Opinion
Civ. No. 02-4300 (RHK/AJB)
February 25, 2004
Geraldine Carlen Steen, Beckman Steen, Minnetonka, Minnesota, for Plaintiff
Thomas E. Marshall Mary L. Senkbeil, Jackson Lewis LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
Plaintiff Johnathan Campbell is an African American who worked for Bodycote Lindberg Corporation, d/b/a Bodycote Thermal Processing ("Bodycote"), from November 2000 to March 2002. While employed at Bodycote's Eden Prairie, Minnesota, metal treating facility, Campbell alleges that he was subjected to a racially discriminatory wage and job classification, a racially hosfile work environment, and reprisal for filing a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Before the Court is Bodycote's Motion for Summary Judgment on each of Campbell's claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Bodycote's motion.
Bodycote purchased Lindberg Corporation on January 17, 2001 and changed its name to Bodycote Lindberg Corporation. (Marshall Aff. Ex. B (Manhattan Dep. Tr. at 23).)
Background
For the purposes of Bodycote's motion, the Court will view the facts in a light most favorable to Campbell. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
I. Bodycote and its Operations
Bodycote, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas, provides metal treating services at various locations, including at its Eden Prairie facility. (Marshall Aff. Ex. A (Campbell Dep. Ex. 36 (Bodycote Employee Handbook)); id. Ex. B (Manhattan Dep. Tr. at 9, 17).) Bodycote heat-treats metal in furnaces designed to harden the metal or provide it with a desired coating. The furnaces are set at certain temperatures and metal parts are then placed on conveyor belts and travel through the furnaces for a specified amount of time. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 87-89.) When the parts come out of the furnace, some are "quenched" in tanks filled with oil or salt to cool. (Id.)
Bodycote runs its furnaces in three shifts. (Manhattan Aff. ¶ 2.) Each shift has a supervisor whose duties include disciplining employees, making pay raise recommendations, and performing evaluations. (Id. ¶ 4.) Groups of similar furnaces are organized into four departments and each department has a leader who schedules the orders to be run for all three shifts. (Id. fflf 2, 3; Manhattan Dep. Tr. at 21.) Individual furnaces are operated by Heat Treatment Operators A, B, C, or D, and General Helpers. (Manhatton Aff. H 2.)
After Bodycote acquired Lindberg in January 2001, all designations moved "down a notch" so that Department Leaders became Heat Treater A's, and Heat Treater A's became Heat Treater B's, and so on. (Manhatton Aff. ¶ 6; Manhatton Dep. Tr. at 20-22.) These changes were in title only and did not affect wages. (Manhatton Dep. Tr. at 22.)
A "General Helper," also referred to as "General Labor," cleans the parts, prepares them for processing, packs them for shipping, and performs housekeeping tasks such as sweeping, trash disposal, and equipment cleaning. (Manhatton Aff. Ex. A.) A "Heat Treater D" prepares metal orders for shipment, tracks their movement, and completes required paperwork. (Id.) A "Heat Treater C" enters the time and temperature settings for furnaces, enters and interprets data, runs inspections, inspects the work, maintains furnace logs and charts, and operates all equipment within the department. (Id.) A "Heat Treater B" performs all the duties of the C and D Heat Treaters, and also determines when to shut the equipment down, starts and stops equipment in emergencies or on weekends, enters orders, and reports unsafe conditions or practices to management. (Id.) Finally, one "Heat Treater A" leads each of Bodycote's four departments. (Manhatton Dep. Tr. at 21.)
Not only do these positions reflect different responsibilities and proficiencies, they command different wages. (Manhatton Aff. Ex. A; Manhatton Dep. Tr. at 20-21; Campbell Dep. Ex. 18.) Each has a minimum, midpoint, and maximum hourly wage. (Manhatton Dep. Tr. at 20-21; Campbell Dep. Ex. 18.) For example, effective February 4, 2000, the minimum, midpoint, and maximum wages for General Helper was $8.76, $9.25, and $10.64 per hour and for Heat Treater B's it was $10.70, $13.77, and $15.85 per hour. Effective March 5, 2001, the minimum, midpoint, and maximum wages for General Helper was $9.25, $10.10, and $10.96 per hour and for Heat Treater B's it was $10.20, $13.27, and $16.33 per hour. (Campbell Dep. Ex. 18.) In conjunction with these guidelines, wages are also affected by experience, competence, length of employment, and market conditions. (Manhattan Dep. Tr. at 19, 59-60.)
