Opinion
Case No. 05-CV-0313W (POR).
March 20, 2006
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On February 14, 2005 Petitioner Robert Castle ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is currently incarcerated and challenges his parole denial. On December 30, 2005 United States Magistrate Louisa S. Porter issued a Report and Recommendation ("Report") recommending the Court deny Petitioner's habeas request. On January 24, 2006 Petitioner timely submitted Objections. The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1.(d.1). For the reasons outlined below, the Court ADOPTS the Report and DENIES the Petition.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 29, 1981 Petitioner and two friends went to Balboa Park to drink beer. ( Report at 5.) They ran out of beer and decided to rob someone so they could purchase more. ( Id.) Petitioner approached a young man and agreed to go with him to the man's home. ( Id.) Petitioner's friends covertly followed. ( Id.) After arriving at the man's home, Petitioner and his friends robbed the man of $22. ( Id.) When the man started yelling, Petitioner pulled a knife and stabbed him three times. ( Id.) The man bled to death in his driveway. ( Id.)
On June 25, 1981 Petitioner plead guilty to one count of first degree murder. ( Id.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, prosecutors dismissed a weapons enhancement and assault charge. ( Petition at 6-A.) On August 10, 1981 Petitioner was sentenced to 25 years to life. Under California's good time/work time sentencing credit scheme, the court estimated Petitioner's Minimum Eligible Parole Date ("MEPD") as March 14, 1996. ( Petition at 6.) Since reaching his MEPD, the Board of Prison Terms ("Board") has repeatedly denied Petitioner parole. ( Report at 15.) Most recently, the Board denied Petitioner parole in 2003 and 2004. ( Id. at 5-6.)
On February 14, 2005, after exhausting all state remedies, Petitioner filed this habeas petition. Petitioner challenges his 2003 and 2004 parole denials and contends that he is entitled to habeas relief because: (1) his continued incarceration violates his plea agreement's terms; and (2) the Board violated his Due Process rights by denying him parole. ( Petition at 6-7H.) Petitioner also requests an evidentiary hearing to further develop the record regarding the circumstances surrounding his plea agreement. ( Report at 9.)
This habeas petition encompasses Petitioner's claims with respect to both the 2003 and 2004 parole denials. At the state level, Petitioner pursued habeas relief under each denial separately. With respect to the 2003 parole denial, Petitioner first filed a habeas writ in California Superior Court, and then filed a habeas writ in the California Court of Appeal. ( Report at 2.) On January 14, 2004 the California Court of Appeal denied the 2003 claim in a written opinion. ( Id.) This opinion presents the last reasoned decision on the 2003 parole denial. ( Id.)
With respect to the 2004 denial, Petitioner filed a habeas writ in California Superior Court. On September 22, 2004 the court denied Petitioner's habeas petition in a written opinion. ( Id.) This opinion presents the last reasoned decision on the 2004 parole denial. ( Id.)
It should be noted that the Respondent only addresses claims with respect to the 2003 parole denial and fails to address Petitioner's 2004 parole denial claims. The Court addresses Petitioner's claims with respect to both the 2003 and 2004 parole denials as they were both raised in the petition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The duties of a district court in connection with a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are set forth in Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court "must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made," and "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989).
Federal courts will conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court Law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law if it (1) applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at the opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of the facts "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Id. at 413. III. ANALYSIS
Having read and considered the underlying Petition, Report and Objections thereto, the Court concludes that the Report presents a well-reasoned analysis of the issues raised in the Petition. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the Report correctly concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
A. PETITIONER IS NOT BEING HELD IN VIOLATION OF HIS PLEA AGREEMENT
Petitioner asserts that he is unconstitutionally being kept in prison in violation of his plea agreement. ( Report at 7.) Specifically, Petitioner contends that he was led to believe that satisfying his MEPD requirements during his "25 to life" sentence would guarantee his release after March 1996, or after serving 16 years, 8 months. ( Petition at 6-A, 6-B.) Petitioner also alleges that the 2003 Board violated his plea agreement by not considering a statement from his sentencing judge. ( Petition at 6-A, 6-B.) The Report found Petitioner's first claim unsupported by the record and the second claim not cognizable under federal law. ( Report at 7-13.) Petitioner objects to the Report by restating his original arguments. ( Objections at 2-6.)
"Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law standards." Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1993). When a plea rests in any significant degree on a prosecutor's promise or agreement, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such a promise must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). When courts determine a plea agreement's terms, the interpretation is controlled by a defendant's reasonable beliefs.Brown, 337 F.3d at 1160. That is, courts view the plea agreement's terms objectively. Id. Additionally, a defendant's representations about his plea agreement's terms at a disposition hearing carry a strong presumption of truth and pose a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
Claims based on state law are not cognizable in a federal habeas petition. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). In conducting habeas review, federal courts are limited to deciding whether a conviction violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991).
The record does not support Petitioner's claim that the plea agreement promised that he would be released after a certain date. Rather, all evidence indicates that, by fulfilling good time/work time requirements, Petitioner understood that he would merely be eligible for parole after 16 years, 8 months, and that the final determination for release lay with the Board. ( Report at 8.) For example, the record indicates that Petitioner twice answered "Yes" when asked separately by his defense attorney and the judge if he understood the mechanisms of parole vis-a-vis the court's sentence. ( Report at 8-9.) That is, Petitioner acknowledged that the plea agreement only specified an indeterminate sentence, and that the Board retained sole discretion whether and when to parole Petitioner. UnderBlackledge, these statements are strong evidence that Petitioner recognized that his MEPD was just that: a minimum benchmark for reviewing purposes only, and not a guaranteed release date.
Although Petitioner contends that his subjective beliefs control the analysis, under Brown this Court objectively reviews Petitioner's "reasonable" beliefs. ( Objections at 6.) Given that the record indicates Petitioner reasonably understood the difference between parole eligibility and parole release, Petitioner's argument that his plea agreement has been violated because he has not yet been granted parole is without merit. ( Report at 8-9.) Accordingly, this Court finds that the plea agreement is valid because no evidence suggests that Petitioner's plea was given in consideration for a "guaranteed" release date.
Petitioner also asserts that the 2003 Board violated California law by not considering and recording statements from the sentencing judge while denying parole. ( Report at 10-11; Petition at 6-A, 6-B) However, two related problems arise respecting Petitioner's argument: (1) the judge's statements clearly indicate that Petitioner would simply be eligible for parole, and thus do not demonstrate that the Board is not abiding by the plea agreement; and (2) even if the Board violated California law by not adequately considering and recording the statements, this merely demonstrates that the Board is in violation of state, and not federal, law. Because the record does not indicate that Petitioner's plea agreement or federal rights were violated, the Court cannot grant relief.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3046 requires that orders granting or denying parole state that any parole recommendations submitted by sentencing judges have been considered. The "consideration" is not determinative: the law only requires the Board to consider the statement and note in their report that such a statement was in fact considered.
Petitioner refers to statements from the sentencing judge. The first statements the Board allegedly failed to consider and record were recommendations from the sentencing judge urging parole after Petitioner completed certain prison programs. ( Petition at 6-A.) However, Petitioner had been informed that the Board, and not the plea agreement (through the prosecutor or sentencing judge), determined the actual length of sentence and terms of parole. ( Report at 9.)
The second statement the Board allegedly failed to consider and record was an admonition by the sentencing judge stating "[d]o you understand that under this sentence you would be eligible for parole after you had served two third of the 25 years; that would appeal to be 16 years and 8 months. That is you would be eligible for parole after that time assuming you have served good time with good work time? Do you understand that?" ( Petition at 6-B) (emphasis supplied).
In denying Petitioner's state habeas petition, the appellate court reviewed the record and concluded that Petitioner was not promised parole upon reaching his MEPD. ( Doc. No. 14, Ex. 6. at 2.) This Court is not called to decide whether it agrees with the state court's decision or whether it would have reached the same conclusion; rather, the Court inquires only whether the state court's decision was objectively unreasonable or resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003). Based on the record, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's determination was objectively unreasonable or resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's Objections and DENIES Petitioner's habeas request insofar as it is based on his plea agreement. B. PETITIONER'S PAROLE DENIALS DO NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
Petitioner claims that the Board violated his due process rights by denying parole in 2003 and 2004. Specifically, Petitioner contends that the Board improperly denied parole because the record contains insufficient evidence to warrant his continued incarceration. ( Report at 16.) Petitioner additionally argues that the Board's denials violate state law and were based solely on unchanging factors. ( Petition at 6-C, 7-E.) The Report found the parole denials adequately supported and that Petitioner's remaining claims were not cognizable under federal law. ( Petition. at 22.) Petitioner's Objections merely restate his original claims of insufficient evidence and unchanging factors. ( Objections at 6-9.)
