reports of damage, notations of shortage or damage or both, on freight bills, delivery receipts, or other documents, or inspection reports issued by carriers, whether the extent of loss or damage is indicated in dollars or cents or otherwise, shall, standing alone, not be considered by carriers as sufficient to comply with the minimum claim filing requirements specified in the paragraph (b) of this section.49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(c) (2002). The Household Goods Descriptive Inventory signed by Plaintiff Tim Dials is an inspection report issued by a carrier, NAVL. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(c) this document does not constitute a claim.
More importantly, the act of signing the Household Goods Descriptive Inventory is not substantial compliance with the federal regulations for filing a claim for loss or damage. At a minimum, any claim for loss or damage must: (1) contain facts sufficient to identify the baggage or shipment of property; (2) assert liability for alleged loss, damage, or delay; and, (3) make a claim for the payment of a specified or determinable amount of money. 42 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b). The Inventory form signed by Tim Dials does not assert liability, nor does the form ask for money damages. The Inventory form cannot be considered a claim for loss or damage to NAVL.
Plaintiffs rely heavily on the case Trepel v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 194 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1999) to support their position that 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2 is an informal regulation, requiring only substantial compliance, not strict compliance. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs' contention, but finds the rule inapplicable to Plaintiffs' case. In Trepel, a formal claim had been filed, however, the claimant did not specify an exact amount of loss. The Sixth Circuit declared that substantial compliance with 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2 will satisfy the written claim requirement, and defined substantial compliance as; identifying the goods, asserting liability and asking for money damages. Id. at 713. Plaintiffs did not, by signing the Inventory form, or in any other way, assert liability against NAVL or ask that NAVL pay any money damages. Plaintiffs did not substantially comply with 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that by filing a claim with Defendant Watts Bros., they gave Defendant NAVL sufficient notice of NAVL's liability. Plaintiffs' argument is based on the theory that Defendant NAVL is a connecting carrier, who, in addition to Watts Bros, delivered Plaintiffs' household goods to their final destination. See 49 U.S.C § 14706(A)(1). Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that because Defendant Watts Bros, is the issuing carrier and Defendant NAVL is the connecting carrier (or delivering carrier) the two parties are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' argument must fail. Defendant NAVL was not a connecting carrier in the agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant Watts Bros. Plaintiffs' contract with Watts Bros., as evidenced by the Watts Bros. Bill of Lading (Pls.' Compl., Exhibit C), was executed in June of 2001. The parties contracted to have Plaintiffs' household goods shipped from Flatwoods, Kentucky, to Watts Bros.'s storage facility in Huntington, Virginia. According to the Bill of Lading, Watts. Bros, was both the receiving and delivering carrier. NAVL was not a receiving carrier, delivering carrier, or connecting carrier for the June of 2001 shipment. Moreover, Plaintiffs did not contract with NAVL until approximately a year after the households were shipped to Huntington, West Virginia. NAVL's Bill of Lading, executed between and Plaintiffs in May of 2002, shows that Plaintiffs hired NAVL to transport their goods from Watts Bros.'s storage facility in Huntington, West Virginia to Plaintiffs' residence in Dublin, Ohio. (Pls.' Compl. Exhibit D).
It is clear to the Court that there were two separate and distinct shipping contracts under two separate and distinct Bills of Lading. NAVL did not contract with Plaintiffs until almost a year after Plaintiffs' contracted with Watts Bros. NAVL's Bill of Lading had a different origin and destination than did the Watts Bros./Dials shipment contract. NAVL and Watts Bros, did not contract with each other in the shipment of Plaintiffs' property, nor did NAVL provide any of the shipping or delivery services for the shipment of Plaintiffs' household goods from Flatwoods, Kentucky to Watts Bros, storage facility in Huntington, West Virginia. NAVL was not a carrier under Watts Bros.'s Bill of Lading, nor is NAVL jointly and severally liable pursuant to this Bill of Lading.
Looking only to the shipment contract between Plaintiffs and NAVL, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against NAVL. Plaintiffs' responsibility to file a written claim for loss or damage with NAVL within nine months of after delivery emanates from 49 U.S.C. § 11707(e)(1982). It is therefore an element of Plaintiffs' cause of action. See Ford Motor Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 795 F.2d 538, 547 (6th Cir. 1986). Failure to file a claim within nine months, a prerequisite to the bringing of an action under NAVL's Bill of Lading, is fatal to Plaintiffs' 49 U.S.C. § 11707-14706. Defendant NAVL's motion to dismiss this claim is GRANTED. B. NAVL's Motion to Dismiss Watts Bros.'s Amended Cross-Claim
Defendant NAVL moves the Court to dismiss Defendant Watts Bros.'s amended cross-claim against NAVL for indemnification and/or contribution. Watts Bros, alleges that it is entitled to indemnification from NAVL pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14706(b). Section 14706(b) provides in relevant part:
Apportionment. The carrier issuing the receipt or bill of lading under subsection (a) of this section or delivering the property for which the bill of lading was issued is entitled to recover from the carrier over whose line or route the loss or injury occurred the amount required to be paid to the owners of the property, as evidenced by receipt, judgment, or transcript, and the amount of its expenses reasonably incurred in defending a civil action brought by that person.
As discussed above, Defendant NAVL was not the receiving carrier, the delivering carrier, nor a carrier over whose line or route the Plaintiffs' property was transported under the Watts Bros. Bill of Lading. There were two distinct bills of lading; one between Watts Bros, and Plaintiffs, the other between NAVL and Plaintiffs. NAVL is not liable to Watts Bros, under the Watts Bros.'s bill of lading, as NAVL did not provide any service pursuant to this shipment.
For the same reasons, Watts Bros.'s claim for contribution also fails. Plaintiffs' sole remedy against Watts Bros, is provided by 49 U.S.C. § 14706 and the bill of lading between Plaintiffs and Watts Bros. As established above, NAVL was not a party to Watts Bros.'s Bill of Lading. NAVL did not act as a receiving carrier, a delivering carrier, or a carrier over whose line or route the property was transported in the shipment of Plaintiffs' property from Flatwoods, Kentucky to Huntington West Virginia. See 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a). NAVL cannot be liable for any contribution based upon the Bill of Lading between Watts Bros, and Plaintiffs. Defendant NAVL's motion to dismiss Watts Bros.'s amended cross-claim is GRANTED.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion to convert NAVL's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment (doc. #18) is DENIED. Defendant NAVL's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims (doc. #7) is GRANTED. Defendant NAVL's motion to dismiss Watts Bros.'s amended cross-claim (doc. #26) is GRANTED. Defendant North American Van Lines is hereby DISMISSED from the above captioned matter.