Summary
In Cooper the vehicle did not have a visible VIN on the dash board, on the driver's door jam, or anywhere else that manufacturers place the visible numbers.
Summary of this case from City of Margate v. SinghOpinion
No. 90-342.
September 12, 1991.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Orange County, Michael F. Cycmanick, J.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Lyle Hitchens, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and James N. Charles, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
Appellant Dennis Cooper appeals his conviction on two counts of possession of a motor vehicle with a removed vehicle identification number in violation of section 319.33(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes (1989). We affirm.
Section 319.33(1)(d) provides that it is an offense to possess a motor vehicle "on which the motor number or vehicle identification number has been . . . removed . . . with knowledge of such . . . removal. . . ." The evidence reveals that on two different dates the appellant possessed a motor vehicle with the visible identification number removed. The evidence also shows that the appellant's vehicle did not have a visible identification number on the driver's side of the dash, on the area of the back side of the driver's door, or at any other area where manufacturers place the visible number. The trial court instructed the jury that it is "unlawful to possess in this state a motor vehicle on which a vehicle identification number has been . . . removed. . . ."
Section 319.33(1)(d) makes it an offense to possess a motor vehicle on which the motor number or vehicle identification number has been destroyed, removed, covered, altered, or defaced with knowledge of such removal except as provided in section 319.30(3), which exception is not applicable.
Appellant contends that the trial court's refusal to grant his request for an instruction which refers to the removal of "the" vehicle identification number and to instead instruct the jury that it is illegal to remove "a" vehicle identification number was erroneous because, even if the visible vehicle identification number has been removed from a vehicle, it is legal to possess a vehicle as long as the concealed vehicle identification number remains on the vehicle. We reject this contention.
It is clear that the legislative intent for section 319.33(1)(d) was to provide for ready ascertainment of a vehicle identification number in order to deter thefts and that removal of the visible identification number is a violation of this section even if the concealed identification number is not removed. To accept appellant's interpretation would render the statute of little or no effect. The statute refers to removal of the vehicle identification number and not to removal of the vehicle identification numbers. It would take a very convoluted statutory construction to interpret the words "the vehicle identification number" to read "the vehicle identification numbers". Although a penal statute must be strictly construed, it must not be construed so strictly as to emasculate the statute and defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and bring about an unreasonable or absurd result. Martin v. State, 367 So.2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). A statute should be construed so as to give effect to the evident legislative intent. Griffis v. State, 356 So.2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1978).
AFFIRMED.
GOSHORN, C.J., concurs.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents with opinion.
I respectfully dissent.
Appellant was stopped by a deputy sheriff for failing to maintain a single lane and the van appellant was driving was seized and impounded by the deputy because no vehicle identification number (VIN) could be found. Later, it was found and the vehicle was ultimately returned to appellant. Apparently appellant was not arrested for any crime relating to the lack of a VIN plate. About three weeks later the same deputy saw appellant again driving the same van and because the deputy knew from his previous encounter that appellant's driver license was suspended he again stopped appellant.
The question on appeal, as explained by the majority opinion, is whether the trial judge was correct in instructing the jury regarding the applicable statute. As far as that is concerned I am simply in disagreement with the trial judge and the two judges of this court who are of the opinion that the jury instruction was correct. It was proved at trial that the vehicle had, at one time, at least two VIN's. One was removed when the van was rebuilt and painted and the other remained on the vehicle. The legislature did not say which VIN must remain on the vehicle and I don't think it is up to judges or juries to decide what is best. In fact I would say the "hidden" VIN, which is harder to locate than the visible one, is the most critical one for crime-stopping purposes. If the evil to be prevented is the taking-apart and reassembling of stolen vehicles by "chop shops," and I believe that it is, then the hidden VIN is the important one. But, of course, what I think does not matter because it is up to the legislature to define crimes and to do so precisely. It is not up to judges or juries to speculate as to what really was intended and then decide accordingly.
Would it that appellant had attacked the statute for vagueness, or challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.