Opinion
1113 WDA 2021 J-A15042-22
05-02-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. STEVEN G. EAKIN
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered September 8, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000647-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM
SULLIVAN, J.
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the pre-trial motion by Steven G. Eakin ("Eakin") to suppress evidence. Following our careful review, we are constrained to affirm.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history as follows: On August 11, 2017, Polk Borough Police Department Chief Edward E. Sharp, Jr. ("Chief Sharp") was on patrol in Frenchcreek Township. See N.T., 8/27/21, 44-45. Chief Sharp observed a vehicle traveling east in a westbound lane. Chief Sharp began to follow the vehicle and noted that it had traveled a half-mile in the wrong lane before coming to a stop near a bait shop. See id. at 45. Chief Sharp initiated a traffic stop. Upon approaching the driver's side of the vehicle, Chief Sharp recognized Eakin, with whom he had a friendly relationship. See id. at 46, 48. Chief Sharp also saw that Eakin had a martini glass with two olives in it in the middle of the center console. See id. at 48. Chief Sharp, in order to remain "fair and impartial," called Polk Borough Police Department Sergeant Alan Heller ("Sergeant Heller") to take over the investigation. Id. at 46.
Sergeant Heller retired from Polk Borough in October 2020 and subsequently became the Chief of Police in Harrisville Borough. See N.T., 8/27/21, at 21-22.
Sergeant Heller, following his arrival on the scene, transported Eakin to a UPMC hospital where Eakin consented to a blood draw. See N.T., 8/27/21, at 26. Sergeant Heller arrested Eakin and ultimately charged him with driving under the influence ("DUI"). See id. at 32. Eakin filed a motion to suppress in which he alleged, among other things, that a traffic stop in Frenchcreek Township by a Polk Borough police officer was illegal under the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act ("ICA"), 53 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2301-2317 and the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act ("MPJA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8951-8955. See Omnibus Pretrial Motion for Relief, 4/23/21, at ¶¶ 15-21. The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on August 27, 2021. At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated to the following:
In April 2019, a jury convicted Eakin of DUI stemming from this incident. Eakin filed a direct appeal to this Court, in which he raised issues alleging error by the trial court in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. This Court, however, concluded sua sponte that Eakin had represented himself pro se at the suppression hearing without a valid waiver of his right to counsel on the record, and, accordingly, we vacated his judgment of sentence and remanded for further proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Eakin, 242 A.3d 387 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum at *3).
[T]he traffic stop . . . occurred in Frenchcreek Township. [C]hief Sharp observed [Eakin] operating the vehicle, which was the basis of his stop[,] when he was in . . . Frenchcreek Township. [A]t the time of the stop, there was a Joint Municipal Agreement between Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township for police services to be provided by [o]fficers of Polk in Frenchcreek. Frenchcreek had a [r]esolution to adopt the Agreement, but no [o]rdinance. Polk had an [o]rdinance as to the Agreement. So, as of the time of the stop in Frenchcreek Township, Frenchcreek had no [o]rdinance adopting the Agreement.
N.T., 8/27/21, at 68 (emphasis added). Chief Sharp conceded that at the time of the stop: he was not responding to a request to assist a federal or state law enforcement officer; he had not been asked to participate in a federal, state, or local task force; the grounds for the traffic stop had not arisen in Polk Borough; and he had not at the time of the stop suspected a specific felony had been committed. See id. at 51-56.
Accord Joint Municipal Agreement for Law Enforcement Services, 4/13/06 (stating Frenchcreek Township's intent to contract with Borough of Polk for the provision of law enforcement functions in Frenchcreek by Polk Police Department); see also Polk Borough Ordinance No. 04-06-2006, §§ 306, 307 (enacting the intergovernmental cooperative agreement authorizing Polk Borough Police Department to police Frenchcreek Township, effective April 6, 2006). But see Joint Municipal Agreement For Law Enforcement Services, 7/12/18, at 6 (noting that both Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township enacted a subsequent July 2018 Agreement into ordinances).
