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Currie v. State

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA
Apr 23, 2020
295 So. 3d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)

Opinion

No. 1D18-2349

04-23-2020

Jack Thomas CURRIE, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, COMMISSION ON OFFENDER REVIEW, Respondent.

Jack Thomas Currie, pro se, Petitioner. Rana Wallace, General Counsel; Thomas A. Klein and Mark Hiers, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review, Tallahassee, for Respondent.


Jack Thomas Currie, pro se, Petitioner.

Rana Wallace, General Counsel; Thomas A. Klein and Mark Hiers, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Commission on Offender Review, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

Petitioner seeks certiorari review of an order denying his petition for writ of mandamus in which he challenged the extension of his presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Because the circuit court correctly denied relief, we deny the petition for writ of certiorari.

In 1977, Petitioner was convicted of sexual battery with a firearm, committed when he was 16 years old, and was sentenced to life in prison. In March 1988, Petitioner escaped from custody. Upon his conviction for this offense, he was sentenced to a consecutive term of 7 years in prison. Consequently, the Florida Commission on Offender Review (Commission) established a new PPRD of December 11, 2016 for Petitioner. Subsequently, in October 2016, the Commission extended the PPRD for 12 months due to an unsatisfactory release plan and for 24 months for further program participation. This resulted in a PPRD of December 11, 2019.

Petitioner filed the underlying petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the extension of the PPRD for further program participation was not "new information" as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 23-21.002(29) and section 947.1745(5)(a), Florida Statutes. He also claimed that the salient factor score for his PPRD should be changed based on his age at the time of the offense. At his initial interview in 1980, his salient factor score included two points for committing a crime when he was under 18 years of age. Appellant noted that the rule which authorized the imposition of the two points was rescinded in 2014 to comport with Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). However, the Commission never adjusted his PPRD.

The circuit court did not err in denying these claims. See Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm'n , 703 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (reviewing quasi-judicial action of Commission for denial of due process and departure from essential requirements of law). Petitioner fails to demonstrate any abuse of the Commission's discretion in extending the PPRD. See Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n v. Paige , 462 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1985) (stating that Commission has ultimate discretion on parole matters).

Section 947.173(3), Florida Statutes, provides:

The commission may affirm or modify the authorized presumptive parole release date. However, in the event of a decision to modify the presumptive parole release date, in no case shall this modified date be after the date established under the procedures of s. 947.172. It is the intent of this legislation that, once set, presumptive parole release dates be modified only for good cause in exceptional circumstances.

Section 947.16(5), Florida Statutes, provides that:

Subsequent to the establishment of the presumptive parole release date, the commission may, at its discretion, review the official record or conduct additional interviews with the inmate. However, the presumptive parole release date may not be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview.

Thus, reading these statutory provisions in pari materia , once a PPRD is established, it cannot be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct, acquisition of new information not available at the initial interview, or good cause in exceptional circumstances. See Taylor v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n , 543 So. 2d 367, 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ; see also McKahn v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n , 399 So. 2d 476, 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

In extending Petitioner's PPRD, the Commission cited "new information." It noted Petitioner's fluctuating institutional behavior. After several years of acceptable behavior, Petitioner's behavior had taken a turn for the worse. The Commission indicated that Petitioner only recently had remained discipline free and had begun participating in programs. Because Petitioner's change in behavior occurred after the last interview date and well after the establishment of the PPRD, this constituted new information. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 23-21.002(29) (defining new information as knowledge acquired subsequent to the initial interview or the establishment of the PPRD). It was not information that could have been considered and acted upon previously by the Commission. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in upholding the Commission's extension of Petitioner's PPRD.

In addition, the circuit court did not err in denying Petitioner's claim that the Commission should have re-assessed his score after the parole guidelines were revised in 2014. At the time his PPRD was established in 1990, the objective parole guidelines authorized the Commission to impose two points for Petitioner committing the offense while 17 years of age or younger. See Rolle v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n , 426 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that Commission properly applies the objective parole guidelines in effect at the time it establishes the PPRD). The subsequent decisions in Miller and Graham do not constitute good cause in exceptional circumstances as required in section 947.173(3), or new information as required in section 947.16(5) to modify the PPRD. Because Petitioner's life sentence was parole eligible, Graham and Miller do not apply. See State v. Michel , 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018) (holding that defendant's parole-eligible life sentence did not violate Graham or Miller ). Petitioner has the ability to obtain parole under the normal process.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits.

Lewis, B.L. Thomas, and Nordby, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Currie v. State

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA
Apr 23, 2020
295 So. 3d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)
Case details for

Currie v. State

Case Details

Full title:JACK THOMAS CURRIE, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, COMMISSION ON…

Court:FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA

Date published: Apr 23, 2020

Citations

295 So. 3d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)

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