Opinion
C.A. No. 15-244 Erie
10-10-2018
TYSCON COLEMAN, Plaintiff v. DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT TICE, SHIFT COMMANDER DIMPERIO Defendants.
District Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Recommendation
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 50. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion be granted. II. Report
A. Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff Tyson Coleman (Coleman) is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (SCI-Huntingdon). He instituted this pro se prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with the filing of a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis on October 05, 2015 [ECF No. 2] and his Complaint was docketed on October 14, 2015 [ECF No. 4]. The allegations of his complaint are based on an altercation Coleman had with another inmate while Coleman was housed at SCI-Forest. Coleman named as Defendants SCI-Forest employees Deputy Superintendent Eric Tice (Tice) and Shift Commander Dimperio (Dimperio). Coleman's Complaint states two claims: a failure to protect claim, arising under the 8th Amendment (Count I), and a state tort claim of negligence (Count II). ECF No. 1, at 6-8, ¶¶ 36-41.
Coleman is identified in this Report and Recommendation as "Tyson" Coleman. His first name is misspelled in the official caption.
Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint on January 19, 2015. ECF No. 9. The parties then engaged in a period of discovery. As part of the discovery process, the Defendants filed a motion to depose Coleman. ECF No. 21. The Court granted the Defendants' motion on June 7, 2018. ECF No 22. During this period of discovery, the Court made requests of counsel to represent Coleman. ECF No. 36. On September 26, 2016, Samantha J. Chugh, Esq., accepted the Court's request to represent Coleman. ECF No. 42.
By order dated October 5, 2018, Michele L. Zerr, Esq. was substituted for Attorney Chugh as counsel for Coleman. ECF No. 63.
On August 4, 2017, upon completion of discovery, the Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment together with supporting documents. ECF Nos, 50, 51, 53, 54. Tice and Dimperio also filed a Concise Statement of Material Facts on that same day. ECF No. 52. Coleman filed a brief in opposition to the summary judgment motion, a Counterstatement of Facts, and an appendix thereto on September 25, 2018. On September 27, 2018, this matter was reassigned from United States Magistrate Judge (now United States District Judge) Susan Paradise Baxter to the undersigned.
The motion is now ripe for recommendation and subsequent disposition.
B. Relevant Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the parties' statements of material facts, responses thereto, and the exhibits submitted. Disputed facts are noted.
On November 8, 2013, Coleman was incarcerated at SCI-Forest. ECF No. 1, at 1-2. Inmate Michael Arce (Arce) was also incarcerated at SCI-Forest at that time. ECF No. 1, at 2. Coleman and Arce had no prior relationship or interaction with each other prior to November 8, 2013. At approximately 2:30 PM (approximately 3:00 PM according to Coleman) on that same day, officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections conducted a search of Arce's cell and discovered alcohol. ECF No. 53-2, at 2-3. Prison officials confiscated the alcohol and cited Arce for possession of contraband. Id. However, Arce was not placed in prehearing confinement after receiving the misconduct citation. ECF No. 1 at 3. The placing of an inmate in prehearing confinement is within the discretion of correctional officers. ECF No. 53-8, at 11; ECF No. 53-8, at 3.
At approximately 8:44 PM, the inmates in B unit, B pod were outside of their cells, in a common area ("the dayroom"). ECF No. 53-4, at 3-5. Coleman and Arce were among them. ECF No. 53-1, at 7; ECF No. 53-4, at 3. Coleman was threatened and chased around the dayroom by Arce for ten to fifteen minutes. ECF No. 53-1, at 12-14. During this incident, Coleman had an opportunity to notify the appropriate prison staff. Id. According to the Defendants, instead of notifying prison officials, Coleman returned to his cell and armed himself with a padlock. Id. Coleman states that while he did return to his cell to obtain a weapon, he did not do so by choice, but rather Arce's aggression left him no alternative but to arm himself. ECF No. 53-1, at 12. Coleman did not notify any prison official that he feared for his personal safety. ECF 53-1, at 7, 11-14. An altercation took place between Coleman and Inmate Arce. ECF No. 1, 3-4, ECF No. 53-1, at 12, 17. During this altercation, Coleman repeatedly struck Arce in the head with the padlock he obtained from his cell, which he had put inside of a sock. ECF No. 53-3, at 2, ECF No. 53-4, at 4-5. Corrections officers responded to the altercation and ordered both inmates to cease fighting. ECF No. 53-4, at 4. Coleman and Arce did not respond to the officers' commands and multiple officers were called in to subdue the inmates. ECF No. 1., at 4; ECF No. 53-3, at 2; ECF No. 53-4. Coleman's "lock in a sock" weapon was recovered by prison officials. ECF No. 53-3, at 2; ECF No. 53-4, at 4-5. Both Coleman and Arce suffered injuries as a result of their fight, with Arce receiving multiple lacerations to his head requiring the use of twenty-six surgical staples, and Coleman receiving stab wounds to his hand and chest. ECF No. 53-4, at 4.
