Opinion
No. CV 05-4007787S
August 31, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiffs, the commissioner of public health and the chief of the department of public health's bureau of community health, appeal from a decision of the defendant freedom of information commission (commission), ordering the release of certain statistical information pertaining to legally induced abortions in Connecticut. The commission's decision was rendered after a hearing pursuant to General Statutes § 1-206(b). Also named as defendants are the Connecticut Catholic Conference (conference) and David W. Reynolds, the conference's legislative liaison, who originally sought the data in question. This appeal is taken pursuant to General Statutes §§ 1-206(d) and 4-183.
I PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The commission mailed its final decision on or after August 18, 2005. (Return of Record [ROR] 158.) On September 27, 2005, the plaintiffs served process on the defendants by certified mail, return receipt requested. The appeal was filed with the clerk of the Superior Court on September 28, 2005. The court heard the appeal on May 15, 2006.
II FACTS
The department of public health (department) is a public agency, as defined in General Statutes § 1-200(1)(A). (ROR, 158.) The department oversees the collection of abortion data in accordance with section 19-13-D54(b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. In February 2004, Reynolds, on behalf of the conference, made an oral request to the plaintiffs for information indicating the relationship between the state of residence and age of patients having legally induced abortions in Connecticut during the calendar years 2002 and 2003. (ROR, 158.) In a written request dated September 3, 2004, Reynolds again sought a "detailed breakout [sic] of information contained in [the bureau of community health's] report entitled `Statistical Summary of Legal Induced Abortions.'" (ROR, 7.) Specifically, Reynolds sought information regarding the "relationship between state of residence and age" and indicated that he was "primarily interested in the patients from Massachusetts and Rhode Island age 18 and under." (ROR, 7.) The plaintiffs declined Reynolds' request by letter dated September 13, 2004, stating: "Although the Department collects these fields for research purposes, we are precluded by [General Statutes § 19a-25] from releasing these data." (ROR, 11.) Reynolds renewed his request by letter dated November 5, 2004. (ROR, 12, 159.). Reynolds subsequently filed a complaint with the commission on December 9, 2004, alleging that the plaintiffs' failure to provide the requested information following his November 2004 request violated the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq. (ROR, 159.) The commission held a hearing on May 5, 2005. In a final decision dated August 10, 2005, the commission determined that the requested information was not exempt from mandatory disclosure under the act because it was not generated primarily for the purpose of studying morbidity and mortality, and therefore did not invoke the statutory privilege set forth in § 19a-25. The commission therefore determined that the plaintiffs violated General Statutes §§ 1-210(a) and 1-211(a) by declining to provide the requested information. (ROR, 163.) On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the commission's decision on the grounds that the commission (1) misconstrued and misapplied § 19a-25 and (2) reached a conclusion unsupported by and contrary to the evidence presented.
Section 19-13-D54(b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part: "All induced abortions will be reported within seven days by the physician performing the procedure to the state commissioner of public health who will maintain such reports in a confidential file and use them only for statistical purposes except in cases involving licensure. Such reports will specify date of abortion, place where performed, age of woman and town and state of residence, approximate duration of pregnancy, method of abortion, explanation of any complications, name and address of the physician."
III JURISDICTION
"Any party aggrieved by the decision of [the freedom of information commission] may appeal therefrom, in accordance with the provisions of section 4-183." General Statutes § 1-206(d). "A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section." General Statutes § 4-183(a). "Within forty-five days after mailing of the final decision under section 4-180 . . . a person appealing as provided in this section shall serve a copy of the appeal on the agency that rendered the final decision at its office . . . and file the appeal with the clerk of the superior court for the judicial district of New Britain or for the judicial district wherein the person appealing resides . . . Within that time, the person appealing shall also serve a copy of the appeal on each party listed in the final decision at the address shown in the decision, provided failure to make such service within forty-five days on the parties other than the agency that rendered the final decision shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Service of the appeal shall be made by (1) United States mail, certified or registered, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, without the use of a state marshal or other officer, or (2) personal service by a proper officer or indifferent person making service in the same manner as complaints are served in ordinary civil actions. If service of the appeal is made by mail, service shall be effective upon deposit of the appeal in the mail." General Statutes § 4-183(c).
