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concluding that “a person is not required to allege a specific amount of actual damages that he has already incurred as out-of-pocket expenses to make out a prima facie case under” the KCPA
Summary of this case from In re Am. Med. Collection Agency, Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-002145-MR NO. 2012-CA-002177-MR
05-22-2015
COMPLETE AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR SERVICES APPELLANT v. STEVE CAPPS APPELLEE AND LARRY STIGERS EQUIPMENT, TRAILERS AND TRUCKS, LLC APPELLANT v. STEVE CAPPS; AND C.A.R.S. PROTECTION PLUS, INC. APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT LARRY STIGERS EQUIPMENT, TRAILERS AND TRUCKS, LLC: Paul C. Harnice Sarah J. Bishop Frankfort, Kenutcky BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT C.A.R.S. PROTECTION PLUS, INC.: Mark Wallace Louisville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE STEVE CAPPS: Walter A. Sholar R. Scott Stutler Shepherdsville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODNEY BURESS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00452
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; JONES AND KRAMER, JUDGES. JONES, JUDGE: This appeal is before us following the Bullitt Circuit Court's November 28, 2012, Additional Findings of Fact-Conclusions of Law and Judgment ("November 2012 Judgment"). For the reasons more fully explained below, we AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, VACATE IN PART, and REMAND for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
In February 2003, the Appellee, Steve Capps, purchased a used 1998 Dodge pickup truck from the Appellant, Larry Stigers Equipment, Trailers and Trucks, LLC ("Stigers Trucks"), and a used car limited warranty from the Appellee, C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. ("CARS"). Very shortly thereafter, Capps took the vehicle to a repair shop in Shelbyville, Kentucky, after it became inoperable. The repair technician informed Capps that the truck needed substantial and costly repairs to make it operable. Capps made a claim under the warranty, which CARS denied on the ground that the damage to the vehicle was present prior to the sale.
In May 2003, Capps filed a complaint in Bullitt Circuit Court against Stigers Trucks and CARS seeking damages based on an alleged breach of the warranty contract and for alleged violations of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act ("KCPA"). After substantial discovery, the trial court presided over a bench trial on May 17, 2007. On July 2, 2007, the trial court entered Findings of Fact-Conclusions of Law and a Judgment ("July 2007 Judgment") in favor of Capps. The trial court found that: (1) the CARS warranty covered the needed repairs to the truck; and (2) Stigers Trucks "deceitfully used the CARS warranty as a sales tool to manipulate the plaintiff into buying a truck that was nothing more than a 'lemon.'" With respect to damages, the trial court found that Capps had incurred "storage costs and engine repair costs in the amount of $33,169.00" and "reasonable attorney fees are $7,032.00." The trial court then entered judgment in favor of Capps as follows:
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendants Larry Stigers Equipment, Trailers & Trucks, LLC and the Defendant, C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., jointly and severally, in the amount of $40,201.00. Plaintiff is also awarded his recoverable court costs. This is a final and appealable order. This is no just cause for delay in its entry.
CARS and Stigers Trucks appealed the July 2007 Judgment to our Court. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc. v. Larry Stigers Equipment, Trailers & Trucks, LLC, Nos. 2007-CA-001542-MR, 2007-CA-001821-MR, 2009 WL 2971542 (Ky. App. Sept. 18, 2009). On appeal, Stigers Trucks maintained that it did not violate the KCPA, the trial court wrongly awarded damages to Capps, and the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment and motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. Id. CARS maintained that it did not violate the KCPA, that the trial court miscalculated the damages, and that the trial court misinterpreted the operative language of the warranty. Id.
We concluded that the trial court correctly denied Stigers Trucks' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. However, we vacated the trial court's July 2007 Judgment against Stigers Trucks and "remanded for the trial court to make specific findings of fact as to all of the KCPA elements and to enter judgment based upon on those further factual findings." Id. at *4.
We concluded that the trial court also found CARS liable for violation of the KCPA, but that "the record is unclear as to the basis for imposing liability against CARS." Id. Accordingly, we also vacated the July 2007 Judgment against CARS for violation of KCPA and remanded "for further specific findings as to all the elements of the KCPA and to enter judgment accordingly." Id. As for the warranty claim, however, we held that the trial court correctly determined that the repairs should have been covered because "the truck components at issue had not actually and fully failed at the time Capps purchased the truck and executed the warranty." Id. at *5.