This information was obtained from Ex. 58 of Brett Young's deposition submitted in a related case, Young v. Bodycote Lindberg Corp., Civ. No. 02-4298 (RHK/AJB). These pay ranges represented a 3% pay increase over the 1999 schedule.
This represented a 3% increase over the 2000 schedule. (Campbell Dep. Ex. 18.)
II. Campbell's Tenure at Bodycote
A. Positions and Wages
Campbell, a resident of Minneapolis, worked for Bodycote from November 28, 2000 until March 11, 2002. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 5.) When he was interviewed in September 2000 by Mark Wielgosz, Bodycote's former Plant Superintendent, Campbell thought it was for a heat treater operator job on an Ajax machine, which heat-treats steel pistons for trucks. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 32-33, 79, 82.) But when he was hired in November 2000, he was not classified as an operator; rather, he was classified as a General Helper and worked on the Ajax machine during the second shift, (Id. at 79, 84, 86-87.) His job was to load steel pistons into the machine, unload them after they were heated, and them in a quench tank. fid, at 87-88.) Although inexperienced when he began, he learned to run the Ajax machine over time. (Id. at 89-90.)
He also worked for Lindberg Corporation for five months during 1994-1995. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 32-33.)
His initial hourly wage was $9.50 per hour (id.. at 76), which was slightly higher than the $9.25 midpoint pay for General Helpers (see supra p. 4). While Wielgosz told Campbell that his pay "should be at $10 or better" after a 90-day probationary period (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 76), Campbell's wage was raised to $9.88 per hour — less than he expected (id. at 101-103). When he questioned Ed Lamberty, his supervisor, about the increase, Lamberty explained that it was a cost-of-living raise and a larger raise was prohibited by a wage freeze due to Bodycote's takeover of Lindberg. (Id. at 101, 105.)
In November 2001, Lamberty recommended a raise for Campbell. (Id. at 127-29, Ex. 12.) Lamberty's recommendation stated, in part:
Associate has been fully trained and has demonstrated he has knowledge in the training areas of the Ajax line. As his supervisor, I would recommend that Associate receive a pay raise for his training and is an added asset for the company.
(Id. Ex. 12.) In December 2001, Lamberty and Wielgosz recommended Campbell for a promotion from General Helper to Heat Treater B and a corresponding wage increase to $10.25 per hour. (Id. at 128, Ex. 13.) The recommendation stated, in part:
Johnathan Campbell has demonstrated the ability of a fully qualified operator for the Ajax automated production line. It is the recommendation of the Shift Leader that Johnathan's current status of General Labor be promoted to Heat Treat "B" operator and that his current hourly wage be increased from $9.88 to $10.25 per hour.
(Id. Ex. 13.) These recommendations came despite Campbell's reprimands for attendance problems. (Id at 119-24, Exs. 10, 11.)
Although Campbell did receive a pay raise to $10.25 per hour, which was slightly higher than the minimum for Heat Treater B's at the time, his title remained General Helper. (Id at 130-32, Exs. 15, 18; Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 4.) Despite his title, he felt he did the same work, if not more, as Heat Treaters and believed that Bodycote gave the Heat Treater title to those with less training and experience. (Campbell Dep. Ex. 22 (Interrog. Ans. ¶ 2).)
Notwithstanding his pay raises, Campbell claims that Bodycote hired non-minorities with similar experience, expertise, and training at higher wages. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 114-16, 134-36, 146-51, Ex. 22 (Interrog. Ans. ¶ 2).) Campbell identified Mike Grill, Steve Swing, Duane Nomeland, Alan Voss, Mark Woltz, Mark Jensen and Mario Cabrera as imilarly situated non-minority co-workers who he claims were paid more than he was. (Id at 133-38, 145-49, Ex. 22 (Interrog. Ans. ¶ 22).)
