No. 14-10-00663-CR
Opinion filed August 16, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 15 Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1657631.
Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, BROWN, and CHRISTOPHER.
JEFFREY V. BROWN, Justice.
Appellant Joseph B. Davis was charged with second-offender driving while intoxicated (DWI). Davis pleaded "guilty" after the trial court denied his pre-trial motion to suppress, and the trial court sentenced him to two years' probation. In his lone issue on appeal, Davis exercises his right to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress. We affirm.
I
Randy Twedt was driving on Loop 610 in Houston around 9:45 p.m. on January 29, 2011. As Twedt prepared to take an exit ramp to Highway 288, a black SUV swerved into his lane, forcing him onto the shoulder lane. The SUV continued to swerve into Twedt's driving lane, and at one point nearly collided with a guardrail. Twedt called 911 from his cell phone and followed the SUV as it exited onto Highway 288. Twedt relayed a description of the SUV and its license plate number to the dispatcher and also gave his name and phone number. While on the phone with the dispatcher, Twedt pulled over on Highway 288 and observed the SUV exit the highway and stop at a convenience store on the service road at Yellowstone Street. While the SUV was stopped at the convenience store, Twedt provided the dispatcher with the location of the SUV but noted that he never saw the driver. Twedt also testified that while he was pulled over, he spoke to an unidentified police officer on the phone. Twedt testified that he resumed driving a few minutes after the dispatcher informed him that an officer was on the way to the convenience store. The dispatcher later called Twedt back and requested he return to the scene. Twedt told the dispatcher he was on the other side of town and was available if required, but the dispatcher eventually told him he was no longer needed and Twedt never returned. The Houston Police Department dispatched Officer Veronica Salmeron to investigate Twedt's complaint. Dispatch informed Officer Salmeron that a citizen had reported a black SUV with license plate number 005-RTV driving aggressively and swerving in and out of driving lanes, and that the SUV reportedly was parked at the convenience store on the service road of Highway 288 at Yellowstone Street. When she arrived at the location, Officer Salmeron spotted a vehicle matching the description given by Twedt pulling out of the convenience store. Officer Salmeron stopped the vehicle before it could leave the parking lot. Officer Salmeron testified Davis was alone in the SUV and that he smelled of alcohol, slurred his speech, and had glassy, red eyes. Suspecting that Davis was under the influence of alcohol, Officer Salmeron detained Davis in her patrol car and called a DWI task force to administer field sobriety testing, after which Davis was arrested for DWI. Davis filed a motion to suppress with the trial court, arguing Officer Salmeron lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, and therefore all tangible evidence and statements obtained from his detention should be suppressed. The trial court denied Davis's motion to suppress, finding that Twedt's information was both credible and specific, and therefore supported a reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Davis. Davis pleaded "guilty" after the trial court denied his motion to suppress but exercised his right to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress. II A
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts, while reviewing de novo mixed questions of law and fact not turning on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. State v. Garcia, 25 S.W.3d 908, 911 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). In this case, whether Officer Salmeron was justified in stopping Davis does not turn on demeanor and credibility; rather, the issue turns on the legal significance of the facts recounted by the witnesses. See Derichsweiler v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. PD-0176-10, 2011 WL 255299, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2011). Therefore, we review the trial court's ruling de novo and determine whether there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain Davis. B
Police officers may stop and briefly detain persons suspected of criminal activity on less information than is required for probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) ("It is clear that circumstances short of probable cause may justify temporary detention for purposes of investigation."). The reasonableness of a temporary detention must be examined in terms of the totality of the circumstances and will be justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead her to conclude that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). These specific, articulable facts must amount to more than a mere hunch or suspicion. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (quoting Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558). The detaining officer must point to something that would lead a reasonable person to believe the person being detained was engaged in a criminal act. Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). The existence of reasonable suspicion is an objective standard; the subjective intent of the officer conducting the stop is irrelevant. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). An anonymous tip alone will rarely establish the level of reasonable suspicion required to justify a detention. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990). However, a tip from an informant exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a detention when the informant has placed himself in a position to be easily identified and held responsible for the information provided. See Hawes v. State, 125 S.W.3d 535, 539-40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Several courts have upheld investigative stops based solely on unsolicited reports from private citizens. See State v. Fudge, 42 S.W.3d 226, 232 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.) (upholding detention based solely on cab driver's unsolicited personal report to officer about erratic driving); State v. Garcia, 25 S.W.3d 908, 913 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding reasonable suspicion existed when individual "flagged down" officer in parking lot and personally reported incident, even though informant later left scene without identifying himself); State v. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d 336, 342-43 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (holding that traffic stop was justified based on tip from informant who witnessed erratic driving, called police on cell phone, followed vehicle, and waited at scene while stop was made); State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd) (upholding stop based on a report personally given to officer even though informant drove away before being identified). III
