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rejecting equal protection challenge to a disaffiliation requirement where groups were not similarly situated under the state election code
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No. 90SA382
Decided October 7, 1991.
Appeal from the District Court, City and County of Denver Honorable Ralph H. Coyte, Judge.
Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of the Colo. Const., art. VI, Sec. 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 10B).
Davis, Graham Stubbs, Karen L. Page, for Petitioners-Appellants.
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Maurice Knaizer, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent-Appellee.
Appellants, the Colorado Libertarian Party (CLP) and Robin Heid (Heid), appeal the district court's ruling that the unaffiliation requirement in section 1-4-801(1)(i), 1B C.R.S. (1980), of the Colorado Election Code of 1980 does not violate appellants' right to political association, U.S. Const. amends. I XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 5, or their right to equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25. We affirm.
Section 13-4-102(1)(b), 6A C.R.S. (1987), grants this court jurisdiction over appeals when the constitutionality of a statute is at issue.
I.
This action arises from appellant Heid's efforts to become the CLP candidate in the 1990 Colorado gubernatorial election. The CLP is the Colorado affiliate of the national Libertarian Party and is a "qualified political organization" within the meaning of Colorado Secretary of State Rule 16, 8 C.C.R. 1505-1 (1984). The CLP has adopted a constitution and by-laws that outline its membership requirements and procedures for nominating CLP candidates. Membership in the organization occurs when an applicant either registers as a Libertarian voter in Colorado or pays the requisite membership fee established by the CLP Board of Directors, or both. The only requirement imposed on prospective CLP candidates is the submission of a signed statement by the candidate that he or she does not believe in or advocate the initiation of force as a means of achieving political or social goals.
Rule 16.1 defines a "qualified political organization" as "one which has placed on the ballot at a congressional vacancy or general election a candidate for district or state office and whose officers have filed under oath with the Secretary of State the required proof of organization and which continues to meet the requirements of 16.3 [meet once a year] and 16.4 [place a candidate or candidates on the general election ballot every two years]." A "political organization" is defined by statute as "any group of registered electors who, by petition for nomination of an independent candidate as provided in section 1-4-801, places upon the official general election ballot nominees for public office." § 1-1-104(17), 1B C.R.S. (1990). A political organization differs from a political party, which is defined as "any political organization which at the last preceding gubernatorial election was represented on the official ballot either by regular party candidates or by individual nominees only if it cast for its gubernatorial candidate at least ten percent of the total gubernatorial vote cast in the state at such election." § 1-1-104(18), 1B C.R.S. (1980).
Heid has been registered as a member of the Colorado Republican Party since April 25, 1980. On May 27, 1988, Heid also became a member of the CLP by paying a $25 membership fee to the CLP finance chairman, which entitled Heid to membership in the CLP for one year. In 1988, Heid circulated a petition for nomination as the CLP candidate for the First Congressional District, but did not receive a sufficient number of signatures to be placed on the ballot. On April 21, 1990, Heid renewed his CLP membership by paying the $25 fee. In convention on that same day, the CLP nominated Heid as its candidate for Governor of Colorado in the 1990 gubernatorial election. At the time of Heid's nomination, he was both a member of the CLP pursuant to its by-laws and constitution and a member of the Republican Party by virtue of his registered affiliation with that party.
On June 9, 1990, Heid attended the Republican Party State Assembly as a candidate for the Republican nomination. Heid's name was placed in nomination, but before the votes were announced, Heid committed his votes to John Andrews, who won the Republican gubernatorial nomination. Pursuant to his nomination as the CLP candidate, Heid submitted a petition to appellee Secretary of State, Natalie Meyer, to have his name placed on the November 1990 ballot. In a letter dated August 15, 1990, the State Elections Officer notified Heid that his petition had been rejected for his failure to register either as a Libertarian or as unaffiliated, and thus to disaffiliate himself from the Republican Party, at least one year prior to filing his petition for nomination, as required by section 1-4-801(1)(i), 1B C.R.S. (1980).