Campbell also identifies Honey Hervey, Judy Hall, and Troy Odom as employees who were paid more than he was, but they are also African American. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 137, 146; Ex. A. to Marshall Aff. (Hervey Dep. Tr. at 210-11, 218) submitted in Hervey v. Bodycote Lindberg Corp., Civ. No. 02-4299 (RHK/AJB).)
B. The Racial Atmosphere at Bodycote
While at Bodycote, Campbell asserts that he was subjected to a racially hosfile environment: (1) race-related comments were made to him or others fid, at 196-200); (2) Ed Lamberty, Campbell's supervisor, called employees "stupid, jackass, dumb," and Lamberty and Wielgosz gave Campbell dirty looks (id.. at 191, 199); (3) he overheard Lamberty tell an African-American co-worker that management did not "give a fuck about the employees here" (id.. at 192-93); (4) he was aware of a near-physical confrontation between Brett Young, an African-American co-worker, and Mark Lindstrom, a Caucasian co-worker (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 17); and (5) he claims that he was the only person not warned not to use a new quench tank and that he was injured while using it (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 178-83, 201-04).
C. Campbell's Discrimination Charge and Bodycote's Alleged Reprisal
On December 28, 2001, Campbell filed a racial discrimination charge with the EEOC. In the charge, he wrote:
I. I started with [Bodycote] as a General Helper/Heat Treating Operator in November of 2000. My starting wage was the lowest at $9.50 per hour. After passing my 90 days probationary period, [Bodycote] said there would be a wage freeze and refused to reclassify me as an Operator. Instead, I received only a slight annual wage increase to $9.88 per hour. Other non-minority new hires were making much more than me, at $15 or $16 per hour. After several complaints from minorities about unfair wages, my wage was increased to $10.25 per hour as of 12/27/01, but I am still paid less for performing the same job as my non-minority counterparts.
II. [Bodycote's] reasons for adverse actions: None given.
III. I believe I have been discriminated against based on my race/Black, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
IV. Class allegation: I believe other minorities are also being paid lower wages than non-minorities, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
(Id. Ex. 15 (EEOC Charge of Discrimination).) He received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on July 19, 2002. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 10.)
After the EEOC charge, Campbell alleges that Bodycote retaliated against him: (1) his work was scrutinized (see Campbell Dep. Tr. at 188-89); (2) he suspected people of taking important paperwork from him (id. at 185); (3) he suspected people of tampering with his machine (id at 188); (4) his overtime was reduced (id at 235-36, Ex. 35); (5) Wielgosz failed to warn him not to use the new quench tank (id.. at 179-82, 201-04); and (6) after he recovered from his injuries, Campbell was willing to work in any area except the Ajax machine, but Bodycote did not offer him another position (id. at 209-10, 218-19).
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Mems v. City of St. Paul. Dep't of Fire Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2000). The court must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Graves v. Arkansas Dep't of Fin. Admin., 229 F.3d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 2000); Calvit v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 122 F.3d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1997). The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995); Elayaperumal v. Medtronic. Inc., Civ. No. 02-860 (RHK/SRN), 2003 WL 21402602, at *6 (D. Minn. June 17, 2003).
Analysis
Campbell has filed a three-count Complaint against Bodycote. Count I alleges race discrimination and a racially hosfile work environment in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c). Count II alleges a pattern and practice of racial discrimination and hosfile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Count III alleges discriminatory reprisal in violation of the MHRA, Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 7. Bodycote seeks summary judgment as to each claim. The Court will begin with Count I. I. Count I: Racial Discrimination in Violation of the MHRA
The MHRA has been re-numbered. For example, § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c) is now 363A.08, subd. 2(c). For convenience, however, the Court will refer to the prior numbering system because both parties have done so in their briefs.
Whether brought under the MHRA or Title VII, Campbell's claims are subject to the same legal analysis. See Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press. 589 NW.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999) ("In construing the MHRA, we apply law developed in federal cases arising under Title VII." (citation omitted)); Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis. 237 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2001) ("We apply the same analysis in reviewing discrimination claims brought under Title VII and the MHRA."(citation omitted)).
