Opinion
7:01-CV-016-R
October 31, 2003
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, Buddy Lee Criner, claims that he was unlawfully arrested and illegally confined in the Wichita County Jail for approximately ten months. Complaint ¶ V. He seeks monetary damages in the amount of $50,000 from each Defendant. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 26. Criner was arrested on January 18, 1999 by Detective Pruitt of the Wichita Falls Police Department. Pruitt arrested Criner pursuant to a warrant issued by Judge Michael R. Little upon the Judge's finding of probable cause. Complaint ¶ V; See Copy of Warrant and Copy of Affidavit for Arrest Warrant, both attached to Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions. Criner was thereafter confined on a charge of capital murder. However he was not indicted and, ultimately, a grand jury no-billed him and he was released. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 2; Arrest Warrant Cancellation Request attached to Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions.
The Fourth Amendment requires that a probable cause determination be made either before or promptly after arrest as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-43 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694 (1979). A person who is arrested pursuant to a valid warrant is not entitled to a separate judicial determination that there is probable cause to detain him prior to trial. Id. Criner was arrested pursuant to a warrant. He makes no claim that the warrant was invalid. Criner's only argument in challenging his arrest is that he was innocent of the offense charged. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 4. Absent some argument that the arresting officer lacked probable cause, Criner cannot succeed on his false arrest claim. See Fields v. City of South Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1189 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding there is no cause of action for false arrest under § 1983 unless the arresting officer lacks probable cause). The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If that were the case, every defendant acquitted and every suspect released would have a cause of action under § 1983. Such is not the case. Baker, 443 U.S. at 145.
Next Criner claims that he was unlawfully confined in the Wichita County Jail for approximately ten months. In support of this claim, Criner argues that, because he did not commit the crime, he should not have been detained. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 17. He also asserts that he was denied due process because the Judge refused to either indict him or drop the charges and because his bail was set at $200,000.00. Id. Unfortunately, this claim must fail. As previously discussed, the constitution does not provide that only the guilty will be arrested. In ordering him detained and setting bail, Judge Little was acting within the scope of his duties as a judicial officer and is, therefore, entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Stump v, Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105 (1978); Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 569 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1991).
Criner was represented by counsel while the capital murder charge was pending. See Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 18. Criner concedes that neither he nor his attorney ever filed a State application for habeas corpus relief under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.07 during the time he was confined nor did they file any other type of pleading, motion or request for his release. Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 18-19. Therefore, Criner's civil rights claims are barred under the Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994) which requires dismissal of a civil rights action where a favorable decision would necessarily imply the invalidity of a plaintiffs incarceration unless the decision resulting in confinement has been reversed, expunged or otherwise declared invalid. See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 971, 121 S.Ct. 1601 (2001).
Finally, the Court notes that, although he was afforded the opportunity to set forth the facts underlying his complaint, Criner has failed to articulate facts which could demonstrate a colorable civil rights claim against any of the named Defendants. See Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 8, 9, 10-14 21-25.
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.