Opinion
CIVIL ACTION CAUSE NUMBER 3:99-CV-160-J
September 13, 2001
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is a pro se civil rights case arising from Plaintiff's arrest and subsequent criminal conviction for evading arrest. Plaintiff and Defendants Barber, Elliott, Neal, Vaughn, Knapp and Settlemeyer have moved for summary judgment on all claims. Defendants' summary judgment motion is granted.
Facts
Plaintiff Dean brings this pro se civil right suit alleging Fourth Amendment violations arising out of her January 27, 1997, arrest by officers of the Midlothian Police Department and her subsequent prosecution and final conviction for evading arrest. Plaintiff was driving a dealer's car without a registration sticker. She was spotted by Defendant Barber, a City of Midlothian policeman, who noticed that her vehicle had no registration sticker. Barber turned around in pursuit. Upon approaching Barber also noticed the auto had no license plates.
Plaintiff noticed that she was being followed by a police car with lights flashing. She chose not to pull over or stop. Plaintiff admittedly continued to travel approximately eight (8) miles after first seeing Barber following her with his overhead lights activated. When a second police car appeared she decided she should pull over and see what the policemen wanted. Upon stopping Plaintiff was arrested by Officer Barber for evading arrest and detention by refusing a lawful order to stop her car.
The local County/District Attorney's Office obtained an indictment upon information of Plaintiff, prosecuted her at trial, obtained a Class B misdemeanor conviction, and successfully defended that conviction upon appeal. Her conviction is now final.
Orders granting the prosecutors and judges' motions to dismiss on the basis of immunity have been entered. The only remaining Defendants are Midlothian peace officers who made the arrest and/or appeared at the scene of the arrest, officers who were involved with booking Plaintiff into jail for a short (less than 10 hours) incarceration period, and the Midlothian Chief of Police.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants participated in a conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights. She seeks money damages for unlawful arrest and seizure, excessive force (her hands being handcuffed behind her back by Officer Barber with no show of resistence by Plaintiff), unlawful search and seizure of her car by officers, false imprisonment in city jail until the police obtained proof of her having secured a criminal appearance bond, allegedly unconstitutional fingerprinting and making a "mug shot" photograph, and malicious prosecution and harassment, all in violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures without a warrant.
Summary Judgment Standards
The Court may terminate litigation by rendering a summary judgement where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (initial burden is on movant to show entitlement to summary judgment with competent evidence). A material fact issue is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The substantive law governing the case will identify which facts are material. Id., 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The party opposing judgment must point the Court to "specific facts with sufficient particularity to meet all the elements necessary to lay a foundation for recovery, including those necessary to negate the defense" offered by movant. Brown v. Texas AM University, 804 F.2d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 1986).
Accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The nonmoving party must designate specific facts showing there exists a genuine issue of material fact on those elements sought to be negated by the movant.Ibid.
Discussion and Analysis
Plaintiff's claims center on her contention that Officer Barber did not have probable cause to stop her as she legally traveled down a Texas roadway. She alleges that she had dealer's tags on the seat next to her, that pursuant to the Texas Transportation Code and state vehicle laws her dealer-owned auto was exempt from vehicle registration requirements, and that the vehicle she was driving was not required to display current windshield registration tags or current license plate stickers. She asserts that Code §§ 503.061 "fails to mandate the application of insignias on dealer plates." Plaintiff contends that absent probable cause to stop, her warrantless arrest, incarceration, booking, and conviction were all unconstitutional.Defendants contend that Barber had probable cause to stop and arrest Plaintiff for evading detention because for eight miles she willfully refused to pull over after admittedly seeing Barber's patrol car with overhead lights flashing. Defendants point out that her arrest led to a misdemeanor conviction, which is now final and has not been expunged or declared invalid. Defendants further assert that they are entitled to immunity from this suit because all actions complained of were acts undertaken in their capacity as peace officers.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, Texas, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense such as a misdemeanor violation punishable only by a fine. Plaintiff warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor violation does not, under Atwater, make out a constitutional violation because the "Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit police officers' authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses." Id., 121 S.Ct. at 1543. Therefore Plaintiff's arrest, handcuffing, subsequent booking, and brief incarceration for a misdemeanor committed in the presence of the arresting officer were not unconstitutional.
Plaintiff's arrest led to a final conviction that has affirmed and not been overturned on appeal. Dean v. State, 995 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, review denied). The fact that her conviction has not been expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or set aside pursuant to a habeas corpus proceeding further bars Plaintiff's claims for false arrest, false imprisonment and improper conviction. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In the alternative and even if these claims were not barred byHeck, malicious prosecution is actionable under federal law only if it deprives a plaintiff of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Id. at 370. To succeed on her malicious prosecution suit, Dean must show that she was exposed to an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (finding that federal malicious prosecutions claims cannot be grounded in substantive due process); Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that the federal right to be free from malicious prosecution rests solely in the Fourth Amendment afterAlbright). Because Barber had probable cause to arrest Dean for refusing to stop, her arrest and detention were valid. Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d at 369-70 (citing Nesmith v. Taylor, 715 F.2d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding no Fourth Amendment deprivation of liberty or consequent deprivation of a constitutional right when the plaintiff was under a legitimate compulsion to make a court appearance based on a violation)). Because she has failed to establish an independent Fourth Amendment violation, Barber and the other officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim. Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d at 369-70.
In Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2001), the Fifth Circuit further ruled that where arresting officers did not violate the constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause, they are entitled to qualified immunity on false arrest claims. Id. at 369. If they are entitled to immunity for the arrest, they are entitled to immunity for handcuffing Plaintiff's hands behind her back, for fingerprinting her, for taking her mug shot, for holding her until they received proof that her criminal bond had been secured, and for the Police Chief refusing to stop the arrest, the booking, or not making the criminal charges go away.
Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendant used excessive force in handcuffing her. She alleges that the handcuffing was itself excessive force because she was surrounded by men and offered no physical resistence to being arrested.
Plaintiff can not prevail on her federal constitutional causes of action related to the alleged actions or inactions by these Defendants in so far as her arrest, handcuffing, booking, indictment, and subsequent criminal trial and conviction, or for failing to drop or halt any of those criminal proceedings, or related to Plaintiff's unsuccessful appeal of her conviction.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
Plaintiff's amended motion for summary judgment is denied.
Judgment will be entered in accordance with this opinion and order.
It is SO ORDERED.