Opinion
No. 04 C 2977.
May 23, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on Defendant Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company's ("IHB") motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, we grant the motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Tisa Crawford ("Crawford") began working for IHB as a conductor on August 9, 2002. Crawford's principal duties were to operate track switches, communicate with locomotive engineers, and connect and disconnect railcars. In compliance with IHB company policy, IHB conducted a sixty day training program in which Crawford was taught proper work and safety expectations before she began her duties. During Crawford's employment, IHB claims it found Crawford violating IHB company policy eight times. IHB states that from August 9, 2002 until August 14, 2003, Crawford failed to report for duty on four occasions, twice failed to properly stabilize a rail boxcar, and once failed to wear the required safety glasses. IHB also contends that on one occasion Crawford failed to ride the railcar in an appropriate manner. IHB states that they disciplined Crawford according to the "System Discipline Policy" by notifying her with a written warning after each policy violation and, if warranted, formally reprimanding or suspending Crawford from work. On August 14, 2003, IHB held a hearing to determine the appropriate measures to discipline Crawford for two unreported absences and improperly securing and damaging a rail boxcar. Following the hearing, IHB suspended Crawford for the absences and terminated her employment for damaging the boxcar. IHB contends that according to the company discipline policy, automatic dismissal may be proper in instances where an employee's violation causes damage to IHB's property.
Crawford challenged her discipline through the United Transportation Union ("UTU") and IHB's collective bargaining agreement, but her complaint was denied. Crawford also appealed her termination before an arbitrator. On September 10, 2003, Crawford filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), claiming race and gender discrimination as the reason for her termination. Crawford filed her amended complaint in the instant action on June 16, 2004, in which she alleges that she was discriminated against by IHB in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment the moving party must identify "those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). This initial burden may be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular issue or by pointing out "an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. Once the movant has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the allegations in the pleadings, but, "by affidavits or as otherwise provided for in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A "genuine issue" in the context of a motion for summary judgment is not simply a "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000). The court must consider the record as a whole, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences that favor the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Bay v. Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2000).DISCUSSION
I. Local Rule 56.1
In the Northern District of Illinois, parties must comply with Local Rule 56.1. Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, when a party files a motion for summary judgment each party must prepare a statement of material facts and each party is required to respond to the opposing party's statement of material facts and either admit or deny each fact. A denial is improper if the denial is not accompanied by specific references to admissible evidence. Dent v. Bestfoods, 2003 WL 22025008, at *1 n. 1 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (stating in addition that "[t]he purpose of the 56.1 statement is to identify for the Court the evidence supporting a party's factual assertions in an organized manner: it is not intended as a forum for factual or legal argument."). Pursuant to Rule 56.1, any facts included in a party's statement of facts that are not properly denied by the opposing party are deemed to be admitted. Local Rule 56.1; Dent, 2003 WL 22025008, at *1 n. 1. See also Jankovich v. Exelon Corp., 2003 WL 260714, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (indicating that evasive denials that do not directly oppose an assertion are improper and thus the contested fact is deemed to be admitted pursuant to Local Rule 56.1). A court is not "obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes and may adopt local rules reasonably designed to streamline the resolution of summary judgment motions." Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920, 922 (7th Cir. 1994). Further, the 7th Circuit has held "that a district court is entitled to expect strict compliance with Rule 56.1." Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating in addition that "[s]ubstantial compliance is not strict compliance.").
In the instant action, Crawford does not dispute fact numbers 1-18, 23-54, and 57-70 of IHB's statement of material facts. IHB states as fact number 19 the following: "Indiana Harbor belt maintained a `System Discipline Policy' during the time period of Plaintiff's employment." (SF 19). Crawford responds to fact number 19 by stating that she disputes the fact, but she cites only generally to "Employee Work records Ex." in support. (R SF 19). Such a general reference, without additional information regarding the exhibits being referred to and the page numbers asks the court to scour the record in search of supporting evidence, which Local Rule 56.1 is intended to avoid. Therefore, IHB's fact number 19 is deemed undisputed and admitted.
IHB states in fact number 21 that IHB considers mitigating circumstances before terminating an employee's employment. (SF 21). IHB states in fact number 22 that it "provides all employees suspected of misconduct with a full and complete investigation before they receive any discipline." (SF 22). Crawford indicates in her Local 56.1 response that she disputes the accuracy of IHB fact numbers 21 and 22 and cites in support page one of her declaration. However, page one of her declaration does not offer support for her denials. There are no facts in her declaration that are contrary to fact number 21 and 22. Crawford voices her general opinion that she was unjustly fired because of her gender, but such a conclusory statement that is not directly contrary to fact numbers 21 and 22 is not proper evidence to support her denials of those facts. Thus, in the absence of a proper supporting citation to support Crawford's denial of fact numbers 21 and 22, the facts are deemed undisputed and admitted.
In IHB's fact number 56, IHB states that none of the statements made to her by Mr. Kelly "referenced Plaintiff's race or gender." (SF 56). In response to statement of fact number 56, Crawford merely states: "Plaintiff disputes." (R SF 56). Since Crawford failed to cite to evidence to support her denial, fact number 56 is deemed undisputed and admitted. As is indicated above, Local Rule 56.1 is more than merely a technicality. Local Rule 56.1 requires citations to evidence to support any denials, because if a plaintiff is allowed to proceed onward to trial, she must be able to offer something more than her own speculation to the trier of fact in support of her case. Therefore, all of IHB's statement of material facts other than statement of fact number 55 are deemed undisputed and admitted and such admissions have been considered in formulating the conclusions listed below.
