Opinion
Case No. 2D20-192
10-14-2020
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Petitioner, v. Richard Alan CHAKRIN, Respondent.
Christie S. Utt, General Counsel, and Mark L. Mason, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Petitioner. Christopher E. Cosden, Fort Myers, for Respondent.
Christie S. Utt, General Counsel, and Mark L. Mason, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
Christopher E. Cosden, Fort Myers, for Respondent.
CASE, JAMES R., Associate Senior Judge. The Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) challenges the circuit court's order granting the petition for writ of certiorari brought by Richard Chakrin pursuant to section 322.31, Florida Statutes (2019), after a hearing officer denied his request to have his driver license reinstated after it was permanently revoked following a conviction for DUI manslaughter. See § 322.271(4), Fla. Stat. (2018). Our review of "a circuit court order entered in its review capacity over a final administrative order" by DHSMV pursuant to section 322.31 is by second-tier certiorari under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(3). Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Alliston, 813 So. 2d 141, 144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; see also Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995). For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition and quash the order of the circuit court.
The limited appendices in this proceeding do not contain the related criminal judgments that led to the revocation of the driver license in this case. According to the facts alleged in the petition or contained in the transcript of the administrative hearing, Mr. Chakrin pleaded no contest to DUI manslaughter and DUI with serious bodily injury, see § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1998), to resolve charges related to a crash that occurred in February 1999 on which he received an otherwise unspecified sentence in 2000 that included a period of incarceration and probation. Mr. Chakrin was released from the incarcerative portion of his sentence on February 3, 2014.
Procedural Facts and Relevant Law Underlying Petition for Reinstatement:
Upon his plea and resulting judgment, Mr. Chakrin's driver license was suspended permanently under sections 322.26, .27(1)(b), .28, Florida Statutes (1999). Following his release from prison in February 2014, he petitioned to have his license reinstated under section 322.271(4), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 322.28(2)(d), a person whose driving privilege has been permanently revoked because he or she has been convicted of DUI manslaughter in violation of s. 316.193 and has no prior convictions for DUI-related offenses may, upon ... the expiration of 5 years after the termination of any term of incarceration under s. 316.193 ..., petition the department for reinstatement of his or her driving privilege.
A hearing on his request was held on February 19, 2019. In order to be considered for a license reinstatement, it was Mr. Chakrin's burden to prove that he had "not been arrested for a drug-related offense during the 5 years preceding the filing of the petition," had "not driven a motor vehicle without a license for at least 5 years prior to the hearing," had "been drug-free for at least 5 years prior to the hearing," and had "completed a DUI program licensed by the department." See § 322.271(4)(a) (emphasis added). The department's role was then to "determine the petitioner's qualification, fitness, and need to drive" and then exercise its discretion to reinstate the license. See § 322.271(4)(b) ("Upon such determination, the department may, in its discretion, reinstate the driver license of the petitioner." (emphasis added)).
It is clear that the petition for reinstatement was filed in 2018, before the requisite five-year period from the end of his prison sentence had run, but by the time the hearing on the petition was held, five years had passed. However, it is also clear that the hearing was held more than thirty days from its filing, despite section's 322.271(4)(a) requiring otherwise.
At the hearing, Mr. Chakrin stated that he had consumed a beer one week before the hearing—when he accidently grabbed it instead of a Coke from the refrigerator—but thought it would not matter as he was not driving anywhere at the time. The hearing officer took the matter under advisement and indicated he would rule once he had checked the statutes. The order of the hearing officer denying the petition for reinstatement made only one factual finding—that a beer was consumed by the petitioner a week before the hearing—followed by the legal statement "Florida Statutes require 5 years of complete abstinence prior to consideration for early reinstatement (see below)." Below that, in a separate section, the order then cited two statutes, sections 322.28(2)(d) and .27(4), and indicated six bulleted requirements under those statutes. The order does not specify whether those requirements were met, with the exception of the alcohol-consumption finding.
