Opinion
Case No. 20000844-CA.
Filed May 9, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Fourth District, Provo Department, The Honorable Gary D. Stott.
Mary C. Corporon, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, for Appellee.
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Decreasing rehabilitative alimony awards are by no means per se inequitable. However, precedent reminds us that some cases will present circumstances in which "a decreasing rehabilitative alimony award is [not] appropriate." Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075-76 (Utah 1985) (explaining that decreasing rehabilitative alimony award was inappropriate where parties had been married for approximately thirty years and wife was in her mid-50's, possessed few marketable job skills, and had little hope of retraining).
To effectively evaluate whether such awards are equitable, this court must have the benefit of detailed findings providing insight into the reasons supporting the trial court's decision to award alimony at a particular level, or levels, but only for a limited time. See Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). In the absence of adequate findings, we generally must remand so that more detailed findings can be entered. See id. See also Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) (explaining that trial courts "must make the findings of fact explicit in support of [their] legal conclusions").
The trial court in this case failed, in both its memorandum decision and its factual findings, to provide an adequate explanation of what justified the alimony amounts set and why reducing, and then terminating, alimony after approximately five years was appropriate. The findings of fact are legally insufficient, and we remand for the entry of more detailed findings. See Willey, 951 P.2d at 230. If those findings, once made, suggest the propriety of some adjustment in the alimony award, then the trial court shall amend its decree as appropriate. See Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) ("We do not intend our remand to be merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached.").
Appellee argues that Appellant should be precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the trial court's findings because her attorney drafted the very findings at issue. He cites Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074-1075 (Utah 1985), as support for this contention. Application of this aspect of Jones, in which, after all, the Court remanded for further consideration of the alimony award, see id. at 1075-76, has generally been limited to cases where the party challenging a court's distribution of marital property was responsible for drafting the findings and wholly failed to include property values — information that the drafting party should be well aware of and capable of supplying. See id. at 1074-75; Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978, 981-82 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). We have not found a case where legally inadequate findings relative to the more complex issue of alimony withstood challenge because they were drafted by the appellant.
On remand, the court shall also determine Appellant's reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal and award those fees to her. See Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (holding that where party was awarded fees at trial and prevails on appeal, she is ordinarily entitled to recover attorney fees incurred on appeal), overruled in part on other grounds by Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19,¶ 76 n. 18, 5 P.3d 616.
WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge, William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.