Opinion
6:20-CV-07050 EAW
2021-09-27
Destin K. CASLER, Plaintiff, v. WEST IRONDEQUOIT SCHOOL DISTRICT and Jeffrey B. Crane, Defendants.
Jeffrey Wicks, Jeffrey Wicks, PLLC, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff. Michael P. McClaren, Webster Szanyi, LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.
Jeffrey Wicks, Jeffrey Wicks, PLLC, Rochester, NY, for Plaintiff.
Michael P. McClaren, Webster Szanyi, LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Destin K. Casler ("Plaintiff") commenced this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants West Irondequoit School District (the "WISD") and Jeffrey B. Crane, the former superintendent of the WISD (collectively, "Defendants"), violated his First Amendment rights when they suspended him from school due to postings Plaintiff made on the social media messaging platform "Snapchat." (Dkt. 1). Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 6). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint. (Dkt. 1). As required on a motion to dismiss, the Court treats Plaintiff's factual allegations as true.
Plaintiff was a student at Irondequoit High School. (Id. at ¶ 6). Although enrolled at the school, Plaintiff attended school only sporadically during the Fall 2018 term. (Id. at ¶ 7). On September 18, 2018, Plaintiff posted several messages to his "Snapchat" account. (Id. at ¶ 8). Snapchat is a messaging application which allows cell phone users to exchange pictures and videos, or "snaps," that are intended to disappear after they are viewed. (Id. at ¶ 9). Snaps can only be viewed by individuals who subscribe to a user and are not available for viewing by the general public. (Id. at ¶ 10). Plaintiff posted the following to Snapchat:
In one of the snaps, Mr. Casler is seen in a photograph with an accompanying message saying "Keep ya cams ready for Monday. I'm going viral."
In the second snap, Mr. Casler posted "Fuck feelings. Ion gotta heart no more. Summer when nobody helped. I'm me bruh."
In a third snap, Mr. Casler posted "Don't get mad when u regret it."
(Id. at ¶¶ 11-13). Plaintiff alleges that he is an aspiring rap artist and the aforementioned messages were "direct quotes from rap songs he had written and publicized approximately six months previously." (Id. at ¶ 14).
Defendants have attached screenshots of Plaintiff's snaps to their motion papers (Dkt. 6-3), which list the snaps in reverse order, and also include additional language in the third snap alleged by Plaintiff, so that the full snap reads, "Remember who u is tho? Dont forget the words u say in a situation you on know none bout. And dont get mad when u regret it." (Id. at 2).
Thereafter, on or about September 20, 2018, a person who observed the snaps took a screen shot of them and sent them to employees of the WISD. (Id. at ¶ 15). The employees contacted the Irondequoit Police Department, as they believed that the snaps were threats against the school. (Id. at ¶ 16). Members of the police department interviewed Plaintiff on September 22, 2018, and concluded that he had not violated any New York Penal Law provisions, and did not arrest him or bring any criminal charges against him. (Id. at ¶ 17).
On September 24, 2018, as a result of the snaps he posted, Plaintiff received a five-day school suspension from Douglas Lauf, the Principal of Irondequoit High School. (Id. at ¶ 18). Principal Lauf also requested a Superintendent's Hearing ("the hearing") pursuant to N.Y. Education Law § 3214 , based on charges of insubordination and endangering the health, safety, and welfare of students and others. (Id. at ¶ 19). The hearing was conducted on October 4, 2018, and on December 20, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 20). Following the hearing, defendant Crane found Plaintiff guilty of the disciplinary infractions alleged, and directed that he be suspended from school for a period of 40 weeks, which was the entire school year. (Id. at ¶ 21).
Both Plaintiff and Defendants cite to N.Y. Educ. Law § 3412 as the section providing for a Superintendent's Hearing (see Dkt. 1 at ¶ 19; Dkt. 9-1 at 3), but that section is found at § 3214, which governs "Student placement, suspensions and transfers." See N.Y. Educ. Law § 3214(3)(c).
Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendants on December 8, 2020, which includes one cause of action for violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights. (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff alleges that his snaps did not constitute a threat to the high school, were not likely to cause a disruption to school activities, and that he has been deprived of educational and social opportunities which would have been available to him had he not been suspended. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-26). Plaintiff further alleges that, as a result, he has suffered extreme anxiety, depression, and mental anguish, and he seeks both compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of two million dollars. (Id. at 4-5).
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on January 19, 2021. (Dkt. 6). Plaintiff filed his response on February 23, 2021 (Dkt. 9), and Defendants replied on March 2, 2021 (Dkt. 10).
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the [pleading], documents attached to the [pleading] as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the [pleading]." DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C. , 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). A court should consider the motion by "accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the [claimant]." Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng'rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt. , 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016). To withstand dismissal, a claimant must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the [claimant] pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Turkmen v. Ashcroft , 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).
"While a [pleading] attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a [claimant]’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "To state a plausible claim, the [pleading]’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ " Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp. , 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants argue that dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint is required because: (1) Plaintiff's First Amendment claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because he previously litigated this claim during his suspension proceedings; (2) Plaintiff's speech materially and substantially disrupted the work and discipline of the district; (3) defendant Crane is entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim for municipal liability against the WISD. (Dkt. 6-4 at 5-13).
A. Collateral Estoppel
In support of their argument that Plaintiff's claim is barred by collateral estoppel, Defendants point to the April 21, 2020 decision issued by the Commissioner of Education (the "Commissioner's decision"), to whom Plaintiff had appealed the decision by defendant Crane imposing a 40-week suspension. (Dkt. 6-4 at 5; see also Dkt. 6-2 at 2-14). Defendants contend that Plaintiff's complaint "is clearly an attempt to circumvent the decision of the Commissioner, which already addressed and determined that the discipline did not infringe on Plaintiff's freedom of speech." (Dkt. 6-4 at 5). In response, Plaintiff argues that he did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate his claim because he did not have counsel during the first day of the hearing (Dkt. 9-1 at 5), and because he was not advised of his right to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner's decision by way of an Article 78 proceeding (id. at 6). Finally, Plaintiff contends that even if the Court finds that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, the Court should exercise its discretion and not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, given that Plaintiff was under the age of 18, he was not represented by counsel on the first day of the hearing, and he was not advised that an Article 78 proceeding was available to review the Commissioner's decision. (Id. ).
"The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that ‘when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ " Hayes v. Cnty. of Sullivan , 853 F. Supp. 2d 400, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Swiatkowski v. Citibank , 745 F. Supp. 2d 150, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd , 446 F. App'x 360 (2d Cir. 2011) ); see also Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon , 310 F.3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents parties or their privies from relitigating in a subsequent action an issue of fact or law that was fully and fairly litigated in a prior proceeding."). "Dismissal under [ Rule] 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a defendant raises claim preclusion ... as an affirmative defense and it is clear from the face of the complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice, that the plaintiff's claims are barred as a matter of law." Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Int'l , 231 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000) ; see also Swiatkowski , 745 F. Supp. 2d at 168 ("A court may dismiss a claim on ... collateral estoppel grounds on a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or a motion for summary judgment"). "The burden of proving identity of the issue rests on the proponent of collateral estoppel, while the opponent bears the burden of proving that he or she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue." Gonzalez v. City of New York , 845 F. App'x 11, 16 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). "It is well-settled that collateral estoppel may bar a plaintiff from bringing an action in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Shell v. Brun , 362 F. Supp. 2d 398, 400 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) ; see Hayes , 853 F. Supp. 2d at 424 ("State court judgments must be given the same preclusive effect in federal court as they would be given in courts of the state itself...."). "The Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of federal common law issue preclusion, ‘when a state agency acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.’ " Locurto v. Giuliani , 447 F.3d 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) ). "The state courts of New York give quasi-judicial administrative fact-finding preclusive effect where there has been a full and fair opportunity to litigate.... In addition, for collateral estoppel to give preclusive effect to administrative agency findings, the issue sought to be precluded [must be] identical to a material issue necessarily decided by the administrative agency in a prior proceeding." Id. at 170-71 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (alteration in original). "Where these requirements are met, school suspension proceedings under New York Education Law are entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent civil actions." Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist. , No. 5:02CV1403, 2006 WL 1741023, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2006), aff'd , 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Livolsi v. Hicksville Union-Free Sch. Dist., 263 A.D. 2d 447, 693 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1999) ); Horton v. Westling , 284 F. Supp. 3d 213, 216-19 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (where plaintiff was suspended from school and appealed decision to Board of Education, granting defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff's procedural due process claim, which was barred by collateral estoppel), aff'd , 765 F. App'x 531 (2d Cir. 2019) ; see also Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ. of the Hastings-on-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 411 F.3d 306, 311-12 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Section 3020-a Hearing, a disciplinary hearing for teachers, and supervisory and administrative staff, is an "administrative adjudication that must be given preclusive effect"). "[C]ollateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine—not a matter of absolute right. Its invocation is influenced by considerations of fairness in the individual case." PenneCom B.V. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 372 F.3d 488, 493 (2d Cir. 2004).