Section 1-4-801, 1B C.R.S. (1980 1990 Supp.), governs petitions for nominating candidates of political organizations pursuant to Rule 16.6, 8 C.C.R. 1505-1 (1984), which provides that "[c]andidates wishing to represent a qualified political organization on the General Election ballot shall be placed in nomination by independent nominating petition pursuant to C.R.S. 1-4-801."
On September 4, 1990, the CLP and Heid filed a verified petition in district court pursuant to section 1-1-112, 1B C.R.S. (1980), requesting the court to enjoin the Secretary of State from enforcing section 1-4-801(1)(i) against the CLP and Heid, to declare section 1-4-801(1)(i) unconstitutional, and to award the CLP and Heid costs and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the appellants' request for relief based on its conclusion that section 1-4-801(1)(i) was constitutional and that the Secretary of State properly rejected Heid's petition for nomination.
Section 1-1-112(1), 1B C.R.S. (1980), governs election-related controversies and provides: "When any controversy arises between any official charged with any duty or function under [the Colorado Election Code of 1980] and any candidate, the officers or representatives of any political party, persons who have made nominations, or any other person, the district court, upon the filing of a verified petition by any such official or person setting forth in concise form the nature of the controversy and the relief sought, shall issue an order commanding the respondent in such petition to appear before the court and answer under oath to such petition. The court shall summarily hear and dispose of any such issues with a view to obtaining substantial compliance with the provisions of this code by the parties to such controversy, shall make and enter orders and judgments, and shall issue the writ or process of such court to enforce all such orders and judgments."
II.
We must determine whether the unaffiliation requirement in section 1-4-801(1)(i), 1B C.R.S. (1980), violates the rights of CLP and Heid to political association and equal protection of the laws under the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution.
Section 1-4-801 outlines the petition procedure by which candidates for public office who do not wish to affiliate with a political party may be nominated, other than by a primary election or a convention. For prospective candidates choosing this route to the ballot, section 1-4-801(1)(i) imposes a twelve-month unaffiliation requirement from a political party. Section 1-4-801(1)(i) provides in relevant part:
"No person shall be placed in nomination by petition unless the person . . . was registered as unaffiliated, as shown on the books of the county clerk and recorder, for at least twelve months prior to the date of filing of the petition . . . ."
In response to the Tenth Circuit's instruction in Baer v. Meyer, 728 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1984), Colorado's Secretary of State refined the meaning of the word "unaffiliated" in section 1-4-801(1)(i), by promulgating Rule 16, 8 C.C.R. 1505-1 (1984), to allow candidates not affiliated with a political party to register as either unaffiliated or as affiliated with a "qualified political organization." Thus, "unaffiliated" as used in section 1-4-801(1)(i) now means unaffiliated with a political party. It is undisputed that the CLP is a "qualified political organization" within the meaning of Secretary of State Rule 16 and that section 1-4-801(1)(i)'s twelve-month unaffiliation requirement applies to all prospective candidates of the CLP by virtue of Rule 16.6, which advises that "[c]andidates wishing to represent a qualified political organization on the General Election ballot shall be placed in nomination by independent nominating petition pursuant to C.R.S. 1-4-801." As the CLP's 1990 gubernatorial candidate, Heid was therefore required to register either as unaffiliated or as a Libertarian twelve months prior to filing his petition for nomination.
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Baer, a person who was affiliated with a political organization was required to register as unaffiliated even though the organization had recognized officials and had previously placed a candidate on the ballot by petition. In Baer, the Tenth Circuit found that the Citizens Party of Colorado and the Colorado Libertarian Party qualified as organizations entitled to designation on the voter registration forms because they previously managed to field candidates on the ballots by the petition process. 728 F.2d at 476. The court cautioned that its opinion did not require the Secretary of State to recognize any political organizations other than the Citizens and Libertarian parties, and that it was the Secretary of State's responsibility to define the specifics for regulating which political organizations may be designated on voter registration forms. Id.
