Opinion
8:97CV344
April 2000.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the defendants' second renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to amend the judgment and motion for new trial (filing 85). In support of and in opposition to the second renewed motion, the parties have submitted post-trial briefs. A telephonic hearing on the motions was held on March 23, 2000. The defendants explained that they felt compelled to restate the objections and arguments raised in their original renewed motion (filing 72) to ensure strict compliance with Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which mandate that post-trial motions be filed within 10 days after entry of judgment. The plaintiff has objected to the second renewed motion arguing that the Court no longer has jurisdiction because the defendants have filed a notice of appeal.
I. Procedural History
This case was tried before a jury commencing on September 15, 1999. On September 17, 1999, the Court entered the jury's verdict for the plaintiff and against the defendants on the national origin claim (filing 66). On September 23, 1999, the Court entered an order declaring that entry of judgment in this case would be delayed until the issues of front pay and attorney fees were resolved (filing 68). On October 14, 1999, the plaintiff filed motions for reinstatement (sic) or for award of lump sum and motion for attorney fees (filings 69-70). On October 28, 1999, the defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative to amend the judgment and for new trial (filing 72). On December 2, 1999, the Court denied the pending Rule 50 and Rule 59(3) motions (filing 77) and also denied the motion for instatement (filing 78). The Court granted the defendants' motion to amend the judgment (filing 77) insofar as declaring that the final judgment would reflect an award of $300,000 for punitive and compensatory damages. The Court stayed the plaintiff's alternative motion for a lump sum award pending a post-trial hearing on front pay (filing 78).
On the same date, December 2, 1999, the Court entered an order amending its earlier order (filing 68) to reducing the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages to $300,000 (filing 79). In this order, the Court reiterated that entry of judgment would be delayed until the issues of front pay and attorneys' fees had been resolved. On December 17, 1999, the Court conducted a hearing on the issues of front pay and attorneys' fees (filing 80). On February 10, 2000, the Court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and awarded the plaintiff front pay, stock options, if offered to A4 level employees, and attorneys' fees (filing 84). On February 23, 2000, the defendants filed a second renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to amend the judgment and motion for new trial (filing 85). On March 10, 2000, the defendants filed a notice of appeal from the district court's judgment (filing 88).
II. Discussion
A. Procedural Issues
Following a review of the procedural case history and applicable circuit case law, it appears that the defendants' original Rule 50 and Rule 59(e) motion (filing 72) was premature because it was filed before entry of judgment. As such, the Court should not have entertained the premature post-trial motion before entering final judgment in the case. Therefore, the Court will enter an order declaring the original post-trial motion premature and vacating its memorandum and order (filing 77).
Final judgment in this case was entered on February 10, 2000 (filing 84). The defendants' second renewed Rule 50 and Rule 59(e) motion was filed on February 23, 2000 (filing 85). Excluding intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and Washington's birthday, the Court finds that the defendants' post-trial motion was timely filed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). As such, a timely post-trial motion tolls the appeal time to provide the district court with jurisdiction to resolve the motion. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4); Innovative Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assoc. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1287 (8th Cir. 1998), and Jackson v. Schoemehl, 788 F.2d 1296, 1298 (8th Cir. 1986). The Eighth Circuit has ruled that Rule 59(e) motions [as well as presumably Rule 50(b) motions], if timely filed, toll the running of the thirty days to appeal the judgment, and the time for appeal commences anew at the entry of the order disposing of the motion, thereby requiring a notice of appeal following entry of the order granting or denying the post-trial motion. Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4)). Since the defendants' second renewed post-trial motion was timely filed, the defendants would be prudent to file a new notice of appeal following entry by this Court of this memorandum and order.
B. Substantive Issues
In support of their second renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law (filing 85), the defendants revisit a litany of arguments that was considered and rejected by this Court at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. The Court will not reconsider these arguments. Following its review of the trial transcript, the Court finds that a sufficient evidentiary basis exists to support the jury's verdict of liability. The Court rejects the defendants' proposition that past conduct cannot establish a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination against the plaintiff. The Eighth Circuit has consistently ruled that an employer's past discriminatory policies, procedures, and practices may well illustrate that an employer's asserted reasons for disparate treatment are a pretext for intentional discrimination. Callahan v. Runyon, 75 F.3d 1293 (8th Cir. 1996), and Hawkins v. Hennepin Tech. Ctr., 900 F.2d 153, 155-56 (8th Cir. 1990). As such, the Eighth Circuit has advised the trial courts that evidence of past discrimination "should normally be freely admitted at trial." Id.