The trial court took Eakin's suppression motion under advisement and later issued an order on August 31, 2021 suppressing evidence obtained as a result of the August 11, 2017 stop. The court based the ruling on its conclusion that the ICA did not authorize the stop, since Frenchcreek had not enacted an ordinance adopting the Joint Municipal Agreement with Polk Borough, and none of the exceptions under the MPJA applied. See Order, 8/31/21, at 2. The court determined the controlling law was set forth by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hlubin, 208 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2019) (plurality) (superseded by statute on other grounds). See Order, 8/31/21, at 1. The Commonwealth timely moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. See generally Order, 9/13/21. The Commonwealth timely appealed and certified that the trial court's order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution. See Notice of Appeal, 9/20/21; see also Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). Both the Commonwealth and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Following Hlubin, our legislature amended section 8953(a)(3) with the express intention of negating our Supreme Court's interpretation of that section. See Commonwealth v. Forsythe, 217 A.3d 273, 279 (Pa. Super. 2019). The Commonwealth, however, does not argue that section 8953(a)(3) applies, so this fact is not germane to the case sub judice.
The trial court elected to specify where in the record the reasons for its ruling appeari.e., its September 13, 2021 order-rather than author a separate opinion in support of its ruling. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/21.
The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting [Eakin's] motion to suppress by relying only on . . . Hlubin, . . . [which] involved a police sergeant who conducted a stop and arrest in a prearranged sobriety checkpoint located outside of his primary jurisdiction.
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting [Eakin's] motion to suppress, as our learned Superior Court has consistently found that suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for a technical violation of the [M]PA].
3. Whether the trial court erred in granting [Eakin's] motion to suppress, due to the Pennsylvania legislature amending [s]ection 8953 of the [MPJA] with the explicit intent to reverse the Supreme Court's interpretation of the MPJA in Hlubin.
Commonwealth's Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and quotations omitted).
The Commonwealth, in all three of its issues, maintains the trial court erred in granting suppression based on its finding of extraterritorial policing without authorization under the MPJA. We note that though the Commonwealth raised three issues, it addresses them together in its argument section under the following heading: "The trial court erred in granting [Eakin's] motion to suppress for a technical violation of the [MPJA]." Commonwealth's Brief at 11. As the Commonwealth's issues are factually and legally intertwined, we similarly address them together.
On appeal from an order granting a suppression motion,
this Court follows a clearly defined scope and standard of review. We consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. This Court must first determine whether the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court and then determine the reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. In appeals where there is no meaningful dispute of fact, as in the case sub judice, our duty is to determine whether the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts of the case.Commonwealth v. Banks, 165 A.3d 976, 979 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal citation omitted).
The ICA authorizes and establishes formal rules for intergovernmental cooperation. See 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2303. At the time of Eakin's stop in 2017, section 2305 required participating local governments to pass an ordinance adopting an intergovernmental agreement, and the ICA further provided that "a cooperation agreement is deemed to be in force (and enforceable) only after its adoption by ordinance by all of the cooperating governmental units. [See] 53 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2315." Hlubin, 208 A.3d at 1039-40. Further, our Supreme Court has articulated the interplay between the ICA and the MPJA as follows: Where the ICA does not authorize extraterritorial policing, an officer has "the authority to act outside the territorial limits of [his or her] primary jurisdiction[] only if an exception in the MPJA so provides." Id. at 1044.
See also Forsythe, 217 A.3d at 276 n.3 (stating that "a cooperation agreement is deemed to be in force only after its adoption by ordinance by all of the cooperating governmental units") (emphasis added). However, we note that our legislature amended the ICA, including section 2315, on November 7, 2019, effective January 6, 2020, to provide: "Any joint cooperation agreement shall be deemed in force as to any local government when the agreement has been adopted by ordinance or resolution by all cooperating local governments." 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2315 (emphasis added); see also 2019, Nov. 7, P.L. 613, No. 80, § 1 (amending the ICA). The Commonwealth does not argue that the amended section 2315 should be given retroactive effect so as to apply to Eakin's 2017 stop. Cf. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1953 (stating that when a statute is amended, "the new provisions shall be construed as effective only from the date when the amendment became effective").
This Court has recently set forth the law applicable to the MPJA as follows:
The MPJA is intended to promote public safety while maintaining police accountability to local authority; it is not intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls benefiting only
criminals hidden in their shadows. To that end, section 8953 of the MPJA authorizes arrests, execution of search warrants and other official police conduct outside of an officer's primary jurisdiction in six specific circumstances.Commonwealth v. Hobel, 275 A.3d 1049, 1057-58 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 567 A.2d 1023, 1029 (Pa. 1989)) (quotations, brackets, and citations omitted), appeal denied, 143 WAL 2022, 2022 WL 10268195 (Pa. 2022). The six circumstances under which police are authorized to act outside the limits of their territorial jurisdiction are as follows:
(1) Where the officer is acting pursuant to an order issued by a court of record or an order issued by a district magistrate whose magisterial district is located within the judicial district wherein the officer's primary jurisdiction is situated, or where the officer is otherwise acting pursuant to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, except that the service of an arrest or search warrant shall require the consent of the chief law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to give consent, of the organized law enforcement agency which regularly provides primary police services in the municipality wherein the warrant is to be served.
