Opinion
F077257
04-15-2021
SHANNON P. CORYELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Shannon P. Coryell, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Monica N. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Neah Huynh and Jeffrey T. Fisher, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. MCV073105)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. James E. Oakley, Judge. Shannon P. Coryell, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Monica N. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Neah Huynh and Jeffrey T. Fisher, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents.
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Plaintiff-appellant Shannon Coryell appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer to his first amended complaint ("FAC") without leave to amend. He is a state prisoner, and in his 775-paragraph, 164-page amended complaint he alleged that dozens of prison staff conspired to violate his civil rights. In short, he alleged that several correctional officers violently assaulted him in December 2012 for stating he was suicidal, and that he was later falsely found guilty in a prison administrative proceeding of having spit on one of the officers and having become combative. He further alleged prison staff wrongfully delayed providing him competent medical care for the many injuries he sustained.
The FAC alleged causes of action under federal and state law against many defendants. The defendants demurred on several grounds, including that the FAC was uncertain, that many claims were barred by various immunity provisions, that Coryell failed to comply with the claim presentation requirements of the California Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, §§ 810—996.6), and that the FAC failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986. The trial court sustained the demurrer on these grounds and several others and denied leave to amend, and also denied Coryell's motion to disqualify the trial court judge.
Except for references to 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986, which are federal statutes, all other references to statutes, codes, and rules are California provisions.
Coryell raises 10 issues on appeal. Much of his appellate briefing, like his FAC and other lower court filings, is very lengthy and hard to understand, and in some places incomprehensibly so. Nevertheless, we have made our best effort to discern his arguments.
We need not address all of Coryell's issues on appeal in order to affirm. We will affirm the sustaining of the demurrer and judgment of dismissal on the grounds that the FAC is uncertain, that many claims are barred by various immunity provisions, that Coryell failed to timely present a claim in compliance with the Government Claims Act, and that the FAC fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986. We also reject Coryell's claim that the trial court judge improperly denied his disqualification motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
"A demurrer admits, provisionally for purposes of testing the pleading, all material facts properly pleaded." (Mendoza v. Town of Ross (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 625, 629, fn. 3.) Accordingly, we draw the facts from the FAC, which we accept as true for purposes of this appeal. (Ibid.)
While Coryell's FAC contains a verbose and confusing factual narrative, we need only a summarized version of the relevant facts to decide this appeal.
Coryell was formerly an inmate at California Institution for Men (CIM) and is now at Valley State Prison (VSP). He received death threats at CIM, and prison staff moved him to a different housing unit in April 2012 pending his transfer to a different prison. Eight months later, his correctional counselor, defendant Gonzalez, expressed surprise that Coryell had not yet been transferred. Several days later, on December 10, 2012, defendant Corrections Officer Smith ordered Coryell to pack up his belongings because he was being transferred to a different prison. Coryell packed his belongings into a bag.
Coryell asked the attendant correctional officers where he was being transferred, and defendant Correctional Officer Espinal stated, "You'll know where you're going when you get there." Coryell told Espinal he was feeling suicidal, and Espinal said, "Fuck that, you'll have to wait 'til third watch to pull that shit." Coryell reiterated he was suicidal, then Espinal ordered him to a holding cell. Espinal slammed Coryell against the cell, forced him to the ground, then pulled upward on his handcuffs, injuring his shoulders and wrists.
An Emergency Response Team—comprised of defendant Correctional Officers Martin, Perro, and Maldonado and defendant Sergeant Baker—arrived and joined in beating Coryell. The officers yanked Coryell to his feet and placed a spit mask on him. They escorted Coryell to the medical clinic where defendant Nurse Rubio examined him. Rubio provided little or no treatment and did not document all of Coryell's injuries. That same day, defendant Dr. Azab deemed Coryell "mentally healthy" after a psychological evaluation.
Coryell spoke that same day with defendant Lieutenant Thomas, who accused him of spitting on Espinal and lying about it. Coryell denied the accusation and attempted to explain to Thomas his version of the incident, but Thomas threatened to "put more than a bump on [Coryell's] head" if Coryell did not stop talking.
About a week later, on December 18, 2012, prison officials issued Coryell a CDCR Form 115—a disciplinary report issued to prisoners for alleged rules violations—accusing Coryell of spitting on Espinal. Coryell was admitted to a hospital that same day for suicide watch, where he remained for nearly a month. On January 1, 2013, defendant Lieutenant Quiroz found Coryell guilty in the disciplinary proceeding.
