Opinion
Civil Action No. 05-6305.
August 9, 2006
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Defendant Ronald McCoy's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Rodney Collins alleges in his Complaint that he was arrested and charged with murder on July 13, 1992. See Complaint ¶ 5. Beginning in May 1993 Plaintiff was tried on the murder charge. Complaint ¶¶ 6-10, 14. According to the Complaint, Defendant Ronald McCoy worked in the Police Department's Forensic Lab, and played some role in laboratory testing done in connection with Plaintiff's murder trial. Complaint ¶¶ 4, 8. Plaintiff also alleges that McCoy testified falsely at his criminal trial, and "changed the date" on laboratory tests. Complaint ¶¶ 9-12, 14, 15, 17.
Plaintiff has filed this civil rights action against Mr. McCoy in which he avers in his First Cause of Action that the allegedly false testimony of Mr. McCoy constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Complaint ¶¶ 21-22. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action is based on an alleged due process violation due to the allegedly false testimony of Mr. McCoy. Complaint ¶¶ 23-24. In his Third Cause of Action Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution. Complaint ¶¶ 25-26.
LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), we must "view the facts alleged in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff," and the Motion should not be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law." Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988).
DISCUSSION
Defendant first contends that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims of constitutional violations are governed by state statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985);Pratt v. Thornburgh, 807 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1986). In Pennsylvania, Plaintiff must bring a cause of action within two years of the injury giving rise to the alleged violations. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5524, see also Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 (3d Cir. 1989); Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 78-80 (3d Cir. 1989); Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 764 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950 (1985); Molina v. City of Lancaster, 2001 WL 322809 at *4 (E.D. Pa., March 30, 2001) (citing Montgomery v. DeSimone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1998)); Colbert v. City of Philadelphia, 931 F. Supp. 389, 391 (E.D. Pa. 1996);Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289 (Pa. 1994).
Plaintiff complains of actions of Mr. McCoy that were committed in 1993. Complaint ¶¶ 10-12, 14, 15. These are clearly barred by the statute of limitations and they will be dismissed with prejudice.
Defendant's second basis to dismiss the Complaint is that the action represents a collateral attack on Plaintiff's murder conviction, and is therefore barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). A § 1983 claim fails under the rule in Heck when a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of a subsequent criminal conviction or sentence. See Marable v. W. Pottsgrove Twp., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9925 (3d Cir. 2006) "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus," (quoting Heck, supra);Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1996).
Here Plaintiff is engaged in a collateral attack on his murder conviction, and there is no allegation that his conviction has been reversed or invalidated on appeal. Therefore, this is also a valid grounds to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's Complaint.
Defendant's third reason to dismiss the Complaint is that it seeks to impose civil liability based on the alleged perjured testimony offered by Defendant Mr. McCoy. Witnesses in criminal proceedings enjoy absolute immunity for their criminal court testimony, because such testimony is absolutely protected underBriscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). We find therefore that Plaintiff's complaints about alleged perjury committed by Mr. McCoy in the Complaint ¶¶ 10-12, 14 are not actionable.
Plaintiff's Eight Amendment claims for "cruel and unusual punishment" must also be dismissed. The Eighth Amendment protection against "cruel and unusual punishment" extends only to incarcerated inmates not to pretrial detainees. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1987). The actions of Mr. McCoy that Plaintiff complains of were prior to Plaintiff's conviction, while he was a pretrial detainee, and do not constitute Eighth Amendment violations.
Plaintiff's claims based on the Pennsylvania State Constitution (Complaint ¶¶ 25-26) are not actionable. In Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 890 A.2d 1188 (2006), the Commonwealth Court held that there is no right to monetary damages for alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
For all of the above reasons we will grant Defendant Ronald McCoy's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and dismiss Plaintiff's claims, with prejudice.
We therefore enter the following Order.