(2) Where the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any offense which was committed, or which he has probable cause to believe was committed, within his primary jurisdiction and for which offense the officer continues in fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the offense.
(3) Where the officer:
(i) has been requested to aid or assist a Federal, State or local law enforcement officer or park police officer;
(ii) has probable cause to believe that a Federal, State or local law enforcement officer or park police officer is in need of aid or assistance; or
(iii) has been requested to participate in a Federal, State or local task force and participation has been approved by the police department of the municipality which employs the officer.
(4) Where the officer has obtained the prior consent of the chief law enforcement officer, or a person authorized by him to give consent, of the organized law enforcement agency which provides primary police services to a political subdivision which is beyond that officer's primary jurisdiction to enter the other jurisdiction for the purpose of conducting official duties which arise from official matters within his primary jurisdiction.
(5) Where the officer is on official business and views an offense, or has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify himself as a police officer and which offense is a felony, misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which presents an immediate clear and present danger to persons or property.
(6) Where the officer views an offense which is a felony, or has probable cause to believe that an offense which is a felony has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify himself as a police officer.42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953(a)(1)-(6).
The legislature amended the MJPA on July 2, 2019 and directed that the current version have retroactive applicability dating to June 15, 1982. See Forsythe, 217 A.3d at 278-79.
Nevertheless, when a police officer's extraterritorial actions do not fall within one of these exceptions, suppression is not automatically appropriate. See Hobel, 275 A.3d at 1058 (citing O'Shea, 567 A.2d at 1029). This Court has provided that, where there is a violation of the MPJA, we must apply the three-prong O'Shea test on a case-by-case basis:
The factors to be considered in applying this case-by-case approach consist of all the circumstances of the case including [1] the intrusiveness of the police conduct, [2] the extent of deviation from the letter and spirit of the [MPJA], and [3] the prejudice to the accused. . . . The . . . spirit, or purpose of, the MPJA is to proscribe investigatory, extraterritorial forays used to acquire additional evidence where probable cause does not yet exist.
[This] unquestionably sets forth the proper standard this Court is to employ in determining whether the exclusionary rule should act to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an MPJA violation.Hobel, 275 A.3d at 1058 (quoting Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 971-72 (Pa. Super. 2008)) (internal citations omitted).
Preliminarily, we note that the Commonwealth stipulated at the suppression hearing that, at the time of Eakin's stop, Frenchcreek Township had not adopted an ordinance enacting the Joint Municipal Agreement with Polk Borough. See N.T., 8/27/21, at 68. The Commonwealth, on appeal, concedes that the intergovernmental agreement needed to be enacted by each of the participating municipalities under 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2305. See Commonwealth's Brief at 14. However, the Commonwealth makes no argument that the agreement was adopted by ordinance and thereby enacted by Frenchcreek Township at the relevant time, i.e., when Chief Sharp stopped Eakin. Accordingly, the ICA did not authorize Polk Borough Police Department Chief Sharp to initiate a traffic stop of Eakin in Frenchcreek Township. See Hlubin, 208 A.3d at 1039-40; see also 53 Pa.C.S.A. § 2315 (providing, at the time of Eakin's stop, that an ordinance need be enacted "by all cooperating local governments" for an agreement to be in force). Thus, if Chief Sharp was authorized to stop Eakin, the authority must derive from the MPJA and applicable case law.
The Commonwealth additionally concedes that there was an MPJA violation but argues that automatic suppression is not warranted, and that, instead, this Court should apply the O'Shea test. Commonwealth's Brief at 15-16, 17. The Commonwealth does not address in any depth the first prong of the O'Shea test, i.e., the intrusiveness of the police conduct, nor does it address the third prong, i.e., the prejudice to the accused. However, regarding the second prong, the Commonwealth argues that the stop at issue was not a "gross deviation from the letter and spirit of the Act," and that the officers here did not stop Eakin in an attempt to "purposefully expand their sphere of power or to engage in an extra[-]jurisdictional fishing expedition." Commonwealth's Brief at 17-19. The Commonwealth emphasizes the policy objectives behind the MPJA, including, as it asserts, the promotion of "public safety while maintaining police accountability to local authority; it is not intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls benefitting only criminals hidden in their shadows." Commonwealth's Brief at 15 (internal citation omitted). The Commonwealth argues that the "public good is certainly advanced and protected by a Polk Borough police officer initiating a traffic stop on a drunk[] driver traveling in the wrong lane[] in an area that had been approved by a Joint Municipal Agreement for more than a decade," and that the stop was not conducted in bad faith. Commonwealth's Brief at 15.