Subsequent references to dates are to dates in 2013 unless otherwise stated.
Three days later, on January 4, Coryell submitted a grievance on CDCR Form 602, the form inmates use to file grievances regarding prison matters. That grievance complained of an "assault on inmate by staff," and detailed Espinal's assaultive actions and Thomas's threatening words. The report did not mention any other prison staff except Espinal and Thomas. Coryell had also submitted three days prior a CDCR Form 22—which is used to request interviews, items, or services—making the same allegations. Prison officials investigated Coryell's claims, found no CDCR policy violations, and denied his grievance. The grievance was denied at the third and final level of administrative review on October 11.
On January 6, two days after he submitted his Form 602 grievance, Coryell returned to CIM from the hospital. Defendant Correctional Officer Berman gave Coryell a partial copy of his 115 disciplinary report, stating that was all that was available. Coryell was then placed in administrative segregation until his transfer to VSP on April 2.
Eight months later, on November 13, defendants Montoya, Aquino, and Thissen held Coryell's annual classification hearing, at which time they implemented the punishment for Coryell's CIM rules violation. They removed 150 days of Coryell's "good time" credits, which effectively extended his parole eligibility date.
These three defendants were not named as defendants in Coryell's original complaint.
In August 2014, Coryell submitted a tort claim to the Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board (the "Board"). The claim listed December 10, 2012—the date of the assault—as the "Date of Incident." The Board wrote a letter to Coryell, explaining his claim was submitted more than one year after the date of the incident and therefore the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim or to grant a late-claim application.
Since his arrival at VSP, Coryell alleges he submitted numerous sick-call slips, but that defendant Doctor Toor provided him with little or no care. Coryell had an MRI of his shoulder in September 2014 that showed "severe damage" from the December 10, 2012, assault. Coryell had reconstructive surgery on his left shoulder on February 6, 2015. Medical personnel tapered off his pain medication after his surgery and stopped providing prompt medical care for Coryell's other medical issues.
VSP's classification committee did not dock his good-time credits relating to his rules violations for spitting on Espinal until June 9, 2015. He thereafter submitted a CDCR Form 602 grievance on January 13, 2016, relating to the assault that occurred on December 10, 2012. That grievance was denied as untimely, as was another grievance he filed requesting to have the rules-violation removed from his file.
Coryell files suit
Coryell filed his first complaint on March 30, 2016, in Sacramento County Superior Court. The matter was transferred in October 2016 to Madera County Superior Court. The complaint was 90 pages and Coryell attached 401 pages of exhibits. The complaint's paragraphs were unnumbered. The complaint named dozens of prison staff and other state government officials as defendants, including the Attorney General and the Governor of California. The complaint is entitled in the pleading caption: "CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT UNDER TORT LAW WITHIN EXCESSIVE FORCE BY AND THROUGH THE VIOLATION OF CA PENAL CODE §§ 147, 2650, 2652, 368(f), 422.7(a), WITHIN § 182(a)(1)(2)(3)(5) AS ESTABLISHED UNDER 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY AS DEFINED BY CIVIL CODE § 52 (b) AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT, UNDER CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION ART. 1 § 28(A)(1)(2)(3)."
The complaint asserted a myriad of state tort claims and federal claims under 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986 for civil-rights conspiracy. The complaint was also interspersed with references to the Eighth Amendment and to provisions of the California Constitution. His complaint, as least facially, attempted to allege seven causes of action. However, each cause of action is only labeled "First Cause of Action," "Second Cause of Action," and so on; the basis for each cause of action is not expressly stated. His complaint is also heavily interspersed with random case law citations. The complaint is very difficult to understand and is in many places incoherent. However, the gist of the complaint seemed to be that he was assaulted, falsely accused of spitting on an officer, and deprived of prompt and competent medical care for his resulting injuries, and that all of this mistreatment was part of a large conspiracy, or perhaps multiple conspiracies, to deprive him of his civil rights.
The defendants, in several groups, demurred to the complaint on multiple grounds, including that "it [was] uncertain, failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, [Coryell] failed to file his claims with the Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board, [Coryell] did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and immunity under California's Government Code."
