Opinion
No. C02-0087
July 28, 2003.
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to the defendant's May 30, 2003 motion for summary judgment (docket number 30). The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion for summary judgment.
In this case, the plaintiff, George Crawley, alleges that Rockwell Collins, Inc., failed to hire him because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code Chapter 216. The defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing: (1) the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under Iowa or federal law; (2) the defendant has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not rehiring the plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiff has offered insufficient evidence of pretext on the defendant's part.
Summary Judgment: The Standard
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if, after examining all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kegel v. Runnels, 793 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1986). Once the movant has properly supported its motion, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the nonmovant must show that, on an element essential to [its] case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, there are genuine issues of material fact." Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Although "direct proof is not required to create a jury question, . . . to avoid summary judgment, `the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.'" Metge v. Baehler. 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Impro Prod., Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1983)).
The nonmoving party is entitled to all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation. Sprenger v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 253 F.3d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 2001). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Id. Although we have stated that summary judgment should seldom be granted in employment discrimination cases, summary judgment is proper when a plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on an essential element of his case. Helfter v. UPS, Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 615-16 (8th Cir. 1997). The standard for the plaintiff to survive summary judgment requires only that the plaintiff adduce enough admissible evidence to raise genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of the defendant's motive, even if that evidence did not directly contradict or disprove defendant's articulated reasons for its actions. O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1995). To avoid summary judgment, the plaintiffs evidence must show that the stated reasons were not the real reasons for the plaintiffs discharge and that sex or other prohibited discrimination was the real reason for the plaintiffs discharge. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) (quoting the district court's jury instructions).
Statement of Material Facts Taken in a Light Most Favorable to the Plaintiff
The plaintiff began employment with the defendant on January 11, 1988. The plaintiff was 45 years old at the time he was hired as a Manager of Component Purchasing in the defendant's Government Avionics division at salary grade 12, earning $50,400 annually. In June of 1990, the plaintiff became a Buyer Specialist Senior with a salary grade 10. The plaintiff received mostly favorable performance evaluations while employed at the defendant.
In June of 1997, the plaintiff, at approximately 55 years of age, sought and received a promotion to the position of Lead Contract Specialist in the Land Transportation Electronics division, later named Rail Road Electronics, at a salary grade of 11. By October of 1998, the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for nearly ten years and had seen his salary increase by approximately $10,000.
On October 5, 1998, employees working in the defendant's Rail Road Electronics division, including the plaintiff, received notice of a sale of that division to Westinghouse Airbake Company (WABCO). The letter explained to affected employees that they would be going to work for WABCO, but if they were laid off by WABCO, the defendant would consider them for employment as a reinstated employee if there was a suitable position open. On that same day, October 5, 1998, the plaintiff voluntarily sought and took retirement status from the defendant.
In August of 1999, WABCO laid off a number of the defendant's former employees. On August 25, 1999, Steve Schick, the defendant's Senior Recruiting Specialist in Resource Acquisition, and Jeff Dwhytie, the defendant's Director of Human Resources Programs, met with former employees laid off by WABCO, including the plaintiff. Those employees were told that they could view current job openings on the defendant's internal website, identify those positions in which they were interested and qualified, submit their resumes and applications to Mr. Schick by August 30, 1999 and Mr. Schick would then forward their resumes to the appropriate hiring managers. The plaintiff needed, sought and received clearance from the defendant to reapply because of his earlier retirement status.
On August 26, 1999, Mr. Schick sent an email to the hiring managers informing them that the WABCO employees had been laid off and they should be considered for any job openings. The email identified the WABCO employees, their telephone numbers, and "snapshot qualifications." The plaintiff was described as a "Lead Contract Specialist/Good negotiator with vendors." The plaintiff submitted his employment application to the defendant in late August of 1999. The application did not identify his date of birth. On September 7, 1999, the plaintiff faxed to Mr. Schick a list of contacts to be used in conjunction with his re-application to the defendant.
The defendant uses "Resumix," an automated staffing system to keep track of job openings and the people who apply for the openings. The defendant gives preference to "internal" employee applicants over "external" applicants in making hiring decisions. All WABCO employees were considered external applicants when reapplying for positions with the defendant.