A. Discriminatory Wages
Campbell alleges that he was paid less than similarly situated non-minority co-workers for comparable work. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 13.) The MHRA prohibits an employer from discriminating "against a person with respect to . . . compensation" because of race. Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. l(2)(c). To determine whether the MHRA has been violated, the Minnesota Supreme Court uses the three-part McDonnell Douglas test. Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press. 589 NW.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999). Under that test, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.Id. In the context of a wage discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that the employer "paid different wages to employees of different races for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions." Tademe v. Saint Cloud State University. 328 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted). "Requisite skill is measured by such factors as education, training, experience, and ability." Id. (citation omitted).
Once the employee has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Fletcher. 589 N.W.2d at 102. Upon articulation of a legitimate and under non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the reason was not the true reason for the action, but was instead a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Bodycote argues that Campbell has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was similarly situated to the non-minorities who were allegedly paid more. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 15-16.) Campbell responds that while he did receive a wage increase, "[o]ther Caucasian employees, similarly situated, were paid more." (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 4; see id at 15.)
To make a prima facie case, Campbell must show that Bodycote paid him different wages than his non-minority co-workers for equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility. Tademe, 328 F.3d at 989. Campbell has failed to meet his burden in two ways. First, he offers no competent evidence of what wages his non-minority co-workers were earning. Rather, he speculates about what others were earning or relies on what others had told him about their, or someone else's, wages. While the Court views the record in the light most favorable to Campbell, it will not "stretch this favorable presumption so far as to consider as evidence statements found only in inadmissible hearsay." Mays v. Rhodes. 255 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Furthermore, although he claims that he read a computer print-out detailing his co-workers' wages (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 134), he has not offered it as evidence or provided any competent evidence of its contents. Campbell cannot rest on mere allegations that he was paid less; rather, he must come forward with specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957. Second, although Campbell compares himself to several non-minority co-workers, he offers no evidence regarding the similarities between his job, skills (including education, training, and experience), effort, and responsibility, and theirs. Accordingly, the Court will grant Bodycote's motion with regard to Campbell's wage discrimination claims.
In fact, he admits that he does not know the experience level of Swing, Nomeland, and Voss, or what position Woltz held at Bodycote. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 134, 136-37, Ex. 22 (Interrog. Ans. ¶ 2).) Moreover, the evidence shows that Grill had fifteen years experience and could run all Bodycote's machines (Manhattan Aff. ¶ 5) and Nomeland had been a Heat Treater A during Campbell's tenure (Manhattan Dep. Tr. at 39). Campbell had less training and experience than either Grill or Nomeland.
Had the Court been called upon to reach the issue, it would have determined that Bodycote followed its wage ranges with respect to Campbell. (See Campbell Dep. Ex. 18; supra p. 4 n. 4.) Therefore, Bodycote's "compensation policy is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [Campbell's] wage rate." Poppe v. Home Depot Corp., Civ. No. 99-1891 (ADM/AJB), 2001 WL 1640042, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 2, 2001). Campbell has not shown that this reason was a pretext for discrimination.
B. Discriminatory Job Classification
Campbell alleges that while he was doing the work of a Heat Treater B, he remained classified as a General Helper because of his race. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 3, 13.) This claim is akin to a claim for failure-to-promote. The MHRA prohibits an employer from discriminating "against a person with respect to hiring . . . upgrading . . . or privileges of employment" because of race. Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. l(2)(c). Again, the three-part McDonnell Douglas test applies. Lyoch v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 139 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1998). To establish a prima face case of a discriminatory failure-to-promote, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was a member of a protected group; (2) he was qualified and applied for a promotion to an available position; (3) he was rejected; and (4) a similarly qualified employee, not part of a protected group, was promoted instead. Id. Focusing on the fourth element, Campbell presents no admissible evidence that a similarly qualified employee, not part of a protected group, was classified as a Heat Treater B while he remained a General Helper. Accordingly, the Court will grant Bodycote's motion with regard to this claim.