In his sole issue on appeal, Davis argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Salmeron lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Davis. Specifically, Davis asserts that Officer Salmeron did not observe Davis driving recklessly and therefore could not corroborate Twedt's statements to the 911 dispatcher. Davis further contends there is no evidence he was driving the SUV when Twedt called 911. Lastly, Davis contends Officer Salmeron acted on unreliable information because she had no detailed description of wrongdoing or knowledge of whether the citizen caller had put himself in a position to be held accountable for his intervention. It is undisputed that Officer Salmeron did not personally observe Davis's reportedly reckless driving. But reasonable suspicion need not arise from the officer's personal observation; it may be supplied by information from another person. Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, it was not necessary for Officer Salmeron to personally observe Davis driving recklessly. See, e.g., Hime v. State, 998 S.W.2d 893, 895-96 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). An officer's subsequent corroboration of information received from an informant may increase the reliability of the information. Stolte, 991 S.W.2d at 341. However, "corroboration" in this sense does not mean the officer must personally observe the conduct that causes him to reasonably suspect a crime is being, has been, or is about to be committed. Id. Rather, corroboration refers to whether the police officer, in light of the circumstances, confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude the information given to him is reliable and a temporary detention is thus justified. Id. Where the reliability of the information is increased, less corroboration is necessary. See White, 496 U.S. at 330. A detailed description of the wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles an informant's tip to greater weight. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983). A tip also deserves greater weight if the person put himself in a position to be held accountable for his intervention. See Garcia, 25 S.W.3d at 913. Also, a person who is not connected with the police or who is not a paid informant is considered inherently trustworthy when he advises the police he suspects criminal activity has occurred or is occurring. Id. Here, Twedt provided the dispatcher with the location of Davis's SUV from Loop 610 until Davis parked at the convenience store. Twedt gave specific accounts of Davis's reckless driving, as well as a detailed description of the SUV and its license plate number. Twedt further provided the dispatcher with his name and phone number and testified he told the dispatcher he could report to the scene if necessary. Considering these facts together, Twedt's tip had a high indicia of reliability because he called the police to give information about a crime under circumstances that would render him accountable for his intervention. See, e.g., Hime, 998 S.W.2d at 895-96 (finding informant reliable because she provided police with her name and gave detailed description of vehicle and wrongdoing); Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 257 (holding that reasonable suspicion need not arise from the officer's personal observation, but may be supplied by information acquired from another person); Stolte, 991 S.W.2d at 341 (holding that corroboration by an officer of any information relayed by the informant may increase the reliability of the information). Although Officer Salmeron did not witness Davis's reckless driving, she was able to corroborate other facts from Twedt's tip, including a description of the SUV, its license plate number, and its location at the convenience store. See id. Given the high indicia of reliability presented by Twedt's tip, we conclude Officer Salmeron corroborated enough of the information provided by Twedt to give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Davis. See Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 259-60; Garcia, 25 S.W.3d at 913. And although Davis argues Officer Salmeron did not have a detailed description of Davis's wrongdoing or knowledge of whether Twedt put himself in a position to be identified, Officer Salmeron testified she knew that Twedt had followed Davis to his present location and remained in contact with the 911 dispatcher until she arrived at the convenience store. Moreover, to the extent Officer Salmeron was unaware of the extent to which Twedt put himself in a position to be held accountable to the information he provided authorities, the dispatcher's knowledge may be imputed to Officer Salmeron. See Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (holding that the cumulative information known to the cooperating officers at the time of the stop is to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists). Furthermore, Davis's contention that there is no evidence he was the driver of the vehicle while Twedt observed the reckless driving is of no effect. Regardless of whether Davis was the same driver Twedt observed, Officer Salmeron nonetheless had the reasonable suspicion necessary initially to stop Davis's vehicle, after which it became clear to Officer Salmeron that Davis displayed signs of intoxication regardless of whether he was the driver Twedt observed. We conclude the information reported by Twedt had a high indicia of reliability and that Officer Salmeron's corroboration of Twedt's information generated the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Davis. See Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38. We overrule Davis's sole point of error. ***
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's decision.