Opinion
Civil Action No. 6:01-CV-118-C
July 29, 2002
ORDER
On this date the Court considered Defendant Wackenhut Corrections Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 13, 2002. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on July 3, 2002, by Natalie B. Butler ("Plaintiff"). Defendant Wackenhut Corrections Corporation's Brief in Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on July 18, 2002. After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, the Court GRANTS in part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant is a provider of private correctional institution services and contracted by the State of Texas to provide care, custody, and control of the residents at the Coke County Juvenile Justice Center located in Bronte, Texas. Plaintiff, a female, was employed by Defendant from September 24, 1994, until Plaintiff's resignation on December 7, 2000. During the course of her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was promoted through the ranks and on March 24, 1997, was promoted to the level of Director of Security.
Plaintiff alleges that until October 1998 her performance reviews were satisfactory or higher, but plaintiff claims that immediately after Brett Bement became Warden of Defendant's facility, Plaintiff was demoted for a period of one to two days. However, after Plaintiff registered a complaint with Defendant's corporate offices, Plaintiff was restored to her former position. Plaintiff claims that Defendant then created a new Director of Operations position, which was filled by Clyde Jackson, and that the bulk of Plaintiff's authority was transferred to Mr. Jackson. Plaintiff acknowledged, however, that Defendant was undergoing an extensive reorganization in October 1998 and that the reorganization nearly doubled the staff and did, in fact, double the number of inmates to include male inmates.
Plaintiff claims that Mr. Bement and Clyde Jackson, both Plaintiff's superiors in rank, sexually harassed and discriminated against Plaintiff because of her gender. Plaintiff also alleges that degrading comments regarding females were made, e.g., "a woman's place is in the home."
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff by treating males preferentially. Specifically, Plaintiff complains that Defendant selected an all-male team to lead a search parry, even though Plaintiff and three of her female subordinates had already invested substantial time on the investigation, were knowledgeable about the search, and outranked the males chosen to replace them. Plaintiff also alleges that she was disciplined for failing to complete an incident report relating to her use of a chemical agent and physical restraints on a resident when, by contrast, a male employee who also failed to file an incident report was not disciplined in any way.
Plaintiff complains that, on February 2, 2000, she was threatened with disciplinary action if she did not report for work on her scheduled day off. Plaintiff contends that Defendant was well aware that Plaintiff was scheduled to be off duty and was unable to work due to lack of child care.
Further, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant falsely accused her of having an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate. Plaintiff contends that the co-employee was not a direct or indirect subordinate of Plaintiff's and, therefore, even if Defendant's allegation was true, Plaintiff's relationship with said co-employee was not prohibited by Defendant's company policy. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was aware that a male supervisor was romantically involved with an immediate female subordinate, but Defendant did not discipline the male supervisor.
Plaintiff complains that on or about November 20, 2000, Defendant scheduled a disciplinary hearing to determine if Plaintiff was to be terminated for violation of company procedures. According to Plaintiff several male employees, including Mr. Jackson, had performed duties in the same manner as Plaintiff but the males suffered no consequences and had no disciplinary actions lodged against them. Plaintiff elected not to attend the hearing and did not report to work on or after November 19, 2000. Plaintiff resigned on December 7, 2000, but Plaintiff claims that she was constructively discharged because she was unable to withstand further harassment and discrimination.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment, injunctive relief. damages for lost income and lost fringe benefits, treble damages, court costs, and attorneys' fees.
Defendant denies each and every of Plaintiff's claims and also affirmatively asserts Eleventh Amendment immunity as a jurisdictional bar with regard to Plaintiff's state law claims in federal court and, in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision waiving immunity, Defendant also claims sovereign immunity with regard to Plaintiff's state law tort claims.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs' [Butler and Kimberly Latham] Complaint and Jury Demand was filed on August 23, 2001. Defendant's Original Answer and Motion to Sever was filed on October 23, 2001. This Court's Order granting Defendant's Motion to Sever was filed on December 17, 2001. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine were filed on June 13, 2002. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on July 3, 2002. This Court's Order granting Defendant's Motion in Limine was filed on July 8, 2002. Defendant's Brief in Reply to Plaintiff's Rcsponse to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on July 18, 2002.