The Commonwealth argues that section 8953(a)(4) of the MPJA, while not providing an exception to authorize the stop at issue, does support a finding that Chief Sharp initiated the traffic stop in good faith based on his belief that Frenchcreek Township had consented to Polk Borough Police Department patrolling its jurisdiction. See Commonwealth's Brief at 18-19.
Following our review, we discern no error of law by the trial court. We initially reiterate that the Commonwealth concedes neither the ICA nor MPJA authorized the stop at issue. Accordingly, we apply O'Shea. The first prong of the O'Shea test concerns the intrusiveness of the police conduct. We must consider the "level of intrusion of a stop that results in an arrest, since only in this circumstance does the issue of possible suppression of evidence arise." Hlubin, 208 A.3d at 1048. In Hlubin, which concerned a sobriety checkpoint, while the checkpoint ordinarily lasted thirty to forty-five seconds, Hlubin, following questioning and observations by an officer, was removed from her vehicle, taken to a testing area, and subjected to field sobriety testing, blood testing, and arrest. See id. at 1048. Our High Court concluded that the stop resulted in a "high level of intrusiveness" for Hlubin. See id. Here, Chief Sharp's stop of Eakin resulted in a subsequent call to another officer, i.e., Sergeant Heller, who, after arriving, transported Eakin to the hospital for blood testing and a subsequent arrest. As in Hlubin, the level of intrusiveness resulting from this stop was high. Accordingly, the first prong of the O'Shea test favors Eakin.
In Hobel, this Court noted that several of our Supreme Court justices indicated their opposition in Hlubin to the continued application of O'Shea, however, three declined to address the validity of O'Shea, and one supported its application. See Hobel, 275 A.3d at 1058 n.5. Accordingly, O'Shea "remains good law." Id.
The second prong of the O'Shea test requires consideration of whether the police conduct deviated from the "letter and spirit" of the MPJA. Our Supreme Court has observed that when officers regularly leave their primary jurisdiction to police in other jurisdictions, "jurisdictional lines are not maintained but rather are obliterated. Moreover . . . where this extraterritorial activity has no advance legislative approval or legal oversight, there is plainly no accountability to local authority." Hlubin, 208 A.3d 1048. Here, no exceptions to the MPJA authorized Chief Sharp's stop of Eakin; and Chief Sharp was patrolling in Frenchcreek under the mistaken belief that he was authorized then to do so under the ICA. Notwithstanding the officers' good faith belief, Polk Police Department's routine provision of police services outside of its primary jurisdiction, i.e., in Frenchcreek Township, was unauthorized at the time under the ICA. This contravenes the MPJA's policy, noted by our High Court in Hlubin, of maintaining jurisdictional police lines, and it adversely affects the MPJA's ultimate goal of maintaining police accountability to local authority. Therefore, the second O'Shea factor favors Eakin. See id.
The last O'Shea factor concerns the prejudice to the accused, i.e., consideration of "whether the search would not have otherwise occurred or would not have been as intrusive" absent the violation. Id. (quoting O'Shea, 567 A.2d at 1030). Here, Chief Sharp testified that he stopped Eakin following his observation of Eakin traveling for a half mile on the wrong side of the road. See N.T., 8/27/21, at 45. Absent Chief Sharp's unauthorized presence, there is no evidence that this stop would have occurred, and, accordingly, Eakin would not have been stopped. The third O'Shea prong thus favors Eakin. Accordingly, following our application of O'Shea, we conclude the trial court committed no error in suppressing the evidence derived from the stop.
Order affirmed.
Judge Kunselman joins this memorandum.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM
BOWES, J.
I respectfully dissent. Upon review, I believe that the learned Majority misapplied the relevant factors in determining whether a violation of the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act ("MPJA") required suppression. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that suppression was not an appropriate remedy for the technical violation of the MPJA in this case and would therefore reverse the trial court's suppression order.