Circuit-court review:
Following the denial, Mr. Chakrin filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court seeking review of the denial, arguing that the denial of the petition for reinstatement based on alcohol consumption was a departure from the essential requirements of law and a failure to provide him due process because section 322.271(4)(a) requires only that he remain free of drugs and not alcohol. The circuit court granted the petition for writ of certiorari and quashed the order denying the petition for reinstatement—which DHSMV challenges by way of a second-tier review of the circuit court's order through this petition for writ of certiorari—because it concluded that section 322.271(4)(a)'s requirement that Mr. Chakrin prove he had remained drug-free could not be interpreted by DHSMV as including alcohol. For the reasons explained below, the circuit court did not observe the essential requirements of the law when it disregarded the application of binding case law holding otherwise and, in its stead, failed to adequately conduct a review of the plain statutory language or the discretion it affords the hearing officer. This deviated from the first-tier certiorari standard it should have applied and resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and even under this court's limited second-tier review, we must grant the petition and quash the circuit court's order.
Standards of review:
"[A] circuit court conducting first-tier certiorari review of an administrative decision is limited to determining (1) whether due process was accorded, (2) whether the essential requirements of the law were observed, and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment were supported by competent[ ] substantial evidence." Wiggins v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 209 So. 3d 1165, 1170 (Fla. 2017). Mr. Chakrin, in his petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court, made two arguments. He primarily argued that the hearing officer failed to observe the essential requirements of law by concluding that the use of alcohol acted as a bar to the reinstatement of his license under the language of the statute. He further argued that the statute's use of the term "drug-free" was sufficiently vague to deprive him of due process. The circuit court granted the petition based only on the first argument—specifically finding that the statutory language was not vague.
This court's "second-tier certiorari review is more narrowly limited to (1) whether the lower tribunal afforded procedural due process and (2) whether the lower tribunal applied the correct law." Id. There is no argument raised by DHSMV or Mr. Chakrin here that asserts the circuit court did not afford procedural due process, nor is the circuit court's finding regarding the statutory vagueness as a due process argument raised as an issue, and our review is therefore limited to whether the circuit court applied the correct law in granting the petition for writ of certiorari and quashing the DHSMV order on the basis of its finding that the hearing officer failed to observe the essential requirements of law. See State v. Jones, 283 So. 3d 1259, 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). "A circuit court departs from the essential requirements of law when it violates a ‘clearly established principle of law,’ which can come from the circuit court's ‘interpretation or application of controlling case law, statutes, procedural rules, or constitutional provisions.’ " Id. (quoting Daniels v. Sorriso Dental Studio, LLC, 164 So. 3d 778, 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ). It is this type of departure that we are tasked with examining in this case.
"A decision made according to the form of law and the rules prescribed for rendering it, although it may be erroneous in its conclusion as to what the law is as applied to facts, is not an illegal or irregular act or proceeding remediable by certiorari ." Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Basnet v. City of Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 523, 526-27 (1882) ). However, the "failure to apply a controlling legal decision is a classic departure from the essential requirements of the law." Jones, 283 So. 3d at 1266 (citing Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hofer, 5 So. 3d 766, 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Walsh, 204 So. 3d 169, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ; Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Clay, 152 So. 3d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) ). "It [likewise] is well-established that a circuit court's failure to apply the unambiguous language of a statute is a departure from the essential requirements of the law." Id. at 1268. Once either basis for such a departure is found, then a district court will grant relief only where the departure constituted a manifest injustice. Id. at 1269 ("Having established that the circuit court's decision ... departs from the essential requirements of law, we must still consider whether it results in a miscarriage of justice.").
"[T]his court cannot grant certiorari absent a showing that the failure to apply the correct law resulted in a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ An important factor to consider when determining whether the circuit court's error amounts to a ‘miscarriage of justice’ is the adverse precedential effect the error might have on subsequent cases." Hofer, 5 So. 3d at 772 ("A circuit court's decision will generally not merit certiorari review if it is issued without a written opinion or is particularly fact-dependent or fact-specific because it lacks precedential value."). "Appellate courts, however, have found a miscarriage of justice and exercised their certiorari jurisdiction when a decision applies incorrect law and establishes principles of general application binding in subsequent cases." Id. With these standards in mind, we turn to an analysis specific to the facts and argument presented in this petition.