III. STANDARD.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleading; deposition; answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the nonmovant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence showing a triable issue of fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) SEC v. Revile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
Sexual HarassmentAlthough Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment argues that "there are genuine issues of facts that are material and favorable to one or more elements of Plaintiff's claim that she endured a hostile workplace," Plaintiff's Response also contradictorily states as follows:
Plaintiff will concede that a partial motion for summary judgment is warranted on the sexual harassment claim alone, since she did not plead said cause of action in the Original Complaint. Plaintiff Butler originally filed suit with another female employee at Defendant's facility, Ms. Kimberly Latham, however, their claims have now been severed. Nonetheless, the sexual harassment claim applies to Ms. Latham's lawsuit and not Plaintiff Butler's present suit.
This Court notes, however, that Plaintiffs' Complaint and Jury Demand filed August 23, 2001, alleges that Defendant's "disparaging treatment created a hostile workplace for Plaintiffs" (emphasis on plural added) and that Defendant's "acts of harassment and discrimination were constant, severe, and pervasive." Plaintiffs' Complaint also alleges that Defendant took no "corrective action to correct or prevent the harassment and discrimination against Latham, Butler (emphasis added), and other female employees similarly situated." Plaintiffs' Complaint also contends that Defendant "sexually harassed and discriminated against Plaintiffs (emphasis on plural added), because of their gender, female." Finally, Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts that Plaintiff Bulter (emphasis added) resigned on or about December 7, 2000, "[u]nable to withstand further harassment and discrimination."
As a threshold matter, this Court notes that the record is clear that Plaintiff has not asked leave of this Court to amend Plaintiffs' Complaint at any time subsequent to filing and/or severance. The record is also clear that Plaintiffs' Complaint constitutes the live pleading before the Court during its consideration of the instant motion. Additionally it is clear to this Court that Plaintiff did, in fact, plead a sexual harassment claim in Plaintiffs' Complaint. What is not clear to this Court is exactly what Plaintiff concedes by agreeing that summary judgment is warranted as to Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim.
Therefore, the Court will reiterate the Fifth Circuit's established methodology for analyzing supervisor sexual harassment cases under Title VII. First, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff suffered a "tangible employment action." Tangible employment actions "require an official act of the enterprise, a company act, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Casiano v. ATT Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 284 n. 6 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted).
If Plaintiff has suffered a tangible employment action, the case is classified as a " quid pro quo" case. Id. at 283. In a quid pro quo suit, proof that a tangible employment action resulted from Plaintiff's supervisors' sexual harassment would render Defendant vicariously liable, and no affirmative defense could be asserted. Id. at 284.
If Plaintiff has not suffered a tangible employment action, the case is classified as a "hostile environment" case. Id. at 283. In a hostile environment case, Plaintiff must show that her supervisors' actions constituted severe or pervasive harassment based on Plaintiff's sex. Id. If Plaintiff is successful in establishing that the supervisors' conduct was severe or pervasive, Defendant can be held vicariously liable for the supervisors' actions. Id. The only affirmative defense to vicarious liability in a supervisor sexual harassment/hostile work environment case is for Defendant to establish (1) that Defendant exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexual harassment, and (2) that Plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by Defendant. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1999); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1999). It is clear to this Court from Plaintiffs' Complaint that Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim is properly classified as a hostile work environment claim. See Casiano, 213 F.3d at 283.
