Opinion
Civ. File No. 02-3668 (PAM/RLE)
January 17, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this putative class action for lack of standing, lack of ripeness, or for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs bring a lengthy list of federal and state claims based on allegedly unlawful treatment that they receive or received while inpatients at the Fergus Falls Regional Treatment Center ("FFRTC") and the allegedly questionable administration of the FFRTC. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies the Motion in part.
BACKGROUND
In 2002, the Minnesota state legislature passed a statute concerning the FFRTC, a state-operated facility providing inpatient psychiatric hospital services. The statute stated the legislature's intent "to continue operation as a downsized regional treatment center in Fergus Falls and to use state employees to operate and maintain the downsized facility." Minn. Stat. § 251.013, subd. 5. Pursuant to this legislation, the Minnesota Department of Human Services ("DHS") directed consolidation of services at the facility, with plans to close the third floor of the facility and to transfer, reassign, or discharge approximately 22 staff members. Additionally, the DHS planned to merge two of the three treatment programs at the FFRTC in September 2002. Before the merger took place, Plaintiffs filed the current action on the basis of past inadequate treatment and fears of further poor treatment as a result of the likely merger and downsizing.
Plaintiffs' initial and First Amended Complaints listed five individuals as representatives of a prospective class, which included some past inpatients, and all present and future inpatients at FFRTC. According to this Complaint, representatives Julie Lessard, Louise Ricketts, and Jon Mayfield had all received provisional discharges and no longer reside at the facility. The remaining original representatives had similarly left the facility by the time Defendants filed their Motion. (Cashman Aff. ¶¶ 1,3.) Additionally, with the exception of Ricketts, Plaintiffs describe the purported injuries to the original representatives in very general terms and with nearly identical language for each. According to Plaintiffs, Ricketts "was sexually approached by a male patient living on the ward with her" during her brief stay at the FFRTC. (Compl. ¶ 94.) Plaintiffs complain that Defendants made no immediate effort to protect Ricketts from the patient. (Id.)
In their Second Amended Complaint, dated August 26, 2002, Plaintiffs add six new class representatives. At the time of the hearing, all six new representatives resided at the FFRTC, but none of the original five Plaintiffs had returned. The new Complaint generally describes the following injuries, in nearly identical language for each of the six new Plaintiffs: inadequate access to the gym and recreational services (because there is no set schedule for gym access), no occupational therapy, which could ostensibly aid Plaintiffs in their eventual transitions from hospitalization, and no regular and private psychiatric counseling. The Second Amended Complaint also describes three specific incidents involving two of the new representatives. First, it states that Plaintiff Chris Field was "pulled into a closet and hit on the face twice by a person in the FFRTC." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 85C.) The assailant also allegedly threatened Field's life. (Id.) Second, the new Complaint describes an incident during which Field cut his own arm and allowed another patient to cut him a second time. (Id. ¶ 98A.) Third, Plaintiff Tammy Niebuhr, a vegetarian, raises dietary complaints. (Id. ¶ 25Q.)
Based on the above facts, Plaintiffs bring this action to redress the allegedly unconstitutional, unlawful, unsafe, and unprofessional conditions of care at the FFRTC. They claim that the treatment at the FFRTC violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, their First Amendment rights, their right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment, their rights to due process, and four separate Minnesota state laws. Plaintiffs request 23 distinct forms of relief in their Second Amended Complaint. Two of them concern procedural matters such as a request that the Court "[a]ssume jurisdiction over this action" and "[o]rder that Plaintiffs may maintain this action as a class action." (Id. at 24, ¶¶ 1, 2.) One of the requests for relief asks the Court to make a declaration that Plaintiffs' rights were violated. (Id. at 24, ¶ 3.) The remaining 20 requests provide instructions on the selection and purpose of a special master and an "expert panel" to give treatment and administrative recommendations for the FFRTC. (Id. at 24-26.)
Defendants raise standing and ripeness questions. They argue that the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under any of the federal or state laws that they reference. The Court agrees that many of the named representatives lack standing. Moreover, the claims alleging future deprivations of liberties and future statutory violations have not yet become ripe. Finally, the Court dismisses the remainder of the claims for failure to state a claim except one: Plaintiffs' substantive due process claim.