Analysis:
In this case, our analysis of whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law must begin with identifying the legal basis on which the circuit court found that DHSMV's order departed from the essential requirements of law and quashed the order. In its order granting the petition, the circuit court first rightly asserted that statutes must be accorded their plain meaning unless the result is unreasonable or ridiculous. See, e.g., Lee Cty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So. 2d 297, 303 (Fla. 2002). The order also correctly recognized (1) that the statutory language at issue is found in section 322.271(4) and requires that Mr. Chakrin prove that he had remained "drug-free" for five years before the hearing and (2) that the terms "alcohol" or "alcohol-free" are not expressly included in that statute. Additionally, in looking to see what terms are defined in chapter 322, the order noted that the term "narcotic drug" is defined in a way that does not include alcohol within its definition.
The circuit court's order then expressly identified three bases on which DHSMV asserted that the order denying the petition for reinstatement correctly concluded that the consumption of alcohol served as a statutory basis for denial, including (1) that the plain meaning of the word "drug" includes alcohol, (2) that DHSMV policy treats alcohol within the scope of section 322.271(4), and (3) that case law firmly establishes that alcohol is within a category of drug-use that prevents license reinstatement. Although purporting to find these reasons blanketly unpersuasive, it is clear from the separate treatment of each that the circuit court recognized the possible validity of certain portions of DHSMV's argument while ignoring other parts entirely.
See Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Abbey, 745 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (granting a second-tier certiorari petition and quashing an order of the circuit court that quashed a DHSMV order rejecting a petition for license reinstatement based on the consumption of alcohol and examining whether an interpretation of section 322.271's use of the term "drug-free" included alcohol); Walsh, 204 So. 3d at 172 (adopting Abbey because "it reflects the proper interpretation of the statute"); see also Lescher v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 985 So. 2d 1078, 1080 n.2 (Fla. 2008) ("The petitioner had to demonstrate to DHSMV that in the last five years, (1) he had not been arrested for a drug-related offense, (2) had not driven a motor vehicle, (3) had been drug- and alcohol-free, and had completed an approved DUI program. § 322.271(4), Fla. Stat. (1997).").
Specifically, the circuit court recognized that dictionary definitions are a source from which the plain meaning of a word not otherwise defined in a statute may be derived. See, e.g., Shepard v. State, 259 So. 3d 701, 705 (Fla. 2018). To that end, the order quoted the Lexico.com definition of the word "drug" as "a medicine or other substance which has a physiologic effect when ingested or otherwise introduced into the body" and acknowledged that this definition plainly would include alcohol as a substance with a "physiologic effect when ingested." But it then, without elaboration or legal support, concluded that applying this dictionary meaning to the term "drug" in section 322.271(4) could include alcohol but is "clearly too broad" to be the controlling definition because it would also include aspirin and caffeine. See id. at 704 ("[W]hen construing a statute, our ‘task is to ascertain the meaning of the phrases and words used in a provision, not to substitute [the Court's] judgment for that of the Legislature.’ " (second alteration in original) (quoting Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1228 (Fla. 2009) )). In offering only this single definition of the word "drug," the circuit court made no further effort to define the term "drug-free" as actually found in the statute or otherwise examine what the limits of that term might be, instead looking only to the more qualified term "narcotic drug" that is defined in chapter 322 as exclusive of alcohol and extrapolating that alcohol is therefore also not included within the unqualified term "drug" for the purposes of section 322.271. See § 322.02(29).
The circuit court is wholly correct that neither "drug" nor "drug-free" are terms expressly defined in the chapters related to license suspension or reinstatement. This, of course, presumes that the term at issue is not expressly defined by the legislature anywhere in a way that would require examination of other related statutes, although the circuit court also did not further endeavor to determine whether any other related chapters defined the term in a way that might require such examination. See, e.g., State v. Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728, 732 (Fla. 2018) ("[G]iven the question presented in this case and the arguments made, some consideration of [a related statute] is necessary in order to determine whether it creates an ambiguity not otherwise apparent on the face of [the statute at issue]. This is true because ‘[w]here possible, courts must give effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.’ " (third alteration in original)); Abbey, 745 So. 2d at 1025 (noting that alcohol is within the definition of the term "drug-free" for section 440.102(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1997) ). The circuit court's recognition that the statutory definition of the term "narcotic drug" does not include alcohol and that narcotic drugs in statutory context are something different than alcohol for the purposes of the chapter is absolutely true and serves to further establish that the term actually at issue in this matter is not defined by chapter 322. But that recognition bears little weight in the actual analysis of what the legislature's intended use of the more general term "drug" plainly means in the statute when it is not qualified by the word "narcotic." See also § 322.02(2) (defining the term "alcohol" for use in chapter 322), .02(9) (defining the term "controlled substance" for the purposes of the chapter).