A.
We first address appellants' contention that the twelve-month unaffiliation requirement in § 1-4-801(1)(i) is an unconstitutional restriction on a political organization's right to choose its representative for public office in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article II, section 5, of the Colorado Constitution. We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court has approached the constitutionality of ballot access restrictions in an inconsistent manner, at times applying a strict standard of scrutiny, see Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), and at other times employing a more flexible standard, see Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986) (following Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); there is "no litmus-paper test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that are invidious . . . . Decision in this context . . . is very much a `matter of degree,' very much a matter of `consider[ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification.'" (Citations omitted.)); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). See National Prohibition Party v. State, 752 P.2d 80, 83 (Colo. 1988) (the Supreme Court "has only provided limited definitive guidance in determining the validity of restrictions on ballot access."); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 13-20 (2d ed. 1988) (discusses Supreme Court's inconsistent approach to ballot access cases).
This court has favored the balancing test set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), wherein the Court advised that, in determining the constitutionality of a ballot access restriction, a court
"must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional."
Id. at 789. See National Prohibition Party, 752 P.2d at 83-84.
Appellants seek protection of their right to associate politically as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). It is well understood that "[f]reedom of association is considered to be an element of the broad right to freedom of expression and protects `the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs.'" State Bd. for Community Colleges and Occupational Educ., 687 P.2d 429, 439 (Colo. 1984) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972)).
A disaffiliation requirement for prospective political candidates, such as the one at issue, directly impacts those aspiring to public office, rather than the voters. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972). Although candidacy for public office has not been recognized as a fundamental right, Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142, "laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters." Id. at 143. Thus, ballot access restrictions imposed on candidates necessarily implicate voters' freedom of association by limiting the field of candidates from which the voters might choose. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 787-88.
There is no question that political organizations enjoy the constitutionally protected freedom of association. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989). This freedom to associate politically includes a voter's right to choose a political organization with which to associate, and a political organization's right to identify those people who constitute the association and to select a candidate who represents the organization's ideologies. See id. Therefore, restrictions on a political organization's access to an election ballot burden two fundamental rights: "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively." Williams, 393 U.S. at 30; accord Munro, 479 U.S. at 193; Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979); National Prohibition Party, 752 P.2d at 83. Despite the fundamental nature of these rights, they are not absolute and are necessarily subject to limitation. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788; National Prohibition Party, 752 P.2d at 83. "[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes." Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); see also Munro, 479 U.S. at 193. Indeed, "the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions." Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788.
We therefore must evaluate the state's interests in imposing a twelve-month unaffiliation requirement on prospective candidates of a qualified political organization, such as the CLP, to determine whether those interests justify the impingement on the organization's associational rights. The federal courts previously upheld the constitutionality of section 1-4-801(1)(i), 1B C.R.S. (1980), in Thournir v. Meyer, 708 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Colo. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1990). There, the plaintiff registered as unaffiliated in Colorado only one month before filing a nominating petition as an unaffiliated candidate for Congress, stating that she failed to register early because she was unaware of section 1-4-801(1)(i)'s time requirement and that she had decided to run for office only six months prior to filing her petition. Applying the Celebrezze test, Judge Carrigan of the United States District Court for Colorado found that section 1-4-801(1)(i)
"does not discriminate unfairly against independent candidates. Rather, the statute works against would be independent candidates prompted by short-range political or personal motives, or who seek to bleed off votes in the general election that otherwise might go to a particular major party candidate. Colorado has an interest in insuring that voters are not presented with a "laundry list" of candidates who have decided on the eve of a major election to seek public office."
Thournir, 708 F. Supp. at 1187. In so holding, Judge Carrigan relied on the Supreme Court's resolution in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), which we also believe to be dispositive.
