Opinion
LEAD CASE: CIVIL NO. SA-19-CA-01119-FB C/w: SA-19-CA-1124-FB C/w: SA-19-CA-1125-FB C/w: SA-19-CA-1126-FB
01-29-2021
PEGGY SUE BUTLER, TDCJ No. 02140165, Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are pro se petitioner Peggy Sue Butler's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1) and respondent Bobby Lumpkin's Answer (ECF No. 15), as well as petitioner's numerous supplemental pleadings concerning the claims raised in her § 2254 petition (ECF Nos. 7, 9, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28, and 29). Having reviewed the record and pleadings submitted by both parties, the Court concludes petitioner is not entitled to relief under the standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is also denied a certificate of appealability.
I. Background
In June 2017, petitioner pleaded guilty to four counts of delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. State v. Butler, Nos. A15412, A15473, A15474, and A15475 (216th Dist. Ct., Kerr Cnty., Tex. June 21, 2017) (ECF Nos. 13-3 at 90-99; 13-4 at 97-106; 13-5 at 97-106; and 13-6 at 88-97). Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, petitioner judicially confessed to committing the offenses as charged in the indictments, stipulated that the enhancement paragraphs contained in each indictment were true and correct, acknowledged the range of punishment for each offense, and waived her right to appeal. Id. Following a separate punishment hearing, petitioner was sentenced to twelve years of imprisonment on the first count and twenty years of imprisonment on the next three counts, with the sentences to run concurrently. Id.
Although she waived the right to appeal as part of the plea bargain agreement, petitioner nevertheless appealed her convictions to the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the appeals pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d) because petitioner had no right to appeal. Butler v. State, Nos. 04-17-00497-CR, 04-17-00499-CR, and 04-17-00500-CR (Tex. App.-San Antonio, Jan. 3, 2018, pet. ref'd); (ECF Nos. 13-12, 13-15, and 13-17). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) then refused her petitions for discretionary review. Butler v. State, Nos. 0129-18, 0130-18, 0131-18, and 0132-18 (Tex. Crim. App. June 13, 2018) (ECF No. 13-1).
Petitioner also sought to challenge each one of her four convictions by filing an application for state habeas corpus relief. However, the TCCA dismissed the first two rounds of her state habeas proceedings (eight applications in all) because mandate had not issued at the time the petitions were filed in the trial court and thus petitioner's convictions were not yet final. Ex parte Butler, No. 87,613-01 through -08 (Tex. Crim. App.); (ECF Nos. 13-24, 13-28, 13-32, 13-36, 13-41, 13-43, 13-45, and 13-47). Shortly after her convictions became final, petitioner filed four more state habeas applications which were eventually denied without written order by the TCCA on May 15, 2019. Ex parte Butler, No. 87,613-09 through -12 (Tex. Crim. App.); (ECF Nos. 13-51, 13-71, 13-90, and 13-110).
Petitioner placed the instant federal habeas petition in the prison mail system on August 30, 2019. (ECF No. 1 at 10). In the petition, petitioner appears to raise allegations that were rejected by the TCCA during her state habeas proceedings—namely, that (1) the multiple indictments violated double jeopardy principles, (2) her punishment was excessive, (3) the indictments were incorrectly enhanced, (4) her due process and equal protection rights were violated, (5) she was the victim of an illegal search and seizure, (6) her Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court refused to appoint her a new attorney, (7) her guilty pleas were induced by threats and were not knowingly and voluntarily made, (8) her guilty pleas were involuntary because she was on drugs at her court appearance, and (9) she was the victim of an "abuse of authority," an "abuse of process," and a "malicious prosecution." Petitioner also raises a multitude of allegations concerning her trial counsel's performance. In his answer, respondent relies, in part, on the state court's adjudication of these allegations and argues federal habeas relief is precluded under the AEDPA's deferential standard.
Specifically, petitioner's list of grievances against her trial counsel allege that counsel failed to: (1) investigate, (2) pursue a defense, (3) file pretrial motions, (4) have a firm grip of relevant statutes, (5) object to the use of drug-free zones for enhancement, (6) interview or research the prosecution's confidential informant, (7) investigate a conflict of interest, (8) file a joinder of prosecution, (9) argue a violation of double jeopardy, (10) request authentication of audio/visual evidence, (11) research Fourth Amendment issues, (12) pursue an entrapment defense, (13) communicate with prior counsel, (14) withdraw her guilty plea, (15) request a continuance, (16) contact witnesses or go to trial, (17) speak with her following trial, (18) seek out the chain of custody for evidence, (19) file for discovery or quash the indictment, (20) preserve evidence, (21) have the confidential informant tested for drugs, and (22) file a motion for a "bill of particulars." Petitioner also contends counsel: (23) was ineffective after her conviction and during the sentencing proceeding, (24) recklessly and erroneously advised her to plead guilty, (25) committed professional misconduct, and (26) "sold out" his client and failed in all of his responsibilities to her.
II. Standard of Review
Petitioner's federal habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of review provided by the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under § 2254(d), a petitioner may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). This intentionally difficult standard stops just short of imposing a complete bar on federal court re-litigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).
