Opinion
132 M.D. 2021
10-05-2021
Carol Ann Carter; Monica Parrilla; Rebecca Poyourow; William Tung; Roseanne Milazzo; Burt Siegel; Susan Cassanelli; Lee Cassanelli; Lynn Wachman; Michael Guttman; Maya Fonkeu; Brady Hill; Mary Ellen Balchunis; Tom DeWall; Stephanie McNulty; and Janet Temin, Petitioners v. Veronica Degraffenreid, in her official capacity as the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Jessica Mathis, in her official capacity as Director for the Pennsylvania Bureau of Election Services and Notaries, Respondents
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Argued: October 5, 2021
BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, (P.) HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, JUDGE
Before this special panel are the Preliminary Objections (POs) of Respondents Veronica Degraffenreid, in her official capacity as the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Jessica Mathis, in her official capacity as Director for the Pennsylvania Bureau of Election Services and Notaries (collectively, Respondents), and Intervenors Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Bryan Cutler, Majority Leader of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Kerry Benninghoff, President Pro Tempore of the Pennsylvania Senate Jake Corman, and Majority Leader of the Pennsylvania Senate Kim Ward (collectively, Intervenors) to Petitioners' Petition for Review (Petition) addressed to this Court's original jurisdiction.
See Section 112(b) of the Internal Operating Procedures of the Commonwealth Court, 210 Pa. Code §69.112(b) ("The President Judge may designate Judges to serve on a special court . . . panel to hear election law matters, appellate or original jurisdiction, on an expedited basis.").
Following a hearing, by Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 2, 2021, this Court granted Intervenors leave to intervene. Carter v. DeGraffenreid (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 132 M.D. 2021, filed September 2, 2021).
Petitioners are Carol Ann Carter, Monica Parrilla, Rebecca Poyourow, William Tung, Roseanne Milazzo, Burt Siegel, Susan Cassanelli, Lee Cassanelli, Lynn Wachman, Michael Guttman, Maya Fonkeu; Brady Hill; Mary Ellen Balchunis, Tom DeWall, Stephanie McNulty, and Janet Temin.
Pursuant to Section 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code, this Court has "original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings . . . [a]gainst the Commonwealth, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity." 42 Pa. C.S. §761(a)(1).
I. Petition for Review
On April 26, 2021, Petitioners filed the Petition against Respondents challenging the current congressional district map based on the 2020 Census. Petitioners identify themselves as 16 citizens of the United States (U.S.) who are registered to vote in Pennsylvania in 11 different federal congressional districts. Petitioners intend to advocate and vote for Democratic candidates in the upcoming 2022 primary and general elections. Petition, ¶11.
Specifically, Petitioners reside in Bucks, Chester, Cumberland, Dauphin, Delaware, Lancaster, Montgomery, Northampton, and Philadelphia Counties and in congressional districts 1 through 7, 10, and 11.
As we detailed in the September 2, 2021 Memorandum Opinion, the Petition provides details regarding the results of the 2020 Census, the dates by which the U.S. Secretary of Commerce must provide the U.S. President and the states with the apportionment data, and the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the delivery of that data. The Petition further explains that, while the Commonwealth's population increased from the last decennial census, the 2020 Census shows that the Commonwealth will lose a representative seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Starting with the upcoming 2022 elections, the Commonwealth will have 17 representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1 fewer than the current 18 representatives. The Commonwealth's congressional district map must be redrawn to accommodate for the loss of a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. Petitioners claim that the Commonwealth's current congressional districts are "unconstitutionally malapportioned" due to shifts in population within the Commonwealth. Petition, ¶2. They believe that the congressional districts in which they live are overpopulated, while other districts are underpopulated, and that, consequently, their votes for members of the U.S. House of Representatives are diluted. Petition, ¶¶18-21.
See Carter, slip op. at 3-6.
The Petition observes that Pennsylvania law does not set a deadline by which a new congressional district map must be put in place prior to the first congressional election following a census. According to Petitioners, it is in the best interest of voters, candidates, and the Commonwealth's entire electoral apparatus to have a new, final congressional district map in place prior to February 15, 2022, the date on which candidates may begin collecting signatures on nomination petitions for placement on the primary election ballot. Petition, ¶¶30-31.
