Opinion
C.A. No. 97C-10-014 (WLW)
Submitted: March 7, 2001
Decided: March 26, 2001
Upon Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Denied.
Darryl K. Fountain, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, attorney for the Plaintiff.
Colin M. Shalk, Esquire, Casarino, Christman Shalk, Wilmington, Delaware, attorneys for the Defendant.
ORDER
Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability and Defendant's response thereto. It appears that:
1. On August 16, 1996, the vehicle operated by Val Cunningham ("Cunningham" or "Plaintiff') was struck by a vehicle driven by Grace Outten ("Outten" or "Defendant"). In this civil action, Cunningham alleges that he suffered injuries in the collision which occurred because of Outten's negligence. As a result of the collision, Outten was charged with "Inattentive Driving," in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4176(b). On October 21, 1996, this charge was tried before the Court of Common Pleas and Outten was found guilty of "Inattentive Driving." Plaintiff claims that based on the conviction for "Inattentive Driving," the Defendant should be collaterally estopped from denying negligence and liability. Defendant concedes that Outten's conviction for inattentive driving cannot be relitigated, but argue that the Court of Common Pleas' decision is not dispositive as to liability because the causation issue is outstanding and must be determined by the fact finder.
2. Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) states that summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment cannot be granted unless after viewing the record in light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no material issues of fact. The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no material issues of fact; however, if the moving party "supports" the motion under the Rule, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that material issues of fact do exist. In Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., the court stated that the "role of a trial court when faced with a motion for summary judgment is to identify disputed factual issues whose resolution is necessary to decide the case, but not to decide such issues." Summary judgment will not be granted in cases where the record indicates that a material fact is in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law.
Sup.Ct. Civ. Rule 56(c).
Moore v. Sizemoore, Del. Supr., 405 A.2d 679, 680 (1979).
Id.
Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., Del. Supr., 606 A.2d 96, 99 (1992).
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, Del. Supr., 180 A.2d 467, 468-469 (1962).
3. Plaintiffs argument for summary judgment is based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel. According to the Plaintiff, the Court of Common Pleas' finding that the Defendant was guilty of "Inattentive Driving" establishes negligence and thereby liability. Under collateral estoppel, "if a court has decided an issue of fact necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case." The test for applying collateral estoppel consists of four parts: it requires that "(1) a question of fact essential to the judgment, (2) be litigated and (3) determined (4) by a valid and final judgment." The question before the Court of Common Pleas was whether or not Outten violated 21 Del. C. § 4176(b). The alleged violation of this statute was litigated and the Court below determined in a valid and final judgment following a bench trial that Outten was guilty. This Court has previously noted that under modern law the decision of whether a criminal conviction can be conclusive as to a question of fact in a civil case rests in the sound discretion of the court, particularly in cases involving offensive collateral estoppel.
Messick v. Star Enterprise, Del. Supr., 655 A.2d 1209, 1211 (1995).
Taylor v. State, Del. Supr., 402 A.2d 373, 375 (1979).
21 Del. C. § 4176(b) states that, "Whoever operates a vehicle and fails to give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle, or whoever fails to maintain a proper lookout while operating the vehicle, shall be guilty of inattentive driving."
Brooks Armored Car Service, Inc. v. Payne, Del. Super., C.A. No. 90C-MR-260, Babiarz, J. (March 3, 1992) (Op. and Order); see also, Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Short, Del. Super., C.A. No. 88C-MR-154-1-CV, Barron, J. (Aug. 8, 1989) (ORDER); Blachowicz v. Pennington, Del. Super., C.A. No. 85C-MY-125, O'Hara, J. (Feb. 17, 1987) (Mem. Op.).
4. Collateral estoppel does not apply to liability in this personal injury action because the issue of liability was not before the Court of Common Pleas as "a question of fact essential to the judgment." The issue before the Court of Common Pleas was whether the Defendant violated the statute in question, 21 Del. C. § 4176(b). The finding with respect to the violation of a motor vehicle statute does not include a determination of liability which consists of more than guilt or negligence. The Court of Common Pleas determined that 21 Del. C. § 4176(b) was violated by the Defendant but did not consider or decide whether the violation of that statute caused any of Plaintiffs injuries. The fact that liability was not the issue before the Court of Common Pleas is also evident as the finding did not have to consider any claims of comparative negligence.
5. The motion for summary judgment on liability also fails because the issue of Plaintiffs alleged negligence has not been determined. Defendant alleges in her Answer and in her response to this summary judgment motion that the Plaintiff was at least partly at fault for this accident. Apportioning liability between the parties involved here has never been done and is the province of the fact finder. Therefore, for collateral estoppel to apply to liability in this action, there must be a valid and final judgment that apportions liability between the parties. In Patrella v. Alexander, the Court stated that "until there is a judicial determination either finding plaintiff not negligent or finding the negligence of plaintiff to be no greater than defendant's negligence, the issue of liability of defendant cannot be resolved." Plaintiffs argument that collateral estoppel should support a judgment as a matter of law for liability is not appropriate because the issue of comparative negligence was not decided by the Court of Common Pleas' ruling. As a practical matter, Defendant could have violated the motor vehicle statute and not have been 100% at fault for this accident. Therefore, it will be up to the jury to determine whose conduct was the ultimate cause of this accident.
Patrella v. Alexander, Del. Super., CA. No. 90C-JL-261, Taylor, J. (Nov. 8, 1991), Order at 2.
6. The doctrine of collateral estoppel only applies to this case insofar as it shows that Defendant was negligent in violating the statute, driving inattentively. The Court of Common Pleas' finding of guilt does not establish liability. Plaintiff will be entitled to a jury instruction on negligence per se stating that the Defendant violated a motor vehicle statute of the State of Delaware; however, this instruction is not conclusive on the issues of causation and liability. The Defendant will still be permitted to assert a comparative negligence defense and the fact finder will ultimately determine who was at fault or the degree of fault for each party in this accident. The Defendant's violation of the motor vehicle statute will only be one of several factors the jury can use to determine liability for this accident. Therefore, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.