C. Hosfile Work Environment
Campbell also claims that he was subjected to a racially hosfile work environment. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 16.) To establish a hosfile work environment claim, Campbell must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) a causal nexus exists between the harassment and the protected group status; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper action. Tademe, 328 F.3d at 991. Harassment which is severe and pervasive is deemed to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Elmahdi v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 339 F.3d 645, 652 (8th Cir. 2003). The objectionable environment must be both objectively severe, as it would be viewed by a reasonable person, and subjectively severe, as it was actually viewed by the victim. See id
In determining whether sufficient evidence of a hosfile work environment claim has been presented, the Court considers all of the attendant circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Id. To satisfy the "high threshold of actionable harm," Campbell has to show his workplace was "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Id at 653 (citation and internal quotations omitted). "[M]ere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in a[n] employee . . . does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment" to implicate the anti-discrimination laws. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Campbell cites several examples of Bodycote's alleged racially hosfile work environment. First, he asserts that race-related comments were made to him or others. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 196-200.) Specifically, he overheard racial comments, such as "nigger this, or black this," in conversations "off in the distance" (id.. at 196-97); he overheard one co-worker, Dean Doyle, talking about "blacks want[ing] something for nothing" (id.. at 197); he heard another co-worker, Mark Jensen, use the word "nigger" (id.. at 198); and he was told that Wielgosz referred to a Bosnian employee as a "fucking immigrant" (id.. at 200). Second, he claims that Lamberty called employees "stupid, jackass, dumb," and Lamberty and Wielgosz gave him dirty looks. (Id. at 191, 199.) Third, he alleges that he overheard Lamberty tell an African-American co-worker that management did not "give a fuck about the employees here." (Id. at 192-93.) Fourth, he asserts that he was aware of a near-physical confrontation between an African-American and a Caucasian co-worker. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 17.) Finally, he claims that he was the only person not warned about a new quench tank which he used and was injured. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 178-83, 201-04.)
Bodycote argues, inter alia, that Campbell has failed to establish the elements of a prima facie case because the alleged harassment was either not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or was not race — related. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 11, 12.) The Court agrees.
The sporadic racially-motivated comments are "neither severe nor pervasive enough to create a hosfile work environment." Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson Son. Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002); see Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections. 153 F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[O]ffhand comments . . . and isolated incidents . . . will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment."). While these comments were certainly offensive, offensive conduct is not enough to sustain a hosfile work environment claim absent the requisite effect on the terms or conditions of employment. Woodland. 302 F.3d at 843.
Additionally, the remaining allegations fail to demonstrate any causal nexus between Campbell's race and the harassment. For example, he has not shown a racially discriminatory aspect to the "stupid, jackass, dumb" comments or to the statement that management does not "give a fuck about the employees" — both apply to African American and non-African American employees equally. Similarly, he has not offered any evidence that the near-physical confrontation between Young and Lindstrom was racially-motivated. In contrast, Young and another co-worker, Honey Hervey, testified that the dispute concerned workplace authority and that both Young and Lindstrom were reprimanded. (See Ex. A to Manhatton Aff. (Young Dep. Tr. at 220-24, 230, 232) submitted in Young v. Bodycote Lindberg Corp., Civ. No. 02-4298 (RHK/AJB); Ex. A to Manhatton Aff. (Hervey Dep. Tr. at 238-45) submitted in Hervey v. Bodycote Lindberg Corp., Civ. No. 02-4299 (RHK/AJB).) Likewise, he has not shown that the dirty looks or the non-warning was race-related. "Title VII does not . . . create a cause of action for all unpleasant or abusive behavior in the workplace," and Campbell has not shown that any of this conduct was "discriminatory in nature and that [he] was singled out for such treatment on the basis of [his]" race.See Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the Court will grant Bodycote's motion with regard to Campbell's hosfile work environment claim.
II. Count II: Racial Discrimination in Violation of Title VII
In Count II, Campbell alleges a pattern and practice of race discrimination and a racially hosfile work environment in violation of Title VII. Because Campbell fails to respond to Bodycote's motion with respect to his pattern and practice claim, the Court will dismiss it as waived. See Graham v. Rosemount, Inc., 40 F. Supp.2d 1093, 1101 (D. Minn. 1999). The Court will also grant summary judgment for Bodycote on Campbell's federal hosfile work environment claim for the reasons previously discussed.
