Opinion
No. 00-CV-0187.
August 24, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
Preliminary Statement
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court for all dispositive matters, including trial. (Docket #28). Pending before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Docket #42). Plaintiff Mickey Darling ("Darling") has submitted papers in opposition (Docket #46) and oral argument was heard on April 26, 2004. The Court announced its intended rulings during oral argument, but agreed to issue a written decision for purposes of the record. The Court incorporates the facts and findings made during oral argument into this Decision and Order.
Factual Background
Darling brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of injuries he sustained on October 29, 1998. Darling claims that defendant Robert York assaulted him and that defendant Patrick Johnson failed to intervene. Both individual defendants were employed as corrections officers in the Chautauqua County Jail at the time of the alleged assault. Defendants deny plaintiff's allegations.
Defendants move for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) that the Chautauqua County Jail is not a proper defendant; and (2) that prior to commencing his suit, Darling failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (" PLRA"). The Court will address each argument in turn.
Claims Against the Jail: Defendants moved to dismiss the Jail as a defendant and argued that no such legal entity exists, in that the Jail is merely the name of the building where inmates are housed. Plaintiff argued that defendants were well aware that Chautauqua County was an intended defendant in the amended complaint. Further, to the extent that the County Jail was improperly named, in response to defendants' motion, plaintiff cross-moved (Docket #47) for leave to amend his complaint to add the County as a defendant.
Despite the nomenclature used, it is clear that the allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint are that there was a custom or policy of excessive force and denial of medical treatment that was permitted to exist at the Jail. Indeed, as noted at oral argument, paragraph forty of the amended complaint specifically refers to the County of Chatauqua as a defendant under a theory that the County failed to adequately supervise and train the individual defendants. (Docket #34). Thus, amending the complaint to reflect that it is the County, and not the "Jail," that is being sued would not prejudice the County, whose lawyers have been involved throughout these proceedings and were on notice of the claims in Darling's lawsuit. Therefore, to the extent it is even necessary, plaintiff's motion to correct his complaint and properly name the County, rather than the Jail, is granted. Exhaustion of Remedies: Under the PLRA, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); see Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Because exhaustion of remedies is an affirmative defense, defendants bear the burden of proving that a remedy is available. Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 1.9, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1999). Moreover, the Second Circuit has recently held that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, and is, therefore, subject to equitable doctrines. Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
Defense counsel briefly suggested that there may be a statute of limitations problem with identifying the County as a defendant at this time. However, as discussed during oral argument, the claims would "relate back" to the original filing date pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Relation back is dependent upon four factors: (1) the claim against the new party must arise out of the same conduct as the conduct alleged in the complaint; (2) the new party must have had such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense; (3) the party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have originally been brought against it; and (4) the second and third requirements must have been fulfilled within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint. Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dept., 66 F.3d 466, 468-469 (2d Cir. 1996). "The goal of relation-back principles is to `prevent parties against whom claims are made from taking unjust advantage of otherwise inconsequential pleading errors to sustain a limitations defense.'" VKK Corp. v. National Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, 106 F.3d 11, 19 (2d Cir. 1997)). The allegations against Chautauqua County fall squarely within the purview of Rule 15(c).
Although prison officials are entitled to expect compliance with their established grievance procedures, (see Rivera v. Goord, 253 F. Supp. 2d 735, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)), there are exceptions to the harsh consequences of expecting strict compliance in every instance. First, a court must be satisfied that such remedies are available. Mojias v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 606, 610 (2d. Cir. 2003) (court must "establish from a legally sufficient source that an administrative remedy is applicable and that the particular complaint does not fall within an exception."). Similarly, a plaintiff may proceed despite non-exhaustion where he has been erroneously advised by prison officials that he has followed the correct grievance procedures.Heath v. Saddlemire, 2002 WL 31242204 at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2002) (defendants were estopped from asserting non-exhaustion where plaintiff relied on a letter assuring him that he had followed the correct grievance procedure). Likewise, an inmate's technical failure to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing a § 1983 action may be excused where officials prevented him from utilizing a grievance procedure. Arnold v. Goetz, 245 F. Supp. 2d 527, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See also Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) ("a remedy that prison officials prevent a prisoner from `utiliz[ing]' is not an `available' remedy under § 1997e(a)"); Thomas v. New York State DOCS, 2002 WL 31164546 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002) ("where a prisoner has made a `reasonable attempt' to file a grievance, and prison officials have prevented the prisoner from filing that grievance, the grievance procedures are not `available' to the [inmate], and thus the [PLRA] does not preclude the prisoner from suing in federal court.").
During oral argument, defense counsel agreed that there were material factual differences in the record as to whether Darling sought to grieve the allegations in the complaint and had his efforts thwarted by defendants. Defendants concede that plaintiff was advised that certain of his claims were not grievable. Whether they were referring to a different type of complaint arising from the same facts or not is a jury question and not one properly resolved in the context of a summary judgment motion.Kendall v. Kittles, 2003 WL 22127135 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.15, 2003) (prison cannot prevent inmate's access to a grievance procedure and then fault the inmate for failing to exhaust); Burns v. Moore, 2002 WL 91607 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2002) (noting that "if an inmate is not allowed to file a grievance by prison authorities, a question exists as to whether he, in fact, had any available administrative remedies."); Feliciano v. Goord, 1998 WL 436358 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1998) (denying dismissal on failure to exhaust grounds where corrections officers refused to provide inmate with grievance forms).
There are also instances where a plaintiff's informal attempts to grieve an alleged wrong have been found by courts to satisfy the requirements of the PLRA. See, e.g., Lewis ex rel. Lewis v. Gagne, 281 F. Supp.2d 429, 435 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that plaintiffs' informal efforts demonstrated a reasonable attempt to exhaust all possible means before filing in federal court). Because the Court finds that there is an issue of fact as to whether administrative remedies were even available to Darling, it need not consider whether his informal attempts independently would have satisfied the PLRA.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied and plaintiff's cross-motion to amend his pleadings is granted. The parties have a further settlement conference with Judge Bianchini scheduled for September 8, 2004. Following that settlement conference, counsel shall advise this Court in writing as to whether the case has settled. If not, this Court will thereafter schedule a trial date status conference. To accommodate counsel, the Court will attempt to hold the trial of this action in Buffalo.SO ORDERED.