Three years after remand, on September 12, 2012, Capps moved the trial court to enter the additional findings discussed in our prior opinion. Thereafter, the trial court entered the November 2012 Judgment, which states:
On or about February 24, 2003, a representative of the Defendant Larry Stigers, David Paulley, advised the Plaintiff that the damage to the truck in question . . . was a faulty gasket. The Defendant informed Plaintiff that he would check for any other problems that the truck might
have. On February 26, 2003, one (1) day after the truck was driven off the lot by the Plaintiff, and with a little over 100 miles driven since it was purchased from the dealership, the truck lost oil pressure and the engine knocked. The Plaintiff drove the truck to the nearby Shelbyville Chrysler. Shelbyville Chrysler found the truck's motor needed a new engine. The Court finds that the truck was in a damaged state while in the possession of Larry Stigers. The Court further specifically finds that the Plaintiff, Steve Capps, bought the vehicle for personal, family and household purpose, being a gift for his son, who resided with him in his home.As before, the trial court awarded Capps a judgment in the amount of $40,201.00 and ordered that Stigers Trucks and CARS were "jointly and severally" liable.
Stigers Trucks and CARS now appeal the November 2012 Judgment.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is well settled that "when reviewing questions of fact, appellate courts set aside a trial court's factual findings only if clearly erroneous." Medley v. Board of Educ ., 168 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Ky. App. 2004). A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by "substantial evidence," which is evidence of substance and relevant consequence sufficient to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Id. Further, in any case tried without a jury, a trial court's factual findings should not be reversed unless they are determined to be clearly erroneous. Bealert v. Mitchell 585 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. App. 1979). The appellate court must keep in mind that the trial court had the opportunity to hear evidence and observe witnesses placing it in a superior position to make findings of fact. Id.
However, questions of law are reviewed de novo. New v. Commonwealth , 156 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Ky. App. 2005). In other words, unlike factual findings, we owe no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Cinelli v. Ward , 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Stigers Trucks
Capps's claim against Stigers Trucks is based upon the KCPA. The KCPA "allows a consumer who becomes a purchaser of goods as a result of unlawful trade practices to sue the seller for money damages." Craig & Bishop, Inc. v. Piles, 247 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Ky. 2008). In our prior opinion, we held that to prevail on his KCPA claim, Capps had to prove: "(1) he bought the truck primarily for personal, household, or family purposes; (2) Stigers and CARS engaged in an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive act; and (3) Capps suffered actual damages as a result of the violation of the KCPA." On remand, we directed the trial court "to make specific findings of fact as to all of the KCPA elements and to enter judgment based upon those further findings."
Primarily for Personal , Household , or Family Purposes
With respect to the first element, the trial court's supplemental findings state that Capps "bought the vehicle for a personal, family and household purpose, being a gift for his son, who resided with him in his home." On appeal, Stigers Trucks maintains that this finding is "flawed" and contrary to the evidence because Capps testified that "he bought the truck for his son in order to furnish him something to drive as an operator" for Three Ts Construction Company, a separate business Capps owned.
By its own terms, the KCPA applies only where the goods at issue are purchased "primarily for personal, family or household purposes." KRS 367.220(1) (emphasis added). In this instance, we believe it is particularly important to examine the words our General Assembly used in the KCPA. The word "primarily" means "essentially; mostly; chiefly; principally." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary, (Random House 1996). Thus, by its own terms, the KCPA does not require the purchase to be exclusively for personal, family, or household purposes. Rather, the KCPA allows some use of the good for commercial purposes so long as it is purchased chiefly or mainly for personal or family purposes.
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
Capps testified that he went to Stigers Trucks because he was looking to buy "a truck with dual wheels and a stick" and "an extended cab." He further testified that he planned on giving the truck to his son. While there was some testimony that his son was going to drive the truck while working for Three Ts Construction Company, there was no testimony that Capps's son was going to be limited to using the truck for his work, or that it was primarily to be a work truck. To the contrary, Capps testified at the hearing that it was to be a "personal use truck" for his son to drive.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Capps purchased the truck primarily for personal and family use.
Unfair , False , Misleading , or Deceptive Act
As we noted in our prior opinion, the trial court initially found that Stigers Trucks violated the KCPA based on its intentional failure to fully disclose the severity of the truck's problems. Specifically, the trial court found that Stigers Trucks owed a duty of disclosure under KRS 186A.540, which provides:
(1) An individual, or a dealer required to be licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 190, shall disclose all damages to a motor vehicle:On remand, we directed the trial court to make a specific finding regarding when the truck was damaged.
(a) Of which the individual or the dealer has direct knowledge;
(b) Which result in repairs or repair estimates that exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000); and
(c) That occur while the motor vehicle is in the individual's or the dealer's possession and prior to delivery to a purchaser.