DISCUSSION
Initially, the Court dismisses all claims against Defendants Pam Wheelock, David Fisher, the Minnesota Departments of Administration and Finance, and the Department of Human Services, State Operated Services. Plaintiffs mention the Defendants in their Second Amended Complaint, but fail to allege any claims against any of them specifically. Moreover, Plaintiffs leave the Department of Human Services, State Operated Services and the Department of Administration off of their caption entirely. The claims against these five Defendants are therefore dismissed.
A. Standing and Ripeness
Plaintiffs must meet three constitutional requirements for standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1036 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). First, the injury must be actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of Mo. v. Cross, 184 F.3d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must also show that the injury is fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant. Third, for an injury to be redressable, judicial action must be likely to remedy the harm. Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Circuit has held that the question of standing depends on the nature of the relief sought, not on the nature of the relief granted. R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1231 (8th Cir. 1983). Prudential constraints also limit the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). The plaintiff must demonstrate that the interest with which the agency interferes is within the zone of interest that the applicable statute is designed to protect. Id.
In this case, the Second Amended Complaint alleges only general injuries for all but three Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs Field, Ricketts, and Neibuhr allegedly suffered unique injuries in addition to the general failure to provide adequate treatment. While Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have therefore failed to articulate an injury in fact, the Court finds that general descriptions can satisfy the requirements of standing because, while general, the injuries noted in the Second Amended Complaint are nevertheless actual or imminent and concrete. Therefore, Plaintiffs have satisfied the injury-in-fact requirements of standing. Likewise, at this stage in the litigation, the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint demonstrate that the injury is fairly traceable to the actions of Defendants or their subordinates. However, some of the Plaintiffs do not meet the third requirement of standing with respect to the bulk of the damages requested. None of the original five named Plaintiffs currently reside at the FFRTC. Therefore, none of the injunctive damages designed to improve the level of treatment at the FFRTC would redress their injuries. These five Plaintiffs lack standing to request the damages listed in paragraphs 4 through 23 of the Second Amended Complaint. (Second Am. Compl. at 24-26.) In addition, paragraphs one and two of this section are improper requests for relief with respect to all Plaintiffs. Thus, Plaintiffs Crimmins, Stoner, Lessard, Mayfield, and Ricketts have standing only to seek declaratory relief as described in paragraph three of the "Prayer for Relief" section of their Second Amended Complaint. (Second Am. Compl. at 24.)
Next, Defendants argue that the claims lack the requisite ripeness for jurisdiction to rest in this Court. The Court agrees, in part. The ripeness doctrine seeks to "prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Garner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)). To be ripe for decision, "the harm asserted must have matured enough to warrant judicial intervention." Paraquad, Inc. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 259 F.3d 956, 958-59 (8th Cir. 2001). "Plaintiffs need not wait until the injury occurs, but the injury must be `certainly impending.'" Id. (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was filed prior to the consolidation of two of the three treatment programs at the FFRTC. Therefore, none of the claims based on post-merger treatment are ripe. Contrary to Defendants' characterization of the Complaint, Plaintiffs also allege past violations of state law, federal statutes and the Constitution. The Court will recognize only those claims based on treatment that Plaintiffs received prior to the merger.
The original Plaintiffs lack standing to request all but the declaratory relief described in the Second Amended Complaint. (Second Am. Compl. at 23, ¶ 3.) The six new Plaintiffs have standing, but only the claims based on pre-merger treatment at the FFRTC have ripened. The Court addresses the merits of each of these claims below.
B. Failure to State a Claim
1. Standard
For the purposes of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court takes all facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint as true. See Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court must construe the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and all reasonable inferences arising from the Second Amended Complaint favorably to Plaintiffs. See Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). A motion to dismiss will be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Id.; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
2. State-law Claims
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated four state statutes. First, they allege that Defendants have gone too far in downsizing the FFRTC and that the Defendants have effectively closed parts of the facility. These actions, they argue, violate subdivision five of Minnesota Statutes section 251.013. This subdivision provides that, "[i]t is the intent of the legislature to continue operation as a downsized regional treatment center in Fergus Falls and use state employees to operate and maintain the downsized facility." Minn. Stat. § 251.013, subd. 5. The plain meaning of the statute contemplates the consolidation of treatment plans and none of the alleged actions violates this legislative instruction. The Court dismisses this claim.
