Summary
dismissing ADA claim where "[plaintiff] fails to detail how his disability substantially limits a major life activity"
Summary of this case from Gill v. Phx. Energy Mgmt., Inc.Opinion
Case No. 02-CR-4231 (FB)(LB)
April 9, 2003
KERRY DAVIE, New York, NY, for the Plaintiff
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, Esq., NY, for the Defendant
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Kerry Davie ("Davie") brings this action claiming that defendant New York City Transit Authority's ("NYCTA") decision not to reinstate him violated Title VH of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). In his complaint, Davie seeks "such relief as may be appropriate, including injunctive orders, damages, costs and attorney's fees." Compl. at 5. The NYCTA moves to dismiss Davie's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted, but Davie is granted leave to amend.
I
Attached to Davie's complaint are, inter alia, an order from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and the NYCTA's answer in an Article 78 proceeding brought by Davie in New York State Supreme Court. The NYCTA has provided the Court with full sets of documents from these EEOC and Article 78 proceedings, including Davie's filings with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"), which were identical to his EEOC grievance. These documents are public, neither their existence nor their contents are in dispute, and Davie had actual notice of them. Accordingly, the documents provided by the NYCTA are appropriate for consideration on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (when adjudicating a motion to dismiss, court may consider "documents that the plaintiffs either possessed or knew about and upon which they relied in bringing the suit."); San Leandro Emergency Med. Plan v. Philip Morris, 75 F.3d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that, on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, court can consider full text of document partially quoted in complaint) International Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Amer. Telephone and Telegraph, 62 F.3d 69, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that, on Rule 12(b)(6) motion, court can consider document integral to complaint that plaintiff chose not to attach or incorporate by reference, without converting motion to one for summary judgment); I. Meyer Pincus Assoc., P.C. v. Oppenheimer Co., Inc., 936 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991) ("We . . . decline to close our eyes" and permit "a plaintiff to evade" a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "simply because plaintiff has chosen not to attach . . . or incorporate by reference" a pertinent document).
The following facts are culled from Davie's complaint and the documents referenced therein. In January and March 2001, after having resigned employment in July 2000, Davie requested reinstatement with the NYCTA. See NYCTA Motion, Ex. C (NYCTA answer in Article 78 proceeding). The request was denied. See id. On July 12, 2001, Davie, represented by counsel, commenced an Article 78 proceeding in New York Supreme Court, Kings County. See NYCTA Motion, Ex. B (Davie's Article 78 petition). In his petition, Davie requested reinstatement as an employee of the NYCTA and incidental damages, including all back pay, benefits, seniority and other relief. See id. The NYCTA filed an answer to the petition on September 21, 2001. The NYCTA's answer included documents in support of its stated reasons for denial of Davie's reinstatement: his final unsatisfactory performance evaluation and his poor attendance record. On October 31, 2001, in a two-sentence order, the court dismissed the petition. See NYCTA Motion, Ex. D (New York Supreme Court order).
In April 2001, Davie filed a complaint with the NYSDHR and the EEOC in which he alleged that he was not reinstated due to disability — specifically, his "allergies." NYCTA Motion, Ex. E (Davie's NYSDHR filing). On February 4, 2002, the NYCTA submitted a response to the NYSDHR. See NYCTA Motion, Ex. F (NYCTA response to Davie's NYSDHR filing). On April 22, 2002, the NYSDHR issued a "Determination and Order After Investigation" finding that "there [was] NO PROBABLE CAUSE to believe that [the NYCTA] has engaged in or is engaging in" unlawful discrimination. NYCTA Motion, Ex. G (NYSDHR Order). On July 7, 2002, the EEOC adopted the NYSDHR's findings and issued a "Dismissal and Notice of Rights". NYCTA Motion, Ex. H (EEOC Dismissal). On July 24, 2002, Davie commenced this action.
II
In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court takes as true all of the allegations contained in plaintiffs' complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1058 (2d Cir. 1993). A pro se complaint should not be dismissed unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). When considering a motion to dismiss apro se complaint, "courts must construe [the complaint] broadly, and interpret [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]." Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is especially true when dealing with pro se complaints alleging civil rights violations. See Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2001). The Court may not dismiss apro se complaint when a liberal reading of the complaint "gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated," without granting leave to amend at least once. Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999).