Aggrievement
"[P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 266 Conn. 531, 537-38, 833 A.2d 883 (2003); see also General Statutes § 4-183. "[A] plaintiff may prove aggrievement by relying on facts established in the record as a whole, including the administrative record." State Library v. Freedom of Information Commission, 240 Conn. 824, 832, 694 A.2d 1235 (1997). "In appeals pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, aggrievement is determined in accordance with a twofold test . . . This test requires a showing of: (1) a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [commission's] decision; and (2) a special and injurious effect on this specific interest." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 833. Because General Statutes § 1-240(b) makes noncompliance with the commission's order a class B misdemeanor, the plaintiffs may face criminal prosecution and sanctions if they fail to comply with the commission's order. See Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 646, 650, 556 A.2d 1020 (1989). "Such a risk of prosecution establishes the requisite specific and personal interest . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are aggrieved by the commission's decision.
Final Decision
Under § 4-183, "the Superior Court has jurisdiction only over appeals from a `final decision' of an administrative agency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairfield v. Connecticut Siting Council, 238 Conn. 361, 369, 679 A.2d 354 (1996). "`Final decision' means . . . the agency determination in a contested case . . ." General Statutes § 4-166(3). "`Agency' means each state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make regulations or to determine contested cases . . ." General Statutes § 4-166(1). "`Contested case' means a proceeding . . . in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by state statute or regulation to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held . . ." General Statutes § 4-166(2). "Any person denied the right to inspect or copy records under section 1-210 or wrongfully denied the right to attend any meeting of a public agency or denied any other right conferred by the Freedom of Information Act may appeal therefrom to the Freedom of Information Commission . . . Said commission shall . . . hear and decide the appeal . . ." General Statutes § 1-206(b)(1). In the present case, the commission held the hearing required under § 1-206. The commission issued a written decision based on its findings in accordance with General Statutes § 4-180(a) and (c). (ROR, 158-64.) Accordingly, the present appeal is from a final decision in a contested case, as defined by § 4-166(3).
Timeliness of the Appeal and Service
The commission's notice of final decision is dated August 18, 2005. (ROR, 158.) In an affidavit of service, counsel for the plaintiffs, assistant attorney general Henry A. Salton, attests that he served a summons and complaint by certified mail, return receipt requested, on the commission, Reynolds and the conference on September 27, 2005, less than forty-five days after notice of the commissioner's decision. (Affidavit, ¶ 2.) The plaintiffs filed their appeal in the Superior Court for the judicial district of New Britain on September 27, 2005. Because the plaintiffs served Reynolds and the conference by certified mail in accordance with General Statutes § 4-183(c)(1); a citation is not required. See Tolly v. Dept. of Human Resources, 225 Conn. 13, 19-21, 621 A.2d 719 (1993). Accordingly, this appeal is both timely and properly served. See General Statutes § 4-183(c).
Based on the foregoing conclusions regarding aggrievement, the existence of a final decision, and the timeliness and method of service, it is concluded that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.
IV STANDARD OF REVIEW
"According to our well established standards, [r]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Christopher R. v. Commissioner of Mental Retardation, 277 Conn. 594, 603, 893 A.2d 431 (2006). "Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108, 124, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003). "Neither [the Supreme Court] nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact . . . Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion . . . [A]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Christopher P. v. Commissioner of Mental Retardation, supra, 603. Thus, "[i]n challenging an administrative agency action, the plaintiff has the burden of proof . . . The plaintiff must do more than simply show that another decision maker, such as the trial court, might have reached a different conclusion. Rather than asking the reviewing court to retry the case de novo . . . the plaintiff must establish that substantial evidence does not exist in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tarullo v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Commission, 263 Conn. 572, 584, 821 A.2d 734 (2003). CT Page 15985
V DISCUSSION
In support of their appeal, the plaintiffs argue that (1) the requested information is exempt from disclosure under § 19a-25 and therefore is not subject to public inspection under General Statutes § 1-210, (2) the commission's conclusion that the requested records were not produced for the purpose of studying morbidity and mortality is unsupported by the evidence in the record, (3) the commission's determination that the requested records fall outside of the confidentiality provisions of § 19a-25 based on the Supreme Court's decision in Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, 251 Conn. 790, 742 A.2d 322 (1999), constitutes an error of law, (4) the commission incorrectly evaluated whether the specific statistical correlations and relationships sought, rather than the underlying abortion data, were subject to § 19a-25, (5) the commission erroneously ignored prior administrative decisions, Superior Court precedent and regulations promulgated under § 19a-25, which predate Babcock and (6) the commission was bound by the decision in Director, Health Services v. Freedom of Information Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 81 1387995 (March, 19, 1981, O'Neill, J.), under principles of res judicata. Because the first three arguments are conceptually intertwined, the court will begin by addressing them together.General Statutes § 1-210(a) provides in relevant part that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency . . . shall be public records and every person shall have the right to . . . receive a copy of such records . . ." Section 19a-25, meanwhile, states in relevant part: "All information, records of interviews, written reports, statements, notes, memoranda or other data, including personal data . . . procured by the Department of Public Health . . . in connection with studies of morbidity and mortality conducted by the Department of Public Health . . . or procured by . . . other persons, agencies or organizations, for the purpose of reducing the morbidity or mortality from any cause or condition, shall be confidential and shall be used solely for the purposes of medical or scientific research . . . Such information, records, reports, statements, notes, memoranda or other data shall not be admissible as evidence in any action of any kind in any court or before any other tribunal, board, agency or person, nor shall it be exhibited or its contents disclosed in any way, in whole or in part, by any officer or representative of the Department of Public Health . . ."