Beginning in August of 1999, the plaintiff applied for eleven positions through Resumix. Two of the positions he applied for were cancelled prior to the submission of the plaintiffs resume and were never filled. Two other positions were cancelled after the submission of the plaintiffs and other applicants' resumes. The remaining positions were filled by applicants other than the plaintiff.
The plaintiff applied for or was considered for six other positions with the defendant outside the Resumix system. For some of these positions, the plaintiff directly contacted the hiring managers. Three of those positions were in Operations. He interviewed in October of 1999 but was not hired for any of these positions. The hiring committee used standardized scoring guidelines to determine the best candidate for each position. The plaintiff scored lower than those chosen for the positions. David D. Young, Vice President of Material and Supply in Operations and the final decision-maker for all three positions, stated that the applicant with the highest point total was the person hired. Another manager in Operations who interviewed the plaintiff did not remember him or remember having any personal contact with him. The plaintiff recalled that he interviewed for six positions at the defendant. He claims that during one of those interviews, a hiring manager asked why he would come out of retirement. The plaintiff cannot identify who made the comment, or when or where it was made.
Of the 68 Rail Road Electronics employees transferred to WABCO, 26, or 38%, were rehired by the defendant. Of the 26 employees rehired, 21 were 40 or more years of age, or 81% of the rehires.
The hiring results of the positions to which the plaintiff applied or was considered for were as follows: the positions of Senior Program Manager, Senior Contracts Manager, Senior Team Manager/IT System Service, and Senior Marketing Specialist were all cancelled and never filled; Thomas Clingerman, age 51, was selected for the position of Principal Program Manager; Susan Hoover, age 40, was selected for the position of Lean Electronics Specialist; for two Lean Consultant positions for which the plaintiff was considered, Michael Perry, age 52, and Robert Wickham, age 57, were hired; Jeffrey Craft, age 45, was selected for the position of Team Manager/IT Customer Service; Ed Calhoun, age 45, was selected for the Principal Marketing Manager position; Peter Collins, age 50, was selected for the position of Principal Marketing Specialist; Tom Bednar, age 48, was hired for the position of Manager Business Development; Charles Withrow, age 28, was selected for the position of Manager Business Development; and for the three Operations positions to which the plaintiff applied, Patrick Murphy, age 57, Delton Robinson, age 54, and Scott Wagner, age 39, were all hired. The plaintiff also claims he sent a resume to Michael Barnes, then Vice President of Marketing and Strategic Management in Air Transport Services, however, Mr. Barnes did not recall having any interaction with the plaintiff regarding an application, nor did he have any information about any decision to hire or not to hire the plaintiff.
Conclusions of Law
The ADEA makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of an individual's age if the individual is over 40 years old. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), 631(a). A plaintiff may demonstrate age discrimination by either direct or indirect evidence. Montgomery v. John Deere Co., 169 F.3d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 (8th Cir. 1991)). Because "`[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes," the plaintiff need not produce direct evidence of discrimination and may rely on circumstantial evidence of discrimination and prove his case through the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)). Because there is no direct evidence of age discrimination presented by the plaintiff, his case would most appropriately be analyzed under this burden-shifting analysis. The Supreme Court has developed the burden-shifting framework as an appropriate analysis for ADEA cases. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The Eighth Circuit has also described this burden-shifting analysis in the context of age discrimination cases. See Berg v. Bruce, 112 F.3d 322, 327 (8th Cir. 1997). "Under this analysis the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which `creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.'" Id. (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254). The burden of production then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing evidence demonstrating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action. Id. (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). If the employer carries this burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). "The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion at all times and accordingly the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to persuade the trier of fact that the adverse employment action was motivated by intentional discrimination." Id. (citing Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the positions to which he applied; (3) he was not hired for the positions he applied for despite being sufficiently qualified; and (4) the employer filled the positions with persons "sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age discrimination." Schiltz v. Burlington Northern R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1412 (8th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
The plaintiff has established the first three elements of his prima facie case. The plaintiff was 56 years old when he reapplied with the defendant, and arguably was qualified for the positions to which he applied. He suffered an adverse employment action because he was not hired for any of the positions he applied for.