Next considering the possibility that DHSMV policy is what defines the term "drug" to include alcohol and that past cases examining this question have deferred to that policy, the circuit court recognized that article V, section 21 of the Florida Constitution was amended as part of the November 2018 package of amendments that passed with the requisite voter approval. Effective in January 2019, a few days before the hearing in this case, this amendment states that "[i]n interpreting a state statute or rule, a state court or an officer hearing an administrative action pursuant to general law may not defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of such statute or rule, and must instead interpret such statute or rule de novo." Art. V, § 21, Fla. Const. Based on this language, the circuit court then reached two conclusions—that "the [c]ourt is no longer required to defer to the Department's interpretation of the word ‘drug,’ and [that it] is not bound by case law relying on such interpretations." Presumably based on this second conclusion, the circuit court made no further attempt to review or even address whether or for what reasons case law had interpreted alcohol use to fall within the scope of section 322.271(4)'s requirement that a petitioner seeking license reinstatement prove he or she has remained "drug-free" for five years before the hearing beyond mere agency deference. The circuit court without further elaboration reached the following conclusion as to why the DHSMV order departed from the essential requirements of law:
To the extent that the circuit court read this amendment as precluding deference to the DHSMV's own interpretation of the scope of the statutory language in derogation of the plain language of the statute itself, although correct, it is important for the purposes of this opinion only to note that the DHSMV's order relied on the statute without indication that its interpretation was based on an official agency expression interpreting that statute or any other administrative rule. Moreover, the cases relevant to this issue have indicated that DHSMV has no formal rule interpreting this statute, Abbey, 745 So. 2d at 1025, and section 322.271(4) ultimately makes the reinstatement of a license a discretionary decision regardless of whether the burdens of proof in section (4)(a) are met.
Instead, the Court presently relies on the definitions provided in Chapter 322, and notes that the word "alcohol" is conspicuously absent from both the definition of "narcotic drug" and the text of subsection (4). Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner's admission during the administrative hearing did not violate the requirement in § 322.271(4)(a) 4. Hearing Officer Felia departed from the essential requirements of law by requiring Petitioner to completely abstain from alcohol for five year[s] prior to the hearing, a requirement that was not part of the statute.
In reaching this conclusion, however, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law in at least two ways. It failed to apply controlling case law of this court that was directly relevant, see Jones, 283 So. 3d at 1264, and it failed to apply the unambiguous language of section 322.271(4), see id. at 1268. Instead, the circuit court rejected as too broad the dictionary definition of the term "drug" that it recognized as plainly including alcohol because the express term "alcohol" is absent from the statutory definition of "narcotic drug" and section 322.271(4). It also silently rejected three cases discussing whether alcohol was included within the statutory term "drug" in chapter 322's license-reinstatement provisions without citation to or discussion of the reasoning or holdings in those cases at all. The rejection of the need to further apply these holdings, particularly the otherwise controlling case from this court in Abbey, was apparently based on its reading the language of the constitutional amendment removing the requirement that courts defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute as also removing the circuit court's duty to follow any case law that interpreted the statute at the time when the agency-deference rule was in effect—something clearly not expressly included within the text of this amendment.
Answering the question of whether the cases that were controlling on this issue prior to the constitutional amendment remained binding after its effective date requires an examination of the role of the circuit court in deciding whether an otherwise on-point case from the district court in which it sits remains as controlling precedent that it must—as the lower tribunal—apply, an examination of the holdings of the cases and what portions of the analysis and holdings within would remain in effect if freed from any reliance on DHSMV's interpretation of the statute, and an examination of the plain language of the statute itself. That this court has previously examined whether alcohol is included within the term "drug-free" within section 322.271 is undisputed. In this instance, it is actually undisputed that two district courts, within similar second-tier certiorari postures, have previously held that alcohol is included within the scope of the requirement to remain drug-free for a five-year period in order to have a license considered for reinstatement pursuant to section 322.271. See Abbey, 745 So. 2d 1024 ; Walsh, 204 So. 3d 169. Moreover, there is no disagreement between the opinion issued by this court and the First District's opinion. "The decisions of the district courts of appeal represent the law of Florida unless and until they are overruled ...." Stanfill v. State, 384 So. 2d 141, 143 (Fla. 1980).