A. Res Judicata
The NYCTA argues that Davie's federal action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Davie previously commenced and lost his Article 78 proceeding in New York State Court. Under the doctrine of res judicata,
a state court judgment has the same preclusive effect in federal courts the judgment would have had in state court. . . . Accordingly, [the Court] must determine what preclusive effect a New York state court would give [Davie's] Article 78 proceeding. New York adheres to a transactional analysis of res judicata, barring a later claim even if the later claim is based on different legal theories or seeks dissimilar or additional relief. . . . This bar will not apply, however, where the initial forum did not have the power to award the full measure of relief sought in the later litigation.Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 32 F.3d 654, 657 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying New York law) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Harp v. City of New York, 218 F. Supp.2d 495, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (" Resjudicata does not apply to plaintiffs racial discrimination claim because in this action, he seeks compensatory damages that were not available in the Article 78 proceedings.").
Giving his prayer for relief a liberal reading, see Cruz, 202 F.3d at 597, Davie seeks in his federal action compensatory damages, which are available under Title VII and the ADA. See Duse v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 252 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2001) (compensatory damages available under Title VII); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 220 (2d Cir. 1997) (compensatory damages available under ADA). Compensatory damages were not available to Davie in his Article 78 proceeding. See Latino Officers Assoc. v. The City of New York, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2003 WL 1701221, at * 6 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2003) ("[C]ompensatory damages are not available to an Article 78 petitioner who primarily seeks reinstatement. . . ."); Harp, 218 F. Supp.2d at 499 (compensatory damages not available in Article 78 proceeding); Vega v. State Univ. of New York Bd. of Trustees, 67 F. Supp.2d 324, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Leisner v. Bahou, 469 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257-58 (3d Dep't 1983) (same).
Accordingly, Davie's Title VII and ADA claims are not precluded by his previous Article 78 proceeding under the res judicata doctrine. See Burka, 32 F.3d at 657; Harp, 218 F. Supp.2d at 499; see also Beharry v. M.T.A. New York City Transit Auth., No. 96 CV 1203, 1999 WL 151671, at * 5 (E.D.N.Y. March 17, 1999) (" [R]es judicata does not bar Beharry's . . . ADA . . . claims, because [he] could not have obtained in his Article 78 proceeding the monetary relief he seeks in this federal action.").
B. Administrative Exhaustion
The NYCTA next argues that Davie's Title VII claim must be dismissed because in his administrative complaint, filed with both the NYSDHR and the EEOC, Davie asserted only a disability claim. See NYCTA Motion, Ex. E (Davie's NYSDHR filing).
Prior to the commencement of a federal action, Title VII claims must first be raised before the EEOC, See Butts v. The City of New York Dep't of Hous. Pres. and Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1992) ("A district court only has jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims that either are included in an EEOC charge or are based on conduct subsequent to the EECOC charge which is `reasonably related' to that alleged in the EEOC charge."). Davie did not include a Title VII claim, nor did he allege facts reasonably related to a Title VII claim. Accordingly, his Title VII claim is dismissed.
C. ADA Claim
The NYCTA argues that, as a matter of law, the facts as alleged by Davie fail to support a claim under the ADA.
At this early stage of the litigation, plaintiffs' complaint is sufficient to withstand dismissal if it alleges that (1) (plaintiff) has a disability for purposes of [the ADA], (2) she is otherwise qualified for the benefit that has been denied, and (3) she has been denied the benefit by reason of her disability.Weixel v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing district court's dismissal of plaintiffs ADA claim on defendant's Rule 12 motion).
Even read liberally, Davie's ADA claim is exceedingly vague and conclusory. Davie fails to detail how his disability substantially limits a major life activity, why he is qualified for reinstatement, and how he has been denied reinstatement by reason of his disability. See, e.g., Jacques v. Dimarzio, 200 F. Supp.2d 151, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[ADA] [c]laimants must demonstrate that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. . . . Examples of `major life activities' include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.") (citations and internal quotations omitted). Davie appears to allege that his allergies substantially limited his major life activity of working, but it is not at all clear. See Compl., Letter to Nathaniel Ford, April 10, 2001 (attachment) ("The other two drugs were safe but made me dro[w]sy, scratchy throat, puffy water eyes not safe to operate a train [sic], but on thousands of occasions I managed.").
The Court notes that under the ADA a disability may be "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment" Jacques v. Dimarzi, 200 F. Supp.2d 151, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
Accordingly, Davie's ADA claim will be dismissed without prejudice. The Court will grant Davie leave to amend his complaint to allege, if he can, how his disability substantially limits a major life activity, why he is qualified for reinstatement, and how he has been denied reinstatement by reason of his disability. Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that "usual practice" upon granting defendant's motion to dismiss is to provide plaintiff with opportunity to amend complaint). Davie should endeavor to allege all the facts that would support his ADA claim.
CONCLUSION
The NYCTA's motion is granted. Davie is granted leave to amend his complaint with respect to his ADA claim. Such amended complaint must be duly filed and served within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Memorandum and Order.