III. Count III: Reprisal Discrimination in Violation of the MHRA
Campbell's final claim is that Bodycote engaged in reprisal discrimination. It is unlawful under the MHRA for employers to "intentionally engage in any reprisal against any person because that person . . . [o]pposed a practice forbidden [by the MHRA] or has filed a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing." Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 7(1). "Reprisal" is defined as "any form of intimidation, retaliation or harassment" including assignment to a "lesser position in terms of wages, hours, job classification, job security, or other employment status." Id. § 363.03, subd. 7(2).
The three-part McDonnell Douglas test applies to reprisal claims. Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co., 153 F.3d 851, 859 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Minnesota law); Fletcher, 589 NW.2d at 101-02. To establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination, Campbell must show (1) that he engaged in starutorily protected conduct; (2) there was an adverse employment action by Bodycote; and (3) a causal connection between his conduct and the adverse employment action.Bergstrom-Ek. 153 F.3d at 859; Fletcher. 589 NW.2d at 101-02. It is undisputed that Campbell engaged in statutorily protected activity when he filed the EEOC discrimination charge in December 2001. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 17.) The issue therefore is whether any of the instances of reprisal discrimination Campbell has identified satisfies the remaining elements of a prima facie case.
Campbell's first reprisal claim is that his work was subjected to increased scrutiny. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 188-89.) Bodycote responds that increased scrutiny is not an adverse employment action. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 19-20.) It is correct. "An adverse employment action is exhibited by a material employment disadvantage, such as a change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities." Tademe. 328 F.3d at 992 (citation and internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). "Employment actions which do not result in changes in pay, benefits, seniority, or responsibility are insufficient to sustain a retaliation claim." Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., Inc., 216 F.3d 707, 715 (8th Cir. 2000). Because Campbell suffered no change in his salary, benefits, seniority, or responsibility as a result of increased scrutiny, he has not made an actionable claim for reprisal.
For his second and third reprisal claims, Campbell alleges that someone took important paperwork from him and someone tampered with the temperature settings on his machine. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 185, 188.) These allegations, however, show neither an adverse employment action nor a causal connection to his EEOC charge. First, there was no adverse employment action because Campbell's salary, benefits, or responsibilities were not affected. Tademe, 328 F.3d at 992. Second, it is impossible to say whether there was a causal connection between these acts and his EEOC charge because Campbell has not identified who was responsible or their motivation. See Smith v. Alien Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 833 n. 6 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that a causal connection requires "a showing that an employer's retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action" (citation and internal quotations omitted)).
For the purpose of this motion, the Court will assume that the unidentified "someone" was a Bodycote employee — the record, however, is silent on this.
Campbell's fourth reprisal claim is a loss of overtime hours. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 235-36.) He argues, "Overtime was available; then it wasn't." (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 21.) Bodycote, in contrast, asserts that even if he lost overtime, which it disputes, there is no evidence that the loss is causally connected to his EEOC charge. (Def's Mem. in Supp. at 17.) The Court agrees. "[T]he kind of causal connection required for a prima facie case is not `but for' causation, but rather, a showing that an employer's retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action."Smith, 302 F.3d at 833 n. 6 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Campbell, however, merely asserts "but for" causation and offers no evidence showing Bodycote's retaliatory motive played a part in his alleged decrease in overtime. Moreover, any inference of a retaliatory motive that could be generated from this showing is significantly diluted by evidence showing that in the five weeks prior to filing the EEOC charge he logged no overtime hours, yet after filing the charge he logged four hours. (See Campbell Dep. Tr. Ex. 35.)