Defendant Tice, at the time of the altercation, was the Superintendent II at SCI-Forest and Defendant Dimperio was the shift supervisor on duty. ECF No. 53-6, at 8-9; ECF No. 53-7, at 9-10. Prior to the altercation, Coleman had not notified either Defendant, or any other SCI-Forest personnel that Arce posed a threat to him. ECF-53-1, at 7-8, 12, 14. The Defendants state that neither of them were aware of any information that Arce posed a specific danger to Coleman on the date of the altercation. ECF No. 53-1, at 8, 11. Coleman disputes this, and states that prior to the fight, both Defendants knew or should have known that Arce's history of misconduct citations for threatening behavior and possession of contraband posed a specific danger to Coleman and the general prison population. Coleman provides no citation to the record to support this statement, however.
Coleman sets out additional material facts which the Defendants have not contested. He states that SCI-Forest has a policy prohibiting inmates from possessing alcohol or any other fermented beverage. ECF No. 53-6, at 15. Further, Coleman states that Inmate Arce has a history of misconducts—including citations for alcohol possession—and threatening behavior. ECF No. 59-1, at 1-8. Finally, Coleman states that Arce inflicted the injuries to his hand and chest. ECF No. 53-1, at 18.
Under Local Rule 56(C), a party opposing summary judgment must admit or deny whether each fact contained in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts is undisputed and/or material, set forth the basis for the denial if any fact is not admitted in its entirety, with appropriate reference to the record, and set forth any other material facts that are allegedly at issue. LCvR 56(C)(1)(2016). Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (ECF No. 58) contains additional averments of facts to which the Defendants failed to respond. Therefore, these facts are admitted.
C. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Under Rule 56, the district court must enter summary judgment against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment may be granted when no "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).
The moving party has the initial burden of proving to the district court the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. Id. at 330. See also Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007); UPMC Health System v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004). When a non-moving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party has no burden to negate the opponent's claim. Id. at 323. The moving party need not produce any evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 325. "Instead, ... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. After the moving party has satisfied this low burden, the nonmoving party must provide facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 324. "Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves." Id. See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001); Garcia v. Kimmell, 2010 WL 2089639, at * 1 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005)) (the non-moving party "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue.").
In considering these evidentiary materials, "courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). See also Doe v. Cnty. of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001) (when applying this standard, the court must examine the factual record and make reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to make credibility determinations, but is limited to deciding whether there are any disputed issues and, if there are, whether they are both genuine and material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 255 ("[O]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted."). In determining whether the dispute is genuine, the court's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 249. The court may consider any evidence that would be admissible at trial in deciding the merits of a motion for summary judgment. Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 8 (1st Cir. 1993).
D. Coleman's Failure to Protect Claim - Count I
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a cause of action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.Id.; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege "the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Prison officials are state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Lorenzano v. Link, 2014 WL 5795568 (W D. Pa. 2014).
Coleman's failure to protect claim is based on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, which imposes on prison officials "a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997). "Being violently assaulted in prison is simply 'not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). See also Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
There are two requirements a prisoner must satisfy to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment based on a failure to protect. First, "the deprivation alleged must be objectively, 'sufficiently serious[.]'" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. That is, an inmate must show that there is a substantial risk of harm. Id. (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). This is an objective inquiry. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F. 3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012). Second, the inmate must show that the prison official had "a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1993)). This means that the prison officials must be deliberately indifferent to inmate health and safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03).
Deliberate indifference is a state of mind "more blameworthy than negligence[,]" and reflecting greater than an "ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety." Id. at 835 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Deliberate indifference is determined through a subjective test, which means that the prison "official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837. Therefore, the simple presence of a risk is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference where the official did not actually perceive the risk. Id. at 838. Injury from a fellow prisoner, in and of itself, does not amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Counterman v. Warren Cnty. Corr. Facility, 176 Fed. Appx. 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) ("It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.").
