Opinion
No. CV04-4000627
June 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an appeal from the decision of the defendant Connecticut Department of Banking (a) ordering that the license of the plaintiff to do business as a "first mortgage broker" and a "first mortgage lender" pursuant to General Statutes § 36a-485 et seq. shall be revoked and (b) ordering that the license of the plaintiff to do business as a "secondary mortgage broker" pursuant to General Statutes § 36a-510 not be renewed.
Procedural History
On January 5, 2004, the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Banking issued an Order of Summary Suspension, Notice of Intent to Revoke First Mortgage Lender/Broker License and Notice of Right to Hearing against the plaintiff. On January 5, 2004, the Commissioner also issued a Notice of Intent to Refuse to Renew Secondary Mortgage Broker License and Notice of Right to Hearing against the plaintiff. In regard to both notices of proposed administrative action, the plaintiff demanded an evidentiary hearing. After the hearings in regard to both licensing matters were consolidated, the matter proceeded to an administrative hearing before a Department of Banking hearing officer. That hearing was held on March 18, 2004, and the transcript of that hearing appears in the record as item 1.
Factual Background
On July 25, 2001, the plaintiff was licensed by the Connecticut Department of Banking to engage in the business of making first mortgage loans and the business of acting as a first mortgage broker in Connecticut pursuant to General Statutes § 36a-489. That "first mortgage" license was subsequently renewed. On June 24, 2003, the plaintiff filed a renewal application for a license as a secondary mortgage broker.
The plaintiff's first and secondary loan brokerage activities are carried out under the trade name of Focus Mortgage, a sole proprietorship, which at all times relevant to these proceedings employed three registered loan originators.
Prior to June 2003, Brian Camilleri, a licensed real estate appraiser of Camilleri Appraisal Company, performed approximately 100 real estate appraisals for the plaintiff's loan brokerage business. Both Camilleri and his partner last performed an appraisal for the plaintiff's loan brokerage business in May 2003.
The files of Focus Mortgage were found to contain copies of 14 Appraisal Reports and/or Inspection Reports that purport to be authored by Camilleri, but which Camilleri did not prepare or sign. They contained forged signatures. The commissioner found that Focus Mortgage had submitted forged Camilleri appraisal/inspection reports to a lender (Provident Funding Associates, L.P.) in regard to six of its loan transactions. Those forged Camilleri appraisal/inspection reports relied on by the commissioner are found in the record.
While the evidence showed that the forged appraisals were "submitted" to Provident by Focus Mortgage, nothing in the administrative record shows that those documents were created by anyone at Focus Mortgage, and there was no evidence that it was the plaintiff, Frederick Cornelius, who personally created or transmitted any of the forged appraisals. Thus, while the name "Focus Mortgage" appears on certain of the loan documentation connected with the subject appraisal reports, the name of Frederick Cornelius does not. The commissioner's decision concludes that Focus Mortgage submitted the forged appraisals in connection with loans that it had brokered, the decision expressly states that "the record did not establish whether respondent personally forged the appraisals or whether the forgery was done by an employee."
Standard of Review
The scope of the Superior Court's review of administrative decisions is well-established. "Judicial Review of [an administrative agency's] action is governed by the [UAPA] . . . and the scope of that review is very restricted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 253 Conn. 661, 668, 757 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1089, 148 L.Ed.2d 963 (2001).
The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decision are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
General Statutes § 4-183(j).
Our State Supreme Court has provided guidance for a trial court's review of an administrative agency's findings of fact.
Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable . . . [T]he trial court may [not] retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact . . . Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 253 Conn. 676.
The requirement in C.G.S. § 4-183(j) that an agency decision must be supported by "substantial evidence on the whole record" has been interpreted as follows:
The substantial evidence rule governs judicial review of administrative fact-finding under the UAPA . . . An administrative finding supported by substantial evidence if the record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred . . . The substantial evidence rule imposes an important limitation on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency . . . and to provide a more restrictive standard of review than standards embodying review of weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous action . . . [S]ubstantial evidence . . . is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 253 Conn. 676-77.
"The determination of whether substantial evidence exists is subject to de novo review by [the] court." Labenski v. Goldberg, 33 Conn.App. 727, 733, 638 A.2d 614 (1994). Further, the court must search the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the agency's findings of fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. See Dolgner v. Alander, 237 Conn. 272, 283, 676 A.2d 865 (1996). Most importantly, "[i]n determining whether an administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence, a court must defer to the agency's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and to the agency's right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in part." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bancroft v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn.App. 391, 400, 710 A.2d 807 (1998).