The Petition informs that the Commonwealth's current congressional district map was drawn by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083 (Pa. 2018) (League of Women Voters III), after the Republican-controlled General Assembly and Democratic Governor failed to agree upon a new congressional district map following the Supreme Court's invalidation of the Commonwealth's 2011 congressional district map. The current political climate has not changed since 2018, as Republican representatives maintain the majority in both houses of the General Assembly and Governor Tom Wolf is a Democrat. For these reasons, Petitioners contend that it is "unlikely" that the political branches of the government will agree upon a new congressional district map. Petition, ¶¶8, 29, 32, 42, 52.
Petitioners present four counts alleging that the current congressional district map violates: (1) Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (free and equal elections clause); (2) 2 U.S.C. §2c (relating to districting for U.S. House of Representatives); (3) Article I, Section 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (relating to right to petition); and (4) Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (relating to qualifications for member of the U.S. House of Representatives).
Pa. Const. art. I, §5. Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, states: "Elections shall be free and equal; and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage."
2 U.S.C. §2c provides:
In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any subsequent Congress thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this title, there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Representatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first Congress).
Pa. Const. art. I, §20. Article I, Section 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance."
U.S. Const. art. I, §2. Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty[-]five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
[Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.] The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four,
Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies. The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
For relief, Petitioners seek both declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they ask the Court to:
a. Declare that the current configuration of Pennsylvania's congressional districts violates . . . the Pennsylvania Constitution [and] . . . the U.S. Constitution . . .;
b. Enjoin Respondents, their respective agents, officers, employees, and successors, and all persons acting in concert with each or any of them, from implementing, enforcing, or giving any effect to Pennsylvania's current congressional district plan;
c. Establish a schedule that will enable the Court to adopt and implement a new congressional district plan by a date certain should the political branches fail to enact such plan by that time;
d. Implement a new congressional district plan that complies with . . . the Pennsylvania Constitution [and] . . . the U.S. Constitution . . ., if the political branches fail to enact a plan by a date certain set by this Court;
e. Award Petitioners their costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorneys' fees; and
f. Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.Petition at 21-22.
II. Preliminary Objections
In response to the Petition, Respondents and Intervenors filed POs. Both Respondents and Intervenors preliminarily object on the bases that Petitioners lack standing and their claims are not ripe pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4), (5).Additionally, Intervenors object on the grounds that the claims are nonjusticiable and that Petitioners fail to otherwise state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4), (5) provides: "Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading and are limited to the following grounds: . . . (4) legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer); [and] (5) lack of capacity to sue[.]"
"In ruling on preliminary objections, the courts must accept as true all well-pled facts that are material and all inferences reasonably deducible from the facts." Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association v. Department of Environmental Protection, 135 A.3d 1118, 1123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), aff'd, 161 A.3d 949 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394, 400 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)). "However, we 'are not required to accept as true any unwarranted factual inferences, conclusions of law or expressions of opinion.'" Id. (quoting Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 400 n.5). "To sustain preliminary objections, 'it must appear with certainty that the law will permit no recovery' and '[a]ny doubt must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.'" Id. (quoting Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 400 n.5).
A. Standing
With regard to standing, Respondents and Intervenors both assert that Petitioners lack capacity to sue because they are not aggrieved. Petitioners' claims turn on one key fact - whether or not there will be a new congressional district plan in time for the 2022 primary election. Petitioners' claims are predicated on the supposition that because the General Assembly is controlled by one political party, the Governor is a member of another political party, and there has been "conflict" between these actors in the past, it is highly unlikely that Pennsylvania will enact a new congressional district plan in time for the 2022 primary election, which would cause them harm. The possible harm is wholly contingent on future events, which may never happen. Petitioners' failure to demonstrate an immediate interest defeats standing.
The hallmark of standing is that "a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not 'aggrieved' thereby." William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 280 (Pa. 1975). An individual is aggrieved if he has a "substantial, direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation." Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 972 A.2d 487, 496 (Pa. 2009). "[A]n interest is 'immediate' if the causal connection is not remote or speculative." Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655, 660 (Pa. 2005).