This Court queries: Because both Plaintiffs' Complaint and Plaintiff's Response couch Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim in terms of the standard analysis of Title VII supervisor sexual harassment/hostile work environment claims rather than quid pro quo claims, is Plaintiff conceding that Plaintiff suffered no tangible employment action? Is Plaintiff conceding that Defendant's harassment, if any, was not severe or pervasive? Is Plaintiff conceding that Defendant took reasonable steps to prevent and promptly correct any harassing conduct? Is Plaintiff conceding that Plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive and corrective opportunities offered by Defendant?
On the one hand, Plaintiff concedes that summary judgment is warranted as to her sexual harassment/hostile work environment claim. On the other hand, Plaintiff claims that Defendant's "hostile treatment of Plaintiff was ongoing and severe," that Plaintiff "endured a hostile workplace," and that the "hostile treatment was so severe that Plaintiff was finally forced to leave her job rather than face another day of the constant, ongoing, and tormenting harassment."
However, Plaintiff's claim of constructive discharge makes no logical sense vis-a-vis Plaintiff's concession of summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim because, in order for Plaintiff to prove constructive discharge, Plaintiff "must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile work environment." Weller v. Citation Oil Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 195 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1996).
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the inconsistencies in Plaintiff's arguments and the lack of clarity in Plaintiffs' Complaint and/or Plaintiff's Response, this Court accepts Plaintiff's concession as to Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim and finds that summary judgment as to said claim is appropriate.
Gender Discrimination
Claims of gender-based discrimination are evaluated under a well-established three-part burden-shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). The first part of the McDonnell Douglas analysis requires Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. In order to establish a prima facie claim of gender discrimination in the context of this case, Plaintiff must establish that (1) Plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) Plaintiff was qualified for the position held; (3) Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) others who were similarly situated to Plaintiff and not within her protected class were treated more favorably. Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102 F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).
If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden shifts to Defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To satisfy this step of the analysis, Defendant may produce evidence, which, "taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993). If Defendant satisfies this prong, there is no longer a mandatory inference of discrimination and the analysis shifts to the third and final step of the burden-shifting framework. Id. at 510-11. In the third stage of analysis, Plaintiff has a "full and fair opportunity to demonstrate" that Defendant's reason is a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. at 507-08. To substantiate Plaintiff's claim of pretext, Plaintiff must demonstrate that discrimination based on Plaintiff's gender was at the heart of Defendant's decision. Rubinstein v. Adm'rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2000).
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff, a female, is a member of a protected class or that Plaintiff was qualified for the position held. Thus, the first two elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case have been met.
As to the third element of Plaintiff's prima facie case, Plaintiff claims that Plaintiff's resignation on or about December 7, 2000, resulted from Plaintiff's inability to withstand Defendant's continued harassment and discrimination and, thus, constitutes evidence that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision through constructive discharge.
Constructive discharge occurs when an employer makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign. Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., Inc., 277 F.3d 757, 771 (5th Cir. 2001); Faruki v. Parsons, 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997). As discussed supra, for Plaintiff to prove constructive discharge, Plaintiff "must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment" than the minimum required to prove a sexual harassment/hostile work environment claim. Weller, 84 F.3d at 195.
Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and making all justifiable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, this Court finds that Plaintiff has offered no evidence of intolerable working conditions to suppors her claims for constructive discharge. Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated evidence of a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than that which would be necessary to prove a sexual harassment/hostile work environment claim. To the contrary, Plaintiff testified in her deposition that "I quit Wackenhut," "I wasn't terminated for job abandonment," and "I was terminated because I resigned."
However, this Court may also consider other factors in determining whether constructive discharge has occurred, including reduction in salary; reduction in job responsibilities; reassignment to menial or degrading work; or offers of early retirement that would make the employee worse off whether the offer was accepted or not. Hunt, 277 F.3d at 771-72.
Plaintiff claims that in October 1998 she suffered a reduction in job responsibilities and that Defendant treated Plaintiff in a discriminatory manner by adversely affecting Plaintiff's authority. Plaintiff contends that when Defendant hired Mr. Jackson in 1998 to fill the newly created position of Director of Operations during a reorganization of Defendant's facility to accept male inmates, Plaintiff "felt like my authority had been stripped away."