Judge James Oakley of the Madera County Superior Court sustained the demurrers in February and March 2017 without leave to amend on the principal grounds that the complaint was uncertain and failed to plead sufficient acts to state a cause of action, that Coryell failed to present his claims to the Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board, and that Coryell failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court entered a judgment of dismissal.
Coryell then filed what amounted to a motion for reconsideration, and the trial court vacated the judgment of dismissal and granted Coryell partial leave to amend as to the "State Employee Defendants." The trial court ordered that Coryell's amended complaint comply with California Rules of Court, rule 2.112.
California Rules of Court, rule 2.112 provides, as follows: "Each separately stated cause of action, count, or defense must specifically state: (1) Its number (e.g., 'first cause of action'); (2) Its nature (e.g., 'for fraud'); (3) The party asserting it if more than one party is represented on the pleading (e.g., 'by plaintiff Jones'); and (4) The party or parties to whom it is directed (e.g., 'against defendant Smith')."
First Amended Complaint
Coryell filed his FAC on August 9, 2017. The FAC added Montoya, Aquino, and Thissen as defendants, even though Coryell had not requested leave to add new defendants to the action. The FAC alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986, of a myriad of Civil Code and Penal Code sections, and of the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. These alleged violations were predicated on theories of assault and battery and deliberate indifference. Also on August 9, 2017, Coryell filed a petition under Government Code section 946.6 for late-claim relief.
On September 5, 2017, the defendants demurred to the FAC. On October 12, 2017, Coryell filed a motion to add Montoya, Aquino, and Thissen as defendants to the complaint, notwithstanding that he had already filed the FAC with these three defendants added.
On November 16, 2017, Judge Oakley entered an omnibus order (1) sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, (2) denying Coryell's Government Code section 946.6 petition, (3) denying Coryell's request for entry of default against several defendants, and (4) denying Coryell's motion to terminate a protective order.
The demurrer was sustained on several grounds: that the entire FAC was uncertain, that all state law claims were barred for failure to timely present a claim to the Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board, that Coryell did not exhaust his administrative remedies against defendant Thomas, that the FAC failed to state a claim for civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986, that Coryell's purported claim under Civil Code section 52(b) fails because that section only provides a remedy for violations of other Civil Code sections, that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars all official-capacity claims against all defendants, that all state law claims are barred by various Government Code immunity provisions, that Coryell was not granted leave to add three new defendants (Thissen, Montoya, and Aquino) to the FAC, and that the FAC does not state any claims against defendant Malone or Parker.
On January 10, 2018, after the court sustained the demurrer, Coryell filed what he entitled a motion to disqualify Judge Oakley. Judge Oakley construed the motion as a statement of disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (b), and struck the statement one week after Coryell filed it, finding it was untimely and facially disclosed no grounds for disqualification.
DISCUSSION
Coryell's ten issues on appeal can be framed as follows:
1. The trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer on uncertainty grounds.
2. The trial court erred in ruling his state law claims were barred by his failure to timely to present a tort claim pursuant to the Government Claims Act.
3. The trial court erroneously concluded he had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to his claims against defendant Thomas.
4. The trial court erroneously determined all defendants have qualified immunity against his claims.
5. The trial court erroneously ruled Civil Code section 52(b) does not provide a basis for a cause of action and instead only provides a remedy for violations of other statutes.
6. The trial court erred in concluding the FAC failed to state a cause of action for civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986.
7. The trial court mistakenly believed he did not request permission to add new defendants to the FAC, and for that reason erroneously denied his request to add these defendants.
8. The trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for entry of default against defendants Clark, Gonzalez, and Spragan.
9. The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to serve his original complaint and other documents on certain defendants in compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.252(a)(b).
10. The presiding judge of this case abused his discretion by not allowing a different judge to hear Coryell's motion to disqualify him.
We can affirm the judgment of dismissal without addressing all of these issues. We will affirm by concluding Coryell has not demonstrated error with respect to the following rulings: (1) that the entire FAC was uncertain, (2) that he failed to satisfy the claim-presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act, (3) that most of his claims are barred by various immunity provisions, (4) and that the presiding judge should not have been disqualified. Our conclusion on these four points moots the rest of Coryell's issues.