II. Race Discrimination Claim
IHB contends that Crawford's race discrimination claim is no longer at issue because Crawford indicated at her deposition that she did not intend to pursue the claim. Crawford admits, pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, that she intended to withdraw "her claim for race discrimination at her deposition. (R SF 62). Since Crawford has admitted, pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, that she does not wish to pursue her race discrimination claim, we shall grant Crawford's request to dismiss the race discrimination claim.
III. Gender Discrimination Claim
IHB moves for summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim. Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, alleging gender discrimination a plaintiff may proceed under the direct or indirect method of proof. Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 978 (7th Cir. 2004). Crawford does not have sufficient evidence to proceed under the direct method of proof and will therefore need to proceed under the indirect method of proof. Oest v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 612 (7th Cir. 2001); Robin v. Espo Engineering Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000). To proceed under the indirect method of proof a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Lim v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 297 F.3d 575, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2002). In order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that, "(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) at the time of the termination, she was meeting her employer's legitimate expectations; (3) that in spite of her meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer, she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated male employees." Lim v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 297 F.3d 575, 580-81 (7th Cir. 2002). If a prima facie case is established, then there is a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and the employer is required to offer a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1998). If the employer provides such a reason, the plaintiff must then show that the reason alleged by the employer is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. A. Legitimate Expectations
IHB argues that Crawford did not meet IHB's legitimate expectations. In IHB's Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts, IHB specifically references each of Crawford's violations of company policy over her years of employment. Crawford admits, pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, that she repeatedly breached IHB's safety and work regulations and was notified and reprimanded accordingly. (R SF 23-45). Crawford admits she was subject to discipline when she violated IHB's regulations (R SF 27, 31, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45), and admits that IHB maintained a "System Discipline Policy" during her employment. (R SF 19). Crawford also admits that all of IHB's employees are provided with a "full and complete investigation before they receive any discipline" by citing to her declaration in opposition to IHB's motion for summary judgment. (R SF 22). She also admits that IHB "considers mitigating circumstances before terminating an employee's employment." (R SF 21). Crawford admits that she violated IHB's established policies on eight occasions and that she received eight separate written disciplinary notices that were issued by four different supervisors. (R SF 25, 27, 29, 32, 34, 37, 40-41). For example, Crawford admits that she failed to report for duty as scheduled on November, 12, 2002 and January 20, 2003. (R SF 24, 28), and that on July 17, 2003, a supervisor observed her riding a railcar in an inappropriate or unsafe manner. (R SF 37).
Crawford points to her declaration as evidence, but in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, Crawford must produce evidence beyond an unsupported declaration. Pugh v. City of Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d 619, 626 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that in the 7th Circuit, a plaintiff "must provide more than his unsupported declaration that the [defendant] was mistaken in order to defeat the [defendant's] motion for summary judgment"). Crawford states in her declaration that she has personal knowledge as to the facts in her declaration, that she worked for IHB, that she was the only female "Train Person" at IHB, and that Dan Kelly made certain comments to her. (Craw. Decl. 1). Crawford also states in a conclusory fashion that she does not believe that she "was justly terminated" and that she believes that her "gender was a factor in the decision" to terminate her employment. (Craw. Decl. 1). The fact that Crawford believes that her position is just and that she was fired because of her gender is not evidence in this case. Such statements are nothing more than her own self-serving unsubstantiated opinion. In order to proceed onward to the trier of fact, Crawford must be able to point to evidence that shows that her contentions are true. Crawford is not entitled to proceed before the trier of fact, in the absence of evidence, and recite her statement that she believes certain facts to be true and leave the jury to speculate in the absence of such evidence. Thus, based upon the above undisputed facts no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Crawford was meeting IHB's legitimate work-related expectations.
B. Similarly Situated Employees I
IHB also argues that Crawford has not pointed to similarly situated males that were treated more favorably. An employee is similarly situated if the employee "is one who is `directly comparable to [the plaintiff] in all material respects.'" Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 755 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 819 (7th Cir. 2002)). While the factors often depend on the context of the case, Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002), a court will often determine if the plaintiff "is similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct." Snipes v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 291 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2002).
Crawford admitted, in her response to IHB's Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts, that of the ten males that Crawford stated were not fired for damaging rail boxcars, two were not conductors. (R SF 66). Crawford also admitted that she was not aware as to who supervised any of the men when they damaged the rail boxcars. (R SF 67). Crawford further admitted that the men who damaged the railcars worked at IHB longer than her, (R SF 68), and that she had no knowledge of the conductors' prior disciplinary record or extent of accountability for any policy violation. (R SF 69). In her statement of additional facts, Crawford attempts to demonstrate that there were similarly-situated males at IHB who had more or similar safety violations and were not discharged. Crawford, however, did not specifically cite to the record or to page numbers when making her comparison, nor did she offer evidence with each numbered paragraph. Furthermore, the only similarity between her and the few males that she identified was that they had responsibilities that were similar to Crawford's similarities.
Crawford has included a chart in her answer to IHB's summary judgment motion in which she attempts to diagram categories of violations for certain employees at IHB. However, absent from the chart or the text before or after the chart is any citation to the record to support the numbers listed in the chart created by Crawford. In the absence of such support, the chart would not be admissible evidence and there is no indication by Crawford that the chart represents any admissible evidence. Waldridge, 24 F.3d 920-21. We also note that even if we were to consider the chart, it would not alter our decision. Thus, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that similarly situated men at IHB were treated more favorably than Crawford. C. Reason and Pretext
Even if Crawford were able to establish a prima facie case, IHB has presented a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating her employment. IHB claims that it terminated Crawford's employment because of her poor work performance. Crawford argues that there is evidence that shows that employees were treated unequally under some policies. However, such evidence is insufficient to enable a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the given reason by IHB for her termination was a pretext. Therefore, we grant summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant IHB's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.