This Court finds, however, that Plaintiff's claims pertaining to her alleged reduction in job responsibilities are time-barred as being outside the 300-day period of limitations within which a Title VII plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination. See Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that, in Texas, a Title VII plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after learning of the conduct alleged).
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff's October 1998 allegation was not time-barred, Plaintiff acknowledged in her deposition that Defendant was undergoing an extensive reorganization of Defendant's facility to house male offenders in addition to female offenders. As part of the expansion/mission change, Reed Smith, Defendant's Regional Operations Director, stated in his Affidavit that the staffing at Defendant's facility increased from 103 employees to 178 employees and that inmate capacity was increased from 100 inmates to 200 inmates.
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions that she felt her authority had been stripped away at the time of the facility's reorganization, Mr. Smith stated that Plaintiff's responsibilities had actually increased significantly. For example, following the expansion and lateral transfer of Mr. Jackson to fill the position of Director of Operations, Plaintiff was charged with supervision of approximately 126 employees as compared to 67 employees prior to the
expension. In addition, Mr. Smith asserted that Mr. Jaokson and Plaintiff were never in the same position and each had very different job responsibilities. Mr. Jackson was responsible for the day-to-day coordination of Defendant's operations, while Plaintiff was responsible for security aspects of the facility, including the supervision of correctional staff.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendant selected an all-male team to conduct a search after Plaintiff and other female officers had invested time in the case and were knowledgeable about the investigation. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Mr. Bement and Mr. Jackson challenged her authority in front of subordinates and that Mr. Jackson exited the room while Plaintiff was speaking to a management group.
"Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions." Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.2d 702, 707 (5th Cir, 1997) (internal citations omitted). "Ultimate employment decisions" include acts such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999). "[E]mployment actions are not adverse where pay, benefits, and level of responsibility remain the same." Id.
This Court finds that neither Plaintiff's allegations with regard to the all-male search team nor Mr. Jackson's challenge of Plaintiff's authority nor Mr. Jackson's exit of the room while Plaintiff was speaking rise to the standard of ultimate employment decisions. None of these instances cited by Plaintiff embraces hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and/or compensating. Evidence of hostility, without more, does not constitute an adverse employment action. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1992). Moreover, Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she was not aware that she had ever suffered any reduction in pay, and Plaintiff has not shown that any of the complained of conduct took place on account of her gender.
Finally, and persuasively, in response to Defendant's Interrogatory No. 16, which asked Plaintiff to "describe each and every specific adverse employment decision . . . which you allege in this lawsuit was made by Defendant against you, and include in your answer such adverse employment decision," Plaintiff answered "None." Thus, Plaintiff rendered nugatory an essential clement of her prima facie claim. It is well established that summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, [and] answers to interrogatories . . . on file . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of intolerable conditions or a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than that which is required to prove a hostile work environment, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not established that she was constructively discharged. In addition, because Plaintiff's answers to interrogatories disclaim any adverse employment decision by Defendant, and because Plaintiff has failed to present evidence of Defendant's conduct which rises to the level of ultimate employment decisions, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not met the burden of establishing the third element of her prima facie case of gender discrimination. Therefore, this Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate with respect to said claim.
Retaliation
Under Title VII, it is
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) that an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 2001).
Having previously determined supra that Plaintiff has failed to prove that an adverse employment action occurred or that Plaintiff was constructively discharged, this Court finds that Plaintiff cannot establish the second element of Plaintiff's prima facie case of retaliation. Therefore, this Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim.
Pendent State Law Claims
Having granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's federal causes of action, this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction as to Plaintiff's pendent state law claims regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring, retention, and training.
CONCLUSION
After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Title VII sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), this Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring, retention, and training and dismisses same without prejudice Plaintiff's refiling in the proper forum.
SO ORDERED this 29th day of July, 2002.