Opinion
99 C 6094.
June 15, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is the Motion for summary judgment of Defendant Hard Rock Café. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
This motion presents the question of whether Plaintiff's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refusal to answer specific questions pertaining to his use of illegal drugs precludes him from recovering damages for mental distress in the civil case he filed with this Court.
Plaintiff Thomas C. Crandall ("Crandall") filed a seven-count complaint including harassment claims against Defendant Hard Rock Café International (Chicago), Inc., now known as "Hard Rock Café International (STP), Inc., ("Hard Rock"), his former employer, and Beth Miller ("Miller") (collectively "Defendants"), the alleged harasser and one of Crandall's former co-workers. Crandall seeks damages for mental distress allegedly inflicted upon him by Miller's harassment. A complete treatment of the facts of this case may be found in our prior opinion.See Crandall v. Hard Rock Café Intl. (Chicago) Inc., 1999 WL 1285864 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30 1999).
The instant dispute arose during Crandall's deposition when he was asked a series of questions about his use of illegal drugs prior to, during, and subsequent to his employment with Hard Rock. While acknowledging that he had used illegal drugs, Crandall refused to answer questions pertaining to specifics, asserting that under the Fifth Amendment, he need not answer questions admitting to criminal activity. Based on his refusal, Hard Rock now seeks summary judgment claiming that his assertion of his constitutional right to not provide self-incriminating evidence dooms his case. To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response brief, leaving it to the Court to construct the arguments in his favor.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits and other materials show that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment carries the initial burden of showing that no such issue of material fact exists. Pursuant to Rule 56(b), when a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
In making our determination, we are to draw inferences from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. We are not required to draw every conceivable inference, but only those that are reasonable.See DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326, 329 (7th Cir. 1987). The nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings or upon conclusory statements in affidavits; rather, the party must go beyond the pleadings and support her contentions with proper documentary evidence. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's cause of action. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 422. It is with these principles in mind that we address the motion before us.
ARGUMENT
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . ." An individual's constitutional right against self-incrimination shields him from being required to answer questions in civil proceedings if the answer could show that he violated a criminal statute. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 17 (1924); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322 (1973);Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1557 (1976). However, "the direct inference of guilt from silence is forbidden." See LaSalle Bank of Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1995).
In the motion before us, however, Hard Rock seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. When presented with issues of this genre, courts have fashioned divergent outcomes, which turn on the status of the party asserting his Fifth Amendment right. For civil defendants, courts may not ignore the other evidence at bar and grant summary judgment against a defendant based exclusively upon him exercising his Fifth Amendment right. See Seguban, 54 F.3d at 391; National Acceptance Co. v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1983); CSC Holdings, Inc. v. J.R.C. Prods., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ill. 1999). Civil plaintiffs, however, are subject to a different treatment. The prevailing view in this District and the Seventh Circuit is that a plaintiff may not invoke his privilege against self-incrimination to refuse to answer questions that are relevant to the issues of his claim. See Kisting v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Wis. 1968) affd 416 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1969); Dimensions Medical Center, Ltd. v. Principal Financial Group, Ltd., No. 93C6264, 1996 WL 494229 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1996); see also Hiley v. United States, 807 F.2d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that "it may be true that a plaintiff, who initiates a civil action but refuses to present evidence, cannot then prevail on the merits with regard to those issues on which he bears the burden of proof."). Should plaintiff exercise his privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer questions pertaining to the issues at bar, the court may properly dismiss the complaint. See Dimensions Medical Center, 1996 WL 494229 at *7; Kisting, 290 F. Supp. at 149 ("[a] plaintiff in a civil action who exercises his privilege against self-incrimination to refuse to answer questions pertinent to the issues involved will have his complaint dismissed upon timely motion.").
On appeal of Kisting, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the issues had been correctly resolved, and adopted and incorporated the lower court's opinion as its own. See Kisting, 416 F.2d at 967.
Here, Crandall would not identify the specific drugs for which he had received chemical dependency treatment, or whether he was addicted to any narcotics. Defendants argue that this information is necessary to establish whether his mental health was impacted by Miller's alleged conduct. He also would not discuss a six-week drug and alcohol binge that occurred during his employment with Hard Rock in the fall of 1998, nor the amount of drugs he consumed on a regular basis, or how much money he spent on drugs. He did testify, however, that he was not chemically dependent on cocaine.
Defendants argue that Crandall's unknown drug use has impaired his ability to recollect the events at issue, and because he has asserted his privilege not to self-incriminate, we must dismiss his suit. Because of Crandall's refusal to testify on the subject of his drug use, the Court is unable to make a reasoned judgment as to whether his ability to accurately perceive and recall events is foreclosed. Also foreclosed is Hard Rock's right and ability to show, in fact, that there was an impaired ability to perceive or remember on the part of the plaintiff. Additionally, defendants' assertion that Crandall made his claims against the defendants in a desperate effort to keep his job and support a drug addiction cannot be properly explored or developed in light of Crandall's refusal to answer otherwise legitimate questions. Crandall's conduct has put the defendant in an unfair and untenable litigation posture, and it is undoubtedly the case that they have been prejudiced in their ability to defend against Crandall's charges.
Crandall also seeks substantial damages allegedly flowing from sexual harassment inflicted upon him by Defendant Miller. Whether Crandall's mental state was truly impaired by the actions of defendants or by the use of drugs cannot be ascertained without taking into account the types of drugs he used, the amounts and the duration and frequency of use. Aside from questions of liability, the mental and emotional bearing allegedly occasioned by the defendants' conduct is the major issue in the case. Damages for these types of injuries cut across the entirety of Crandall's complaint. Any attempted lawful resolution of these issues would be impossible because of the testimonial decision made by Crandall. To permit this case to go forward in light of Crandall's refusal to answer relevant questions is to fundamentally abridge the defendants' rights to fairly defend themselves. The plaintiff's conduct has visited upon the defendants a deep and pervasive prejudice and deprived them of their rightful opportunity to defend this case. In these circumstances, it would be unjust to subject them to any risk of an adverse damage award or the opportunity to demonstrate the speciousness of the plaintiff's charges. For these reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and the complaint is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.