On remand, the trial court made the additional finding that the truck was "in a damaged state" while in the possession of Stigers Trucks. Stigers Trucks now asserts that this finding is insufficient to impose a duty of disclosure under KRS 186A.040 because the trial court did not find that the damage occurred while the truck was in Stigers Trucks' possession rather than before Stigers Trucks acquired the vehicle.
The trial court actually stated that the truck was in the possession of Larry Stigers. We presume the trial court was referring to the entity, Larry Stigers Equipment, Trailers & Trucks, LLC, instead of the individual Larry Stigers, its owner, as it was the only entity before the trial court.
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This Court has already considered and rejected essentially the same argument Stigers Trucks advances regarding whether the damage must have occurred while the vehicle was in the dealer's possession to come within the scope of KRS 186A.540. See Keeton v. Lexington Truck Sales, Inc., 275 S.W.3d 723, 727-28 (Ky. App. 2008). We concluded that KRS 186A.540 applies "regardless of when or where the damages occurred." Id. We reasoned that requiring disclosure of only damages that occurred while the vehicle was in the dealer's possession would undermine the clear purpose of the statute because it would "enable unscrupulous dealers to keep the secret that the dealer is selling a damaged vehicle." Id.
Based on the reasoning and holding set forth in Keeton, we disagree with Stigers Trucks' assertion that the trial court was required to make a finding that the damage to the truck occurred while in Stigers Trucks' possession. Accordingly, we believe that the trial court permissibly determined that the KCPA was violated where the truck was in a damaged state at the time Stigers Trucks sold it to Capps (even if said damage occurred prior to Stigers Trucks' acquisition of the truck); Stigers Trucks was aware or should have been aware of the full extent of the damage; and Stigers Trucks failed to disclose the full extent of the damage to Capps.
Damages
Stigers Trucks' last assignment of error concerns the trial court's damages award. Stigers Trucks asserts that the trial court erred because Capps did not prove that he sustained any ascertainable loss where he had not yet paid the storage or repair fees. Stigers Trucks also takes issue with the trial court's award of joint and several liability.
With respect to damages, the trial court's November 2012 Judgment states:
The Court further finds that the Plaintiff has suffered ascertainable loss and damages in the amount of $33,169.00 as of the date of this Court's Judgment on July 2, 2007, and further suffered ascertainable loss of $7,032.00 in attorney's fees, for a total ascertainable loss as of July 2, 2007, of $40,201.00. The Court hereby adopts and incorporates as it [sic] fully set out herein, its Findings of Fact-Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered on July 2, 2007, and states for clarity, that it is therefore Ordered and Adjudged, that the Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against the Defendant's [sic] Larry Stigers Equipment, Trailers and Trucks, LLC, and the Defendant, CARS Protection Plus, Inc., jointly and severally, in the amount of $40,201.00, plus interest, at the legal rate from July 2, 2007, until paid.The trial court's July 2007 Judgment provided: "The Court finds Plaintiff incurred storage costs and engine replacement costs in the amount of $33,160.00. The Court further finds Plaintiffs [sic] reasonable attorney fees are $7,032."
We turn first to the relevant provision of the KCPA, KRS 367.220. It provides:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by KRS 367.170, may bring an action under the Rules of Civil Procedure in the Circuit Court in which the seller or lessor resides or has his principal place of business or is doing business, or in the Circuit Court in which the purchaser or lessee of goods or services resides, or where the transaction in question occurred, to recover actual damages. The court may, in its discretion, award actual damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit a person's right to seek punitive damages where appropriate.Id.
To date, our state appellate courts have not considered the meaning of an "ascertainable loss" within the context of KRS 367.220. Stigers Trucks would have us conclude that an "ascertainable loss" cannot be proved in the absence of a showing by the plaintiff that he has incurred out-of-pocket expenses/damages as a result of the alleged violation of the KCPA. We disagree.
"Loss" and "damages" are not always synonymous terms. Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), defines a loss as "an undesirable outcome of a risk; the disappearance or diminution of value, usu. in an unexpected or relatively unpredictable way." It defines "damages" as "money claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury." Id. These definitions make clear a loss is a form of injury whereas damages are money used to compensate one for an injury.
Turning to KRS 367.220, we note that the General Assembly used the terms "ascertainable loss" and "actual damages" within the same statutory provision. This is evidence that the General Assembly appreciated the difference between the two terms. Commonwealth v. Wright, 415 S.W.3d 606, 609 (Ky. 2013) ("We presume that the General Assembly intended for the statute to be construed as a whole, for all of its parts to have meaning, and for it to harmonize with related statutes.").