Defendants have submitted the Commissioner's decision in connection with their motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. 6-2 at 2-14). Although Plaintiff omitted from his complaint that he appealed his suspension to the Commissioner, the Court may consider the Commissioner's decision in connection with ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss because it is a matter of public record of which the Court may take judicial notice. See Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp. , 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Although the general rule is that a district court may not look outside the complaint and the documents attached thereto in ruling on a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, we have acknowledged that the court may also consider matters of which judicial notice may be taken." (quotations and citation omitted)). Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, district courts "may take judicial notice of documents where the documents ‘can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’ " Finn v. Barney , 471 F. App'x 30, 32 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) ). "[C]ourts routinely take judicial notice of documents filed in other courts ... not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings." Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991). Further, a district court may take judicial notice on a motion to dismiss of documents that satisfy the requirements of Rule 201(b)(2) and "b[ear] directly on the question of issue preclusion." Bristol v. Nassau Cnty. , 685 F. App'x 26, 28-29 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming decision by district court that the plaintiff's claim for false arrest was precluded by the decision in his state criminal case, where he "raised a probable cause challenge to his arrest and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question with the benefit of counsel"); see also Can v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Sys., Inc. , 711 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246 (D. Conn. 2010) ("On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), judicial notice may be taken of other judicial documents that might provide the basis for issue preclusion."). The Court cannot discern any reason why the Commissioner's decision does not meet the requirements of Rule 201, nor has Plaintiff raised any issue relating to the authenticity of that document or otherwise objected to the Court's consideration of it in connection with Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court finds that it may take notice of the Commissioner's decision when resolving the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants’ collateral estoppel argument focuses entirely on the second prong of the analysis, arguing that "it is manifest that Destin did not have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate his claim." (Dkt. 9-1 at 5). In support of his position that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his First Amendment claim, Plaintiff contends that (1) he did not have counsel on the first day of the hearing, and (2) he was not advised of his right to appeal the Commissioner's decision in an Article 78 proceeding. (Id. at 5-6). Defendants dispute Plaintiff's contention that these facts support a conclusion that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim. (See Dkt. 10-1 at 6-9).
Even assuming for purposes of Defendants’ motion to dismiss that Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to carry their burden that collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff's claim, at least at this stage of the proceedings. The fact that the Commissioner addressed the First Amendment issue and Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate does not necessarily preclude his federal § 1983 claim. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendants have raised the issue, but the Court notes that several district courts have found that unreviewed administrative determinations of questions of law—as opposed to questions of fact—do not have collateral estoppel effect in later federal proceedings. See Levich v. Liberty Cent. Sch. Dist. , 361 F. Supp. 2d 151, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (in considering effect of collateral estoppel on the plaintiff's First Amendment claim, explaining that the "distinction between issues of fact and law ... makes sense in light of the court's unique expertise and ability to adjudicate First Amendment constitutional issues"); see also Doe v. Pfrommer , 148 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1998) ("this circuit has not taken a position regarding the split in the circuits as to whether to give preclusive effect to the unreviewed legal determinations of state administrative decisions"); Buttaro v. City of New York , No. 15 CV 5703 (ILG), 2016 WL 4926179, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2016) (explaining that "[t]hese courts reason that the Supreme Court's choice of language in Elliott —the case which established that when a state agency resolves disputed issues of fact ... federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts—is too specific and consistent to ignore." (quotations and citation omitted)); Pappas v. Giuliani , 118 F. Supp. 2d 433, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("The Supreme Court's specific language in Elliott lends further support to the conclusion that it did not wish to extend issue preclusion to unreviewed administrative determinations of law."), aff'd , 290 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2002). For example, in Buttaro , the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff's discrimination, selective-enforcement, and First Amendment retaliation claims were barred by collateral estoppel, explaining that "[t]he ALJ decided only that Buttaro engaged in misconduct; it did not address whether the FDNY engaged in discrimination, selective enforcement, or retaliation. And while the ALJ's factfinding is preclusive, its legal determinations (for example, its rejection of Buttaro's First Amendment defense) are not," and "the ALJ's finding that potential workplace disruption outweighs [Buttaro's] First Amendment right to wear non Department-issued t-shirts in the firehouse is a legal determination that is not entitled to preclusive effect." 2016 WL 4926179, at *5-6 (quotation omitted). The court concluded that while it would "defer to the ALJ's finding of potential workplace disruption, it w[ould] decide de novo whether Buttaro's activities were protected by the First Amendment." Id. at *6.