Judicial review of the conclusions of law reached administratively is also limited. The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion . . . Although the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law . . . it is the well established practice of this court to accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement . . . Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, supra, 253 Conn. 669.
The rules of statutory construction apply to administrative agencies. See Preston v. DEP, 218 Conn. 821, 829, n. 9 591 A.2d 421 (1991). One such rule provides, "that when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny . . . the agency is not entitled to special deference . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dortenzio v. Freedom of Information Commission, 48 Conn.App. 424, 430-31, 710 A.2d 801 (1998). A presumption of validity attaches to the actions of an administrative official. Huck v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 537, 525 A.2d 940 (1987). The burden, therefore, is on the plaintiff to establish his claim that the commissioner's decision was arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion; see Griffin v. Muzio, 10 Conn.App. 90, 94, 521 A.2d 607, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 805 (1987); and that the decision was not based on reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record. See General Statutes § 4-183(j)(5).
Analysis
After conducting a public hearing, the Commissioner revoked the plaintiff's first mortgage lender/broker license and refused to renew the plaintiff's secondary mortgage broker license. The commissioner properly determined that the plaintiff's submission of false appraisals in support of mortgage loan applications fully supported the finding that the plaintiff could not operate his mortgage broker business soundly and efficiently, in the public interest and consistent with the purposes of the First and Secondary Mortgage Acts as outlined in General Statutes Chapters 668 part 1(A) and (B).
Based on the evidence, the hearing officer determined ". . . the record establishes that respondent submitted at least six appraisals in support of mortgage loan applications that were not prepared or signed by the person who purportedly prepared and signed them." The plaintiff's response to the charge of submitting false appraisals was not convincing. In his brief in this appeal, the plaintiff acknowledges the state agency was entitled to infer that this was done by somebody at Focus Mortgage. Plaintiff's claim is that there is no finding as to which person in fact created the forged documents and submitted them to the lender. The court finds, however, there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the fact that the plaintiff submitted forged documents.
In ruling on the issue regarding the submission of forged documents, the hearing officer found:
While the record did not establish whether the Respondent personally forged the appraisals or whether the forgery was done by an employee, "courts have repeatedly held that licensees are responsible for the acts of their employees." Ford Dealers Ass'n v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal.3d 347, 360; 650 P.2d 328, 335 (1982). See also, NME Properties, Inc. v. Rudich, 840 So.2d 309 (2003). In California Ass'n of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Servs., 16 Cal.4th 284, 295; 940 P.2d 323, 330 (1997), the court observed that the rule of nondelegable duties of licensees was "akin to the rule of respondeat superior in tort law," a doctrine that is recognized by Connecticut courts. See, Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480 (1995). "The essential justification for . . . [the] rule [of nondelegable duties of licensees] is one of ensuring accountability of licensees so as to safeguard the public welfare . . . [and] the prevention of future harm to the public by giving the licensees strong incentives to ensure that their employees' conduct conforms to law." California Ass'n of Health Facilities, supra at 296, 330. Moreover, under Section 36-494(a)(1)(B), a license may be revoked based on a finding that a licensee or an employee or agent of the licensee misrepresented the material particulars of a first mortgage loan transaction. (Mem. pages 19-20.)
Connecticut courts have not previously considered the liability of a licensee for the acts of its employees, but the case law of other states is instructive.
In Ford Dealers Association v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal.3d. 347, 650 P.2d 328 (1982), the issue involved a statute that prohibited the holders of automobile dealer licenses from disseminating untrue or misleading statements to the public. The Ford Dealers Association contended that this statute did not authorize the imposition of penalties against licensed automobile dealers for the statements of the dealers' employees. In rejecting the Ford Dealers Association's claim, the court found:
The courts have repeatedly held that licensees are responsible for the acts of their employees. The licensee, if he elects to operate his business through employees must be responsible to the licensing authority for their conduct in the exercise of his license . . . By virtue of the ownership of a . . . license such owner has a responsibility to see to it that the license is not used in violation of law . . . The settled rule that licensees can be held liable for the acts of their employees comports with the general law governing principal-agent liability. An agent represents his principal for all purposes within the scope of his actual or ostensible authority . . ." (Civ. Code § 2330.) When a licensed dealer places salespeople in the position to work with customers, the dealer is responsible for the actions of those employees.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 360.
Additionally, California Association of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Services, 16 Cal.4th 284, 940 P.2d 323 (1997), involved the vicarious liability of nursing home licensees for the acts of their employees. In ruling on whether a nursing home licensee could be held liable for the misconduct of its employees, the court found:
the imposition of nondelegable duties on licensees is also a recognition of the reality that many entities subject to administrative regulation are, regardless of the precise form of ownership, corporate ones that can only act through their agents and employees. Thus to speak of the liability of the licensee without referring to the liability of the licensee's employees and agents would often be a meaningless abstraction and would make the enforcement of administrative regulations a virtual impossibility.