In Storer, the Supreme Court upheld a California election statute that denied ballot access to an independent candidate seeking elective public office if the candidate had a registered affiliation with a qualified political party within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election. Id. at 736. In finding California's disaffiliation requirement constitutional, the Court stated as follows:
" The requirement that the independent candidate not have been affiliated with a political party for a year before the primary is expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot. It involves no discrimination against independents.
. . . .
"The general election ballot is reserved for major struggles; it is not a forum for continuing intraparty feuds. The provision against defeated primary candidates running as independents effectuates this aim, the visible result being to prevent the losers from continuing the struggle and to limit the names on the ballot to those who have won the primaries and those independents who have properly qualified. The people, it is hoped, are presented with understandable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern effectively.
". . . [The disaffiliation statute] protects the direct primary process by refusing to recognize independent candidates who do not make early plans to leave a party and take the alternative course to the ballot. It works against independent candidacies prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel. It is also a substantial barrier to a party fielding an `independent' candidate to capture and bleed off votes in the general election that might well go to another party.
". . . It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffiliation provision furthers the State's interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling and as outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in making a late rather than an early decision to seek independent ballot status."
Storer, 415 U.S. at 733-36 (emphasis added). In our view, the state's compelling interest in "maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot" is served by imposing the unaffiliation requirement on prospective candidates of political organizations as well. We therefore hold that Colorado's one-year unaffiliation requirement preserves the state's compelling interest in "maintaining the integrity" of its ballot access system, see Storer, 415 U.S. at 733, and thus promotes the overall stability of the state's election process, without "unfairly or unnecessarily" impinging upon the CLP's associational rights. See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982) ("The inquiry is whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the `availability of political opportunity.'") (quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974)). "Although a disaffiliation provision may preclude . . . voters from supporting a particular ineligible candidate, they remain free to support and promote other candidates who satisfy the State's disaffiliation requirements." Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 792 n. 12.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Storer in Munro v. Socialist Worker's Party, 479 U.S. 189, 198 (1986). The Court noted, however, that the statute upheld in Storer imposed a disaffiliation requirement that, if unsatisfied, barred ballot access, id. at 198, whereas the statute challenged in Munro imposed a restriction that did not bar access to primary election ballots, id. at 191-93. Thus, while political organizations challenged ballot restrictions in both cases, only the Storer requirement raised "concerns of constitutional dimension" by virtue of its potential absolute ban on ballot access. Since the Storer court considered the constitutional concerns presented by a disaffiliation requirement, Storer thus provides the best framework for resolving appellants' constitutional challenge to section 1-4-801(1)(i)'s unaffiliation requirement.
Our holding is consistent with other cases upholding state disaffiliation requirements. In Anderson v. Hooper, 632 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1980), the Tenth Circuit relied on Storer to sustain the constitutionality of New Mexico's disaffiliation provision, which required independent candidates to have no political party affiliation after January 1 of the general election year. In Davis v. State Election Board, 762 P.2d 932 (Okla. 1988), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld a six-month disaffiliation requirement for independent candidates as "a reasonable ballot access restriction," stating that the statute "[did] not exclude independent candidates from the ballot. It merely insure[d] that one who files for office as an `independent' is in fact nonpartisan." Id. at 934. See also Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 758 (1973) (court held that voter affiliation requirement served the legitimate state purpose of deterring party "raiding" and "did not constitute a ban on their freedom of association, but merely a time limitation on when they had to act in order to participate in their chosen party's next primary."). Similarly, section 1-4-801(1)(i) does not exclude CLP candidates from the ballot; it merely discourages those potential candidates "prompted by short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel," and disrupts the practice of diverting votes that might go to another political party or organization. Storer, 415 U.S. at 735.
