Opinion
Cause No. IP00-0063-C-M/S
February 27, 2001
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 135's ("Local 135" or the "union") motion for summary judgment on the claim of plaintiffs Beverly Copeland, James MacGregor, and Thomas Springer ("plaintiffs") that it breached its duty of fair representation. After reviewing the parties' arguments, the Court has concluded that an issue of material fact exists with respect to plaintiffs' claim, and that summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the union's motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. PLAINTIFFS' EMPLOYMENT AS CASUAL DRIVERS
Plaintiffs were initially employed as drivers in the transportation department of Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. ("INI"). Joint Stmt. Undisputed Facts ¶ 3. The union had a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with INI and represented all drivers in INI's transportation department. Id. ¶ 1. Approximately 25 to 30 years ago, the union allowed INI to use casual drivers and include them in the bargaining unit. This provided INI with a supplemental pool of labor to fill in for vacancies and to assist with extremely heavy work loads. Id. ¶ 26. All members of the bargaining unit, including the casual drivers, were required to become members of the union and paid the same amount of dues. Id. ¶ 42.
As will be explained later, INI employed both casual drivers and regular drivers. Unlike the regular drivers, casual drivers had no guarantee to specific days or hours of work.
Instead, casual drivers worked on an "on-call" or "as-needed" basis. In addition, casual drivers were not entitled to the same benefits as regular drivers.
Copeland began working as a year-round casual driver in January 1979, MacGregor in May 1977, and Springer in September 1984. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. All three became members of the union shortly after INI hired them. Id. ¶ 7. Virtually all of the casual drivers either held full-time jobs or were retired from INI and used the casual driver positions to supplement their income. Id. ¶ 27. For example, Copeland was an elementary school teacher at Wayne Township Schools until 1996; MacGregor has been a guidance counselor and guidance director at Pike High School for 21 years; and Springer is a guidance director at Southport Middle School. Id. ¶ 9-11. All three worked only part-time as casual drivers for INI during the school year, mainly on the weekends. They worked full-time for INI during the summers. Id. ¶ 12. In contrast, the majority of the regular full-time and part-time drivers relied upon their INI jobs as their primary source of income. Id. at ¶ 28.
Plaintiffs did not attend monthly union meetings, never sought an elective office in the union, and never campaigned against any officer of the union. Id. ¶ 34. MacGregor and Springer never filed a grievance during their tenure with INI. Id. ¶ 35. Copeland filed at least three grievances, and the union assisted her in obtaining a favorable result in two of her grievances. Id. ¶ 36.
B. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CASUAL AND REGULAR DRIVERS
In accordance with the CBA, casual drivers received the same hourly rate of pay as the regular drivers. Id. ¶ 13. Casual drivers also received employer contributions to the negotiated pension plan if they worked at least 1,000 hours in a calendar year. Id. ¶ 14. Casual drivers did not, however, receive the same benefits as the regular drivers. For example, they did not receive health insurance coverage, personal days, or paid vacations, but did receive holiday pay if scheduled to work on a holiday. Unlike the regular drivers, casual drivers had no guarantee to specific days or hours of work. Schmidt Aff. ¶ 5. Instead, casual drivers worked on an "on-call" or "as-needed" basis. Id. Casual drivers also did not have the same seniority rights as regular drivers, but had a separate seniority list. Regular drivers had superior job bidding rights. Stmt. of Undisputed Facts ¶ 15. When new collective bargaining agreements were reached with INI, the agreements frequently provided a signing bonus for regular drivers, but not for casual drivers. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. In 1995, INI offered buyouts to regular drivers, but not to casual drivers. Id. ¶ 18.
Plaintiffs each received periodic negative comments from full-time drivers, including union stewards, regarding those rights and entitlements they did enjoy as casual drivers. MacGregor Dep. at 29-33.
On various occasions, INI offered plaintiffs employment as regular drivers as positions became available. Id. ¶ 19. MacGregor and Springer turned down these offers each time due to their jobs with the schools. Id. ¶ 20. Copeland accepted such an offer and worked for several months in 1981 or 1982, but was unable to continue because of her teaching position. Copeland turned down similar offers of regular employment with INI because of her other occupation. Id. ¶ 21.