Id. at 296.
The Connecticut Supreme Court has determined:
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master is liable for the wilful torts of his servant committed within the scope of the servant's employment and in furtherance of his master's business . . . The master is not held on any theory that he personally interferes to cause the injury. It is simply on the ground of public policy, which requires that he shall be held responsible for the acts of those whom he employs, done in and about his business, even though such acts are directly in conflict with the orders which he has given them on the subject . . . [I]n order to hold an employer liable for the intentional torts of his employee, the employee must be acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the employer's business. But it must be the affairs of the principal, and not solely the affairs of the agent, which are being furthered in order for the doctrine to apply.
Larsen Chelsea Realty Company v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 500-01, 656 A.2d 1009 (1995). (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In this case, forged documents were submitted to lenders in support of loan applications by the "licensee," Focus Mortgage. Whether these forged appraisal reports were personally submitted by Frederick Cornelius, or submitted by one of his employees, the fact is that these documents were submitted in the course of and in the furtherance of the plaintiff's mortgage lender/broker business.
The plaintiff's persistent claim that no harm was caused is not persuasive. Although no evidence of harm was established, the commissioner nonetheless has an obligation pursuant to §§ 36a-489(a) and 36a-513(c) to ensure that a licensee's business is operated soundly and efficiently in the public interest and consistent with the purposes of the First and Secondary Mortgage Acts. It is not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or erroneous for the commissioner to make the determination that the submission by a licensee of false documents to support mortgage loan applications supports a finding that the "character, reputation, integrity and general fitness" of the licensee is not such as to warrant a belief that such licensee's business would be operated soundly and efficiently in the public interest.
The Notice Claim
The plaintiff claims that the commissioner failed to afford him adequate due process of law because in the commissioner's Notice of Intent to Revoke First Mortgage/Broker License, the Commissioner did not inform him that his license revocation could be based on conduct of his employees or agents and not necessarily on his own personal conduct.
The commissioner's order of Summary Suspension, Notice of Intent to Revoke First Mortgage Lender/Broker License and Notice of Right to Hearing ("Notice") apprised the plaintiff as follows:
General Statutes Section 36a-494(a)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes, states, in pertinent part, that: The commissioner may . . . revoke . . . any [first mortgage lender/broker] license, in accordance with the provisions of section 36a-51, for any reason which would be sufficient grounds for the commissioner to deny an application for a license under sections 36a-485 to 36a-498, inclusive, or if the commissioner finds that the licensee . . . has done any of the following: . . . (B) committed any fraud . . . or misrepresented, concealed, suppressed, intentionally omitted or otherwise intentionally failed to disclose any of the material particulars of any first mortgage loan transaction, including disclosures required by subdivision (6) of subsection (a) of section 36a-493, or part III of chapter 669 or regulations adopted pursuant thereto, to anyone entitled to such information . . .
The plaintiff argues that because the Department utilized an ellipsis after the word "licensee," it chose not to rely on the language in the ellipsed section, which reads "or any proprietor, director, officer, member, partner, shareholder, trustee, employee or agent of such licensee." General Statutes § 36a-494(a)(1) consequently, the plaintiff alleges that he was not put on notice that he could be held accountable for actions of an "employee or agent of such licensee."
With regard to "notice" General Statutes § 4-122(a) provides:
(a) When the grant, denial or renewal of a license is required to be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing, the provisions of this chapter concerning contested cases apply.
General Statutes § 4-177 provides the general notice requirements for contested cases as follows:
(a) In a contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice.
(b) The notice shall be in writing and shall include: (1) A statement of the time, place, and nature of the hearing; (2) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held; (3) a reference to the particular sections of the statutes and regulations involved; and (4) a short and plain statement of the matters asserted. If the agency or party is unable to state the matters in detail at the time the notice is served, the initial notice may be limited to a statement of the issues involved. Therefore, upon application, a more definite and detailed statement shall be furnished.
General Statutes § 4-182(c), however, provides in relevant part:
(c) No revocation, suspension, annulment or withdrawal of any license is lawful unless, prior to the institution of agency proceedings, the agency gave notice by mail to the licensee of facts or conduct which warrant the intended action . . .
"The stricter notice requirements . . . are a function of the more compelling private interest involved" in revocation proceedings. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Levinson v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 211 Conn. 508, 534, 560 A.2d 403 (1989). "In such circumstances, due process requires that the notice given must advise the party of the facts or conduct alleged to be in violation of the law and must fairly indicate the legal theory under which such facts are claimed to constitute a violation of the law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 535.