The District Courts of Appeal are required to follow Supreme Court decisions. As an adjunct to this rule it is logical and necessary in order to preserve stability and predictability in the
law that, likewise, trial courts be required to follow the holdings of higher courts—District Courts of Appeal. The proper hierarchy of decisional holdings would demand that in the event the only case on point on a district level is from a district other than the one in which the trial court is located, the trial court be required to follow that decision. Alternatively, if the district court of the district in which the trial court is located has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it.
Nader v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 3d 712, 724 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666–67 (Fla. 1992) ).
The "failure to follow" precedential case law from district courts by the circuit court reviewing the DHSMV decision here is "a profound error, amounting to a clear departure from the essential requirements of law because ‘in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts.’ " See Walsh, 204 So. 3d at 171 (quoting Pardo, 596 So. 2d at 666 ); cf. Powell v. City of Sarasota, 857 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("The circuit court, sitting in an appellate capacity, erred by failing to follow ... binding precedent of this court[ ] when reaching its decision."); Rodriguez v. Palm Beach Cty. Div. of Animal Care & Control, 56 So. 3d 45, 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ("[T]he circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law and applied the wrong law when it failed to abide by this court's precedent."). This is distinguishable from a mere misapplication of the same precedent because "[t]he circuit court did not engage in simple legal error by, for example, applying the correct law incorrectly; rather, it failed to follow binding precedent." See Walsh, 204 So. 3d at 171.
In the face of this precedent, only one of two possible sources might have operated such that the circuit court was not bound to follow Abbey because it was otherwise superseded—the facial statutory language itself or the constitutional amendment that changed the deference courts once gave to the DHSMV's statutory interpretation. See Jones, 283 So. 3d at 1268 (suggesting circumstances where a circuit court's application of otherwise binding precedent that is contrary to the plain language of a statute itself would constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law); cf. Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985) ("No conflicting district court decisions existed on this point of law. This Court had no jurisdiction to review [the prior binding case law] without decisional conflict or some other constitutional basis for review."). However, a close examination of the cases, the statute, and the constitutional amendment here shows that no combination of the statutory language or constitutional amendment created a circumstance that allowed the circuit court, within its limited scope of jurisdiction to review this DHSMV order, to disregard the prior holding of this court in Abbey or the other cases that also supported its original holding. The reasoning is two-fold.
First, the relevant constitutional amendment's language does not speak at all to the precedential value of past cases under standards of agency deference. It merely prohibits the application of that deferential standard when a court with jurisdiction to do so is engaged in such review. While that may beg the question of whether the case law here should be reexamined by a court with authority to do so and possibly overturned or recognized as outdated in light of this amendment, it is not within the jurisdiction or task assigned to a circuit court reviewing an agency order in a petition for writ of certiorari to ignore or overturn otherwise binding precedent of the district court in which it sits. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030 (describing the scope of jurisdiction to review decisions from lower tribunals at each level of Florida courts); cf. Shepard, 259 So. 3d at 707 (reexamining and receding from its own past precedent that too narrowly defined a statutory term and excluded items that would have otherwise fallen within its plain meaning while otherwise recognizing the importance of stare decisis when doing so). The jurisdictional role of receding from Abbey if the statutory language requires it belongs to this court at whatever point such reexamination is properly before us within the scope of the review within a given case, see Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b), or to the Florida Supreme Court, see Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a). But the circuit court's departure in this case has not presented us with that opportunity. And while we recognize that the circuit court here was faced with an intervening constitutional amendment that could, under proper circumstances, be the catalyst for this court to reexamine its prior opinion, the circuit court was bound to apply the precedent of this court and the language of the statute here and could not simply ignore Abbey and substitute its own statutory interpretation solely on the basis of the constitutional amendment. See, e.g., Nader, 87 So. 3d at 725 ("[W]e note that there is presently an important difference between the review of administrative proceedings, which proceed directly to the circuit court, and the review of county court proceedings, which can be either appealed to the circuit court or heard by the district court through certified question. In the latter situation, the appellate rules expressly provide for a means by which the county court can certify a question to be of great public importance to the district court, thus providing a method by which the county court can receive a ruling on whether precedent ... controls. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(4)(A) ; Fla. R. App. P. 9.160.... The option of certification of a question to the district court is not presently available, either by rule or statute, for a circuit court hearing an appeal of an administrative decision.").