Our Supreme Court first addressed the scope of § 19a-25 in Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, supra, 251 Conn. 790. There, "the Supreme Court looked to the statute's language and its legislative history to narrowly interpret the privilege afforded by § 19a-25." Allen v. Beverly, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 00 0433853 (June 13, 2001, Lager J.) ( 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 74, 75). In Babcock, the defendant hospital and its parent company moved for a protective order, asserting that certain infection data was protected from disclosure under General Statutes § 19a-25. Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, supra, 251 Conn. 796. The defendants argued, inter alia, "that the plaintiffs were requesting documents that reflected data used by the committee for very specific purposes; the improvement of the quality of care of patients and the reduction of morbidity and mortality . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 843. The defendants "offered no factual support for their assertion that the reduction of morbidity or mortality was in fact the purpose of any study undertaken in response to a rise in . . . infection." Id. The court denied the defendants' motion for a protective order. Id., 814. The defendants subsequently appealed the trial court's interlocutory ruling to the Supreme Court. Id., 817-18. Among the issues on appeal was "whether the trial court reasonably concluded that the defendants had not satisfactorily established that the documents at issue were generated principally for a morbidity or mortality study undertaken for the purpose of reducing incidents of patient death." Id., 842.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, noting that "[i]t is insufficient for the party invoking the privilege to do so solely by way of factual assertions made by an attorney in a memorandum of law to the court." Id., 843. "That burden is discharged by the presentation of evidence in the form of testimony or affidavits concerning the document's content and use." Id., 848. The court stated that where § 19a-25 is concerned, "confidentiality attaches . . . only when the study itself is undertaken for the distinct purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality . . . [T]he language of the statute contemplates the protection of material related to a specific topic when it is collected for a distinct purpose." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 838. Thus, the court in Babcock limited "the privilege afforded by § 19a-25 . . . to the designated materials of a hospital staff committee that are generated primarily for the purpose of the study of morbidity and mortality, undertaken specifically for the purpose of reducing the incidence of patient deaths." (Emphasis added.) Id., 841. The commission concluded in the present case that "[i]n making this holding, Babcock set forth the relevant standard for § 19a-25 . . . determinations." (ROR, 162.)
The plaintiffs argue that the commission improperly refused to apply the medical studies privilege based on Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital. (P.B., 8-11.) The Babcock court stated that "[w]here the nature of a document is not patently discernible from the face of the discovery request . . . the burden of establishing immunity from discovery rests with the party asserting the privilege." Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, supra, 251 Conn. 847-48. The present case, however, differs procedurally from Babcock in that this is an administrative appeal, while Babcock dealt with discovery in a civil action. Thus, while the burden in Babcock was on the party asserting the privilege to establish that the requested information was within the privilege, the court must decide the present case in light of the standard of review for administrative appeals set forth above. Thus, the plaintiffs' burden is to demonstrate that the commission's conclusion that the requested information was not privileged was unsupported by substantial evidence. The court must therefore determine whether the record sets forth substantial evidence indicating that the requested information was not generated primarily for the purpose of the study of morbidity and mortality.
The extent of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs regarding the nature of the requested records consisted of testimony from an employee of the department's planning branch, Julianne Konopka. On direct questioning by plaintiffs' attorney, Konopka testified in relevant part as follows:
"Q . . . I'm going to show you . . . a regulation . . . which is 19-13-D54 entitled Abortions. This is the regulation that is the authority for the collection of abortion data?
"A: Yes.
"Q: And the data is collected pursuant to this regulation?
"A: Right.
