Summary
In Commonwealth v. Watts, 216 Pa. Super. 300, 264 A.2d 439 (1970), this Court in an opinion by President Judge WRIGHT strictly construed the operation of Rule 1101 and held that it is fundamental error not to comply with its requirements.
Summary of this case from Commonwealth v. HooksOpinion
March 19, 1970.
April 14, 1970.
Criminal Law — Practice — Trial by judge without jury — Written waiver — Colloquy of record between trial judge and defendant — Pa. R. Crim. P. 1101 — Fundamental error.
1. In a nonjury criminal trial, the absence of record of a written waiver of jury trial and of a colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant to show a knowing and intelligent waiver, as required by Pa. R. Crim. P. 1101, establishes fundamental error requiring a new trial.
2. In this case, contentions of the Commonwealth, that (a) defendant raised no objection either at trial or in his post-trial motions, and (b) since the indictment bore a notation that jury trial was waived, the presumption of regularity applied, were held, in the circumstances, to be without merit.
Before WRIGHT, P.J., WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, JACOBS, HOFFMAN, SPAULDING, and CERCONE, JJ.
Appeal, No. 1108, Oct. T., 1969, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas, Trial Division, of Philadelphia, Nov. T., 1968, No. 996, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. French Watts. Judgment reversed.
Indictments charging defendant with possession and use of narcotics. Before GLANCEY, J., without a jury.
Finding of guilty of possession of narcotics, and judgment of sentence entered thereon. Defendant appealed.
Louis M. Natali, Jr., Assistant Defender, with him Melvin Dildine, Assistant Defender, and Vincent J. Ziccardi, Acting Defender, for appellant.
James D. Crawford, Deputy District Attorney, with him Charles A. Klein, Assistant District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Argued March 19, 1970.
On March 24, 1969, French Watts was called for trial in the Criminal Section of the Trial Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia on two bills of indictment returned at November Term 1968. Bill No. 996 charged possession of narcotic drugs. Bill No. 997 charged use of narcotic drugs. Watts pleaded not guilty to both charges and the case was heard nonjury by the Honorable Joseph R. GLANCEY. A motion for a directed verdict of not guilty was granted as to Bill No. 997. A verdict of guilty was entered as to Bill No. 996. On June 26, 1969, motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were denied and sentence was imposed. Watts has appealed.
The contention advanced on this appeal is that Watts did not properly waive his constitutional right to a jury trial because there was no waiver in writing, and no colloquy regarding waiver appears in the record as required by Pa. R. Crim. P. 1101. This rule became effective August 1, 1968, and suspends the Act of June 11, 1935, P.L. 319, 19 P.S. 786.
"In all cases, except those in which a capital crime is charged, the defendant may waive a jury trial with the consent of his attorney, if any, the attorney for the Commonwealth, and approval by a judge of the court in which the case is pending, and elect to be tried by a judge without a jury. The judge shall ascertain from the defendant whether this is a knowing and intelligent waiver and such colloquy shall appear on the record. The waiver shall be in writing, made a part of the record and shall be in the following form. . ."
Our most recent decision on the subject is Commonwealth v. Copeland, 212 Pa. Super. 195, 240 A.2d 391, which concerned a nonjury trial on August 3, 1965, wherein there had been no waiver in writing. It was held in Copeland that the court below was without jurisdiction to try a criminal case without a jury unless a waiver in writing had been signed by the defendant in accordance with the Act of 1935. We quoted the statement of our Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Wilson v. Banmiller, 393 Pa. 530, 143 A.2d 657, that, before a court is empowered to try a criminal case without a jury, the defendant "must always sign a written waiver".
It is argued by the able counsel for the Commonwealth (1) that appellant raised no objection either at trial or in his post-trial motions, citing Commonwealth v. Whiting, 205 Pa. Super. 92, 208 A.2d 1; and (2) that, since the indictment bears a notation that jury trial was waived, the presumption of regularity applies, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Moore v. Tees, 179 Pa. Super. 634, 118 A.2d 224. These arguments are not persuasive in view of the frank admission in the Commonwealth's brief that "there is no inquiry on the record concerning appellant's waiver of jury trial".
Briefly stated, fundamental error clearly appears in the case at bar because of the entire failure to comply with the requirements of Pa. R. Crim. P. 1101. It will therefore be necessary to grant a new trial.
Judgment reversed with a venire.