Our Supreme Court addressed standing in Office of Governor v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1229 (Pa. 2014), explaining:
In Pennsylvania, the doctrine of standing . . . is a prudential, judicially created principle designed to winnow out litigants who have no direct interest in a judicial matter. In re Hickson, [821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. 2003)]. For standing to exist, the underlying controversy must be real and concrete, such that the party initiating the legal action has, in fact, been "aggrieved." Pittsburgh Palisades Park, . . . . As this Court explained in William Penn Parking Garage, "the core concept [of standing] is that a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not 'aggrieved' thereby and has no standing to obtain a judicial resolution to his challenge." 346 A.2d at 280-81. A party is aggrieved for purposes of establishing standing when the party has a "substantial, direct and immediate interest" in the outcome of litigation. Johnson [v. American Standard, 8 A.3d 318, 329 (Pa. 2010)] (quoting Fumo[, 972 A.2d at 496]). A party's interest is substantial when it surpasses the interest of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law; it is direct when the asserted violation shares a causal connection with the alleged harm; finally, a party's interest is immediate when the causal
connection with the alleged harm is neither remote nor speculative. Id. [(emphasis added).]
Here, Petitioners' allegations fail to meet the immediacy test. Petitioners do not allege that they have sustained a present or imminent legally cognizable injury or otherwise sufficiently develop facts to permit judicial resolution at this juncture. Petitioners' claims are predicated on what may happen in the event a new congressional map is not enacted before the 2022 primary election.
At this juncture, Petitioners' claims are premature. Petitioners filed this suit in April 2021 on the heels of the 2020 Census release without ever giving the General Assembly and the Governor an opportunity to act. In fact, Petitioners allege that the U.S. Secretary of Commerce was not expected to deliver to Pennsylvania the redistricting data in legacy format until mid-to-late-August 2021, or the same detailed population data showing the new population of each political subdivision in a tabulated format until September 30, 2021. Petition, ¶23.
The U.S. Census Bureau provided redistricting data in legacy format for all states on August 12, 2021. See https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial census/data/datasets/rdo.html (last visited October 5, 2021).
Petitioners' action is premised on their belief that it is "extremely unlikely" that the branches will pass a lawful congressional redistricting plan in time for the upcoming 2022 election. Petition, ¶29. Petitioners attribute this unlikelihood to the divided political branches. Petition, ¶29. Both chambers of the General Assembly are controlled by the Republican Party and the Governor is a Democrat. Petition, ¶29. The Republican control of the General Assembly is not large enough to override a gubernatorial veto. Petition, ¶29. However, Petitioners do not allege that the political branches have announced a present impasse.
Nor do they allege that a legislative impasse is a fait accompli based on the political divide between the General Assembly and the Governor. In fact, Petitioners admit that, in the last two years, legislation has passed with bipartisan support and without a gubernatorial veto, despite the current political division. Respondents' Preliminary Objections, ¶10; Petitioners' Answer to Respondents' Preliminary Objections, ¶10; see, e.g., Act 77 of 2019 (allowing all eligible voters to vote by mail-in ballot); Act 12 of 2020 (changes to voting by mail-in electors and sweeping temporary measures to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic).
Act of October 31, 2019, P.L. 552, No. 77.
Act of March 27, 2020, P.L. 41, No. 12.
Petitioners acknowledge, as they must, that "there is still time for the General Assembly and the Governor to enact a new congressional plan." Petition, ¶9. Petitioners also acknowledge that Pennsylvania law does not set a deadline by which congressional redistricting plans must be in place prior to the first congressional election following the census. Petition, ¶30. Petitioners allege that "it is in everyone's interests - candidates and voters alike - that district boundaries are set" prior to February 15, 2022 - the first day for candidates to circulate and file nomination petitions for the 2022 primary election. Petition, ¶31. There is still ample time for the lawmakers to act. See League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 743 (Pa. 2018) (League of Women Voters II) (noting that the congressional district map that followed the 2010 Census was signed into law on December 22, 2011).
Respondents concede that February 15, 2022, is a key date for redistricting. "In order to ensure efficient election administration, allow for timely notice to candidates, and permit proper implementation of the new congressional districts," Respondents assert that "the Department of State must receive a final and legally binding congressional district map no later than January 24, 2022." Respondents' Brief at 5; see Respondents' Preliminary Objections, ¶¶13-17. "In order to account for potential litigation, Respondents believe that a new map must be signed into law by the end of December 2021." Respondents' Brief at 5; see Respondents' Preliminary Objections, ¶17.
Should lawmakers fail to act, Pennsylvania courts have demonstrated the ability to move swiftly to implement remedial congressional districting plans, which further undermines Petitioners' demand for immediate, premature relief. In Mellow v. Mitchell, 607 A.2d 204, 205 (Pa. 1992), eight Democratic state senators brought an action on January 28, 1992, the first day to circulate nominating petitions that year, asking the Supreme Court to create a new congressional district plan due to an impasse. On March 10, 1992, only 42 days after the suit was filed, the Supreme Court adopted a remedial plan. Similarly, in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2018) (League of Women Voters I), on January 22, 2018, the Supreme Court struck down the 2011 congressional district plan. See League of Women Voters II, 178 A.3d at 825. On February 19, 2018, just 28 days later, the Supreme Court adopted a remedial plan. League of Women Voters III, 181 A.3d at 1089-1121.
