Opinion
Cause No. NA 01-119-C H/H
July 18, 2002
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Lavon Casey worked for several years for defendant Community Action of Southern Indiana (CASI). Casey was fired on February 3, 2000, and she has sued CASI under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that she was fired because of her race, African-American.
CASI has moved for summary judgment, asserting that the undisputed facts show that Casey cannot prove race discrimination, even if the admissible evidence is viewed in the light reasonably most favorable to plaintiff Casey and even if she is given the benefit of any reasonable inferences from the evidence. As explained below, the court agrees with CASI, grants the motion for summary judgment, and dismisses Casey's claim. Casey has not come forward with evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that CASI fired her because of her race.
Standard for Summary Judgment
The purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, leaving the moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party must show there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual issue is material only if resolving the factual issue might change the suit's outcome under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual issue is genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence presented. Id.
Although intent and credibility are often critical issues in employment discrimination cases, there is no special version of Rule 56 that applies only to such cases. See, e.g., Alexander v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health Family Serv., 263 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2001); Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). In an employment discrimination case, as in any case, the court must carefully view the evidence in the record in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party and determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Haugerud v. Amery School Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 689 (7th Cir. 2001) (same standard applies to any type of case). If the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to support a verdict in her favor, however, summary judgment must be granted — it is not a discretionary procedure. Jones v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).
Local Rule 56.1
The presentation of motions for summary judgment and opposition to such motions is governed by this court's Local Rule 56.1. The rule has been amended several times in recent years, most recently on July 1, 2002, after the parties filed their papers in this case. Under any recent version, however, Local Rule 56.1 has plainly required a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to submit and to identify specifically any evidence the party relies upon to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Such specific references and submissions of evidence have always been the core of the rule's requirements.
The version of Local Rule 56.1 in effect when the parties filed their papers in this case provided in subsection (g):
In determining the motion for summary judgment, the Court will assume that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except to the extent that such facts are specifically controverted or objected to in compliance with L.R. 56.1(f). The Court will also assume for purposes of deciding the motion that any facts asserted by an opposing part are true to the extent they are supported by the depositions, discovery responses, affidavits or other admissible evidence.
Defendant CASI has submitted a properly supported motion for summary judgment, attaching affidavits and portions of Casey's deposition as evidence. Plaintiff Casey's response has completely failed to comply with the letter or purpose of Local Rule 56.1. She has not responded specifically to CASI's statements of material fact. She has provided a page and a half of a factual narrative, citing in support pages of her deposition, many of which have not even been submitted to the court. The court disregards factual assertions that are not supported by admissible evidence filed with the court.
Discussion
Casey worked for CASI for several years as a bus driver and teacher's assistant in CASI's Head Start program for pre-school children. Before February 2, 2000, Casey had performed satisfactorily and had received annual merit and wage increases. On February 2, 2000, however, parents of a child complained that Casey had forcibly placed their young child in a bathroom, closed the door, turned out the light, and leaned on the door so that the child could not come out. According to Casey, the child had become disruptive and was screaming and kicking the bathroom door before Casey put her in the bathroom. Casey Dep. 22-23.
In response to the complaint, Casey was suspended with pay while the incident was investigated. CASI's Jeannine O'Connell conducted the investigation by taking written and oral statements from adults who were aware of the situation. Joy Shanks, who is white and the director of CASI's Head Start program, reviewed the results and concluded that firing Casey would be justified.
Shanks did not have authority to fire Casey on her own. She submitted a recommendation to CASI executive director, Fred Mitchell, an African-American.
Mitchell concurred with the recommendation, and Casey was fired on February 3, 2000. CASI gave as its reason for firing Casey her conduct in the incident the day before, labeling her actions "gross misconduct."
Casey has not come forward with any direct evidence that she was fired because of her race. She relies solely on the indirect method of proof established under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For the first step in the method, Casey must come forward with evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination, meaning circumstances which, if not otherwise explained, would support an inference of discrimination. See, e.g., Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1995) (age discrimination). The four elements of a prima facie case for this termination claim are: (1) plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting her employer's legitimate performance expectations; (3) she was fired; and (4) other employees who were not members of the protected class were similarly situated and were treated more favorably. E.g., Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 1999).