The plaintiff's claim that the Notice of Revocation and Right to a Hearing failed to satisfy the due process clause cannot prevail. The Notice contained a concise description of the factual allegations asserted in paragraph 4 on page 2 as well as the statutory basis for license revocation as required by the UAPA. The plaintiff, Frederick Cornelius dba Focus Mortgage, a sole proprietorship, is the licensee. The commissioner only has recourse against his licensees. A licensee doing business as a sole proprietorship includes actions of the licensee's employees. The attempt to distinguish the plaintiff as an individual from his dba Focus Mortgage while novel, does not withstand analysis.
Moreover, since this matter involves a license revocation of the "licensee," the plaintiff was apprised of the charges asserted, and the specific violation of law via an obligatory § 4-182(c) notice issued prior to the issuance of the order of Summary Suspension and Notice of Intent to Revoke First Mortgage Lender/Broker License. (See Exhibit 30.) This notice stated with specificity that it appeared the plaintiff, while acting as a mortgage broker, submitted appraisals to various lenders to support loan applications without the knowledge, consent or authorization of the appraiser. Furthermore, said notice stated that "[t]his claim, if proven true would form the basis for the issuance of a notice of intent to revoke FM's licensee pursuant to . . . § 36a-494."
The plaintiff's reading with regard to the punctuation of the subsequent Notice of Intent to revoke the Plaintiff's license is not helpful. The § 4-182(c) Notice would have been sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice of the alleged misconduct, or at the very minimum, that some behavior associated with the plaintiff's business was called into question. The plaintiff, as licensee, must bear responsibility for assuring the commissioner that his "sole proprietorship" is operating in full compliance with the law.
The plaintiff also claims that to hold him vicariously liable for the acts of his employees violates his due process rights because the Notice alleged unlawful conduct by the "licensee" only. In this aspect of his appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the commissioner's decision to revoke the plaintiff's license based on conduct of one or more of his employees is impermissible. The plaintiff argues "[t]o charge on one theory and then find on another about which the plaintiff did not know and against which he was not prepared to defend, is contrary to law and would, in this case, constitute the taking of property without due process of law."
As previously noted, the plaintiff received adequate notice of the misconduct alleged and the statutory violation of law he would be charged with if such misconduct were proven true. This does not appear to the court to constitute a change of theory. Moreover, Hart Twin Volvo Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 42, 327 A.2d 588 (1973), relied upon by the plaintiff, is distinguished from the present case because the offenses alleged in Hart Twin Volvo were "separate and distinct in point of time and in factual detail." Id. at 48. As pointed out by the defendant, in Hart Twin Volvo, the plaintiff was charged with conspiring to defraud a customer in the repair of an oil leak which developed in the customer's car several days after the sale. The basis for the plaintiff's license revocation, however, stemmed from the reduction of the guarantee given on the sale of the car, a charge separate and distinct from the charge provided in the notice. There is no similar situation here.
The General Fitness Claim
The plaintiff asserts that the "general fitness" requirement in General Statutes §§ 36a-489(a) and 36a-513(c) "refers only to the general fitness of 'the applicant,' which in the case of a sole proprietorship necessarily refers to a single individual, and not to others." The plaintiff further claims that to support a finding of unfitness, the commissioner must establish that the licensee intentionally committed misconduct, or was, or should have been aware of wrongdoing by others and chose not to act.
The plaintiff, a sole proprietor, is the licensee. The "character, reputation, integrity and general fitness of the applicant" requirement includes the plaintiff's ability to effectively manage his "sole proprietorship" which includes taking accountability for the transactions performed by his employees.
The hearing officer succinctly outlined the policy of the First Mortgage Act in her decision:
The policy underlying the First Mortgage Act, which was originally enacted as Public Act 85-399, is the protection of the public. Testifying before the banks Committee, Commissioner Woolf stated that the bill, a Department proposal, was needed because the Department had received numerous complaints with respect to first mortgage lenders and believed it was imperative that the Department get jurisdiction over such lenders because of the abuses seen by the Department. (Banks Committee Proc. at 119-20.) Public Act 89-347 amended the First Mortgage Act to extend its licensing and other requirements to first mortgage brokers. Thus, the policy of the First Mortgage Act is to protect the public from possible abuses by nondepository first mortgage lenders and brokers in connection with the making of first mortgage loans. To achieve this public policy, the Commissioner is required by Section 36a-489 to make certain findings regarding the character, reputation, integrity and general fitness of the licensee before issuing or renewing a first mortgage lender or broker license. Section 36a-494(a) ensures the continued protection of the public by authorizing the Commissioner to revoke a license if the licensee, because of its conduct, ceases to meet the licensing standards. (Mem. pages 15-16.)