C. INI CLOSES ITS TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT AND ENTERS TERMINATION AGREEMENT WITH THE UNION
In 1999, INI decided to close its transportation department and subcontract the work to an outside company known as Penske Logistics, Inc. Id. ¶ 22. As part of this closure, INI and the union negotiated an agreement known as the Termination Agreement with an effective date of October 1, 1999. Id. ¶ 23. The Agreement provided for the payment of severance pay and certain benefits to regular employees of the INI transportation department. Id. ¶ 24. It appears that INI initially notified all drivers — including the casual drivers — that they would receive severance pay. Copeland Aff. ¶ 7. However, the Agreement ultimately did not provide for the payment of severance pay to casual employees. Joint Stmt. Undisputed Facts ¶ 25. At the time of the Agreement, INI employed 62 regular drivers and 21 casual drivers. All were members of the bargaining unit. Id. ¶ 29.
All casual drivers had access to a bulletin board in the driver's room where notices regarding union business were posted. Copeland Dep. at 16; MacGregor Dep. at 20-21; Springer Dep. at 24. According to the union, it posted on this bulletin board notices of its meetings wherein the Termination Agreement was to be discussed. Schmidt Aff. ¶ 17. Although they regularly examined the bulletin board for union and company notices, plaintiffs never saw any notices regarding meetings where the Termination Agreement was to be discussed. Plaintiffs believe they would have seen such notices if they were posted. In addition, the union portion of the bulletin board had a Plexiglass cover so that notices could not be added or removed improperly. MacGregor Dep. at 20-21, 25, 28, 47-49; Springer Dep. at 24. Paul Jansen was the only casual driver who attended any of the union meetings regarding the Termination Agreement. Joint Stmt. Undisputed Facts ¶ 32. Severance pay was not an issue at any of the union meetings where the Termination Agreement was discussed. Id. ¶ 33.
Roger Brock was a member of the negotiating committee representing all the drivers when INI terminated its employment of both the casual and regular drivers. Copeland Aff. ¶ 3. At least twice before the union entered the Termination Agreement, Copeland discussed with Brock that the union needed to represent the casual drivers with respect to severance negotiations. Brock told Copeland that the committee would not negotiate on the casual drivers' behalf because it might have a negative effect on their own benefits. Id. ¶ 4. When Copeland complained to Brock that the casual drivers paid the same dues and should also receive severance payment, Brock indicated that he would not change his opinion. Id. ¶ 5. As a driver of 25 years, Brock received an award of a full year's pay and an additional $2,000 bonus. This was one of the highest awards. The only higher award would have been an additional $1,000. Ex. 5.
D. THE UNION NEGOTIATES A CBA WITH PENSKE
The union negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement with Penske. Joint Stmt. Undisputed Facts ¶ 37. During contract negotiations it was agreed that Penske would employ all the regular and casual drivers formerly employed by INI who applied for employment with Penske. Id. ¶ 41. In fact, Penske hired many of the regular and casual drivers who had previously been employed by INI, including plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 38. The CBA with Penske provided that the regular drivers would receive a $500 bonus, but that casual drivers would not get that benefit. Id. ¶ 39. The CBA with Penske also did not provide casual drivers with pension benefits, health insurance, or paid vacations, but it did allow them to receive holiday pay. Casual drivers also received employer contributions to the negotiated pension plan if they work at least 1,000 hours in a calendar year. Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiffs have not challenged the union's actions with respect to the negotiation of this agreement. Their only contention is with the union's failure to negotiate on their behalf with respect to severance pay under the Termination Agreement. With that in mind, the Court will now address the parties' arguments.