If the plaintiff comes forward with evidence sufficient to support a finding in her favor on each element of the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to state a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to fire the plaintiff. If such a reason is articulated (and one always is), the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the stated reason is a false pretext, from which the further inference of intentional unlawful discrimination may be drawn. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) ("The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination."); Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 892-93 (7th Cir. 2001).
For purposes of summary judgment, CASI has chosen to contest only the fourth element of the prima facie case and the issue of pretext. Regarding the fourth element of the prima facie case, plaintiff Casey has not come forward with any actual evidence that any other white CASI employees were similarly situated and were treated more favorably. She has cited portions of her deposition that were not provided to the court to claim that a white CASI employee, Vicki Klingsmith, engaged in similar conduct but that the matter was not investigated.
CASI itself has come forward with evidence about two incidents regarding Klingsmith. In the first, Klingsmith mistakenly failed to deliver two children riding her bus to their home. She had left them alone on the bus for a short time, and then realized her mistake and took them home. (According to Casey's testimony, which the court must accept on summary judgment, Casey herself notified Klingsmith of the situation by telephone after Klingsmith had gone home, Casey Dep. at 67-68, and Klingsmith then found the children asleep in the parked bus.) CASI investigated, found that Klingsmith had been negligent, removed her from bus driving duties, and referred the incident to Child Protective Services for further action if needed. Klingsmith was not fired, though. She continued to work for CASI as a teacher's assistant.
In the second Klingsmith incident, a parent complained that Klingsmith had physically mistreated a child, but the complaint was not substantiated after investigation. No action was taken against Klingsmith as a result of that complaint.
Casey has not come forward with actual evidence disputing CASI's and Klingsmith's accounts of those incidents. The second, which was not substantiated, can be disregarded. The first, involving negligence but no physical mistreatment of a child, is not so similar to the incident Casey was involved in as to support an inference of racial discrimination. For a prima facie case to support an inference of discrimination, the comparator employee(s) must be similarly situated in all material respects. E.g., Greer v. Board of Educ., 267 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit has explained:
For example, in disciplinary cases — in which a plaintiff claims that he was disciplined by his employer more harshly than a similarly situated employee based on some prohibited reason — a plaintiff must show that he is similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct. Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1032 (1st Cir. 1995). This normally entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617-18 (7th Cir. 2000).
In practice, this standard means that where the evidence shows beyond reasonable dispute that plaintiff's misconduct was more serious than that of comparators, summary judgment should be granted. See, e.g., Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Indiana, Inc., 211 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment where, although plaintiff and other employee both initially furnished false information to employer and only plaintiff was fired, other employee had recanted and provided truthful statement long before plaintiff had); Kaniff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 258, 263-64 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment for employer where plaintiff's misconduct was more serious than actions of comparators). In this case, the undisputed difference between Casey's intentional conduct toward the child on February 2nd and Klingsmith's negligent oversight provides a plain basis for CASI to differentiate between the two situations. Casey has failed to come forward with evidence that would support a finding in her favor on the fourth element of a prima facie case.
Even if Casey had raised a genuine issue of fact about treatment of other employees so as to avoid summary judgment on the absence of a prima facie case, CASI has articulated a legitimate reason for its decision to fire her. Casey obviously believes that accounts of the February 2nd incident were exaggerated and that the incident was not so serious as to justify her firing. Casey's disagreement with the judgment of CASI management about such matters, however, is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the question of pretext.
Pretext "means a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error." Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000). "A `pretext for discrimination' means more than an unusual act; it means something worse than a business error; `pretext' means deceit used to cover one's tracks." Id. at 684. "On the issue of pretext, our only concern is the honesty of the employer's explanation." O'Connor v. DePaul University, 123 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, even if an employer's reasons for firing the plaintiff were "mistaken, ill considered or foolish," so long as the employer honestly believed those reasons, pretext has not been shown. Jordan v. Summers, 205 F.3d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 2000). In other words, a plaintiff cannot show pretext by showing merely that a reasonable person might have disagreed with the employer's decision. Instead, the plaintiff must come forward with evidence tending to show that the employer did not honestly believe the stated reason for the firing. Casey has not done so in this case.
Accordingly, the undisputed facts before the court show that defendant CASI is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Its motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED, and the court will enter final judgment dismissing this action.