The Third Circuit has elaborated on the deliberate indifference standard in the context of suits against guards for failure to protect an inmate from harm caused by other inmates, stating that "a prison official is deliberately indifferent when he knows or should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate." Young, 960 F.2d at 361. The term "should have known" is a term of art, which
[d]oes not refer to a failure to note a risk that would be perceived with the use of ordinary prudence. It connotes something more than a negligent failure to appreciate the risk ..., though something less than subjective appreciation of that risk. The "strong likelihood" of [harm] must be "so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for" preventative action. [T]he risk of ... injury must be not only great, but also sufficiently apparent that a lay custodian's failure to appreciate it evidences an absence of any concern for the welfare of his or her charges.Id. (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1025 (3d Cir. 1991)) ("Colburn II") (citation omitted, alterations in original). So then, to survive a motion for summary judgment on his failure to protect claim, Coleman must produce sufficient evidence to support the inference that Tice and Dimperio "knowingly and unreasonably disregarded an objectively intolerable risk of harm." Davis v. Williams, 572 F. Supp.2d 498, 507 (D. Del. 2008) (quoting Beers-Capital v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 132 (3d Cir. 2001)). Knowledge of a risk can be shown either through actual notice, or where there is a "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted" risk and the circumstances are such that a defendant had information regarding the risk that would allow the court to infer that defendant knew about the risk. Id. (citing Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67-66 (3d Cir. 1996)); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
1. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm - The Objective Inquiry
The Court should grant summary judgment to the Defendants because Coleman cannot establish that he was subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm. Coleman "must show 'a pervasive risk of harm to inmates from other prisoners'" in order to show prison conditions posing a substantial risk of harm arising from an inmate on inmate assault. Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973)). Coleman cannot point to any evidence on this record that Arce articulated a specific threat against him that should have alerted the Defendants. For example, Coleman has established neither a prior history of antagonism or violence between himself and Arce, nor pointed to any complaints about Arce that he lodged with the Defendants or other corrections officers that would have alerted them that Arce posed a threat. See, e.g., Bizzell v. Tennis, et al., 44 Fed. Appx. 112, 115 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming grant of summary judgment where attacker had a history of trouble making, but had not had a history of fighting or other general violent incidents for two years). As he stated in his deposition, Coleman was unaware of any danger posed by Arce and had no prior interaction with him:
Q: I want to talk about your relationship with Inmate Arce just prior to the day of the incident. Did you have interactions or any dealings with him?
A: We never had no beef or words, anything like that . . . we weren't friends, we weren't enemies.
Q: Did you have any reason to believe that he might have a motive to attack you?
A: Like I said, we didn't have no problems so I didn't have no reason to believe anything was going to ---
Q: So you didn't notify the Defendants, Tice or Dimperio, about a possible issue with him?
A: I never had issues.
* * *
Q: Okay. And if I got your testimony right, sir, prior to this fight, you know, prior to the day in question, the six hours prior to the fight until he pulls a shank
on you, he never threatened you, he never said he was going to kill you, he never said he was going to kick your ass, or anything like that; right?ECF No. 53-1, at 8, 11. Given Coleman's testimony and the totality of the record, the altercation here was a single, isolated, spontaneous occurrence and objectively, the Defendants could not have known prior to the incident that Arce posed a threat to Coleman. "A pervasive risk of harm may not ordinarily be shown by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents, but it may be established by much less than proof of a reign of violence and terror." Riley, 777 F.2d at 147 (quoting Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1985)). The altercation and assault under review here was unexpected and without notice. Thus, there is no evidence that Coleman was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Summary judgment should be granted on this basis alone.
A: I was completely in the dark that there was a problem ---
2. Deliberate Indifference - The Subjective Inquiry
Even had Coleman satisfied the objective inquiry prong of the analysis, the Court should still grant summary judgment to the Defendants because there is no evidence that Tice and Dimperio possessed actual knowledge that Arce presented an excessive risk of harm to Coleman. "[T]he official must actually be aware of the existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should have been aware." Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001). Actual knowledge can exist where "a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past," and where "circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it." Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43). It is insufficient, however, for an official to simply be "aware of facts from which the inference can be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
In his deposition testimony, Coleman admitted that he did not inform the guards about his altercation with Arce. As the fight began, instead of seeking the assistance of the Defendants, Coleman returned to his cell to arm himself:
Q: And then, at any point, and I forget what you said, sir, did you go into your cell to get the lock to defend yourself?