"Q: . . . Now, can you tell me for what purposes is the abortion data collected and how it's utilized?
"A: The department uses this data for a variety of morbidity and mortality studies in terms of trends and health outcomes for populations.
"Q: And what types of populations, and give me some examples of how the data is utilized in such studies.
"A: . . . I have epidemiologists who actually do this analysis, but we, on an ongoing basis, pay attention to age specific pregnancy rates and abortion data is part of the equation for that information, and this gives us a risk profile of women in the state of Connecticut so that we can look at different age cohorts and with our program people we have school based health centers, community health centers and adolescent pregnancy programs — all kinds of programs like that, but this informs them about where they should target resources." (ROR, 89-90.)
The commission hearing officer, Clifton A. Leonhardt, subsequently questioned the same witness as follows:
"Leonhardt: Describe for me in more detail how the information . . . relates to study of morbidity and mortality. What I see here is the number of abortions, the types of facilities that they're done at, the patient's state of residence, their age, and the physician's estimate of weeks of gestation at the time of the procedure, and then the method. I don't see anything about aftereffects, morbidity, mortality, anything like that.
"Konopka: Right. This is one piece of the equation. I mean, we really need to look at the entire health outcomes per person and it's not just one piece of information. So this will tell us about unintended pregnancies and other things.
CT Page 15989
"Leonhardt: And how does it do that, for instance, unintended. I don't see anything related to unintended.
"Konopka: Well, when we look at the age cohorts, I mean, it's combined with other information because you were asking me how we use the data, so it's when you combine it with the birth information and age information that we can get a better picture of the population.
* * *
"Leonhardt: So what you're saying and so I understand your argument is that while this information alone maybe doesn't reflect too much on morbidity and mortality, in combination with other information it might.
"Konopka: Yes." (ROR, 92-93.)
The commission found that pursuant to § 19-13-D54(b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, the plaintiffs collect from physicians information concerning each legally induced abortion performed in Connecticut and that, based on this information, the plaintiffs prepare a document entitled "Statistical Summary of Legal Induced Abortions," which is publicly disclosed. (ROR, 160.) A copy of the statistical summary for the year 2003 is part of the record in the present case. (ROR, 9-10.) The commission further found that the publicly released document includes statistics regarding the number of abortions broken down into various categories including "the total number of abortions, the type of facility where the abortion is performed, the patient's state of residence, the patient's age, the physician's estimate of the number of weeks of gestation of the fetus, and the method of abortion." (ROR, 160.) The commission noted, however, that the document does not "indicate the relationship between the state of residence and the age of the patient, with a number for each relevant category," which is the information sought in the present case. (ROR, 160.) With regard to the purpose for which the information was gathered, the commission found that "the information . . . concerning the total number of abortions, the type of facility where the abortion is performed, the patient's state of residence, the patient's age, the physician's estimate of the number of weeks of gestation of the fetus and the method of abortion [was] not generated primarily for the purpose of the study of morbidity and mortality. Rather this information was procured in order to compile statistical studies of the sort at issue herein, as authorized by [§§ 19a-25-1 to 19a-25-4 and 19-13-D54(b) of the] Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies . . ." (ROR, 161.)
The plaintiffs argue that all of the evidence in this case pointed to a single conclusion, namely, that the information sought was generated primarily for the study or reduction of morbidity and mortality. The plaintiffs refer to Konopka's testimony as essentially conclusive on this point, and argue that the commission could not have reached any other conclusion, because there was no other evidence presented as to the purpose of gathering the information. The plaintiffs are correct that Konopka referred to the department's use of the requested records in "a variety of morbidity and mortality studies." Konopka also mentioned, however, that the information is used in developing a "risk profile of women," in developing "adolescent pregnancy programs" and is used "with . . . birth information and age information [to] get a better picture of the population." Furthermore, Konopka acknowledged that the information regarding abortions is gathered pursuant to § 19-13-D54 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. That section provides: "All induced abortions will be reported within seven days by the physician performing the procedure to the state commissioner of public health who will maintain such reports in a confidential file and use them only for statistical purposes except in cases involving licensure. Such reports will specify date of abortion, place where performed, age of woman and town and state of residence, approximate duration of pregnancy, method of abortion, explanation of any complications, name and address of the physician." (Emphasis added.)
"[T]estimony adequate to establish an exemption from disclosure must not be couched in conclusory language or generalized allegations . . . but should be sufficiently detailed, without compromising the asserted right to confidentiality . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Babcock v. Bridgeport Hospital, supra, 251 Conn. 828. In Babcock, the court rejected the defendants' arguments that certain infection records were nondiscoverable based on assertions that they "reflected data used by the committee for . . . the improvement of the quality of care of patients and the reduction of morbidity and mortality . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 843. Given the Babcock court's warning against such testimony being too generalized or conclusory, the court is not convinced in the present case that the commission was bound to accept Konopka's general statements that the information was utilized in "a variety of morbidity and mortality studies" as conclusive. On the contrary, the commission's conclusion that the information was used for more generalized statistical purposes is well supported by Konopka's other remarks indicating that the information is used in the development of a number of different programs overseen by the department. Finally, the commission's conclusion is strongly supported by the text of § 19-13-D54 of the regulations, which indicates that the abortion information is gathered for statistical purposes and for use in cases involving licensure. In light of these factors, the court concludes that the commission's determination was supported by substantial evidence in the record, and resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found.
The plaintiffs next argue that the commission incorrectly evaluated whether the statistical correlation sought by Reynolds, rather than the underlying abortion data, was generated primarily for the purpose of the study of morbidity and mortality. (P.B., 11-12.) As previously stated, however, the commission specifically found that "the information . . . concerning the total number of abortions, the type of facility where the abortion is performed, the patient's state of residence, the patient's age, the physician's estimate of the number of weeks of gestation of the fetus and the method of abortion [was] not generated primarily for the purpose of the study of morbidity and mortality. Rather this information was procured in order to compile statistical studies of the sort at issue herein . . ." (ROR, 161, ¶ 15.) It is clear from the language used by the commission that it considered the information as a whole, and did not limit its inquiry to whether the specific correlation sought by Reynolds was generated for the purpose of the study of morbidity and mortality.
The plaintiffs further argue that the commission erroneously ignored controlling legal authority. Specifically, they claim that the commission ignored an opinion of the attorney general as well as the commission's own opinions in the cases of O'Brien v. Department of Public Health and Obarowski v. Department of Health Services. In those cases, the commission exempted from disclosure certain "records with respect to the performance of abortions in Connecticut institutions." (ROR, 51, 56.) The plaintiffs state that the commission's findings in each case remain applicable. (P.B., 13.) Nevertheless, the administrative decisions and the opinion by the attorney general included in the record predate Babcock and, as a result, did not take into account the Supreme Court's construction of the statutory privilege under § 19a-25. Thus, those decisions have been overruled by Babcock to the extent that they would, as argued by the plaintiffs, require a result contrary to that reached by this court based on the authority of Babcock.
Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that the commission is bound by the Superior Court's opinion in Director, Health Services v. Freedom of Information Commission under the doctrine of res judicata. (P.B., 14.) "The doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties . . . in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction . . . If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or which might have been made . . . To determine whether two claims are the same for purposes of res judicata, we compare the pleadings and judgment in the first action with the complaint in the subsequent action . . . The judicial [doctrine] of res judicata . . . [is] based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield County, Inc. v. Cantore, 96 Conn.App. 326, 332, 901 A.2d 49 (2006).
The plaintiffs state that the court in Director, Health Services v. Freedom of Information Commission considered "the same records" and the "same claims of law" involved in this matter. Director, Health Services involved a request to the department for full access to individual abortion forms filed by three private clinics in 1976 in addition to other statistical abstracts regarding the number of abortions and post-procedural complications for the same period. Director, Health Services v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 81 1387995. The court, O'Neill, J., stated that disclosure in such circumstances would "with very little effort and no special knowledge" expose the "identity of women submitting to the procedures," and on that basis, upheld the department's claim of privilege under General Statutes § 19-6a, now § 19a-25. Id.
The claims central to the present case differ from those adjudicated in Director, Health Services. As the commission noted, the information in this case "merely concerns reworking statistical studies that are already disclosed, in order to disclose very narrow, additional statistical correlations." (ROR, 162.) The material sought in the present case certainly does not include full access to individual abortion forms or any information that would pose any danger of exposing the identity of the individual patients. In short, the present appeal does not involve the same claim or cause of action involved in that earlier case. Furthermore, neither the conference nor Reynolds was a party to the earlier action. Thus, the plaintiffs' reliance on the doctrine of res judicata is inapposite.
VI CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is concluded that substantial evidence supports the commission's conclusion that the requested records were not generated primarily for the purpose of the study of morbidity and mortality. Accordingly, the plaintiffs must provide the requested records pursuant to § 1-210.
The appeal is dismissed.