We conclude that a person is not required to allege a specific amount of actual damages that he has already incurred as out-of-pocket expenses to make out a prima facie case under KRS 367.220. If the consumer proves that he has purchased an item that is different from or inferior to that for which he bargained, the "ascertainable loss" requirement is satisfied.
This approach is consistent with the approach taken by a majority of the states to have considered this issue under statutes containing language similar to the KCPA. See Andreason v. Felsted, 137 P.3d 1, 4 (Utah App. 2006); In re West Virginia Rezulin Litigation, 585 S.E.2d 52, 75 (W.Va. 2003); Weigel v. Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co., 690 P.2d 488, 495 (Or. 1984); Mayhall v. A.H. Pond Co., Inc., 341 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1983); Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp., 440 A.2d 810, 814 - 815 (Conn. 1981). Most importantly, however, it is consistent with the statutory language, in keeping with the remedial aims of the KCPA, and will ensure that the private civil action established by the KCPA will remain a meaningful avenue of redress for consumers who have been the victims of unfair or deceptive trade practices and can show some injury as a result thereof.
Here, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Capps suffered an ascertainable loss when he received something other than what he bargained for - namely an inoperable truck with substantial damage instead of a working truck needing some minor repairs. The exact amount of Capps's damages is irrelevant for purposes of making this finding. Capps satisfied the "ascertainable loss" requirement.
We next turn to Stigers Trucks' argument that the trial court erred in including damages related to the storage fee and engine replacement costs. Stigers Trucks maintains the trial court exceeded its authority in ordering damages for such costs. We disagree.
Though there was some conflicting testimony regarding the cost of a replacement engine, Capps did submit an estimate from Shelbyville Chrysler that listed with specificity each prospective charge. Nothing in the statute suggests that the trial court was required to rely on the least expensive alternative for repairing the vehicle in awarding damages. Substantial evidence in the form of Capps's testimony and the repair estimate supported the trial court's conclusion with respect to the replacement engine cost.
Stigers Trucks also takes issue with the trial court's imposition of the storage fees because those fees are not directly related to repair of the truck. In Craig & Bishop, Inc., the Kentucky Supreme Court considered whether the trial court properly awarded the plaintiff damages under the KCPA for both "inconvenience" and "loss of the use of the vehicle." The Court held that there was no error as "separate losses for inconvenience were proven" and related to the violation of the KCPA. Craig & Bishop, Inc., 247 S.W.3d 899-02.
Capps proved that the truck was not operable and that he incurred storage fees while he was waiting to receive the funds necessary to pay for the repairs. But for the truck being inoperable, Capps would not have incurred the storage fees. We believe that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings and award of damages for the storage costs. Id.
Stigers Trucks' last argument regarding the damages award is that the trial court erred by awarding damages "jointly and severally" between it and CARS. Citing KRS 411.182, Stigers Trucks asserts that the trial court had to make specific findings regarding each party's fault and allocate a percentage to each taking into account the nature of the conduct and the extent of the causal relationship between the conduct and the damages.
KRS 411.182 provides:
1) In all tort actions, including products liability actions, involving fault of more than one (1) party to the action, including third-party defendants and persons who have been released under subsection (4) of this section, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury to answer interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings indicating:
(a) The amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded; andId.
(b) The percentage of the total fault of all the parties to each claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and person who has been released from liability under subsection (4) of this section.
(2) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.
(3) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under subsection (4) of this section, and shall determine and state in the judgment each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the respective percentages of fault.
(4) A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable, shall discharge that person from all liability for contribution, but it shall not be considered to discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons shall be reduced by the amount of the released persons' equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of this section.
By its own terms, KRS 411.182 only applies to "tort actions." In determining whether it applies to the instant action, we must decide whether Capps's KCPA claim sounds primarily in tort or contract. Abbott v. Chesley, 413 S.W.3d 589, 603 (Ky. 2013). "Kentucky courts have [] not specified whether a KCPA action sounds in contract or in tort." Corder v. Ford Motor Co., 272 F.R.D. 205, 211 (W.D.Ky. 2011).
A contractual relationship is a prerequisite for bringing a KCPA claim. See Keaton v. G.C. Williams Funeral Home, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 538, 546 (Ky. App. 2013) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a KCPA claim because they could not demonstrate that they were in privity of contract with the defendant). However, not every breach of a contract will give rise to a KCPA claim. A viable KCPA claim must be based on some "element of intentional or grossly negligent conduct." Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc. v. Roberts, 813 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Ky.1991). In this way, a KCPA claim is more analogous to a tort-based claim. Id.