Before beginning our discussion, we feel it is appropriate here to revisit some principles of appellate review. We initially note a judgment or order of the trial court is presumed correct. (Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 473.) All presumptions and intendments are in favor of supporting the judgment or order appealed from. (Plotnik v. Meihaus (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1600.) The appellant has the burden of showing reversible error, and the judgment or order appealed from will be affirmed in the absence of such showing. (Ibid.) Error must be affirmatively shown. (Universal Home Improvement, Inc. v. Robertson (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 116, 125.)
With these principles in mind, we turn to the issues.
I. Uncertainty
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f) permits a defendant to demur to a complaint that is uncertain. " '[U]ncertain' includes ambiguous and unintelligible." (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) The trial court noted in its order sustaining the demurrer that the defendants' demurred to the entire FAC "on the grounds that it is uncertain because it is ambiguous and unintelligible[.]" The court's order stated, "[Coryell] had the benefit of the briefing and findings on the demurrer to the original complaint, which highlighted many of the same deficiencies existing in the [FAC], but [Coryell] failed to remedy any of them."
Coryell contends the court erroneously sustained the demurrer on the ground of uncertainty. He asserts the FAC brought his pleading into compliance with California Rules of Court, rule 2.112, which the trial court stated he must do in its order granting him leave to amend his original complaint, and he seems to argue this was sufficient to defeat the defendants' demurrer to the FAC for uncertainty. But the trial court's order granting leave to amend did not state that the only thing Coryell had to do was bring his complaint into compliance with rule 2.112. And more importantly, the trial court explained in the order now appealed from that the demurrer to the FAC was based on the FAC being "ambiguous and unintelligible," but Coryell offers no counterargument to this on appeal. Coryell also has not explained how his complaint could be amended to cure the uncertainty. For these reasons, Coryell has presented no justification for us to reverse on this ground.
Subsequent references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and therefore strictly construed. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility the defect in a complaint can be cured by amendment. However, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint might be amended. (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Department of Industrial Relations (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.) Even before reaching the question of leave to amend, the appellant must first show the court erred in sustaining the demurrer. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) "Error is never presumed on appeal." (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 4:2.) The appellant's burden on appeal "includes the obligation to present argument and legal authority on each point raised. This requires more than simply stating a bare assertion that the judgment, or part of it, is erroneous and leaving it to the appellate court to figure out why; it is not the appellate court's role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness." (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 8:17.1.)
Coryell's briefing offers no argument as to how the FAC was not uncertain; he only asserts his complaint is now in compliance with rule 2.112. Instead, Coryell asks us to review his complaint for uncertainty, "point[ ] out" to him "exactly where" the uncertainties lie and provide him "line by line instructions" regarding how to amend his complaint. This, of course, is not the court's obligation. However, even if one posits the trial court may have erred in not allowing amendment on this ground, there are even more significant reasons why successful amendment is not possible, which are next discussed below.
II. Immunity provisions
The trial court ruled that all of Coryell's federal claims against all defendants in their official capacities, as well as all of Coryell's state law claims against all defendants, were barred by various immunity provisions. Specifically, the court concluded the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution barred Coryell's official-capacity federal claims, and also ruled that all defendants are entitled to immunity under Government Code sections 818.2, 820.2, and 821 because all allegations concern the performance of defendants' discretionary duties. These three Government Code sections afford immunity only against state claims and not federal claims. (Guillory v. Orange County (9th Cir. 1984) 731 F.2d 1379, 1382 ["State statutory immunity provisions do not apply to federal civil rights actions."].) As such, the trial court's ruling barred on immunity grounds all of Coryell's state law claims as well as his official-capacity federal claims, but not his personal-capacity federal claims. Section 818.2 provides as follows: "A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law."
Section 820.2 provides as follows: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused."
Section 821 provides as follows: "A public employee is not liable for an injury caused by his adoption of or failure to adopt an enactment or by his failure to enforce an enactment."
Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.
Coryell does not challenge in his opening brief any portion of the trial court's ruling on immunity grounds. That is, he never discusses the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment or the three Government Code sections. He only argues the trial court erred in ruling the defendants were entitled to "qualified immunity," a doctrine that "shields a public officer from an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 unless the officer has violated a 'clearly established' constitutional right." (Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1241—1242.) However, neither respondents' demurrer nor the trial court's ruling were based on qualified immunity. Coryell also did not address the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment or the Government Code sections in his reply brief even though the respondents discussed those provisions and pointed out that the trial court did not rely on qualified immunity. He therefore has not demonstrated error with respect to the immunity issues, and we thus have no basis for disturbing the trial court's ruling that all claims except for the personal-capacity federal claims are barred by various immunity provisions. "A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal" (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133), and it is the appellant's burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. (Fundamental Investment etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971.)