The plaintiff's reliance on the language of Sage-Allen Co., Inc. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 678-79, 179 A. 195 (1935), does not support his claim of a separation between his personal actions and that of his d/b/a Focus Mortgage which was in fact the "applicant" on his license application.
Multiple Reasons
A reviewing court must sustain an administrative agency's decision if the record contains substantial evidence that will support any one of the reasons given. Adriai v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 228 Conn. 545, 550-51, CT Page 10411 636 A.2d 1360 (1994); Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 226 Conn. 579, 587-88, 628 A.2d 1286 (1993); Laufer v. Conservation Commission, 24 Conn.App. 708, 714-15, 592 A.2d 392 (1991).
The basis on which the hearing officer upheld the revocation of the plaintiff's First Mortgage Lender/Broker License, and non-renewal of the plaintiff's Secondary Mortgage Broker License is clearly set forth in the decision. There is ample evidence supporting the reasons for the revocation and non-renewal of the plaintiff's mortgage lender/broker licenses; namely that because the plaintiff submitted fraudulent documents to support loan applications, the plaintiff lacks the character, reputation, integrity and general fitness to warrant a belief that his business would be operated soundly and efficiently, in the public interest and consistent with the purposes of the First and Secondary Mortgage Broker Acts, pursuant to §§ 36a-494(a) and 36a-517(a).
In this case, the plaintiff has not met his burden of proof that the record lacks substantial evidence supporting the agency's action. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate compliance with the law despite receipt of § 4-182(c) notification of the commissioner's intent to revoke the plaintiff's license. The plaintiff failed to provide rebuttal evidence at the hearing regarding the fraudulent documents submitted by Focus Mortgage. Instead, the plaintiff insists that substantial evidence must prove that Frederick Cornelius personally himself intentionally committed this misconduct or had reason to know that one of his employees committed the misconduct. On the contrary, the plaintiff as the licensee is responsible for the actions of the plaintiff's "sole proprietorship" whether Frederick Cornelius, individually committed the misconduct, or another Focus Mortgage employee has committed the misconduct, as long as the actions were committed in the furtherance of the plaintiff's business. Any other finding by this court would undermine the clear intent and policy of the statutes. Clearly, the submission of appraisals to support mortgage loan applications is directly in the furtherance of the plaintiff's business. The plaintiff's submission of false appraisals, however, misrepresented the material particulars of loan transactions, as well as reflecting adversely on the character and general fitness of the plaintiff's business.
Even if there were some evidence in the record which may tend to support the plaintiff, or suggest that another trier may reach a different conclusion, this is insufficient to overturn the agency's decision.
In challenging an administrative agency action, the plaintiff has the burden of proof. Anthony Augliera, Inc. v. Loughlin, 149 Conn. 478, 482, 181 A.2d 596 (1962); see also Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Conservation Commission, 212 Conn. 710, 718, 563 A.2d 1339 (1989); Lovejoy v. Water Resources Commission, 165 Conn. 224, 229, 332 A.2d 108 (1973). The plaintiff must do more than simply show that another decision maker, such as the trial court, might have reached a different conclusion. Rather than asking the reviewing court to retry the case de novo; Calandro v. Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 439, 440, 408 A.2d 229 (1979); the plaintiff must establish that substantial evidence does not exist in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision. Feinson v. Conservation Commission, 180 Conn. 421, 425, 429 A.2d 910 (1980).
Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, supra, 226 Conn. 587.
As the court stated in Dolgner v. Alander, 237 Conn. 272, 676 A.2d 865 (1996):
We review the issues raised by the plaintiff in accordance with the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the UAPA. Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 164, 635 A.2d 783 (1993); Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 3, 509 A.2d 489 (1986). "Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dufraine v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 250, 259, 673 A.2d 101 (1996); Schallenkamp v. DelPonte, 229 Conn. 31, 40, 639 A.2d 1018 (1994). Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact. Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 781, 93 L.Ed.2d (1986); Connecticut Natural Gas Corp. v. Public Utilities Control Authority, 183 Conn. 128, 134, 439 A.2d 282 (1981). Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 164; New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 773, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988).
Dolgner v. Alander, supra, 237 Conn. 280-81.
In this case, the record amply supports the Commissioner's decision to revoke the plaintiff's First Mortgage Lender/Broker License and not to renew the plaintiff's Secondary Mortgage Broker License.
For these reasons the commissioner's decision is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
Robert C. Leuba, JTR