Plaintiffs second state-law claim alleges that the consolidation of treatment programs at the FFRTC violated section 246.0135(a) of the Minnesota Statutes. This section prohibits the commissioner of human services from closing a treatment center or any program without specific authorization from the legislature. The Court finds that Defendants' actions do not amount to the closure of the FFRTC or the termination of a program. Moreover, because Defendants had explicit authorization from the state legislature to downsize the FFRTC, even the termination of programs does not violate section 246.0135(a). The Court dismisses this claim.
Third, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated the standards for treatment and services for inpatient facilities set forth in section 246.014 of the Minnesota Statutes. Defendants point out that state law explicitly provides that the standards "hereinafter set forth are established and prescribed as the goal of the state of Minnesota." Minn. Stat. § 246.012. Another section states that attaining and maintaining the standards of section 246.014 are subject to "the paramount authority of the legislature with respect to appropriations," and that the commissioner of human services must perform the duties under section 246.014 "[w]ithin the limits of the appropriations." The Court finds that the aspirational nature of the statute does not create a private cause of action. Even if the statute conferred a private cause of action by implication, Defendants in this case are acting within the appropriations and authority given them by the state legislature, see Minn. Stat. § 246.0135(a), and do not violate section 246.014 as a matter of law. The Court dismisses this claim.
Plaintiff's bring their fourth state-law claim under subdivision seven of section 253B of the Minnesota Statutes, a provision of the Civil Commitment Act. Subdivision four of section 253B.23 allows suits under the Act only in cases where Defendants acted in bad faith. Because Plaintiffs in this case do not allege bad faith on the part of any of the Defendants, the Court dismisses their claims under the Civil Commitment Act.
3. Federal Statutory Claims
Plaintiffs bring claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The two federal statutes are so closely related that courts analyze them together. See Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2000) ("We have held that the enforcement, remedies, and rights are the same under both Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.") Title II of the ADA "prohibits qualified individuals with disabilities from being excluded from participation in or the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity." Id. (quoting Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 857 (8th Cir. 1999)). Similarly, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act mandates that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall . . . be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000)). Plaintiffs also cite federal regulations that generally prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. Finally, Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act mandates by allegedly failing to treat their patients in the most integrated setting possible.
Even if all the facts alleged in their Second Amended Complaint are true, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under these two federal statutes. Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants discriminated against them, much less that Defendants discriminated against them on the basis of disability. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to even assert a prima facie case of discrimination. Instead, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' alleged conduct violated the statutes "by failing to prevent abuse and neglect of the named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff class." (Opp'n Mem. at 26; see also id., at 28.) However, Plaintiffs refer to no authority (and the Court is aware of none) for their argument that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act prescribe minimum standards of care that could make Plaintiffs' claims actionable. Lastly, Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants violated the integration mandate also lacks merit. Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that they "do not claim they require more integrated settings." (Id.) Instead, they argue that Defendants failed to provide additional programs, in essence, faulting Defendants for not providing a more segregated setting. Neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act provide Plaintiffs with a viable avenue for relief in this case. The federal statutory claims are dismissed.
4. Constitutional Claims
a. Section 1983 Defendants
All that remains of Plaintiffs' claims are the careless bundle of constitutional claims that Plaintiffs bring under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss these claims against the remaining six Defendants. First, they correctly point out that § 1983 claims can only implicate "persons," not state agencies or state-run facilities. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781 (2000) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)); see also, Hamilton v. North Dakota, No. 02-1565, 2002 WL 1492119 (8th Cir. July 15, 2002) (per curiam). State officials, when sued in their official capacity for injunctive relief, are "persons," however. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10. The Court dismisses the constitutional claims brought against Defendants FFRTC and the Minnesota Department of Human Services.
Defendants next argue that individuals cannot be found vicariously liable under § 1983, and Plaintiffs can only proceed to the extent that they sue the remaining four individuals directly and not under a theory of vicarious liability. The Court agrees. "The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to claims arising under § 1983." Pearl v. Dobbs, 649 F.2d 608, 609 (8th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, to prove direct liability against a supervisor, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor had some personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation or that the supervisor's corrective inaction constitutes deliberate indifference toward the violation. Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995)). "The supervisor must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye [to it]." Id. In this case, Plaintiffs allege constitutional violations against the remaining four individuals in their official capacity: Elaine Timmer, Assistant Commissioner of State Operated Services; Linda Anderson, DHS Commissioner; Douglas V. Seiler, Regional Administrator of the Northern State Operated Services Network; and William Dorholt, Site Director of the FFRTC. In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs fail to state any facts suggesting that Defendants Timmer and Anderson had specific knowledge of the alleged violations. Plaintiffs make no discernable effort to show that Defendants Seiler and Dorholt knew about the alleged violations either, or that they facilitated, condoned or turned a blind eye to them. Reading the Second Amended Complaint liberally, the Court notes that both Seiler and Dorholt have offices at the FFRTC. The Court, therefore, infers that Seiler and Dorholt may have known about the complained-of constitutional violations. The constitutional claims may proceed against Defendants Seiler and Dorholt only. The Court dismisses the constitutional claims against Defendants Timmer and Anderson.