Although it is possible that the General Assembly and the Governor may reach an impasse on the congressional redistricting legislation, the mere possibility is not sufficient to state a cognizable claim. "[A]ny possible harm to Petitioners is wholly contingent on future events," which may never occur. Pittsburgh Pallisades Park, 888 A.2d at 660. Because no one can predict what will happen in negotiations between the General Assembly and the Governor, the facts underlying the Petition and alleged harm are far too speculative and uncertain to constitute an immediate interest. Petitioners cannot reserve their place in line to be the lead petitioners in the event that future impasse litigation becomes necessary.
First, we are not bound by decisions from courts in other jurisdictions. E.N. v. M. School District, 928 A.2d 453, 466 n.20 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007); Ferraro v. Temple University, 185 A.3d 396, 404 (Pa. Super. 2018). Second, although we may use such decisions "for guidance to the degree they are found to be useful, persuasive, and . . . not incompatible with Pennsylvania law," such is not the case here. Ferraro, 185 A.3d at 404. In Minnesota, a "special redistricting panel," comprised of judges, conducts public outreach and factfinding to prepare itself to address any redistricting litigation that may arise. Wattson, Order at 2-3. Pennsylvania has no such counterpart. Minnesota also has statutory deadlines. Wattson, Order at 2 (citing "Minn. Stat. §204B.14, subd. 1a (2020)," which provides that redistricting plans are to be implemented no "later than 25 weeks before the state primary election" in 2022). Given the panel's expansive role and the statutory deadline, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the panel should commence its work in the summer of 2021. Wattson, Order at 3. That decision, under those unique circumstances, has no bearing on the standing and ripeness issues under Pennsylvania jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Minnesota orders do not contain any analysis regarding the standing and ripeness issues presented here. Arrington is similarly unpersuasive. There, two groups of legislators - the Wisconsin State Senate Democratic Caucus, who intervened as plaintiffs, and the Wisconsin State Senate's Speaker and Minority Leader, who intervened as defendants - filed briefs agreeing that the case was justiciable and that "legislative failure to redistrict is a very real possibility." 173 F.Supp.2d at 858-59, 864. Based on these admissions, the Arrington Court accepted jurisdiction. Id. at 864. Conversely, here, the political branches have not taken such a position. Further, Arrington interpreted federal law as applied to the Wisconsin legislative process, which is not applicable here. Petitioners rely upon jurisprudence from Wisconsin and Minnesota to support their position that they have standing to prosecute their claims and that their claims are ripe at this juncture. Petitioners' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Preliminary Objections, at 2; see Arrington v. Elections Board, 173 F.Supp.2d 856 (E.D. Wis. 2001); Wattson v. Simon (Minn., Nos. A21-0243, A21-0546, filed June 30, 2021); see also Sachs v. Simon (Minn., No. A21-0546, filed May 20, 2021). According to Petitioners, the courts in Wisconsin and Minnesota accepted jurisdiction in similar redistricting cases where a risk of impasse was alleged. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the complaint presented a justiciable controversy upon recognizing that "challenges to districting laws may be brought immediately upon release of official data showing district imbalance." Arrington, 173 F.Supp.2d at 860 (citations omitted). Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court appointed a special redistricting panel to "order implementation of judicially determined redistricting plans for state legislative and congressional seats that satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements in the event that the Legislature and the Governor have not done so in a timely manner," noting that the redistricting panel's "work . . . must commence soon in order to permit the judicial branch to fulfill its proper role in assuring that valid redistricting plans are in place for the state legislative and congressional election in 2022." Wattson, Order at 2-3.
Although we recognize that Petitioners' rights might be abridged at some future point in time, at this juncture, the alleged harm is too remote and too speculative to warrant judicial resolution of the dispute. Petitioners' allegations fail to demonstrate the immediacy required to confer standing. We, therefore, sustain Respondents' and Intervenors' POs on the basis that Petitioners lack standing to litigate their claims.
B. Ripeness
Next, Respondents and Intervenors preliminarily object to the Petition on the basis that Petitioners' claims are not ripe because the claims are based on uncertain and contingent events that may never occur.