Additionally, punitive damages are not permitted for breach of contract claims. KRS 411.184 ("In no case shall punitive damages be awarded for breach of contract."). In contrast, the KCPA expressly recognizes "a person's right to seek punitive damages where appropriate" for violations of the Act. KRS 367.220.
While a contractual relationship is a prerequisite for a plaintiff to bring a KCPA claim, the conduct that gives rise to liability under the KCPA is tortious in nature requiring a showing of some "intentional or grossly negligent conduct." Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 291. Moreover, in awarding damages under the KCPA, the plaintiff is required to demonstrate a "causal nexus between [some ascertainable loss] and the defendant's allegedly deceitful practice." M.T. v. Saum, 7 F.Supp.3d 701, 706 (W.D. Ky. 2014). In practicality, a KCPA claim is much more akin to a tort claim than a simple breach of contract claim.
A KCPA claim is conduct driven and requires the plaintiff to establish a nexus between the wrongful conduct and his loss. It also permits the plaintiff to seek punitive damages, which are designed to punish wrongful conduct. For these reasons, we believe that joint and several liability is not appropriate for KCPA claims. KCPA claims should be governed by KRS 411.182, requiring the fact-finder to "consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed."
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding joint and several liability against Stigers Trucks and CARS for violation of the KCPA.
B. CARS
CARS' sole assignment of error on appeal is that the trial court failed to identify a single, additional fact regarding its conduct. During the first appeal, this Court stated:
[T]he record is unclear as to the basis for imposing liability against CARS. The court found CARS to be jointly and severely liable under the KCPA, but this is the sole mention of CARS in relation to the KCPA. Again, the trial court made no findings as to the three required elements under the KCPA. Therefore the judgment against CARS must also be vacated and the matter remanded for further specific findings as to all of the elements of the KCPA and to enter judgment accordingly.C.A.R.S. Protection Plus , Inc., 2009 WL 2971542 at *4. (Emphasis added).
On remand, the trial court made additional findings regarding Stigers Trucks. Once again, however, the trial court's only statement regarding CARS was: "[Mr. Capps] is awarded Judgment against the Defendant Larry Stigers Equipment, Trailers and Trucks, LLC, and the Defendant, CARS Protection Plus, Inc., jointly and severally, in the amount of $40,201.00, plus interest, at the legal rate from July 2, 2007 until paid."
Capps's KCPA claims against Stigers Trucks and CARS are based on different conduct. There was no proof presented that CARS concealed anything about the extent of the truck's damage before Capps purchased it. Capps's claim against CARS is based on its allegedly wrongful refusal to provide the warranty coverage. Additionally, Capps had separate contracts with Stigers Trucks and CARS for different goods. Capps's contract with Stigers Trucks was for the purchase of a used truck. Capps's contract with CARS was for the purchase of a warranty. A finding that Stigers Trucking violated the KCPA does not necessarily mean that CARS did so as well.
The trial court had previously determined that CARS did breach the warranty contract based on its incorrect interpretation of the preexisting damage language in its contract. As noted above, however, the mere breach of a contract by itself does not give rise to a claim under the KCPA. "The statute requires some evidence of 'unfair, false, misleading or deceptive acts' and does not apply to simple incompetent performance of contractual duties unless some element of intentional or grossly negligent conduct is also present." Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc., 813 S.W.2d at 291.
To hold CARS liable under the KCPA, the trial court must find that CARS engaged in conduct that violated the KCPA, i.e., that CARS engaged in an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive act. The trial court has never made any such finding as related to CARS. Therefore, the trial court should not have awarded damages against CARS for a violation of the KCPA. Thus, we must remand this claim to the trial court once again.
To be clear, on remand the trial court must first make a factual finding regarding whether CARS "engaged in an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive act." If the trial court determines that CARS did not engage in such an act, it must enter judgment in favor of CARS on the KCPA claim. In such case, any damages awarded against CARS would be limited to covering the repairs and other damages permitted under the warranty contract. If the trial court determines that CARS' conduct violated the KCPA, it must then also award damages in accordance with KRS 367.220 and KRS 411.180.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the trial court with respect to Stigers Trucks' liability; we VACATE the trial court's liability determination with respect to the KCPA claim against CARS; we REVERSE the trial court's imposition of joint and several liability; and we REMAND this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT LARRY
STIGERS EQUIPMENT, TRAILERS
AND TRUCKS, LLC:
Paul C. Harnice
Sarah J. Bishop
Frankfort, Kenutcky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT C.A.R.S.
PROTECTION PLUS, INC.:
Mark Wallace
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE STEVE
CAPPS:
Walter A. Sholar
R. Scott Stutler
Shepherdsville, Kentucky