Opinion
Case No. 01-1460-CIV-MORENO
April 30, 2001
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, the former Clinical Director of the Federal Detention Center in Miami, alleges that she was demoted and transferred to rural Georgia for engaging in speech that was of public concern and protected by the First Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that the demotion and transfer violate her First and Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection) rights, as well as violate the Family Medical Leave Act.
The Court is troubled by the allegations that a prison doctor might be penalized for truthfully providing information as a physician inconsistent with the desire of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. However, Congress has provided a method for such federal employees to redress their grievances. Therefore, the case is DISMISSED.
Defendant's motion to dismiss raises the succinct issue of whether a federal employee's exclusive remedy for alleged constitutional and statutory violations is the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA"). 5 U.S.C. § 2392, et seq. if answered affirmatively, Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue and determined that the government's comprehensive statutory scheme in the CSRA provides the exclusive mode for federal employees to redress alleged employment grievances, including constitutional violations. The Court phrased the query as follows:
The one distinguishing factor between Bush and the present case is that Plaintiff here does not seek monetary damages.
The question is not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue.Id. at 388; see Lee v. Hughs, 145 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1998). In ruling that the CSRA was the exclusive means for federal employees to seek redress, the Supreme Court reasoned that "Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service" Bush, 462 U.S. at 389.
Plaintiffs opposition to the instant motion contends that only in federal court will her constitutional and statutory rights be vindicated. Plaintiff highlights the fact that the Merit Service Protection Board ("MSPB") does not have the authority to order injunctive relief to stay her transfer, as well as the fact that the MSPB dismissed Plaintiffs administrative claim for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff also argues that this case is somehow different than Bush and Eleventh Circuit precedent that follows Bush because Plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief, not monetary damages.
Defendant contests Plaintiff's assertion that her rights will not be vindicated through the CSRA. Defendant directs the Court's attention to the Office of Special Counsel ("OSC"), which has the authority to seek a stay of her transfer before the MSPB. The employee may appeal an adverse ruling to the Federal Circuit. In any event, the availability of injunctive relief for Plaintiffs claims is not case determinative within the CSRA context. See Lee, 145 F.3d at 1275 (holding that the CSRA is the exclusive mechanism for the plaintiffs grievances, "notwithstanding the fact that the CSRA does not provide administrative or judicial review" for plaintiffs grievances).
Plaintiff filed on Friday, April 27, 2001, a Notice confirming an oral declination of a stay by the OSC of the adverse employment action at issue in this lawsuit. be entitled to seek redress through the OSC. Congress enacted "an elaborate remedial scheme" for instances such as Plaintiffs current claims for injunctive relief. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388 see also Stevens, 901 F.2d at 1576 (holding that "[t]he CSRA provides adequate remedial mechanisms."). This Court will not usurp the legislature's inherent power to enact a remedial system to resolve disputes involving federal employees.
Furthermore, Defendant acknowledges a circuit split with respect to the issue of whether a federal employee who seeks injunctive relief is precluded by the CSRA from initiating a lawsuit in federal court. Paige v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 40, 44 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing circuit split). But Defendant highlights that the Eleventh Circuit has taken the approach that the CSRA is the exclusive means for a federal employee seeking injunctive and/or monetary relief to redress alleged constitutional and statutory violations. See Stevens v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1990); Hallock v. Moses, 731 F.2d 754 (11th Cir. 1984). While the Court recognizes that the plaintiffs in Stevens and Hallock sought both injunctive and monetary relief, the Court finds that there is no rationale to deviate from the Eleventh Circuit precedent, as well as Bush, merely because Plaintiff does not seek monetary damages.
At bottom, Plaintiff is able to seek redress for her alleged grievances through the CSRA, which provides the exclusive means for resolving federal employment disputes. The fact that the MSPB dismissed Plaintiffs grievance claim for lack of jurisdiction does not impact the Court's holding. Plaintiff may file an appeal of that decision with the Federal Circuit. Also, Plaintiff may be entitled to seek redress through the OSG. Congress enacted "an elaborate remedial scheme" for
WHEREFORE, it is
ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (D.E. No. 17), filed on April 17, 2001, is GRANTED. The entire complaint is dismissed.