III. Government tort claims filing requirement
Coryell claims the trial court erred in denying his petition to present a late claim under section 946.6. Section 945.4 required Coryell, as a prerequisite to filing suit, to present a timely tort claim to the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board ("the Board") within six months of the date of his injuries. (Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061 (Castaneda).) If Coryell did not present the claim within six months, he had up to six months thereafter to request the Board's permission to present a late claim. (§ 945.4.) The court found Coryell did not satisfy either of these requirements and determined all of Coryell's state law claims were therefore irretrievably barred.
Coryell challenges the court's ruling on two points. He first claims he did not have to present a tort claim at all, but his argument is incomprehensible. He alternatively argues that even if he were required to present a claim, he had between two and three years to do so—as opposed to six months—and therefore his first claim, filed one year, 10 months after the alleged beating, was timely. His argument seems to be that since the statutes of limitations for all of his claims ranged from two to three years, that is how long he had to present his claims to the Board. This conflation of the statute of limitations and the claim presentation deadline is erroneous. The trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the state law claims without leave to amend. Coryell is incorrect on both his points, and we conclude the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the state law claims on this ground without leave to amend.
The law is well-established. Before an inmate may pursue a personal injury claim for money or damages against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or its employees, he or she must present a claim to the Board within six months of the date on which the claim accrued. (§§ 911.2, subd. (a), 945.4; Olden v. Hatchell (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1034; Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1061.) " 'Compliance with the claims provisions is mandatory.' " (Castaneda, supra, at p. 1061.) Coryell does not offer any law or coherent analysis to contradict the well-established law that required him to timely present a tort claim to the Board. His state law claims were for money and damages and he was therefore required to comply with the Government Claims Act's claim presentation requirements.
Under section 911.2, subdivision (a), "[a] claim relating to a cause of action for ... injury to person or to personal property ... shall be presented ... not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action."
An inmate who misses the six-month claim-presentation deadline may apply to the Board for leave to file a late claim. (§ 911.4.) If the Board denies the application, the inmate may petition the superior court for leave to file a late claim like Coryell did here. (§ 946.6, subds. (a), (c).) The inmate must establish, among other things, that (1) the failure to present a timely claim was due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," unless the Board establishes that it would be prejudiced if the court granted the requested relief; or (2) the inmate "was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time specified in Section 911.2 for the presentation of the claim and by reason of that disability failed to present a claim during that time." (§ 946.6, subds. (c)(1), (c)(3).) The claimant has the burden of proving these elements by a preponderance of evidence. (Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 171, 175.) Additionally, and as particularly relevant here, a court may only grant a section 946.6 petition if the plaintiff submits his late claim within one year of the claim's accrual. (J.J. v. County of San Diego (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1221 [filing a late-claim application within one year of accrual of claim is jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief petition].)
Coryell admits his first of several tort claims were not filed until one year, 10 months after the beating, but contends this was timely because he had between two and three years to present a tort claim. He cites Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1, providing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), providing a three-year limitation period for fraud, fraudulent concealment, and negligent misrepresentation claims. He evidently believes the statutes of limitations are coextensive with the claim presentation deadlines codified in the Government Claims Act. He is incorrect.
To be sure, claims for personal injury must be presented to the appropriate government entity "not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action[,]" (§ 911.2) and "accrual" for claim filing purposes is measured by the same rules governing accrual of a cause of action for statute of limitations purposes. (§ 901; Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 906—913.) However, failure to satisfy either the six-month or one-year deadline for presenting his or her claim will cut off a plaintiff's right to proceed against a public entity, regardless of the length of the statute of limitations. In other words, even though the claim filing requirement and the statute of limitations for filing suit may accrue simultaneously for a cause of action, a longer statute of limitations will not extend the shorter claim filing deadline. Coryell's admitted failure to satisfy either the six-month or one-year presentation deadlines operates as an incurable bar to his recovery on the state law causes of action.