A: After we went around the table two or three times and somebody was talking, which I believe was Beast, like you're drunk. I made it up the steps again. As soon as I got to my cell, how the guard hit the door and I went in my cell. So now I'm in my cell, I'm like damn, you know, I'm like - I'm shocked that he just chased me around the block with a shank.
Q: Did you tell anybody? When he pulls out the shank and he's yelling at you and everything like that and you go down?
A: Everybody saw it. The whole block saw it, and it's impossible for the officers not to see it where they desk is. So the way his desk is he's got a straight view of the table where we at, the bottom of the steps when we first started talking, when we're going up the steps. And my cell is right in front of the desk and the bubble.
Q: So you assume he saw it. You didn't sa[y] anything to him; right?
A: No. I didn't have a chance to.
Q: Uh huh.
A: You know, because I was going to grievance the issue, like you know, this is crazy.
* * *
Q: Why didn't you --- when you went back into your cell, you got the lock to defend yourself, why didn't you close the cell door, use the intercom and tell the bubble hey, this is what's going on. I'm not going out there until you get this shank off this guy. Why didn't you do that?ECF No. 53-1, at 12. Instead of notifying the Defendants, Coleman returned to the dayroom where he fought with Arce, inflicting severe injuries on him. ECF No. 53-4, at 3-4. This testimony is fatal to Coleman's claims because it reveals Coleman's decision to continue the altercation with Arce instead of notifying the proper prison authorities. Without actual knowledge of Arce's behavior, Coleman cannot establish deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846 (noting that to defeat summary judgment a plaintiff must present enough evidence to support the inference that the prison official "knowingly and unreasonably disregarded an objectively intolerable risk of harm").
A: I was going to get a grievance. I was going to write a grievance on the matter. Like, I'm not going to snitch him out or just there'll be another incident.
There is no evidence in the record that Defendant Tice or Defendant Dimperio were in the 'bubble' at the time of the altercation. --------
Coleman's argument that Arce's possession of alcohol posed a substantial risk of serious harm and that Defendants Tice and Dimperio knew of that risk is meritless. Coleman contends the Defendants' failure to isolate Arce after discovering alcohol in his cell amounts to deliberate indifference to his personal safety. He points to the Department of Corrections' policy against inmates manufacturing intoxicating beverages, and Arce's substantial history of possessing contraband as evidence of a serious risk of harm. Indeed, the Department of Corrections has such a policy. ECF 53-6, at 15. But any punishment that results from a violation of that policy is discretionary. See ECF No. 53-1, at 7 (Deposition of Coleman); ECF No. 53-6, at 15 (Deposition of Defendant Tice). Further, no weapons or any other additional information was confiscated from Arce's cell at the time of search which might have mandated a different assessment of Arce's danger to Coleman or any other inmate. ECF No. 53-8, at ¶¶ 6, 7 (Declaration of Defendant Dimperio). Any risk of violation associated with Arce's alcohol possession is too attenuated to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim. See, e.g., Brown v. Ellis, 175 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 1999) (table) (holding that "[f]ailure to protect from actual physical injury, not failure to protect from the fear of injury, is what violates the Eighth Amendment").
IV. State Law Negligence Claim - Count II
At Count II of his Complaint, Coleman alleges negligence claims under Pennsylvania state law. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over state law claims "that are so related to claims in the action within [the court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." See Regalbutto v. City of Philadelphia, 937 F. Supp. 374, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1995). "Stated otherwise, a prerequisite to the federal court's exercise of pendant jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claims is that at least one claim based on the court's original diversity or federal question jurisdiction is before the court." Polite v. Rendell, 2010 WL 1254334, *4 (E.D. Pa., 2010); Kelley v. Bradford County, 2010 WL 1136313, at *10 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, where dismissal of the claims over which the court had original jurisdiction occurred by way of a motion for summary judgment).
It is respectfully recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Coleman's state law negligence claims because of the absence of any cognizable federal claims. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) ("[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well."). IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 50] be granted. In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).
s/ Richard A. Lanzillo
The Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: October 10, 2018
c: Hon. Susan Paradise Baxter
United States District Judge