Opinion
C/A No. 8:21-cv-00315-RMG-KFM
03-30-2021
Derrick Jerome Davis, Plaintiff, v. Anna Sumner, David Stumbo, Kay Williams, Donald B. Hocker, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Constitutional rights (doc. 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's case was entered on the docket on February 1, 2021 (doc. 1). By order dated February 24, 2021, the plaintiff was informed that his case was not in proper form for review and instructed to complete certain paperwork to bring his case into proper form (doc. 7). The plaintiff complied with the court's order, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. Having reviewed the plaintiff's complaint, the undersigned recommends it be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Greenwood County Detention Center ("the Detention Center"), brings this action alleging violations of his constitutional rights by the defendants (doc. 1). As an initial matter, the court takes judicial notice of the plaintiff's pending criminal charges in the Greenwood County General Sessions Court. See Greenwood County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenwood/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2018A2420100432, 2018A2420100612, 2018A2420100676) (last visited March 30, 2021).
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record."); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that '[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'").
The plaintiff contends that the defendants have violated his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights (doc. 1 at 4). The plaintiff alleges that Det. Williams testified at a bond hearing before Judge Miller and prevented the plaintiff from being released on bond (id. at 4-5, 7-9). Assistant Solicitor Sumner also recommended that the plaintiff's bond request be denied during that hearing (and a later bond hearing) (id. at 5, 7-9). Solicitor Stumbo is Sumner's supervisor and instructed her to prevent the plaintiff from being released on bond (id. at 6, 8-9). Judge Hocker also allegedly violated the plaintiff's rights by denying his bond request (id. at 6, 8-9).
The plaintiff alleges that he is constitutionally entitled to bail and that the refusal by the defendants to grant him bail means he has been kidnapped (id. at 9-10). His Fourth Amendment rights have been violated because he has been "seized" and kept in jail unconstitutionally, his Fifth Amendment right to due process has been violated, his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated because he can't work on his defense while incarcerated, his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because he is being held on excessive bail (because being denied bond is an excessive bail), his Thirteenth Amendment rights have been violated because being kept in jail as if he has been convicted is a form of slavery, and his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights have been violated because he is being treated differently than other pretrial detainees who have been granted a bond (id. at 10-12).
For injuries, the plaintiff alleges emotional distress (id. at 14). The plaintiff seeks money damages as well as a declaratory judgement that the plaintiff be provided a reasonable bond by the state court and released from the Detention Center (id. at 14-15).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. For the reasons that follow, the instant matter is subject to summary dismissal. Younger Abstention
With respect to the plaintiff's assertion that the defendants have violated his rights in his pending state criminal prosecution, seeking an order from this court requiring that the state court release the plaintiff on bond, the plaintiff is requesting that this court interfere with or enjoin the pending state criminal prosecution against him (see generally doc. 1). As noted above, the plaintiff has several pending charges in the Greenwood County General Sessions Court, including: two counts of criminal sexual conduct with a minor (case numbers 2018A2420100432 and 2018A2420100612) and one count of incest (case number 2018A2420100676). See Greenwood County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2018A2420100432, 2018A2420100612, 2018A2420100676) (last visited March 30, 2021). Because a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this court should abstain from interfering with it. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Here, the first criterion is met, as the plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. As for the second criterion, the Supreme Court has stated that the "States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting "'that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'" Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Here, the plaintiff has the opportunity to argue his entitlement to bond in the South Carolina state court. Indeed, the plaintiff has not made a showing of "extraordinary circumstances" justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) ("A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where 'extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm."). Therefore, to the extent the plaintiff seeks an order from this court instructing the state court to grant him bond, this court should abstain from hearing this action.
As for the plaintiff's damages claims, federal courts typically stay rather than dismiss claims for money damages during the pendency of the state court proceedings. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988). Nevertheless, dismissal rather than a stay is appropriate when the plaintiff's damages claims are "plainly barred" for other reasons. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 248-50 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, as set forth in detail below, the plaintiff's claims, as presented, are barred for other reasons; thus, they are subject to summary dismissal.
The plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief
As noted above, the court should abstain from the plaintiff's claims for relief based upon Younger. Nevertheless, even on the merits, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Release from Custody Request
As an initial matter, the plaintiff may not seek release from custody in a § 1983 action. Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, § 1983. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004); see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, (1973) (an application seeking release from custody is an application for habeas corpus and is not an available remedy under the Civil Rights Act). "Habeas corpus, and not § 1983, is the exclusive federal remedy for state prisoners seeking actual release from confinement," Griffin v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 804 F.3d 692, 694-95 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. 475, 487-90), and "requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action," Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750. Here, as noted, the plaintiff seeks pretrial release from the Detention Center (doc. 1 at 15); however, release from the Detention Center is not available in this civil rights action. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (noting that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983"). Additionally, the Supreme Court has recently explained that "the pragmatic considerations discussed in Heck apply generally to civil suits within the domain of habeas corpus, not only to those that challenge convictions." McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2158 (2019). As such, "[t]he proper approach in our federal system generally is for a criminal defendant who believes that the criminal proceedings against him rest on knowingly fabricated evidence to defend himself at trial and, if necessary, then to attack any resulting conviction through collateral review proceedings." Id. at 2159.
Nevertheless, to the extent the plaintiff also seeks monetary relief based upon his alleged unlawful pretrial confinement, his claim is barred by Heck. In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the Constitution, the imprisonment must first be successfully challenged. The Court stated:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted); see also Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (the preclusive rule of Heck extended to § 1983 claims challenging procedural deficiencies which necessarily imply the invalidity of the judgment). This is known as the "favorable termination" requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). As acknowledged by the plaintiff, he has not even got to trial on his pending criminal charges - much less been convicted (doc. 1 at 4). As such, the plaintiff cannot show that his conviction or sentence has been invalidated or called into question. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see Roberts v. Lewis, C/A No. 2:17-cv-00177-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 1148594, at *5-6 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1134717 (D.S.C. Mar. 24, 2017). Thus, the plaintiff's claims regarding his pretrial detention are barred by Heck.
Named Defendants
Even aside from Heck, the defendants named in this action are subject to summary dismissal, as outlined below.
Anna Sumner and David Stumbo
The plaintiff's claims against Assistant Solicitor Sumner and Solicitor Stumbo, the prosecutor assigned to the plaintiff's pending state criminal case and her supervisor, are subject to dismissal because they are entitled to prosecutorial immunity. The crux of the plaintiff's claims against Sumner and Stumbo is that during the plaintiff's bond hearing(s) Sumner requested that his bond request be denied and she was following the instructions of Stumbo (doc. 1 at 5-6, 8-13). However, prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings such as criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial motions hearings. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 267-71 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff's bare allegations alone are insufficient to overcome the immunity afforded to Sumner and Stumbo, so his claims against them are subject to summary dismissal.
Judge Hocker
The plaintiff alleges that Judge Hocker has erred in his handling of the plaintiff's bond motion(s) (doc. 1 at 6, 8-13). It is well-settled that judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions unless they acted in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-64 (1978); see also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (explaining that if a challenged judicial act was unauthorized by law, the judge still has immunity from a suit seeking damages). Whether an act is judicial or non-judicial relates to the nature of the act, such as whether it is a function normally performed by a judge and whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. Immunity applies even when the judge's acts were in error, malicious, or in excess of his authority. Id. at 12-13. Absolute immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The allegations as to Judge Hocker concern his judicial actions; as such, judicial immunity squarely applies and he should be dismissed.
Detective Kay Williams
The plaintiff's claims against Det. Williams are subject to dismissal because Det. Williams is entitled to witness immunity. The plaintiff's claims against Det. Williams all involve Det. Williams' testimony at the plaintiff's bond hearing(s) (doc. 1 at 8-13). However, witnesses have absolute immunity from civil liability for testifying in judicial matters - referred to as Witness Litigation Privilege. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983); see Day v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corp., 907 F.3d 766, 771-73 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing Briscoe and noting that the "law affords absolute immunity to those persons who aid the truth-seeking mission of the judicial system. This protection extends to judges, prosecutors and witnesses"). The plaintiff's bare allegations alone are insufficient to overcome the immunity afforded to Det. Williams as a witness, so his claims against her are subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his complaint. See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, 807 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2015); In re GNC Corp., 789 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2015); Chao v. Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2005); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993)). As noted in more detail above, even absent Younger/Heck, the named defendants are subject to dismissal based upon prosecutorial, judicial, and witness immunity. Thus, the undersigned recommends that the court decline to automatically give the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge March 30, 2021
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).