Additionally, Coryell argues the continuing violation doctrine applies in his case to extend the claim presentation deadline. This doctrine, largely developed in the employment discrimination context, "allows liability for unlawful employer conduct occurring outside the statute of limitations if it is sufficiently connected to unlawful conduct within the limitations period." (Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 802 (Richards); Banke et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial, Statute of Limitations (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 3:70:3.) In other words, the doctrine allows a plaintiff to " 'aggregate[] a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them.' " (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1124.)
In employment discrimination cases, the doctrine applies "if the employer's unlawful actions are (1) sufficiently similar in kind[...]; (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not acquired a degree of permanence." (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 802, 823.)
Coryell asserts in conclusory fashion that the continuing violation doctrine applies here to extend the claim presentation deadline to two years from the date of accrual of his cause of action, and since his initial claim was filed within those two years, every other claim arising out of the beating is also timely. However, Coryell's briefing does not even set forth the elements of the continuing violation doctrine, much less analyze how the facts of his case satisfy any of the elements, nor explain if or how the doctrine applies in the personal injury context. In sum, he has not demonstrated that the continuing violation doctrine applies here.
The trial court correctly determined it was too late for Coryell to cure the defects regarding the tardy presentation of his state law tort claims. Coryell's failure to satisfy either the six-month or one-year deadline irretrievably has cut off his ability to proceed on any of his state law claims, and therefore this ground was sufficient by itself to deny leave to amend the state law claims.
IV. Failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986
Coryell argues the trial court erroneously sustained the demurrer on the ground that it failed to state a claim for civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. sections 1985 and 1986. We address this issue, even though we do not need to in light of our resolution of the foregoing issues, because these appear to be the principal statutes Coryell relies on to construct his claims. We agree with the trial court Coryell has failed to state a cause of action under these two federal statutes.
"Section 1985 proscribes conspiracies to interfere with certain civil rights." (Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept. (9th Cir. 1988) 839 F.2d 621, 626 (Karim-Panahi).) To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3), which is obviously the subsection Coryell relies on, plaintiffs must allege four elements: "(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." (Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp. (9th Cir. 1992) 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (Sever).)
The trial court ruled the FAC did not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3) because it did not allege that a conspiracy existed, that Coryell was denied equal protection of the law or of equal protection of privilege and immunities under the law, or that there existed a discriminatory animus. The court also recognized there must be a 42 U.S.C. section 1985 claim in order to state a 42 U.S.C. section 1986 claim. We conclude Coryell did not allege either the existence of a conspiracy with sufficient specificity or discriminatory animus.
For the first element, a 42 U.S.C. section 1985 claim "must allege facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient." (Karim-Panahi, supra, 839 F.2d at p. 626.) Under the second element, in addition to identifying a legally protected right, a plaintiff must demonstrate a deprivation of that right motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." (Griffin v. Breckenridge (1971) 403 U.S. 88, 102.) In the Ninth Circuit, 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3) is extended beyond race "only when the class in question can show that there has been a governmental determination that its members 'require and warrant special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights.' " (Schultz v. Sundberg (9th Cir. 1985) 759 F.2d 714, 718 (Schultz); see also McCalden v. California Library Ass'n (9th Cir. 1990) 955 F.2d 1214, 1223, superceded by rule on other grounds as recognized in Harmston v. City and County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 1273, 1279—1280 [plaintiff must be a member of a class that requires special federal assistance in protecting its civil rights].) "More specifically, we require 'either that the courts have designated the class in question a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring more exacting scrutiny or that Congress has indicated through legislation that the class required special protection.' " (Sever, supra, 978 F.2d at p. 1536, quoting Schultz, at p. 718.) Importantly, the defendants' actions must have been "motivated by invidiously discriminatory animus" against that protected class. (Orin v. Barclay (9th Cir. 2001) 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 (Orin).) These limitations exist to support the background rule that 42 U.S.C. section 1985 "is not to be construed as a general federal tort law." (Gerritsen v. de la Madrid Hurtado (9th Cir. 1987) 819 F.2d 1511, 1518—1519.)