"There is considerable overlap between the doctrines of standing and ripeness, especially where the contentions regarding lack of justiciability are focused on arguments that the interest asserted by the petitioner is speculative, not concrete, or would require the court to offer an advisory opinion." Robinson Township, Washington County v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 917 (Pa. 2013). Like standing, the principles of ripeness "mandates the presence of an actual controversy." Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Industry, 8 A.3d 866, 874 (Pa. 2010). Unlike standing, "ripeness also reflects the separate concern that relevant facts are not sufficiently developed to permit judicial resolution of the dispute." Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 917.
Under the ripeness doctrine, "[w]here no actual controversy exists, a claim is not justiciable and a declaratory judgment action cannot be maintained." Cherry v. City of Philadelphia, 692 A.2d 1082, 1085 (Pa. 1997). In other words, declaratory judgment is not appropriate to determine rights in anticipation of events that may never occur; the presence of an actual controversy is generally required. Id. The same holds true for actions seeking injunctive relief. Mazur v. Washington County Redevelopment Authority, 954 A.2d 50, 56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
"In deciding whether the doctrine of ripeness bars our consideration . . . we consider [(1)] whether the issues are adequately developed for judicial review and [(2)] what hardships the parties will suffer if review is delayed." Township of Derry v. Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, 932 A.2d 56, 57-58 (Pa. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). As for whether the issues are "adequately developed," we examine "whether the claim involves uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated or at all; the amount of fact finding required to resolve the issue; and whether the parties to the action are sufficiently adverse." Id.
Rooted in the first part of this test is the principle that "[o]nly where there is a real controversy may a party obtain a declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment must not be employed to determine rights in anticipation of events [that] may never occur or for consideration of moot cases or as a medium for the rendition of an advisory opinion which may prove to be purely academic." Gulnac by Gulnac v. South Butler County School District, 587 A.2d 699, 701 (Pa. 1991) (internal citations omitted); accord City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 171 A.2d 768, 770 (Pa. 1961). "Under the 'hardship' analysis, we may address the merits even if the case is not as fully developed as we would like, if refusal to do so would place a demonstrable hardship on the party" Township of Derry, 932 A.2d at 58 (emphasis added).
Petitioners' claims are premised on the fear that there will not be a new congressional district plan in place in time for the 2022 primary election. Petitioners allege that it is highly likely that Pennsylvania's political branches will "be at an impasse this cycle" and "fail to enact a new congressional district plan." Petition, ¶33. However, the issues are not adequately developed because these events may never occur. As Petitioners acknowledge, there is still time for lawmakers to enact a new congressional district plan. Petition, ¶9. Petitioners' claims also ignore the presumption that public officials will faithfully discharge their duties. In re Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 938 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. 2007).
Additionally, Petitioners will not suffer any hardship if review is delayed. Only if the General Assembly and the Governor fail to adopt a new congressional district plan by an arbitrary deadline will the alleged constitutional and statutory violations occur. As this Court observed, "[a]t this juncture, it is not known how the redistricting process will proceed." Carter, slip op. at 12. "The events which might bring these parties into actual conflict are thus too remote to justify our resolution of this dispute by declaratory judgment." South Whitehall Township v. Department of Transportation, 475 A.2d 166, 169 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).
The fact that the current districts may not have equal numbers of voters does not give rise to a constitutional injury. "Malapportionment's harm is felt by individuals in overpopulated districts who actually suffer a diminution in the efficacy of their votes and the proportional voice in the legislature." Garcia v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 559 Fed.Appx. 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2014). Petitioners will not suffer an injury based on malapportionment harm until an election occurs using malapportioned districts.
Because Petitioners have alleged no immediate harm and their claims are contingent on future uncertainties, Petitioners' claims are not ripe for disposition. We, therefore, sustain Respondents' and Intervenors' POs on the basis that the dispute is not ripe.
We recognize that there may come a time when Petitioners' claims ripen, and they will have standing to pursue the claims in the Petition; however, that time is not now.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, we sustain Respondents' and Intervenors' POs based on a lack of standing and ripeness as to all four counts of the Petition. Accordingly, we dismiss the Petition without prejudice.
In light of this disposition, we decline to address Intervenors' additional POs.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of October, 2021, Respondents' and Intervenors' Preliminary Objections relating to lack of standing and ripeness are SUSTAINED. Petitioners' Petition for Review is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.