Opinion
Case No. 20030032-CA.
Filed November 4, 2004. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable William B. Bohling.
Ralph J. Marsh, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Steven W. Call and Benjamin J. Kotter, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Jackson.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Development Associates, Inc. (Development) appeals a trial court order granting summary judgment to Gene Peaden. We affirm.
"We review the trial court's summary judgment rulings for correctness." Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ¶ 5, 53 P.3d 947. Development's complaint is based upon three legal theories: unjust enrichment, implied-in-fact contract, and implied-in-law contract. Each legal theory relies upon Development's allegation that Peaden benefitted from improvements Development made to a subdivision "as required by Salt Lake County and later by Riverton City."
Development also claims that the trial court erred by failing to consider a cause of action, equitable lien, in Development's amended complaint. However, in its two-sentence argument Development does not cite to any legal authority that would indicate that the trial court's failure to consider explicitly Development's claim of equitable lien was prejudicial. Therefore, we do not consider this argument on appeal. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ¶ 23 n. 9, 48 P.3d 918 (declining to address inadequately briefed claim on appeal where claim was supported by "[a] single, vague sentence without citation to the record or legal authority").
However, because these improvements were "required by Salt Lake County and later by Riverton City," all three of Development's legal theories fail as a matter of law. For Development's implied-in-fact contract claim to succeed, the improvements had to result from Peaden's request that they be done. See Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). Because the improvements were requested and required by the governmental entities, Development cannot satisfy this element of its implied-in-fact contract claim.
Although Development alleges that Peaden encouraged Development to make the improvements, Development also candidly admits that it was required by the governmental entities to make "all subdivision improvisions, not just for the lots owned by it, but for all lots located" in the subdivision. Therefore, even the improvements that allegedly benefitted Peaden were done pursuant to the requirements of the governmental entities, not pursuant to any request by Peaden. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) (stating that "services performed by the plaintiff for his own advantage, and from which the defendant benefits incidentally, [are not] recoverable" (quotations and citation omitted)).
For similar reasons, Development cannot satisfy an element of its implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment claims, namely that it would be unjust to permit Peaden to retain the benefit without compensating Development. See id.; see also Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions, 2003 UT 57, ¶ 34, 84 P.3d 1154. "The value of services performed by a person for his own advantage and from which another benefits incidentally are not recoverable."See Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 558 (Utah 1984). Because any benefit Peaden received was incidental to improvements Development was required to make regardless of Peaden, Development's claims for implied-in-law contract and unjust enrichment fail as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Development's claims fail as a matter of law because the improvements were not done pursuant to Peaden's request and any benefit to Peaden was incidental to Development fulfilling its own obligations to Salt Lake County and Riverton City. Therefore, we affirm.
We Concur: Russell W. Bench, Associate Presiding Judge, Norman H. Jackson, Judge.