First, Coryell cannot maintain a 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3) claim against any defendant, individually or as part of a group, because his complaint contains insufficient specific factual allegations supporting the existence of a conspiracy. (See Karim-Panahi, supra, 839 F.2d at p. 626.) While Coryell does allege that multiple defendants harmed him; alleging, for instance, that a group of correctional officers beat him up for informing them he was suicidal, and that a number of prison staff "conspired" to protect the abusive officers from facing discipline or criminal liability, his complaint contains no factual allegations—specific or general—describing any agreement or "meeting of the minds" between or among any of the defendants to violate his rights. (See Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine (9th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3d 916, 929—930 [dismissing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim when plaintiff's complaint was "devoid of any discussion of an agreement ... to violate her constitutional rights"].) We also observe that it is unclear from Coryell's complaint whether he is alleging one grand conspiracy among all the defendants or instead several distinct conspiracies among distinct groups of defendants.
The FAC also does not aver the deprivation Coryell suffered was motivated by discriminatory animus against a protected class to which he belonged. 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3) was enacted as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, and its original purpose "was to enforce the rights of African Americans and their supporters." (Holgate v. Baldwin (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3d 671, 676.) One may argue—though Coryell does not—that 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3) protection nevertheless extends to Coryell because Congress "has indicated through legislation" (Sever, supra, 978 F.2d at p. 1536) that people with mental illnesses require special protections. (See 42 U.S.C. § 10801, containing the statement of purpose of the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act.) But we need not resolve at this juncture whether Coryell's mental illness, which one could argue was inferentially manifested as suicidality on December 12, 2012, qualified him as a member of a class protected by 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3) because nothing in his complaint implies—much less alleges—that any of the defendant's actions were "motivated by invidiously discriminatory animus" against people with mental illness. (See Orin, supra, 272 F.3d at p. 1217.) Coryell clearly identifies the motivation for the unlawful beating he allegedly suffered as being that the correctional officers were upset at the inconvenience Coryell caused them by saying he was suicidal. The complaint nowhere suggests any defendant harbored ill will towards Coryell because he suffered from a mental illness or was suicidal. (See Manistee Town Center v. City of Glendale (9th Cir. 2000) 227 F.3d 1090, 1095 ["A cause of action under the first clause of § 1985(3) cannot survive a motion to dismiss absent an allegation of class-based animus."].)
Because we agree the FAC does not state a cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1985, we necessarily conclude the FAC also does not state a cause of action for violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1986 because violation of that section requires a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1985. (Taylor v. Mitzel (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 665, 674.)
V. Disqualification of judge
On January 10, 2018, Coryell filed a motion to disqualify the trial court judge, Judge James Oakley. Coryell stated in the pleading caption that the motion was brought under "[Code of Civil Procedure] section 170 et. seq.", and the body of the motion specified he was relying on grounds listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. The motion listed many ways in which Judge Oakley was allegedly "prejudiced and biased" against Coryell, had participated in a conspiracy against Coryell, and had a financial interest in the outcome of the case. His motion asserted disqualification grounds found in Code of Civil Procedure sections 170.1 and 170.6.
Without holding a hearing, Judge Oakley issued a written order designating Coryell's motion a "statement of disqualification" and ordering the statement stricken pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (b). That section allows a judge against whom a statement of disqualification is filed to strike the statement if it is untimely filed or fails to facially disclose legal grounds for disqualification. Judge Oakley struck Coryell's statement on both of these statutory grounds. Coryell argues Judge Oakley had no authority to decide the disqualification question and in any event erred in denying the motion. Unfortunately for Coryell, the time for challenging this issue has passed.
Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) states: "The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding. The petition for the writ shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the court's order determining the question of disqualification. If the notice of entry is served by mail, that time shall be extended as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 1013." (Italics added.) The statute's use of the word "only" means the "expedited [writ] procedure is the exclusive means for reviewing an unsuccessful peremptory challenge filed under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 170.6." (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 522 (Webb), italics added.)
Here, Coryell did not file a writ of mandate seeking review of the January 2018 order denying his Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 and 170.6 challenge. Consequently, he did not comply with the requirements of subdivision (d) of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3. Because that statutory provision states the order is not appealable, we lack the authority in this appeal to address whether the challenge should have been granted or whether a different judge should have decided it. In other words, Coryell "cannot relitigate the [disqualification] issue in the instant appeal." (Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 523.) He should have filed a petition for writ of mandate. He did not, and has therefore forfeited any challenge to Judge Oakley's presiding over the case.
The balance of Coryell's issues are moot.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. Coryell's motion to augment the record is denied.
SNAUFFER, J. WE CONCUR: FRANSON, Acting P.J. SMITH, J.