His fifth reprisal claim is based on his workplace accident. (Id. at 179-80, 201-04.) Campbell states that while he was cleaning a quench tank on March 11, 2002, he noticed a steel tub filled with water lying in the tank. (Id. at 178-79.) While there were usually small pans or pots inside the tank, the larger steel tub was something new and had been put there before Campbell's shift started. (Id.) Apparently, the water inside the steel tub interacted with the contents of the quench tank and caused a reaction that burned his hand and forehead. (Id. at 179.) Campbell alleges that Wielgosz had warned other co-workers not to use the quench tank lever to clean the machine, but he was not warned. (Id. at 179, 181.) Campbell claims that he was not warned because "some kind of a plan [was] going on . . . to get me out of the company" as a result of his EEOC charge. (Id. at 180-82.) No one, however, told him that there was such a plan. (Id. at 182-83.)
Bodycote argues that Campbell cannot show that the accident was a retaliatory conspiracy designed to oust him. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. at 18-19; Def.'s Reply Mem. in Supp. at 6.) It is correct. Campbell has failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his EEOC charge filed December 28, 2001 and his accident on March 11, 2002. He appears to rely simply on the temporal proximity between the EEOC charge and the accident to support an inference of retaliation. "Generally, [however], more than a temporal connection . . . is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation." Kiel v. Select Artificials. Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). The amount of time passing between the charge and the accident cannot justify a finding of a causal link. See E.E.O.C. v. Kohler Co., 335 F.3d 766, 774 (8th Cir. 2003) ("The further in proximity the decision to [retaliate] is from the protected activity, the less suspect the decision [to retaliate] becomes."); Kipp v. Missouri Highway Transp. Comm'n 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he interval of two months between the complaint and [the adverse employment action] so dilutes any inference of causation that we are constrained to hold as a matter of law that the temporal connection could not justify a finding in [the plaintiff's] favor on the matter of causal link."). Beyond a temporal connection, Campbell has provided no competent evidence showing that a retaliatory motive played a part in Wielgosz's alleged failure to warn.Smith, 302 F.3d at 833 n. 6.
Finally, Campbell claims that Bodycote retaliated against him by refusing his request to return to work in a capacity other than on the Ajax machine after he recovered from his injuries. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 6-7; Campbell Dep. Tr. at 218-19).) He attempts to explain:
Q: . . . Exhibit 33 shows a telephone call you have with Ed Lamberty — excuse me, with John Michaelson. Apparently you called to ask for Ed Lamberty. I'll let you read through that. I don't know if you've ever seen that before or not.
A: No.
Q: But this reflects a phone call you had with him?
A: Yeah, that's true.
Q: "He said he would not be back at work. He said, quotes, I have fear of running the ajax line and my car does not work, I have no transportation." And he said, "Are you telling me that you quit, he said yes." Is that what happened in that conversation?
A: That's absolutely true. That's what I told him.
Q: Okay. Any further discussion than that?
A: None other than that — not to Michaelson. But I had told Ed [Lamberty] that I would be interested in doing something else, you know, in another department or —
Q: You had — I'm sorry.
A: In a different department or — you know, I'll run the ajax machine but I don't want to touch the quench tank. But, you know, you can't — they wouldn't let you have it like that. You run it, you've got to do —
Q: The whole shebang?
A: Yeah. But then I — you know, like I said, my hand had somewhat healed up, but it was still sore inside. I didn't want to put that kind of stress on my hand, you know, hanging steel parts, you know.
(Campbell Dep. Tr. at 217-19; see Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n at 6-7.)
Campbell has failed to show that Bodycote's denial of his request for a new position-if such denial occurred, which is far from clear from the record before this Court-was causally related to his EEOC charge. Although the denial occurred after his charge, temporal proximity cannot justify such a finding, as Bodycote's denial of his request for a different position occurred more than two months after his injury.See Kohler Co., 335 F.3d at 774; Kipp. 280 F.3d at 897. Moreover, his scanty showing fails to provide any evidence that a retaliatory motive played a role in Bodycote's alleged decision. Smith, 302 F.3d at 833 n. 6.
Furthermore, Campbell has testified that he voluntarily quit his position at Bodycote because, in part, he lacked transportation. (Campbell Dep. Tr. at 217-19.)
Accordingly, because Campbell has failed to make a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination, the Court will grant Bodycote's motion.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Bodycote Lindberg Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 22) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Johnathan Campbell's Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.