We recognize that the recent and substantial changes in the process for appellate review by a circuit court and the inevitable procedural rule changes that will follow might provide an avenue by which the apparent gap recognized in Nader (to address what a circuit court reviewing an agency order through a petition for writ of certiorari might do in order to have a question such as the effect of a constitutional amendment on older, binding case law answered) might be filled. But doing so is not within the scope of this opinion, and we reach no conclusion on this matter.
Additionally, although Abbey certainly discusses the application of the old deferential standard to the DHSMV decision in that case, a close reading of Abbey indicates that standard was not the sole basis of its holding. 745 So. 2d 1024. In other words, even if the circuit court was mandated by the constitutional amendment to disregard Abbey's reasoning related to the deferential standard or empowered by the rules of appellate procedure to declare invalid that portion of Abbey within the scope of its certiorari review, Abbey's ultimate holding remains intact apart from its acknowledgment and application of the standard addressed in the constitutional amendment. This is because Abbey did not hold that DHSMV's inclusion of alcohol among the substance-use that precludes a license reinstatement was a reasonable one, it held that in view of related statutes and legislative intent, it was the only reasonable interpretation. Abbey, 745 So. 2d at 1025 ("The Department is interpreting section 322.271(4) to require abstinence from the same mind-altering substances, i.e. drugs, that can result in an arrest for DUI. In the context of these statutes, any other interpretation would be unreasonable."); see also Walsh, 204 So. 3d at 172 ("Unlike the trial court, we are not required to adopt the Second District's decision in Abbey, but we do so because it reflects the proper interpretation of the statute. To hold that ‘drug-free’ excludes alcohol would ignore the common understanding that alcohol is a drug, the deference due to the Department's reasonable interpretation of the broad phrase ‘drug-free,’ and the Legislature's intent, as clearly expressed in the statute."). This was something the circuit court never addressed because it failed to ever examine, apply, or distinguish the reasoning of Abbey as compared to the statutory language within its review at all. That failure constituted a classic departure from the essential requirements of law.
We are left then with the second consideration—the question of whether the case law that the circuit court was otherwise bound to apply was in such conflict with the plain language of the statute itself, which both Abbey and Walsh clearly purport to uphold for reasons beyond mere deference to DHSMV interpretation, that the circuit court did not depart from the essential requirements of law by ignoring the binding precedent of its district court because it applied the plain statutory language instead. See Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Nader, 4 So. 3d 705, 711 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ("We conclude that a district court is authorized to find clearly established law on the face of a statute even when another district court has interpreted the statute to require a different outcome in a published opinion. Moreover, a district court is then authorized to grant certiorari relief and quash a circuit court decision that obeyed the controlling precedent and disobeyed the plain language of the statute."), approved, 87 So. 3d 712 (Fla. 2012). The circuit court here was faced with binding precedent from its own district rather than another district court like Nader, which may further the distinction. But regardless, the circuit court never actually completely examined the plain language of the statute in this way, although its order purported to do so by analyzing the plain statutory language without regard to agency deference or the prior opinions having done so. Nor did anything it concluded about that statutory language conflict with the examination of the same language in Abbey or Walsh.