I begin with our standard of review. "When reviewing an order granting a motion to suppress we are required to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn by the suppression court from those findings are accurate." Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 969 (Pa.Super. 2008) (cleaned up). In the case sub judice, the facts largely are not in dispute. Rather, this case hinges on the trial court's application of the law to those facts. In that regard, "[o]ur scope of review over the suppression court's legal conclusions . . . is plenary." Id. (citations omitted).
From the outset, I note that I take no issue with the Majority's conclusion that Chief Sharp's extraterritorial conduct at the time of the stop was not authorized by statute. As conceded by the Commonwealth, Chief Sharp's actions were not authorized by the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act ("ICA") because the 2006 Joint Municipal Agreement, which called for Polk Borough police officers to provide police services for Frenchcreek Township, had not been adopted by ordinance in Frenchcreek Township, as was required at that time by the ICA for the agreement to take effect. Additionally, the Commonwealth concedes that Chief Sharp's actions were not authorized by the MPJA as they did not fall within one of the six enumerated circumstances.
The parties stipulated to the following recitation surrounding the interplay between Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township:
At the time of the traffic stop, which is the subject of this case, it occurred in Frenchcreek Township. . . . Chief Sharp observed [Eakin] operating the vehicle, which was the basis of his stop when he was in . . . Frenchcreek Township. . . . At the time of the stop, there was a Joint Municipal Agreement between Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township for police services to be provided by officers of Polk in Frenchcreek. Frenchcreek had a resolution to adopt the agreement, but no ordinance. Polk had an ordinance as to the agreement. So, as of the time of the stop in Frenchcreek Township, Frenchcreek had no ordinance adopting the agreement.N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 68 (capitalization altered). I note the ICA has since been amended to expressly permit adoption of such an agreement by ordinance or resolution. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 2305.
Chief Sharp's technical violation of the MPJA, however, does not automatically compel suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop. See Commonwealth v. Hobel, 275 A.3d 1049, 1058 (Pa.Super. 2022). In determining the appropriate remedy for an MPJA violation, this Court employs a case-by-case approach. Id. "The factors to be considered . . . consist of all the circumstances of the case including the intrusiveness of the police conduct, the extent of deviation from the letter and spirit of the MPJA, and the prejudice to the accused." Id. (cleaned up). This case-by-case approach permits "this Commonwealth's courts to tailor a remedy in situations where police intentionally have overstepped their boundaries while still affording our courts the flexibility to deny suppression when police have acted to uphold the rule of law in good faith but are in technical violation of the MPJA." Id. (cleaned up). Upon review, I find that the case sub judice is a textbook example of Chief Sharp acting "to uphold the rule of law in good faith [while] in technical violation of the MPJA[,]" and therefore the trial court erred in granting suppression. Id.
I note with displeasure that the trial court utterly failed to apply this test, instead concluding summarily that "[t]he remedy is suppression of the evidence" based on Chief Sharp not having the authority to stop Eakin. See Order of Court, 9/8/21, at 2.
My analysis of the first factor is guided by our Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Hlubin, 208 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2019), wherein the High Court considered the intrusiveness of a sobriety checkpoint. Rather than considering the intrusiveness of a checkpoint for an unimpaired driver, the Court concluded that it "must instead measure the level of intrusion of a stop that results in an arrest, since only in this circumstance does the issue of possible suppression of evidence arise." Id. at 1048. In Hlubin, the officer initially questioned Hlubin for 30-45 seconds and then, based upon that interaction, "removed Hlubin from her vehicle and took her to a testing area, where she was subjected to field sobriety testing, blood testing and arrest." Id. Our High Court determined that such an interaction "resulted in a high level of intrusiveness[.]" Id.
In accordance with Hlubin, I consider the entirety of the encounter from when Chief Sharp stopped Eakin to when Eakin was arrested to determine the level of intrusiveness. In that regard, Chief Sharp conducted a traffic stop of Eakin based upon a traffic violation. Upon observing a martini glass in the vehicle and realizing that Chief Sharp had a personal relationship with the driver, he called for another officer to conduct the traffic stop. That officer arrived and ultimately transported Eakin to a hospital for blood testing and arrest. Based on Hlubin, I am constrained to agree with the Majority that this interaction involved a high level of intrusiveness and thus the first factor favors Eakin. See Majority at 11-12.
