Opinion
Civil Action 1:21-69
09-10-2021
SEAN DANIELS, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT MICAHEL CLARK, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, and SECRETARY DEBORAH L. CARPENTER, Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the petition of Sean Daniels (“Daniels”) for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
II. Report
A. Background
In 2013, after pleading guilty to robbery, theft, and conspiracy to rob, Daniels was sentenced to confinement and probation. (ECF No. 9-1 at 6-7.) While on probation, he was arrested and charged with new criminal offenses in March 2017. (Id. at 16; see Id. at 10.) In September 2018, he pleaded guilty to “possession of a firearm by a prohibited person” in the newer case and was sentenced to a minimum term of two and half years and a maximum term of five years of confinement. (Id. at 17.) His probation in the prior case was also revoked and an additional probation term was imposed. (See Id. at 6, 7; ECF No. 9-2 at 2.)
In July 2019, while in prison, Daniels was charged with and pleaded guilty to a misconduct for “[f]ailure to report or unexcused absence from work[, ] school, or mandatory programs.” (ECF No. 3-1.) Later that year, he completed rehabilitative programs such as Violence Prevention Moderate and SMART Recovery (substance abuse). (ECF Nos. 3; 3-3 at 1.) In February 2020, he finished a Flagger Training Course to enhance his employment potential upon release from prison. (ECF No. 3-3 at 2; see ECF No. 2 at 2.) That month, he also acquired ten hours in Victim Awareness Education. (ECF No. 3-3 at 4.) And, being a father of four children, he successfully concluded a Parenting class in March of 2020. (Id. at 3; ECF No. 2 at 1.)
In April 2020, after an interview and a review of his file, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”) denied Daniels' parole. (ECF No. 9-2 at 2.) The Board premised its decision on Daniels' “institutional behavior, including misconduct reports” and his “prior unsatisfactory parole supervision history.” (Id.) Daniels was informed that he would be considered for parole again in or around January 2021, at which time the Board would review his file and consider whether he “maintained a favorable recommendation for parole from the Department of Corrections, ” and “received a clear conduct record.” (Id.)
Daniels claims that he received a clear conduct record as well as the Department of Corrections' recommendation for parole on the next review date. (ECF No. 2 at 3.) But in January 2021, the Board denied his parole again. (ECF No. 9-2 at 5.) The Board explained that “following an interview with [Daniels] and a review of [his] file, and having considered all matters required[, ]” it had determined that Daniels would pose a risk to the community if he was paroled. (Id.) In support of its determination, the Board relied on Daniels' “risk and needs assessment” as well as “reports, evaluations and assessments/level of risk, ” which indicated his risk to the community. (Id.)
Daniels timely filed this habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the grounds that the decision of the Board to deny him parole violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1.) He also filed a brief in support of his petition along with various exhibits. (ECF Nos. 2, 3.) Respondents filed an answer to which they appended certain exhibits as well. (ECF No. 9.) Daniels did not file a reply. Accordingly, the matter is ripe for resolution.
B. Discussion
Section 2254 provides that a federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). And challenges to denial of parole are cognizable under this section. See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that jurisdiction to review a state prisoner's habeas petition challenging denial of parole lies under § 2254).
Although “[s]ections 2254(b) and (c) provide that a federal court may not grant such applications unless, with certain exceptions, the applicant has exhausted state remedies[, ]” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011), the Third Circuit has held that a Pennsylvania prisoner challenging the denial of parole on constitutional grounds-aside from litigating an ex post facto claim-is exempt from this exhaustion requirement. DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 2005). See Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]o the extent there has been any shift in Pennsylvania law, we cannot comfortably say that it is clear enough to alter our decision in DeFoy.”) While recognizing that Defoy is controlling Third Circuit precedent, Respondents request the Court to dismiss this case based on Daniels' failure to exhaust so that this issue is preserved for appellate review. (ECF No. 9 at 3.) But the Court “may bypass the exhaustion issue altogether should [it] decide that the petitioner's habeas claim fails on the merits.” DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d at 209. And because Daniels' claims lack merit, the Court need not address the issue of exhaustion further.