The defendants also contend that the punitive damages, compensatory damages, and back pay awarded by the jury are unreasonable. The Court finds a sufficient evidentiary basis to support the jury's award of damages. The Court finds that the jury's award of back pay of $50,942 is sufficiently supported by the plaintiff's unrefuted testimony on cross-examination (filing 75 at 144:16-25; 145:1-3). However, the Court finds that the defendants are correct in their assertion that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) places a $300,000 limit on the sum of compensatory damages and punitive damages. Therefore, the Court has entered an amended order (filing 68), and the judgment (filing 84) properly reflects the $300,000 statutory limit.
The defendants further assert that the Court's act of sustaining the plaintiff's Batson challenge to the defendants' peremptory strike of a Mexican-American venire person denied the defendants their statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges and mandates a new trial. Under Batson's three-step process for evaluating an objection to a peremptory challenge, the challenger must make a prima facie showing that the party exercising a peremptory strike did so on the basis of race. The burden then shifts to the party to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Thereafter, the trial court must determine whether the challenger has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 352 (1991).
After making a prima facie showing that the defendants exercised a peremptory strike against the only Mexican-American on the jury panel on the basis of her race, the defendants articulated three reasons for striking her. The first reason articulated was the venire person was retired, and in an unemployment case it was appropriate to see jurors who are employed. The second reason articulated was that the venire person failed to follow the Court's seating directive during the impaneling process. The third reason articulated was that the venire person appeared to be confused by several of the Court's questions during voir dire. After assessing the first two steps of the Batson process, the Court determined that the defendants' proffered reasons, all three of which were unpersuasive and implausible, constituted a pretext for purposeful discrimination.
In support of its motion for new trial, the defendants cite Devoil-El v. Groose, 160 F.3d 1184, 1187 (8th Cir. 1998). In Devoil-El, the Eighth Circuit ruled that unemployment is a race-neutral reason in which to exercise a peremptory strike. Here, the defendants proffered retirement, not unemployment, as a reason. While the Court finds it inherently reasonable that an employer could choose to exercise a peremptory strike against an unemployed venire person, such reasoning is not persuasive when applied to retired venire persons. Because the Court found that retired status was neither a credible nor plausible explanation for exercising a peremptory strike against the sole Mexican-American venire person, the Court rejected the defendants' proffered explanation as pretext for purposeful discrimination. In the absence of a published appellate ruling that retired status constitutes a race-neutral reason to exercise a peremptory strike, the Court affirms today its earlier rejection of this proffered explanation.
Similarly, the Court rejects as pretextual the remaining two explanations proffered by the defendants — alleged misperception and confusion. As the Court explained to counsel outside of the presence of the panel, venire persons frequently confuse the Court's directions to proceed to the back row of the jury box and to commence seating from the left side. More often than not, venire persons proceed to the back row and commence seating from the right (filing 75 at 19:20-25). Whether this behavior results from a natural tendency to turn to one's right or from some other unknown cause, misperception of right- and left-sidedness by venire persons in the courtroom occurs with such high frequency that the Court cannot accept the proffered explanation as a valid justification to strike a prospective juror. The Court also rejects defense counsel's blanket assertion that he thought the venire person appeared confused by several of the Court's voir dire questions. When the defendant failed to proffer any specific instance of purported confusion by the venire person, the proffered explanation became inherently suspect to the Court. After advising counsel that the Court had no recollection of the venire person being confused during the voir dire examination, the Court proceeded to sustain the plaintiff's Batson challenge (filing 74, 20:3-5). Upon reconsideration, the Court reaffirms today its earlier rejection of the defendants' proffered explanations.
Finally, the defendant argues that the Court's awards of front pay and stock options are unduly speculative and unsupported by the evidence. The Court rejects these arguments. The Court awarded front pay until the plaintiff reached age seventy or until he retired, whichever occurs first. At trial the plaintiff testified under oath that he intended to work for the defendants until age seventy. The defendants offered no evidence to refute his testimony. That the defendants currently employ no management employees over age sixty-five is wholly irrelevant. Mr. Cardenas stated he intended to work for the defendant until age seventy. This Court has no basis on which to conclude otherwise. The defendants are correct in their understanding that the judgment awards Mr. Cardenas stock options should the defendants offer any stock options to A4 level supervisory employees.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The defendants' original motion for judgment as a matter of law (filing 72-1) or, in the alternative, for new trial (72-3) is denied as premature;
2. The defendants' original motion to amend judgment (filing 72-2) is granted insofar as the judgment reflects an award of $300,000.00 for punitive and compensatory damages; otherwise the motion to amend judgment is denied;
3. The Court's memorandum and order dated December 2, 1999 (filing 77), is vacated;
4. The defendants' second renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative to amend the judgment and motion for new trial motion(filing 85) is denied; and
Upon the filing of this order, the defendants shall file a new notice of appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
In this action pursuant to Title VII, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant on the national origin discrimination claim (filing 66). Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for instatement or, in the alternative, for a lump sum front pay award (filing 69). The plaintiff also filed an application for attorney fees (filing 70). In accordance with the Court's directive, both parties submitted post-trial briefs on the issues of front pay and attorney fees, and on December 17, 1999, the Court conducted a post-trial hearing on these issues. Based upon the evidence received at the hearing and the arguments of counsel, the Court will grant the plaintiff's motion for front pay and his application for attorney fees.