However, the plaintiff cannot prove the final element of his prima facie case. The plaintiff points to statistics regarding WABCO employees rehired by the defendant, focusing on the number rehired over the age of 55. The defendant also spends a great deal of time refuting these statistics. In their briefs, the parties analyze the statistics and debate whether WABCO applicants only should be included in calculating these statistics. However, there is no support for considering only WABCO applicants to determine whether age was a motivating factor in the decision to not hire plaintiff. Although the defendant did not rehire any WABCO applicants over the age of 55 as the plaintiff points out, it did hire persons over 55 from the general pool of applicants for the positions the plaintiff applied for. The plaintiff applied or was considered for 17 positions with the defendant. Besides for the four positions that were cancelled and the one position for which there is no record of the plaintiff applying, 83% of the positions the plaintiff applied for were filled by members of the protected class. Only two of the persons hired for those positions were under the age of 40. It does not matter whether they were WABCO employees, internal hires, or other employees. This evidence clearly does not create an inference that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff because of his age.
There were two positions for which the plaintiff applied that were filled by applicants who were younger than the plaintiff and not members of the protected class. However, the plaintiff presents no evidence that these two individuals were hired over him as a result of age discrimination. Taken together with the evidence that 83% of the available positions to which the plaintiff applied were filled with members of the protected class and the fact that the plaintiff has presented no evidence whatsoever that these two applicants were hired over him because of age discrimination, this court finds that the plaintiff has not proven his prima facie case.
In any event, if the plaintiff had established his prima facie case of age discrimination, the burden would shift to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not rehiring the plaintiff. The defendant has done this for each of the positions the plaintiff applied for or was considered for, going through a detailed analysis as to why the plaintiff was not chosen for each position. The defendant asserts that, in exercising its business judgment, the most qualified candidates for the positions were hired, with a preference given to internal candidates. This qualifies as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not rehiring the plaintiff.
The burden would then shift back to the plaintiff to show the defendant's assertion was a pretext to cover age discrimination. To satisfy his burden, the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence that age discrimination was the real reason the defendant did not rehire him. See Bauer v. Metz Baking Co., 59 F. Supp.2d 896, 909 (N.D. Iowa 1999). "To defeat the motion for summary judgment, [the plaintiff is] required to `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine material issue [regarding age discrimination] that requires a trial.'" Berg v. Bruce, 112 F.3d at 327 (quoting Roxas v. Presentation College, 90 F.3d 310, 315 (8th Cir. 1996)). The plaintiff has not offered evidence to satisfy this burden.
The plaintiff does not attempt, for each position, to rebut the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not rehiring him. Again, the plaintiff relies on the statistical evidence set forth above. The plaintiff specifically points out that no WABCO employee over the age of 55 was rehired. The plaintiff also argues that he was generally a good employee, however, again, this fails to rebut the specific reasons cited by the defendant for each position as to why it chose the applicant that it did.
The plaintiffs reliance on an inquiry made by an unknown hiring manager into his retirement status and a statement made by another hiring manager allegedly telling the plaintiff he had some "retirement issues" is also misplaced. See Montgomery v. John Deere Co., 169 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that reasonable inquiries into an employee's retirement plans do not permit an inference of discrimination). The alleged statement made by some unknown hiring manager at some unknown time and place is not sufficient to establish pretext.
To the extent that the plaintiff argues that the defendant's preference for internal candidates somehow discriminates against him because of his age, this argument is without merit. It is not unlawful for an employer to make decisions based on favoritism of its own employees or "even unsound business practices, as long as these decisions are not the result of discrimination based on an employee's membership in a protected class." Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 959 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). "[E]mployment decisions motivated by factors other than age . . . even when such factors correlate with age, do not constitute age discrimination." EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 1999). Therefore, even if the plaintiff was not rehired solely because the defendant regarded him as an external candidate, that does not show age discrimination.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's May 30, 2003 motion for summary judgment (docket number 30) is granted. This case is dismissed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.