Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:04-CV-1880-B.
November 2, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Abstain and to Remand, filed on September 28, 2004. At issue is whether the Plaintiff's negligence claims against his employer are preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq, thus giving this Court federal question jurisdiction over the claims in this case. Having considered the pertinent pleadings, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiff's motion to remand for the reasons that follow.
Although there is some confusion as to the date the motion to remand was filed, both parties agree in their joint status report that it was filed on or about September 28, 2004, and Defendant filed its response on October 14, 2004. Plaintiff missed the deadline to file its motion by one day, but this failure to file by the deadline is ultimately irrelevant as this Court has determined that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this case.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a negligence action brought by Plaintiff Simon Campuzano ("Campuzano") against his employer, Defendant R.R. Hall Inc. D/B/A Hall's Automatic Sprinkler's ("Hall") for an injury Campuzano allegedly sustained at the workplace as a result of his employer's failure to maintain a safe workplace and to properly train its employees. (Pet. ¶¶ 5-9). Specifically, Campuzano alleges that, "while not wearing any safety equipment, [he] was pulling on a long pipe when he felt a sharp pain in his stomach. At the time of the accident [Campuzano] was not wearing a back brace, any gloves, or any other type of safety equipment nor was he ever required to wear any." (Pet. ¶ 6). Campuzano further contends that as a result of this injury, he had to be admitted to the hospital and undergo surgery to treat his "serious bodily injuries." ( Id.)
Campuzano originally filed this lawsuit on July 14, 2004 in the County Court at Law, Kaufman County, Texas. Hall filed a timely notice of removal, based on federal question jurisdiction, on August 27, 2004, within thirty days of the date of service. (Notice of Removal). The parties agree that Hall is a "non-subscriber" under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act. Hall has created an "Employee Injury Benefit Plan," through which it provides benefits to its employees (Removal Brief 2). The parties do not dispute that ERISA governs Hall's plan. Hall contends that Campuzano's claims relate to its ERISA plan because (1) his alleged injuries were sustained in the "course and scope of his employment," and (2) Hall covers such injuries through its plan. ( Id. 2-3). Therefore, Hall asserts, Campuzano's claims relate to Hall's ERISA plan, creating a federal question, and this Court has original and supplemental jurisdiction over the claims in this case. ( Id.); 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Campuzano disagrees, asserting that his claims arise under Texas Workers compensation laws and are brought pursuant to section 411 of the Texas Labor Code. (Mtn. Remand 1). Campuzano contends that this Court is required to remand this "non-subscriber" personal injury action. ( Id.).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard.In an action which has been removed from state court, the removing party bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865 (1995) (citation omitted). Additionally, whether jurisdiction exists for a removed action is determined by looking at the complaint at the time the notice of removal is filed. Brown v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990). As a general rule, a plaintiff's cause of action may confer federal question jurisdiction only when the well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law. Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
1. The Texas Worker's Compensation Act.
The Texas Worker's Compensation Act ("TWCA"), provides the exclusive remedy for any work-related injury or death of employees whose employers carry insurance offered under the Act. TEX.LAB.CODE.ANN. § 406.034. Unlike most state workers compensation statutes, employers have the option under the TWCA not to carry such insurance. Id. at § 406.002. Electing this option comes with a high price, however, as employers such as Hall who opt out, referred to as "nonsubscribers," may be sued in state court by their employees and are further stripped of their traditional common law defenses, such as contributory negligence. Id. at § 406.003.
2. ERISA Preemption.
a. Complete Preemption and Conflict Preemption.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized two types of preemption under ERISA: complete preemption and conflict preemption. McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. 1998). Complete preemption serves as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule in that ERISA may occupy a particular area such that "any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Giles v. Nylcare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Metro Life, 481 U.S. at 64-65) (internal quotations omitted). ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), completely preempt any state cause of action seeking the same relief, thus a claim falling within § 1132(a), regardless of how artfully pled as a state claim, will be treated as a federal claim. Id. At 337 n. 7. (citations omitted). Because such a claim raises a federal question, it will provide a basis for the Court's exercise of removal jurisdiction from state court. Id.On the other hand, conflict preemption, also known as ordinary preemption, arises under U.S.C. 1144(a) and applies to state law claims which fall outside the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. Copling v. The Container Store, 174 F.3d 594, 595 (5th Cir. 1999). Such claims are governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule and, therefore, conflict preemption, in and of itself, fails to establish federal question jurisdiction over those claims. Id.
The Fifth Circuit has summarized the interplay between the issues of preemption and jurisdiction as follows:
[W]hen a complaint raises state causes of action that are completely preempted, the district court may exercise removal jurisdiction; but when a complaint contains only state causes of action that the defendant argues are merely conflict preempted, the court must remand for want of subject matter jurisdiction. When a complaint raises both completely preempted claims and arguably conflict preempted claims, the district court may exercise removal jurisdiction over the completely preempted claims and supplemental jurisdiction [under 28 U.S.C. § 1367] over the remaining claims.Id. Thus, the issue here with respect to Campuzano's motion is whether any of his state law claims are completely preempted under ERISA. If so, the Court may exercise removal jurisdiction over all claims in this case.