I. Front Pay Award
In its earlier memorandum and order (filing 78) the Court denied the plaintiff's motion for instatement to an A4 level supervisory position finding that instatement was not a feasible option given evidence adduced at trial of prior hostilities between the plaintiff and management personnel in the workplace. At the post-trial hearing, Mr. Cardenas testified that he was sixty-five years old and that he intended to work for the defendant until age seventy. The plaintiff's date of birth is July 19, 1934. He will be seventy years old on July 19, 2004. The Court finds that based upon Mr. Cardenas's long employment history with the defendant, his testimony that he intends to work until age seventy is credible.
The parties have stipulated that if front pay is awarded, the base front pay amount is to be $2,646.40 per annum based on the pay differential between the plaintiff and Thom Leroux, an employee of the defendant who received one of the A4 level supervisory positions in June/July 1995. Plt. Ex. 200. The plaintiff also requests an additional sum of $5,235.35 per annum to compensate him for individual and team performance awards he would have received had he been promoted to an A4-level supervisory position. This additional sum is based on the individual and team performance bonuses awarded to Thom Leroux between March 1996 and December 1998. Id. at p. 3, also marked as Trial Ex. 52. Finally, the plaintiff requests a court order directing the defendant to include the plaintiff in any future stock option awards offered to management employees (A4-level supervisory positions and higher).
In opposition to the plaintiff's motion for front pay award, the defendant argues that any award of front pay would be unduly speculative. In the event an award is made, the defendant contends that the Court should limit the award to one or two years. During the post-trial hearing, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's request for bonus pay based on performance awards was entirely too speculative. Specifically, the defendant claimed it has no way of knowing how the plaintiff would have performed in the A4 level supervisory position. Lastly, the defendant argued that its various stock option awards are infrequent and have variable beneficiaries, sometimes benefitting non-management employees, and at other times benefitting management employees.
Based on the evidence presented at the post-trial hearing, the Court concludes that Mr. Cardenas is entitled to a front pay award. The front pay award includes the stipulated pay differential of $2,646.40 per annum plus an additional $4,956.33 per annum. The additional amount of $4,956.33 represents an average of the team performance awards Mr. Leroux received between 1996 and 1998. Plt. Ex. 200 at p. 3, also marked as Trial Ex. 52. The Court agrees with the defendant that it is entirely too speculative for the Court to forecast how the plaintiff would have individually performed in his first supervisory capacity had he been promoted to an A4 level supervisory position in 1995. Thus, the Court has not included Mr. Leroux's individual performance and merit awards in its calculation of the plaintiff's front pay award. The total front pay award equals $7,602.73 per annum ($633.56 per month) from the date of judgment until either July 19, 2004, or the date the plaintiff retires, whichever date occurs first.
The Court further concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to any future stock option awards offered by the defendant and its successor(s), if any, to A4 level management employees commencing from the date of the judgment and ending on either July 19, 2004, or the date on which the plaintiff retires, whichever date first occurs.
II. Attorney Fees and Costs
The plaintiff has also submitted an application for attorney fees and costs, requesting $55,425.75 in attorney fees and $2,230.35 in costs. At the post-trial hearing, the plaintiff offered Exhibit 204, a time sheet for attorney Eric Brown recording an additional 44.8 hours of legal work at $110 per hour for the period of October 19, 1999, through December 17, 1999.
The defendant argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the full $36,163.00 in fees that his former counsel, Bruce Mason, allegedly expended. The Court has carefully reviewed the application for Mr. Mason's fees and concludes that Mr. Mason's fees are excessive and should be reduced by one third to $24,108.67. The Court further concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney fees in the amount of $24,190.75 for work performed by attorneys Tom Cope and Eric Brown. Thus, the Court will award the plaintiff $48,299.42 in attorney fees and $2,230.35 in costs.
Pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a judgment has been entered on this date in accordance with the jury verdict and this memorandum.
In accordance with the memorandum filed on this date,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgment is entered in accordance with the jury verdict (filing 66) in favor of the plaintiff, Jesse Cardenas, and against the defendants, ATT Corporation and Lucent Technologies, Inc., in the following amounts:
a) $300,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages;
$50,942.00 in back pay;
$633.56 per month in front pay commencing from the date of judgment and ending on July 19, 2004, or the date on which the plaintiff retires, whichever date occurs first;
$48,299.42 in attorney fees;
$2,230.35 in costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant or its successor shall offer to the plaintiff all stock option awards/offerings offered to A4-level management personnel commencing from the date of this Judgment and ending either on July 19, 2004, or the date on which the plaintiff retires, whichever date first occurs.