While Article 78 proceedings "constitute state court judgments and are accorded full issue preclusive effect in § 1983 actions under the Full Faith & Credit statute," Pappas v. Giuliani , 118 F. Supp. 2d 433, 438 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), Plaintiff did not commence an Article 78 proceeding and therefore the decision of the Commissioner was not reviewed by a court.
The Second Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, and in both Wisniewski and Horton , where the district courts determined that issue preclusion applied to the decisions of the state agency but also addressed the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, the Second Circuit affirmed the decisions on the merits, rather than whether dismissal on collateral estoppel grounds was proper. See Wisniewski , 494 F.3d at 37 ("We see no need to resolve the dispute between the parties as to whether the Plaintiffs’ claim was barred by collateral estoppel arising from the determinations in the Superintendent's hearing. Instead, we turn directly to the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claim that Aaron's icon was protected speech under the First Amendment."); Horton , 765 F. App'x at 533 n.3 ("Because Horton's procedural due process claim fails on the merits, we see no need to resolve whether the district court erred in holding that collateral estoppel barred the claim." (quotations, citation, and alteration omitted)). Because the legal authority cited above supports the conclusion that this Court must address de novo the legal question of whether Plaintiff's Snapchat postings were protected by the First Amendment, as opposed to simply relying on the legal conclusions of the Commissioner, the Court concludes that it must address the merits of whether Plaintiff's Snapchat postings were protected by the First Amendment. In doing so, the Court concludes that it cannot resolve that issue at this stage of the proceedings.
"Freedom of speech ... is not an unfettered right for any U.S. citizen," and "[a] student like Plaintiff possesses even less free speech rights." D.F. ex rel. Finkle v. Bd. of Educ. of Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist. , 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd , 180 F. App'x 232 (2d Cir. 2006) ; see also TC v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. , 777 F. Supp. 2d 577, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Students in public schools ... enjoy a more limited form of First Amendment protection than do adults in society at large."). "[S]tudent expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will ‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.’ " Morse v. Frederick , 551 U.S. 393, 403, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) ). "Courts recognize that the administrators should be given leeway to address any potential disruption before it manifests itself," TC , 777 F. Supp. 2d at 591, and "[u]nder Tinker , it is the objective reasonableness of the school administrators’ response, rather than the student's private intentions, that are relevant," Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 714 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd , 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff alleges that he made postings on Snapchat, which were viewable to his followers but not to the general public. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 8-10). One of the individuals who saw Plaintiff's Snapchat postings reported them to the district, and the district reported them to the police department, which interviewed Plaintiff and concluded that he had not violated any law. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-17). Given these allegations and considering the procedural posture of the case, the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff's Snapchat postings materially and substantially disrupted the work and discipline of WISD. Defendants cite to the Second Circuit's decision in Wisniewski as supporting their position that Plaintiff's speech materially and substantially disrupted the work of the district (see Dkt. 6-4 at 9), but Wisniewski was decided at the summary judgment stage and involved an instant messaging icon Plaintiff shared with several students which on its face was violent. 494 F.3d at 36. The icon consisted of "a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person's head, above which were dots representing splattered blood," and beneath the drawing appeared the words "Kill Mr. VanderMolen" who was Plaintiff's English teacher. Id. The court concluded that "[t]he potentially threatening content of the icon and the extensive distribution of it, which encompassed 15 recipients, including some of [the plaintiff's] classmates, during a three-week circulation period, made this risk at least foreseeable to a reasonable person, if not inevitable. And there can be no doubt that the icon, once made known to the teacher and other school officials, would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment." Id. at 39-40 ; see also D.F. , 386 F. Supp. 2d at 125-26 (on motion to dismiss, concluding that story written by plaintiff, which had "graphic depictions of the murder of specifically named students and sex between named students" would materially interfere with the work of the school and constituted a true threat of violence). In contrast to the speech in these cases—which involved direct threats of murder—Plaintiff's Snapchat postings do not specifically reference murder or any other form of violence.