Appellants cite Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986), and Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989), in support of their argument that section 1-4-801(1)(i) is an unconstitutional restriction on a political organization's right to choose its representatives. In Tashjian, the Republican Party of Connecticut challenged the constitutionality of a state statute requiring voters in any political party primary to be registered members of that party. The Republican Party had adopted a rule allowing independent voters to vote in Republican primaries. The Court struck down the state's enforcement of its closed primary system as an unreasonable burden on the first amendment rights of the Republican Party. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225. In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished Storer, stating:
"The statute in Storer was designed to protect the parties and the party system against the disorganizing effect of independent candidacies launched by unsuccessful putative party nominees. This protection, like that accorded to parties threatened by raiding in Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), is undertaken to prevent the disruption of the political parties from without, and not, as in this case, to prevent the parties from taking internal steps affecting their own process for the selection of candidates. The forms of regulation upheld in Storer and Rosario imposed certain burdens upon the protected First and Fourteenth Amendment interests of some individuals, both voters and potential candidates, in order to protect the interests of others. In the present case, the state statute is defended on the ground that it protects the integrity of the Party against the Party itself."
Id. at 224, 107 S.Ct. at 553-54.
The Court also qualified its holding, stating that its decision "[did] not establish that state regulation of primary voting qualifications may never withstand challenge by a political party or its membership. A party seeking, for example, to open its primary to all voters, including members of other parties, would raise a different combination of considerations. Under such circumstances, the effect of one party's broadening of participation would threaten other parties with the disorganization effects which the statutes in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 752 (1974), and Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), were designed to prevent." Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224-25 n. 13. Under this rationale, a state could restrict a person to becoming a candidate for only one political entity in an election year. Thus, it is not impermissible for Colorado to prevent Heid from presenting himself to the voters as a Libertarian-Republican candidate as he had apparently intended.
In Eu, certain California election laws prohibited the official governing bodies of political parties from endorsing candidates in party primaries, and dictated the internal organization of political parties. The Court invalidated the challenged laws because they burdened the first amendment rights of political parties and their members without serving a compelling state interest. Eu, 489 U.S. at 233. We find Eu inapplicable since it addresses intra-political party concerns and not the situation in the present case where a political organization's lack of any affiliation requirement for prospective candidates has a disorganizing effect on other political parties or organizations.
The appellants' reliance on Tashjian and Eu is misplaced in that they do not address the issue of whether the state may make distinctions between political organizations and political parties in maintaining the integrity of the political process of its ballot access system in order to promote the overall stability of the state's election process. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 733, 737; see also Munro, 479 U.S. 189. We conclude that Colorado's one-year unaffiliation requirement preserves the state's compelling interest in maintaining a fair election process, without unfairly or unnecessarily impinging upon Heid's and the CLP's associational rights.
B.
We now address the appellants' claim that section 1-4-801(1)(i), 1B C.R.S. (1980), imposes a twelve-month unaffiliation requirement on political organization candidates that is not imposed on candidates of the two major political parties, and that the statute is therefore an unconstitutional violation of the appellants' right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution. In advancing an equal protection argument, "it is the claimant's burden to `demonstrate in the first instance a discrimination against [him] of some substance.'" Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967 (1982) (quoting American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974)). Appellants have failed to carry this burden. We thus find their argument to be without merit.
The Colorado election code distinguishes political organizations from political parties. A political organization is defined as "any group of registered electors who, by petition for nomination of an independent candidate as provided in section 1-4-801, places upon the official general election ballot nominees for public office." § 1-1-104(17), 1B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Section 1-4-801(1)(i) provides in relevant part:
"No person shall be placed in nomination by petition unless the person . . . was registered as unaffiliated . . . for at least twelve months prior to the date of filing of the petition."
Under Rule 16, 8 C.C.R. 1505-1 (1984), the term "unaffiliated" in the statute means unaffiliated with a political party.
It is undisputed that the CLP qualifies as a political organization.
