Opinion
C. A. 3:21-2739-MGL-PJG
05-04-2022
Jimmy-Joe Cooley, Plaintiff, v. Gary L. Martin, Jr., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jimmy-Joe Cooley, a self-represented litigant, filed this civil rights action in the Kershaw County Court of Common Pleas. Defendant Gary L. Martin, Jr. removed this action on August 25, 2021. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Martin's motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 16.) Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Cooley of the summary judgment and dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to the defendant's motion. (ECF No. 18.) Cooley filed a response in opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 27.) Having carefully reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes that Martin's motion should be granted.
The court directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on whether this case should be stayed pursuant to Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). (ECF No. 30.) Only Martin provided a supplemental brief. (ECF No. 33.) In light of the court's recommendation, the court need not address this issue.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are either undisputed or are taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, to the extent they find support in the record. Cooley was arrested by the Kershaw County Sheriff's Office on June 18, 2021 for two counts of pointing and presenting a firearm in violation of South Carolina Code § 16-23-410. Cooley was arrested after a motorist and his passenger complained to City of Camden Police that a black Hyundai Sonata with chrome rims pulled up beside them on a highway and the white male in a blue tank top pointed a black handgun at them in an apparent road-rage incident. Shortly thereafter, the police stopped Cooley who was driving a black Hyundai Sonata with chrome rims in the vicinity of the incident. Sergeant Brandon Hudson of the Kershaw County Sheriff's Office met the police at the scene. Cooley was wearing a blue tank top and had a black handgun tucked into the waistband of his pants. Cooley admitted to Sergeant Hudson that he was involved in a road-rage incident with the victims but claimed that he only flipped-off the victims and did not point his handgun at them. Sergeant Hudson took a picture of Cooley and sent it to Deputy Martin of the Kershaw County Sheriff's Office, who was talking to the victims. The victims confirmed that Cooley was the person who pointed the gun at them. Sergeant Hudson placed Cooley under arrest, seized Cooley's gun, and transported Cooley to the Kershaw County Detention Center. Subsequently, Defendant Deputy Martin applied for and obtained from a county magistrate arrest warrants for pointing and presenting a firearm. Those charges remain pending in the Kershaw County Court of General Sessions.
On July 19, 2021-the day after his arrest-Cooley filed this action in the Kershaw County Court of Common Pleas. On a one-page complaint form, Cooley wrote “Treason and Deprivation of rights under color of law. Officer Martin denied my rights to due process and as a State Citizen.” (Compl., ECF No. 1-1 at 5.) Cooley indicated he sought $7,500 in damages, the return of his handgun and ammunition, and to have his charges dismissed and removed from his record. In a typed letter attached to the Complaint, Cooley indicated he was suing Martin for violations of his constitutional rights, specifically mentioning his rights to due process and equal protection.
Cooley further claims he was “falsely detained, arrested, kidnapped, imprisoned, ” and had his property “vandalized and stolen.” (Id. at 7.)
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party may support or refute that a material fact is not disputed by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the evidence of the nonmoving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Martin's Motion for Summary Judgment
In his Complaint, Cooley does not expressly identify a legal cause of action. In accordance with the court's duty to liberally construe pro se complaints, the court construes it as asserting a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and imprisonment and an unlawful seizure of property in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that claims for false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); see also Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment, rather than the “more generalized notion” of due process is the proper constitutional standard for evaluating pre- trial conduct of law enforcement officers). A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
To the extent Cooley asks the court to dismiss his charges or otherwise interfere in his ongoing criminal prosecution, such relief is not available in a § 1983 action. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (stating § 1983 is not the proper vehicle to challenge the validity or duration of confinement). Nor would that relief be available if the court construed this matter as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (providing that federal habeas corpus cannot be used to dismiss an indictment or prevent a prosecution). Regardless, the court generally may not equitably interfere with a state criminal proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971); Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, any claim based on Cooley's assertion that the arrest warrants obtained by Defendant Martin were not supported by probable cause would be premature, as Cooley's criminal charges remain pending. See Nivens, 319 F.3d at 153 (stating that Younger abstention is appropriate where the state court provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claim); see also Humbert v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. City, 866 F.3d 546, 555 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating that a plaintiff raising a § 1983 claim based on defective arrest warrants must show that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor).
Martin argues that Cooley cannot put forth evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he violated Cooley's constitutional rights in connection with Cooley's arrest because Martin did not arrest Cooley. The court agrees. Cooley does not provide any response to Martin's legal arguments. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Instead, Cooley makes conclusory assertions that Martin deprived him of his rights under color of law and that Martin violated the oath of office, attaching pages of documents that are irrelevant to this case. (Pl.'s Resp., ECF No. 27.) However, the undisputed facts in the record show that Cooley was arrested by Sergeant Hudson, not Martin. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 16-1 at 2-3.) Therefore, on this record, Cooley has failed to forecast evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Martin was personally involved in any deprivation of his constitutional rights in connection with his arrest. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)); see also Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[C]onstitutional torts . . . require a demonstration of both but-for and proximate causation.”).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends that summary judgment be granted as to Cooley's claims asserting an unreasonable arrest and seizure of property in violation of the Fourth Amendment against the defendant. (ECF No. 16.)
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).