b. First Amendment and Privacy
In Count II of their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the treatment they received and the alleged overcrowding at the FFRTC violated their First Amendment freedoms of expression and association and their constitutional right to privacy. However, no case law or any other authority reads treatment standards into the First Amendment. Indeed, the only case mentioned by Plaintiffs to substantiate their novel First Amendment argument does not include the words "First Amendment," "expression," "freedom of speech," "freedom of association," or "overcrowding." See Welsh v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D.Minn. 1974). Plaintiffs' First Amendment and constitutional privacy claims are utterly frivolous and the Court dismisses these claims without further comment.
c. Equal Protection Clause
Plaintiffs devote three sentences of their 32-page Second Amended Complaint to their purported claims under the Equal Protection Clause. At no point do Plaintiffs attempt to show that they belong to a suspect class. Likewise, Plaintiffs make no attempt to show that Defendants treated them any differently from a similarly situated class of persons. Accordingly, the Court dismisses these claims without further comment.
d. Due Process Clause
The heart of this lawsuit is that Defendants failed to comply with the minimum standards of treatment for inpatients at a psychiatric hospital. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' actions violated their substantive due process rights to minimally adequate treatment. The Court takes these claims very seriously. The Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 357 (1982), governs this claim. Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1028-31 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining the applicability of and the standard articulated in Youngberg).
In the Youngberg case, the Supreme Court adopted the standard derived by Third Circuit Judge Collins J. Seitz for minimally adequate treatment: "the appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct was such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards in the care and treatment of the plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not base their conduct on a professional judgment." Id., at 1029 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiffs allege that the care they received falls short of what accepted professional judgment requires. In response, Defendants argue that the facts alleged amount to no more than simple negligence and are therefore insufficient to support a claim under Youngberg. Defendants also argue that qualified immunity protects the individually named Defendants in this case. While Defendants' arguments may ultimately prevail, for the purposes of a 12(b)(6) Motion, the Court construes all of the facts alleged in the Second Amended Complaint as true. Plaintiffs sprinkle their Second Amended Complaint with occasional reference to specific injuries such as the ones involving Plaintiffs Ricketts and Field. These injuries, as well as the more general allegations, if true, may rise to the level of a constitutional violation under Youngberg. Further, Defendants' official immunity arguments are premature, as they depend entirely on disputing the facts contained in the Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, the Court denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs' substantive due process claims against Defendants Seiler and Dorholt.
CONCLUSION
First, the Court determines that Plaintiffs Crimmins, Stoner, Lessard, Mayfield, Ricketts, and all prospective class members who no longer reside at the facility have standing only to seek declaratory relief as described in paragraph three of the "Prayer for Relief" section of the Complaint. (Second Am. Compl. at 24.) Second, Plaintiffs' post-merger claims are not ripe. Third all Plaintiffs may only proceed on their substantive due process claim against only Defendants Seiler and Dorholt. The Court dismisses the remaining Defendants and claims. For the foregoing reasons and based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No. 15) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
1. Plaintiffs Crimmins, Stoner, Lessard, Mayfield, Ricketts, and all prospective class members who no longer reside at the facility have standing only as to the declaratory relief sought in the Second Amended Complaint;
2. All claims based on post-merger treatment are dismissed;
3. The Court dismisses Counts II-VII on their merits; and
4. The Court dismisses all claims against Defendants Fergus Falls Regional Treatment Center; Elaine Timmer, Assistant Commissioner of State Operated Services, Minnesota Department of Human Services; Linda Anderson, Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services; Minnesota Department of Human Services; Minnesota Department of Finance; Pam Wheelock, Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Finance; Minnesota Department of Administration; and David Fisher, Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Administration.