To determine whether the claim is subject to ordinary preemption under ERISA, the Fifth Circuit uses a two-pronged approach. See McClelland, 155 F.3d at 517. The first step is to determine whether the claim is subject to ordinary preemption under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Id. "Ordinary preemption is a necessary — but obviously not a sufficient — precondition to complete preemption in the context of ERISA." Id. Therefore, a claim that is not subject to ordinary preemption cannot be completely preempted. The second step, then, assuming the claim is subject to ordinary preemption, is to determine whether it is completely preempted; i.e. whether the claim seeks the same relief as provided for in ERISA's civil enforcement provisions in § 1132(a). See id.; see also Giles, 172 F.3d at 337.
b. Ordinary Preemption Under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
As noted, the instant motion raises the issue of ERISA preemption and the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) states that ERISA preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . ." ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The Supreme Court defines the phrase "relate to" very broadly. It is to be "`given its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law `relates to' a benefit plan, `in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.'" Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (citations omitted). If a state law relates to a benefit plan, then ERISA preempts it. Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1992).
ERISA preemption is also governed by 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B), but these provisions are inapplicable to this case.
Two characteristics unify those state law causes of action which have been preempted by ERISA: (1) these claims address areas of exclusive federal concern, such as the right to receive benefits under the terms of an ERISA plan; and (2) they directly affect the association among the traditional ERISA participants — the employer, the plan and its fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries. Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins., 904 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Texas Children's Hosp., 84 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 95 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. Campuzano's Claims Do Not Relate to Hall's ERISA-Governed Employee Injury Benefit Plan.
The Court finds that Campuzano's action affects Hall's ERISA plan in a manner "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral" to warrant a finding of ERISA preemption. Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (finding that plaintiff's negligence claim did not relate to employer's ERISA plan on similar facts); Noyola v. Oasis Car Wash, 220 F. Supp.2d 638, 641 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (quoting Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988) (same)). Particularly instructive is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hook. In Hook, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's remand of a case where the plaintiff's sole remaining claim was one against her employer for negligent failure to maintain a safe working environment, concluding that the plaintiff's claim did not relate to her employer's ERISA plan. Id. at 778. Like the plaintiff in Hook, Campuzano's sole claim against his employer is one for negligence based on Hall's failure to maintain a safe workplace. Id. at 781-82.
The plaintiff in Hook originally filed a wrongful discharge claim also, but amended her petition, removing that claim and leaving only her negligence claim. Hook, 38 F.3d at 779-80.
The Court finds that both parties essentially mischaracterize Campuzano's claims. While his petition makes specific reference to section 411.103 of the Texas Labor Code, Section 411.103 does not create a cause of action, but rather prescribes an employer's duty to provide a safe working environment. Plaintiff's claims are common law negligence claims. While Hall is correct that they are not "dependent solely on the provisions of the [TWCA]," they are dependent solely on state common law and supported by state statute. (Resp. 2-3).
Both the United States and the State of Texas filed Amicus briefs in Hook at the request of the Circuit Court, arguing that the plaintiff's negligence claim, standing alone, was unrelated to her employer's ERISA plan. See id. The Fifth Circuit agreed, stating that the plaintiff's claim "affect[ed] only her employer/employee relationship with [her employer] and not her administrator/beneficiary relationship with the company." Id. at 783-84. Campuzano's claim is indistinguishable. Campuzano only seeks damages for Hall's "alleged negligent maintenance of its workplace," not benefits under the plan or damages for Hall's improper administration of the plan. Id. Like the claims at issue in Hook and in the Eastern District case, Noyola, Campuzano's unsafe workplace claim is "totally independent from the existence and administration of" his employer's ERISA plan. Hook, 38 F.3d at 784; Noyola, 220 F. Supp.2d at 642.
In fact, Campuzano's claims are even less related than those of the plaintiff in Hook, because in that case, unlike the present one, there was an issue regarding a waiver signed by the plaintiff in the benefit plan at issue. See Hook, 38 F.3d at 776.
Because Campuzano seeks damages for his personal injury, not plan benefits, in the form of a negligence claim, his claim cannot be said to be "rooted in the existence of an ERISA-governed plan, and as such, does not relate to one." Noyola, 220 F.Supp.2d at 643-44 (following Hook and holding that the plaintiff's claims for negligent maintenance of its workplace was not preempted, as it would exist even if the employer did not have an ERISA-governed plan); Hook, 38 F.3d at 776; cf Hernandez v. Jobe Concrete Prod., Inc., 282 F.3d 360, 362 n. 3, 363 n. 5 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that employer's plan was governed by ERISA, where parties conceded that the plaintiff's personal injury-type claims brought after employee quit and ceased receiving plan benefits, were related to the plan). In conclusion, because Campuzano's negligence claim does not relate to Hall's ERISA plan, his claims against Hall are not preempted, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this case.
C. Attorneys Fees.
Campuzano further requests that the Court order Hall to pay his reasonable attorneys fees and expenses incurred in presenting this motion, in the amount of $750.00, urging that Hall had "no plausible basis" for claiming that this Court had jurisdiction over this action. (Mtn. Remand 1-2; Proposed Order of Remand). Because the Fifth Circuit in Hook, along with "numerous federal district courts in Texas," holds that "a tort claim alleging an unsafe workplace does not relate to an ERISA plan," the Court GRANTS Campuzano's request, and orders Hall to pay Campuzano $750.00 in attorneys fees and costs. Hook, 38 F.3d at 784 (citing, e.g., Westbrook v. Beverly Enters., 832 F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Tex. 1993)); Pyle v. Beverly Enters.-Texas, 826 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Tex 1993); Noyola, 220 F. Supp.2d at 642 n. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (authorizing attorney fee award).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the Court finds that it does not have federal question jurisdiction over the claims in this case because Campuzano's claims are not related to Hall's ERISA-governed employee benefit plan. Campuzano's motion for remand is therefore GRANTED, and this case is REMANDED to the County Court at Law, Kaufman County, Texas. The clerk shall mail a certified copy of this memorandum order to the Clerk for the Kaufman County County Court at Law, Kaufman, Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
SO ORDERED.