Summary
concluding that the plaintiff's NYHRL sexual harassment claim failed to state a cause of action when "[a]t no time during the period in which the alleged harassing behavior occurred did the defendant employ four or more persons."
Summary of this case from Arculeo v. On-Site Sales MarketingOpinion
Argued October 7, 1999
October 18, 1999
In an action under Executive Law article 15 to recover damages for discrimination based on sexual harassment, the defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Carter, J.).
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying the defendant's motion and substituting therefor a provision granting the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the defendant, and the complaint is dismissed.
This action was brought pursuant to Executive Law § 296(1)(a). The plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to conduct constituting sexual harassment while employed by the defendant. The defendant moved for summary judgment, contending, inter alia, that he does not satisfy the statutory requirement of "employer" under Executive Law § 292(5).
Under the Executive Law the term "employer" excludes "any employer with fewer than four persons in his employ" (Executive Law § 292; see, Kern v. City of Rochester, 254 A.D.2d 757; Germakian v. Kenny Intl. Corp., 151 A.D.2d 342). At no time during the period in which the alleged harassing behavior occurred did the defendant employ four or more persons. Contrary to the plaintiff's position, the defendant's motion goes to the substance of her claim. The contention of the defendant in this case is that the plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action (see, CPLR 3211[a][7]). An argument of that nature may be raised at any time (see, 3211[e]; Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3211:13, at 6). Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment must be granted.
The Supreme Court correctly denied the plaintiff's cross motion to amend her complaint inasmuch as the plaintiff' s factual allegations fail to support the additional causes of action (see, Ruggiero v. Contemporary Shells, 160 A.D.2d 986; Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553; Restatement [Second] of Torts § 36[1], [3 ]; Zgraggen v. Wilsey, 200 A.D.2d 818; Hayes v. Schultz, 150 A.D.2d 522; Kelly v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 717 F. Supp. 227, 235).
KRAUSMAN, J.P., McGINITY, FEUERSTEIN, and SMITH, JJ., concur.