Because we do not fully reconsider the holding of Abbey within the limited scope of this second-tier certiorari opinion, it is not necessary to this determination to engage in a full parsing of the plain language of this statute to resolve the question of whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by both ignoring controlling case law and otherwise failing to engage in a full analysis of the statutory language to reach its conclusion that the language itself is in conflict with the binding precedent. Nothing in this opinion should be read, however, as a suggestion that an extensive reexamination of the reasoning of the current case law or a full and complete analysis of the plain language of section 322.271 should never be undertaken if it reaches this court in the right posture to best facilitate such review. Nevertheless, we note that the mere expansiveness of a dictionary definition of the word "drug" does not, as the circuit court order suggests, make that definition too broad to ignore the plain meaning of the statutory language, and it is not—alone—a sufficient basis to reject the scope of the actual language the legislature enacted. In fact, the circuit court's only reasoning offered to explain why that dictionary definition is too broad is that in addition to alcohol, its scope could include the common use of aspirin or caffeine, something both Abbey and Walsh rejected outright based on the chapter 322 and other related statutory uses of the term "drug-free." Moreover, a careful reading of the complete definitions of all the words involved in the statutory language at issue shows why the common use of substances like caffeine or aspirin are not plainly included within the scope of the definition on which the circuit court relied in a way that does not also exclude alcohol.
We use the definitions from Lexico.com and Dictionary.com here solely because that was the source of definition selected by the circuit court, and it therefore serves to highlight why even a complete examination of the circuit court's own choice of dictionary sources might not result in an exclusion of alcohol from the statutory language "drug-free" simply because the definition might then also include common legal substances like aspirin and caffeine.
First, it is imperative to recognize that the statutory term "drug-free" is a compound word, with a definition that is different than mere reliance on the definition of one of its component words—"drug." "-Free," when recognized as "a combining form" as used in this statute, is defined as "a combining form with the general sense ‘free of or from something specified,’ and typically meaning ‘not having, containing, subject to, or affected by something unwanted, burdensome, etc.’ " See -Free , Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/-free (last visited July 17, 2020). Together with the definition of the word "drug" relied on by the circuit court, the term "drug-free" as actually used in section 322.271 is therefore defined as "free of or from" "a medicine or other substance which has a physiologic effect when ingested or otherwise introduced into the body," and typically means "not having, containing, subject to, or affected by" "a medicine or other substance which has a physiologic effect when ingested or otherwise introduced into the body" that is "unwanted, burdensome, etc." See id.; Drug , Lexico.com, https://www.lexico.com/definition/drug (last visited July 17, 2020). Thus, while the term "drug" alone may also include aspirin (a medicine) used to restore a body to pain-free condition or treat a medical issue or caffeine (another substance) contained in a morning cup of coffee, the examination of the term "drug-free" as used in this statute is more limited to ingested substances that are of a burdensome effect on the body. This is further supported by a recognition that the term "physiologic effect" speaks to effects on the normal functioning of the body rather than any physical effect on the body at all. See Physiological , Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/physiologic (defining the adjectival form "physiological" as "consistent with the normal functioning of an organism") (last visited July 17, 2020). And it is consistent with the legislature's use of the broader term "drug" rather than the more limited term "narcotic drug" that it used in other parts of the chapter.
It is not hard then to see that an inclusion of alcohol within the term "drug" in section 322.271 can rest easily within the plain meaning of the term "drug-free" and accomplish the legislature's stated intent within chapter 322, see § 322.42, without also broadly preventing a person from choosing between over-the-counter medical treatment with aspirin or reinstatement of a license, and the plain language of the term then also remains entirely consistent with the statements of both Abbey and Walsh that common sense precludes the denial of a license reinstatement based on ingestion of an aspirin. Nor was it the role of the circuit court here to substitute its arbitrary conclusion that the dictionary definition it selected could not be used to reach the plain meaning of the term simply because it was a potentially broad one. Cf. Shepard, 259 So. 3d at 707. The circuit court therefore also departed from the essential requirements of law in its attempt to examine the statutory language apart from Abbey. See Jones, 283 So. 3d at 1268.
Conclusion:
Coupled with section 322.271(4)'s directive that the hearing officer has the discretion to reinstate the license, it is clear that the circuit court's order quashing the DHSMV order by ignoring Abbey, failing to otherwise show why Abbey must be rejected on the face of the statutory language, and requiring the license be reinstated was a departure from the essential requirements of law. In this instance, and for the reasons clearly expressed in Walsh, the departure here also constituted a manifest injustice both by requiring a license reinstatement and by ignoring binding case precedent and statutory language in quashing the DHSMV order. See Walsh, 204 So. 3d at 172-73. For the foregoing reasons, we therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order of the circuit court.
Petition granted; order quashed.
KELLY and BLACK, JJ., Concur.