My analysis differs from the Majority as to the second and third factors. Turning to the second factor, I consider "the extent of deviation from the letter and spirit of the MPJA[.]" Hobel, supra at 1058. This Court has held that "the spirit, or purpose of, the MPJA is to proscribe investigatory, extraterritorial forays used to acquire additional evidence where probable cause does not yet exist." Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, the MPJA endeavors "to promote public safety while maintaining police accountability to local authority; it is not intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls benefiting only criminals hidden in their shadows." Commonwealth v. Lehman, 870 A.2d 818, 820 (Pa. 2005) (cleaned up).
Of relevance, the MPJA permits an officer to act outside his jurisdiction where he "is on official business and views an offense, or has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify himself as a police officer and which offense is a felony, misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which presents an immediate clear and present danger to persons or property." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(5).
Instantly, at the time of the stop, Chief Sharp was operating pursuant to a belief that his conduct in Frenchcreek Township was authorized by the ICA based on the agreement between Polk Borough and Frenchcreek Township. See N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 51 (stating that he had jurisdiction in Frenchcreek Township). Upon review, I find that he had a good faith belief that he was in Frenchcreek Township on official business.While in Frenchcreek Township on what he reasonably believed to be official business, Chief Sharp observed Eakin driving his vehicle for one-half of a mile in the wrong direction on a public roadway. Unequivocally, Eakin's driving presented "an immediate clear and present danger" to other vehicles on the roadway. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a)(5); Hobel, supra at 1062-63 (concluding that Hobel's driving presented "an immediate clear and present danger" when he swerved back and forth across the road into the oncoming traffic lane). Under these circumstances, but for Frenchcreek Township's misguided decision to adopt the agreement by resolution instead of ordinance, Chief Sharp would have been in Frenchcreek Township on official business when he observed Eakin's dangerous driving, and therefore his conduct would have been authorized by the MPJA.
I observe, again, that the 2006 agreement had been adopted by resolution in Frenchcreek Township at the time of the stop, but not by ordinance as was required by the ICA at that time. As noted, our legislature amended the ICA in 2019 expressly to permit adoption by ordinance or resolution. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 2305.
While not pursued by the Commonwealth, Chief Sharp testified at the suppression hearing that he was in Frenchcreek Township while en route to Utica, a municipality where he stated that he also had jurisdiction. See N.T. Suppression, 8/27/21, at 51.
The Majority finds this factor weighs in favor of Eakin, essentially positing that the violation of the MPJA "contravenes the MPJA's policy[.]" See Majority at 12. I cannot countenance a conclusion that amounts to a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the second factor favors the accused whenever there is a violation of the MPJA, then every application of this test would have the second factor favoring the accused because we only apply it in circumstances where the police have violated the MPJA. In fact, such a rigid application focusing solely on police accountability ignores that the MPJA also endeavors "to promote public safety while maintaining police accountability to local authority; it is not intended to erect impenetrable jurisdictional walls benefiting only criminals hidden in their shadows." Lehman, supra at 820 (cleaned up); see also Hlubin, supra at 1048 (observing that our Supreme Court previously "held that the goals of the MPJA are the promotion of public safety while maintaining jurisdictional police lines and to expand the powers of local police to protect the public, where such expansion would not adversely affect the ultimate goal of maintaining police accountability to local authority" (cleaned up)). Given the entire letter and spirit of the MPJA, I find that its objectives were advanced by Chief Sharp's conduct in this case. Thus, I disagree with the Majority's conclusion that this factor favors Eakin.
Finally, I consider the prejudice to Eakin. See Hobel, supra at 1058. This factor requires us to consider "whether the search would not have otherwise occurred or would not have been as intrusive." See Hlubin, supra at 1048 (cleaned up). The Majority concludes that this factor favors Eakin because there was no evidence that the stop otherwise would have occurred. While it is unclear whether the search would have otherwise occurred, it is likely that any other officer pulling over Eakin would have conducted the search in the same manner as Officer Heller, who was ultimately called to the scene, transported Eakin for blood testing, and arrested him for drunk driving. Therefore, even if another officer had conducted the stop, the resulting search would have been equally intrusive. Thus, I disagree with the Majority's conclusion that the third factor favors Eakin.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that in this case "suppression would not be an appropriate remedy under the MPJA, the legislative intent of which is to advance public safety and not shield criminal behavior." Hobel, supra at 1064 (citation omitted). Since I would reverse the suppression order and remand for further proceedings, I respectfully enter this dissent.