In contrast, a political party is defined by the election code to mean "any political organization which at the last preceding gubernatorial election was represented on the official ballot either by regular party candidates or by individual nominees only if it cast for its gubernatorial candidate at least ten percent of the total gubernatorial vote cast in the state at such election." § 1-1-104(18), 1B C.R.S. (1973). The election code does not require political parties to comply with section 1-4-801 in order to place nominees on general election ballots.
The election code allows a political organization to become a political party if it commands a modicum of support among the electorate. See § 1-4-801(1)(b), 1B C.R.S. (1990). A political party, similarly, can become a political organization if its popular support decreases. See National Prohibition Party v. State, 752 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1988) ("Any political entity that fails to receive at least ten percent of the total vote cast in the preceding gubernatorial election is a `political organization' subject to section 1-4-801(1)."). The code thus distinguishes political organizations from political parties, but does not, however, prevent organizations from becoming parties.
See Clements v. People ex rel. Lee, 58 Colo. 105, 109-10, 143 P. 834 (1914) ("it clearly appears that an association of qualified electors who, by petition, place upon the official ballot individual nominees for public office, constitute and are a `political organization'; that as a condition precedent for such `political organization' to become a `political party' within the meaning of the act, it shall participate in such election, and, in addition thereto, cast for its candidate for governor at least ten per cent of the total vote cast at such election.") (interpreting the similar precursors of today's election code).
Political organizations and political parties are thus not similarly situated under the election code. Political organizations can be accorded dissimilar treatment from political parties, therefore, if they are not unfairly deprived of exercising their fundamental rights. See J. Nowak R. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 568 (4th ed. 1991) ("[T]he Court has increasingly focused upon the concept of equal protection to guarantee that all individuals are accorded fair treatment in the exercise of fundamental rights . . . ."). The permissibility of this dissimilar treatment is the basis for appellants' contention that section 1-4-801(1)(i)'s sole application to political organizations denies them equal protection of the laws and discriminates against them in their exercise of a fundamental right.
This court has previously considered whether section 1-4-801(1) deprives political organizations of equal protection of the laws. National Prohibition Party, 752 P.2d at 83. Petitioners argued therein that section 1-4-801(1) "unconstitutionally discriminates against political organizations by requiring them to bear burdens that are not imposed on majority party candidates." Id. Specifically, petitioners challenged the requirement that "each candidate for public office who is either independent or affiliated with a political organization . . . circulate and file a separate petition before his [or her] name can appear on the ballot." Id. at 81. We noted that "[t]he burdens placed on political organizations under section 1-4-801(1) are no more restrictive than those placed on candidates from political parties . . . . To require political organizations . . . to comply with the elaborate requirements for a political party would inhibit such entities from placing candidates on the ballot." Id. at 85 (citing §§ 1-4-601 to -701). We found that Colorado's interests in preserving "the integrity of the electoral process by avoiding voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, and the presence of frivolous candidates" outweighed the burdens imposed on petitioners' constitutional rights. Id. We thus held that section 1-4-801(1) satisfied the requirements of equal protection of the laws. Id.
With respect to the one-year unaffiliation requirement, we have evaluated the burden that section 1-4-801(1)(i) imposes on appellants' constitutional rights, and concluded that the requirement outweighs the burden by preserving Colorado's interest in "maintaining the integrity" of its ballot access system. See part II.A. (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974)). Because the requirement serves compelling state interests, the election code's different treatment of political parties and organizations does not deprive appellants of equal protection of the laws. In fact, the dissimilar treatment may facilitate political organizations' access to ballots. Id.
Appellants' contention that they are discriminated against because political parties can author their own unaffiliation requirements thus fails as appellants are not unfairly burdened by section 1-4-801(1)(i) in their access to the ballot.
The election code's dissimilar treatment is thus permissible under the federal and state constitutions.
III.
In conclusion, we hold that section 1-4-801(1)(i) is constitutional, and accordingly affirm the district court.
JUSTICE LOHR specially concurs.
JUSTICE MULLARKEY specially concurs.
JUSTICE QUINN dissents.