The Report also discusses, in depth, Respondent's argument that Petitioner does not possess a protected "liberty interest" in parole under California law. ( Report at 14.) As the Ninth Circuit's law is currently at odds with the California Supreme Court, the existence of a federally cognizable liberty interest in parole is uncertain. See ( Report at 15) (collecting cases). Should no liberty interest exist, Petitioner would not have alleged any recognizable claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. However, assuming a federal liberty interest in parole still exists, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to show a due process violation.
Prison officials' decisions denying parole must be supported by "some evidence." Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying standard set forth in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 447, 454 (1985)). Under the "some evidence" test, reviewing courts must uphold the state's administrative decision as long as it has "some basis in fact." Hill, 472 U.S. at 456. The test does not require examining the entire record or weighing evidence; instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the Board's decision.Id. at 455-56. However, courts have warned that denying parole based solely on unchanging factors like the nature of the offense and prior criminal history may constitute a due process violation. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917 (holding that denying parole based solely on factors beyond prisoner's control runs contrary to the prison system's rehabilitative goals).
Under California law, parole determinations are to be made based on "[a]ll relevant, reliable information available." CAL.CODEREGS. 15, § 2402(b) (2006). Such information includes the prisoner's social history; past and present mental state, past criminal history; base and other commitment offenses; past and present attitude toward the crime; and any other information which bears on the prisoner's suitability for release. Id. Factors tending to demonstrate unsuitability for parole include previous records of violent behavior, unstable social history, and history of severe mental problems. CAL. CODE REGS. 15, § 2402(c). Further, a prisoner may be found unsuitable if the offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering or the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense. Id.
The record clearly indicates that there is "some evidence" supporting the Board's parole denial. Both the 2003 and 2004 denials cited the commitment offense's trivial motive and brutal execution. ( Report at 17.) Although his recent accomplishments are not insignificant, both Boards determined that Petitioner's unstable social history and psychological status did not ultimately support release. ( Report at 19.) Nor did the Boards did rely solely on unchanging factors to deny parole. For example, both Boards cited Petitioner's present lack of remorse and found that Petitioner could make further progress by participating in self-help. ( Report at 22.) Because both of these factors are "changeable" and within Petitioner's control, the Board's denial of parole based thereon does not triggerBiggs' due process concerns. Taken together, the Petition and Objections essentially ask this Court to re-weigh the evidence, second-guess the Board, and make a finding in Petitioner's favor. However, such analysis is inappropriate under Hill.
Petitioner's remaining arguments are that the Boards failed to follow California law in finding him unsuitable for parole. ( Report at 22-23.) Under Estelle, these state law claims cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68 (holding that, in conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States). Accordingly, the Court does not address these claims.
In reviewing the Boards' decisions, the California courts applied the "some evidence" test and concluded that the Boards' decisions were adequately supported by the record. ( Doc. No. 14, Ex. 6 (2003 denial)); Doc. No. 14, Ex. 5 (2004 denial).) Again, this Court does not decide whether it agrees with the state courts' decisions, only whether that decision was "objectively unreasonable." Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 4. For the above reasons, the Court finds that the record contains "some evidence" supporting both parole denials and thus Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court's determination was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner's objections and DENIES Petitioner's due process claim.
C. PETITIONER HAS NOT ALLEGED FACTS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Throughout his Petition and Traverse, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to further develop the record regarding his expectations at the time he pled guilty. Specifically, Petitioner requests a hearing "to ascertain the agreements made and what the Petitioner believed the agreement meant to him. Also important here is what the Sentencing Judge and Petitioner's counsel believed at the time [of the plea]." ( Traverse at 16-17.) The Report found an evidentiary hearing unwarranted because the objective facts surrounding the plea taking were not disputed. ( Report at 10.) Petitioner's Objections merely restate his original allegations, specifically arguing that "Petitioner's subjective belief of his plea agreement is at issue before this Court." ( Objections at 3.)
The Ninth Circuit has held that an evidentiary hearing is required only when the petitioner has alleged facts that, if proven, would entitle him to habeas relief. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 586 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioner's request to develop the record to ascertain his "subjective beliefs" do not meet this standard. Under Brown, courts objectively view Petitioner's reasonable beliefs at the time of the plea taking. Brown, 337 F.3d at 1160. That is, Petitioner's subjective beliefs have no evidentiary force alongside the undisputed, objective evidence indicating that Petitioner understood his plea agreement's terms. ( Report at 8-9.) Because Petitioner has failed to allege facts that, if true, would entitle him to habeas relief, the Court DENIES Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
In light of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the reasoning and findings contained in the Report. For the reasons stated in the Report, which is incorporated herein by reference, the Court DENIES Petitioner's § 2254 writ of habeas corpus. The Clerk of Court shall close the district court case file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.