II. STANDARDS A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment — even when in dispute. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
B. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
A union violates its duty of fair representation to the employees it represents only if its actions are "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith . . ." Griffin v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 32 F.3d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir. 1994), quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). This is a tripartite standard; a court should look to each element when determining whether a union violated its duty. Id., citing Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 77 (1991). Therefore, `[t]he three separate levels of inquiry under this standard are as follows: (1) did the union act arbitrarily; (2) did the union act discriminatorily; or (3) did the union act in bad faith." Id., citing Ooley v. Schwitzer Div., Household Mfg. Inc., 961 F.2d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 872 (1992). To defend against the union's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs must point the Court to record evidence supporting any one or all of these elements. Id., citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
III. DISCUSSION
The first issue the Court must resolve is whether the union's decision to pursue severance benefits on behalf of only the regular drivers was arbitrary. The Supreme Court has noted that the arbitrary prong of the fair representation analysis is very deferential. Griffin, 32 F.3d at 1083, citing O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 76-79. The Court's examination of whether the union's conduct was arbitrary looks to the objective adequacy of the union's conduct. Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium, Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir. 1997). "It is not the court's role to second-guess tactical decisions made by employees' duly appointed bargaining representative. We only begin to inquire into such decisions when there is evidence that they are `so far outside a wide range of reasonableness, that the actions rise to the level of irrational and arbitrary conduct.'" Griffin, 32 F.3d at 1083, citing Ooley, 961 F.2d at 1302, quoting O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
INI's elimination of the driver jobs in its transportation department deprived the regular drivers of their primary source of income. In contrast, the casual drivers lost only their "on the side" jobs. This led the union to believe that the regular drivers had a greater need for severance pay. As a result, the union determined that it would only seek severance pay for the regular drivers, not the casual drivers. Schmidt Aff. ¶ 5. This decision obviously did not sit well with at least some of the casual drivers. Any time a union must decide a controversial issue, its decision is likely to provoke dissension. That alone, however, does not make the union's decision irrational, arbitrary, or outside the wide range of reasonableness.
The union claims that it simply "listened to the voice of the majority, who happened to be the regular employees." Union's Brief at p. 22. It also correctly cites cases upholding unions' disparate treatment of distinct classes of workers where there was a rational basis for doing so. Assuming that allowing casual drivers to receive severance pay would have diminished the amount of severance pay available to the regular drivers, the union's decision in this case appears to have been rational. At least one union negotiator, Roger Brock, believed that to be the case. Brock, who was a regular driver, told Copeland that the union would not negotiate on the casual drivers' behalf because it might have a negative effect on the regular drivers' benefits. Brock apparently believed there was a fixed amount of money available for severance benefits, and that if the union secured severance benefits for the casual drivers the regular drivers would receive a smaller piece of the pie.
But that was not necessarily the case. Instead, plaintiffs have submitted a letter from INI's Vice President of Circulation and Distribution stating that the company "has proposed a separation incentive in the range of $10,000 to $40,000 (depending on years of service). If the drivers remain as Star/News employees, any obligation for a buyout or separation incentive expires after October 1, 1999." Ex. A Copeland Affidavit. Based on this letter, it appears that INI was willing to offer all employees severance pay in the range of $10,000 to $40,000. Assuming that were true, then securing severance benefits for the casual employees would have had no impact whatsoever on the regular drivers' severance packages. There would have been no reason to "listen to the majority," because there is no evidence that their entitlement to severance benefits was tied in any way to whether or not the casual employees received such benefits. In that situation, there would have been no basis for Brock's and the union's flat refusal to negotiate on behalf of the casual drivers.
Again, the Court is well aware that its role is not to second-guess the union's tactical decisions. In this case, however, for the union's decision to have been rational it must have rested on the assumption that there was only a fixed amount of money available for all severance packages. That assumption simply finds no support in the record. Maybe the union knew more than it is telling the Court — maybe INI actually told it that there would be a fixed amount of money available for severance pay and that it would have to determine how to divide it among its members. But there is no evidence of that fact. To the contrary, the only document in the record that speaks to the issue — the letter from INI — declares that the company was prepared to offer $10,000 to $40,000 in severance pay to all employees. Assuming that were the case, there is at least a question of fact as to whether the union's refusal to negotiate on behalf of the casual drivers was irrational and arbitrary. As a result, summary judgment is inappropriate and the Court DENIES the union's motion. Because the Court has determined that an issue of material fact exists with respect to whether the union's conduct was arbitrary, it need not discuss whether it was also discriminatory or made in bad faith.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court has concluded that a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to plaintiffs' claim against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. Accordingly, the union's motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED