Summary
In Columbus v. Molt (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 94, 65 O.O.2d 244, 304 N.E.2d 245, the court held that R.C. 4511.06 and 4511.99 were not "general laws," as that term is used in Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.
Summary of this case from Columbus v. KemperOpinion
No. 73-322
Decided November 28, 1973.
Motor vehicles — Traffic laws — Penalties — Municipal ordinance penalty for violation of traffic ordinance — Validity — R.C. 4511.99(F) and 4511.06 — Not "general laws."
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.
Defendant was tried by a jury in Franklin County Municipal Court for reckless operation of a motor vehicle in violation of Section 2133.03, Columbus City Code. He was found guilty and sentenced under the penalty provision of that ordinance, Section 2133.99(c), Columbus City Code.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the penalty section of the Columbus ordinance is invalid because it imposes a greater penalty for reckless operation than does R.C. 4511.99(F), which provides the penalty for violation of the reckless operation statute (R.C. 4511.20). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding "the Columbus ordinance * * * penalty section, C.C. 2133.99, not to be in conflict with the general law of Ohio, and therefore valid."
However, for reasons not before this court, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court as to the penalty which was imposed.
The cause now is before this court upon a certification by the Court of Appeals that its judgment is in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Medina County in State v. Waite (1971), 27 Ohio App.2d 187.
Mr. James J. Hughes, Jr., city attorney, Mr. Daniel W. Johnson and Miss Phyllis F. Kunkler, for appellee.
Mr. Duane F. Lantz, for appellant.
Appellant argues that R.C. 4511.99(F) is a general law, as contemplated by Section 3, Article XVIII, Constitution, with which municipal police legislation (Section 2133.99, Columbus City Code) must not conflict, and that the Columbus penalty ordinance must fall because it is substantially in conflict with R.C. 4511.99(F).
It is further argued by appellant that R.C. 4511.06, which provides for the uniform application and precedence of traffic laws, has as its purpose the creation of a uniform traffic law throughout Ohio and requires uniform application of R.C. 4511.99(F) as a general law, thus invalidating the Columbus penalty ordinance.
Under the holdings of this court in Struthers v. Sokol (1923), 108 Ohio St. 263; Youngstown v. Evans (1929), 121 Ohio St. 342; and West Jefferson v. Robinson (1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 113, R.C. 4511.99(F) and 4511.06 are not general laws, as that term is used in Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.
Accordingly, the penalty provision of the Columbus ordinance, Section 2133.99(c), is not in conflict with general laws.
On authority of the Struthers, Youngstown and West Jefferson cases, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN, CELEBREZZE, W. BROWN and P. BROWN, JJ., concur.