Opinion
November 4, 1952.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, George E. Holt, J.
George B. Carter, Orlando, for appellants.
Joseph A. Perkins, Miami, for J. Larry Shields and Craig-Shields Realty, Inc.
Franks Gordon and H.H. Eyles, Miami, for R.L. Morton and Estelle C. Meyer.
Appellant, Florida Real Estate Commission, filed an information, charging appellees with violating certain provisions of Chapter 475, F.S.A., being the Real Estate License Law. In their answer defendants denied the material allegations of the information. An examiner was appointed, testimony was taken and on final hearing the registration of J. Larry Shields and Craig-Shields Realty, Inc., was suspended for a period of one year. The order also suspended the registration of R.L. Morton for six months and Estelle C. Meyer for three months. On appeal to the Circuit Court the order of the Real Estate Commission was reversed as to all defendants. We are confronted with an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court.
Five questions are urged for determination but they all turn on the ultimate question of whether or not there was warrant in the record for the chancellor to overthrow the findings and judgment of the Real Estate Commission.
The pertinent statute Section 475.31, F.S.A., provides that the findings of fact of the Commission shall have the same force and effect as findings of the Master. In City of Miami v. Huttoe, Fla., 38 So.2d 819, we held that the findings of the Master would not be disturbed unless contrary to the manifest preponderance of the evidence. As contended by appellants, the gist of this case is (1) that the matter in litigation is one of public interest, and being so, it should be dealt with as such, rather than if it was a controversy between private individuals; (2) the alteration and recordation of a written agreement to purchase, by a broker or a salesman, should not be sanctioned except when authority to make the alteration and recordation is clearly given.
From this it follows that the real point for determination is not strictly one of whether or not there was evidence to support the findings of the Master, but whether or not the evidence showed a wilful intent to alter the agreement to purchase, or was, in effect, an agreement altered by consent of the parties. The chancellor found that the finding of the Commission on this point was in error as to all the defendants and his finding is supported by the record.
The chancellor also found that appellees acted in good faith, with proper motives, that they acted at all times on the advice of counsel and sought the advice of the Commission to guide them in handling the transaction. The chancellor further found that the prosecuting witnesses who were the purchasers, did not act in good faith in that they attempted to employ the office of the Commission to accomplish what they could not have legally accomplished under the circumstances. Counsel for the Commission conceded this.
We have examined the record and find ample support for the finding of the chancellor, which involved much more than the mere approval of evidence sufficient to support the Commission's order. His finding involved intent, good faith and the consistency of the Commission's finding with the evidence to support it, all of which were matters within the province of the chancellor to review. The legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the Real Estate Commission may always be reviewed. Ringo v. Owens, Fla., 54 So.2d 366.
His judgment is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and THOMAS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.