Daniels asserts that the Board “abused its power and discretion” in denying him parole because he had complied with the criteria of the Department of Corrections and the Board. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) He also criticizes the Board for only issuing a boilerplate statement that he is a risk to the community. (Id.) According to Daniels, he “is entitled to an explanation detailing what the alleged risk is, so he can better himself.” (Id.) Daniels contends that the Board's decision to deny him parole is in violation of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 2 at 3.)
i. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment, as incorporated and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Third Circuit has explained that “[t]hough a prisoner already may have been convicted and imprisoned for an offense, the Fifth Amendment still applies to ensure that the individual not be compelled to bear witness against himself or to divulge information that might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984)). In order to prevail on this claim, Daniels “must demonstrate two key elements: compulsion and use.” Id. He has not done so. In fact, apart from making a bare assertion, he has not explained how his Fifth Amendment rights were implicated in any way by the Board's decision to deny him parole. Therefore, Daniels' claim with respect to his Fifth Amendment rights is untenable.
ii. Eighth Amendment
“The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, prohibits the imposition of ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary standards of decency.'” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). The Third Circuit has explained that “imprisonment beyond one's term constitutes punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment.” Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989). And in Pennsylvania, “the actual sentence of a prisoner subject to total confinement is his maximum sentence . . . .” Hudson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 204 A.3d 392, 396 (Pa. 2019). But Daniels has not alleged, and the record does not reflect, that he has been incarcerated beyond his maximum sentence of five years. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on Eighth Amendment grounds either.
Iii. Fourteenth Amendment
The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “While on its face this constitutional provision speaks to the adequacy of state procedures, the Supreme Court has held that the clause also has a substantive component.” Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992)).
1. Procedural Due Process
To establish that his procedural due process rights have been violated, Daniels must first demonstrate that “there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State.” Ky. Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). The Supreme Court has explained that “an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. And “[p]rotected liberty interests ‘may arise from two sources-the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.'” Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983)). If Daniels makes such a showing, the next step is for the Court to determine “whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Id.
Daniels' procedural due process claim fails at the first step of this inquiry because “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Similarly, Daniels “has no right or entitlement to parole under Pennsylvania law.” DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d at 214 (citing Commonwealth v. Brittingham, 275 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa. 1971)). See Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 2001) (“It is undisputed that [an inmate] does not have a clear legal right to the grant of parole, nor does the [B]oard have a corresponding duty to grant the same.”)
In sum, because he does not possess a protected liberty interest in parole, the Board's decision does not violate Daniels' procedural due process rights.
2. Substantive Due Process
With respect to substantive due process, the Third Circuit has explained that even if a state statute does not create a protected liberty interest in parole release, “once a state institutes a parole system all prisoners have a liberty interest flowing directly from the due process clause in not being denied parole for arbitrary or constitutionally impermissible reasons.” Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980). Therefore, a federal court may “review the substance of parole decisions, as distinguished from the adequacy of the procedures, to determine whether a parole board exercised its authority arbitrarily.” Id.
At the same time, the Third Circuit has “made clear that the federal courts, on habeas review, are not to ‘second-guess parole boards,' and the requirements of substantive due process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.” Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487). Additionally, the “relevant level of arbitrariness required to find a substantive due process violation involves not merely action that is unreasonable, but, rather, something more egregious, which [the Third Circuit] ha[s] termed at times conscience shocking or deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 247 (quotations marks and footnote omitted).
Daniels has failed to allege, let alone support it with evidence, that the Board's decision to deny him parole was so egregious as to be conscience shocking. The Board premised its first denial on Daniels' prior unsatisfactory parole supervision history and his institutional behavior while in custody. These reasons are not only rational, but also based on factors that Board is required to consider. Daniels does not, because he cannot, dispute that he committed his current firearms offense while he was on probation for a prior robbery conviction. Nor does he deny that he pleaded guilty to a misconduct while in prison.
In exercising its discretion in making a decision regarding parole, state law requires the Board to consider factors such as the nature and circumstances of the offenses committed, the general character and background of the inmate, the notes of testimony of the sentencing hearing, if any, together with such additional information regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense committed for which the sentence was imposed as may be available, the written or personal statement of the testimony of the victim or the victim's family, and the conduct of the person while in prison and his physical, mental and behavioral condition and history, his history of family violence and his complete criminal record. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6135(a).
The second denial was based on the Boards' determination that if paroled, Daniels would pose a risk to the community. Again, there is no basis for this Court to conclude that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious or based upon any factor prohibited by the Constitution. To the extent Daniels asserts that he is entitled to an explanation detailing what the alleged risk is, so he can better himself, the Court notes that the Board is only required to provide inmates with a “brief statement of the reasons” for its action any time that it grants or denies parole. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6139(a)(5). And the Board complied with its statutory mandate by explaining that Daniels' risk and needs assessment as well as his reports, evaluations and assessments considered by the Board reflected that he would pose a risk to the community.
Accordingly, Daniels has failed to demonstrate that either of the Board's decisions to deny him parole violated his substantive due process rights.
iv. Certificate of Appealability
28 U.S.C. § 2253 provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Where the district court has rejected a constitutional claim on its merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying that standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether Daniels' claims should be denied. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should not be issued.
C. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the petition of Daniels for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections thereto. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).