This case is more analogous to Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. , 341 F. App'x 692 (2d Cir. 2009), where the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision granting a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's First Amendment claim, distinguishing Wisniewski :
In Wisniewski we affirmed entry of summary judgment in favor of a school where "no reasonable jury could disagree," based on the summary judgment record, that the student's speech "would foreseeably create a risk of substantial
disruption within the school environment."
By contrast, this case is before us at the pleading stage, and the particular facts pled do not compel a similar conclusion: B.C. was, at the time of the infraction, a ten-year-old fifth-grade student; his apparent threat was made in crayon in direct response to a school assignment; he did not show the assignment to any classmates but rather handed it directly to his teacher; and B.C. had no other disciplinary history that would suggest a violent tendency. We cannot say, based on these facts, that it was reasonable as a matter of law to foresee a material and substantial disruption to the school environment, just as we cannot say that foreseeing such a risk was, as a matter of law, unreasonable.
Id. at 693.
The Court likewise concludes that the facts as they are pled in Plaintiff's complaint do not compel the conclusion that it was reasonable as a matter of law to foresee a material and substantial disruption to the school environment. Plaintiff's Snapchat postings do not specifically reference any form of violence. In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants cite to portions of the Commissioner's decision, which provide more background relating to Plaintiff's personal circumstances at the time he made his Snapchat postings. (See Dkt. 6-4). However, as explained above, while the Court may take judicial notice of the Commissioner's decision, it may only do so to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings, and not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation. In other words, while the Commissioner's factual findings are entitled to preclusive effect, those facts are not properly before the Court at this juncture. None of the information relating to Plaintiff's background—including that he was the victim of a physical altercation with other students, that he had a gun, and that he was going through a personal crisis, including that he was not attending school, not living with his parents, and was "essentially homeless"—are alleged in the complaint, and the Court may not consider them for their truth. While the Court may very well conclude that this additional information would require dismissal of Plaintiff's First Amendment claim on summary judgment, the Court does not consider it at this stage of the litigation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the record would benefit from further development regarding the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's Snapchat postings, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.
B. Qualified Immunity and Monell Liability
Defendants also move for dismissal on the basis that defendant Crane is entitled to qualified immunity and because Plaintiff has failed to allege a Monell claim against the WISD. (Dkt. 6-4 at 11-13).
Defendants’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds is denied. "A qualified immunity defense is established if (a) the defendant's action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law." Tierney v. Davidson , 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although claims of qualified immunity "should be decided as early as possible in a case," it "is often best decided on a motion for summary judgment when the details of the alleged deprivations are more fully developed." Walker v. Schult , 717 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, whether qualified immunity protects defendant Crane necessarily turns on the reasonableness of his response to the Snapchat postings which, as described above, the Court finds is not ripe for adjudication at this stage of the proceedings. See T.C. , 777 F. Supp. 2d at 593 ("Whether qualified immunity protects the individual defendants who were involved in the song lyrics incident turns on whether it was reasonably foreseeable for the song lyrics to be disseminated or shared or to become public. As to this question, the Court would benefit from a fuller record."). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim against defendant Crane on this ground is denied.
However, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Monell claim against the WISD. Plaintiff does not oppose this basis for dismissal in his response papers (see Dkt. 9), and the Court agrees that the complaint is devoid of allegations sufficient to state a claim against the WISD pursuant to Monell. (See Dkt. 1). "A school district's liability under Monell may be premised on any of three theories: (1) that a district employee was acting pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy; (2) that a district employee was acting pursuant to a longstanding practice or custom; or (3) that a district employee was acting as a ‘final policymaker.’ " Hurdle v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York , 113 F. App'x 423, 424-25 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Plaintiff's complaint contains no allegations relating to an expressly adopted policy, a longstanding practice or custom, or that defendant Crane was acting as a "final policymaker." Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted on this basis, although the dismissal is without prejudice. See Ronzani v. Sanofi S.A. , 899 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1990) (typical practice at motion to dismiss stage is to dismiss claims without prejudice).
While Plaintiff alleges that defendant Crane was the superintendent of WISD and that following the hearing he held that Plaintiff be suspended from school for 40 weeks (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 21), nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege that defendant Crane was a "final policymaker."
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 6) is granted in part and denied in part.
SO ORDERED.