A federal habeas court's inquiry into unreasonableness should always be objective rather than subjective, with a focus on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable" and not whether it was incorrect or erroneous. McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). Even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable, regardless of whether the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion itself. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Instead, a petitioner must show that the decision was objectively unreasonable, which is a "substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). So long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the correctness of the state court's decision, a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In other words, to obtain federal habeas relief on a claim previously adjudicated on the merits in state court, petitioner must show that the state court's ruling "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103; see also Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 24 (2011).
III. Merits Analysis
Pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, petitioner judicially confessed to committing the offenses for which she was indicted, acknowledged the range of punishment, and waived her right to a jury trial. Id. Nevertheless, petitioner raises numerous constitutional challenges to her convictions and argues that her plea was involuntary. Because the record demonstrates that petitioner voluntarily pleaded guilty to the convictions she is now challenging under § 2254, however, petitioner waived the right to challenge all non-jurisdictional defects in her proceeding. Further, it appears that each of the allegations raised by petitioner were rejected by the state court during petitioner's state habeas proceedings. Federal habeas relief is therefore unavailable because petitioner has not shown that the state court's merits adjudication was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. A. Petitioner's Claims are Conclusory
To the extent the AEDPA's deferential standard does not apply because petitioner has not exhausted her allegations in state court, the Court finds that relief would still be denied on the merits of the claims under a de novo standard of review.
Initially, the Court notes that many of petitioner's allegations come in the form of short, declarative statements without any supporting argument or evidence. For instance, petitioner lists the following allegations without explanation: "excessive punishment," "Due Process Equal Protection," "illegal search and seizure," "abuse of authority," "abuse of process," "wrongful process of law," and "malicious/vindictive prosecution." (ECF No. 1-1 at 5-8). Many of petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IATC claims) are also simply listed without any argument or support.
Under Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a petitioner is required to plead facts in support of her claims. Conclusory allegations do not state a claim for federal habeas corpus relief and are subject to summary dismissal. Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding "mere conclusory allegations do not raise a constitutional issue in a habeas proceeding"); Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir. 1990) (same). Petitioner's bare-bones allegations, unsupported by any argument or evidence from the record, are insufficient. See Ford v. Davis, 910 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) ("[A]bsent evidence in the record," a court cannot "consider a habeas petitioner's bald assertions on a critical issue in his pro se petition . . ., unsupported and unsupportable by anything else contained in the record, to be of probative evidentiary value.") (citation omitted). B. Petitioner's Pleas Were Voluntary
It is axiomatic that a guilty plea is valid only if entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, "with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005); United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000). A plea is intelligently made when the defendant has "real notice of the true nature of the charge against him." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). And a plea is "voluntary" if it does not result from force, threats, improper promises, misrepresentations, or coercion. United States v. Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1997). The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); United States v. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2012).
The record in this case indicates petitioner's pleas were a voluntary and intelligent choice and not a result of any misrepresentation or coercion. Petitioner signed documents entitled "DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF GUILT, WAIVERS, STIPULATIONS OF EVIDENCE AND ADMONISHMENTS" wherein she stipulated to the evidence against her and judicially confessed to committing the charged offenses. See, e.g., ECF No. 13-109 at 5-10. The agreements also indicate petitioner was represented by counsel, understood the nature of the charges in the indictments and the range of potential punishment, and entered the pleas freely and voluntarily. Id. Counsel for petitioner also signed the agreement, stating that he discussed with petitioner the rights she was waiving and indicating his belief that petitioner was "aware of the consequences of the plea[s] entered herein." Id. at 10. The trial judge then gave his approval of the agreement, concluding:
It appearing to the Court that the Defendant is represented by competent counsel and that said Defendant understands the nature of the charge and has been by the Court admonished and warned of the consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere including the minimum and maximum punishments provided by law, that the Attorney for the Defendant and the State each consent and approve the waivers and agree to stipulate the testimony in this case, the Court, therefore, finds such plea of guilty or nolo contendere, waivers and consent to be voluntarily made and accepts the plea of guilty or nolo contendere and approves the waivers herein and the consent to stipulate evidence.Id.
The voluntariness of petitioner's pleas is also demonstrated by petitioner's appearance before the trial court, which was adequately summarized by the state habeas trial court in its findings of fact and conclusions of law:
6. [Petitioner] was represented by licensed attorney in the State of Texas, Richard Gentry, at the time of the entry of the pleas of guilty and sentencing in the cases.
7. [Petitioner] selected and retained Richard Gentry to represent her in the cases.
* * *
15. When Richard Gentry began representation of [petitioner] in the cases, the plea offer to [petitioner] was for 30 years in prison.
16. [Petitioner] accepted a plea bargain offer of the following; pleading guilty in cause numbers A15412, A15473, A15474, & A15475; the waiver of all of her appellate rights in the cases; a pre-sentence investigation report being completed; sentencing
by the court with the full-range of punishment available on those cases, which were 2nd degree felonies; the sentence in all cases running concurrently; and the dismissal of the 1st degree felony charge in cause number A15413 along with the State foregoing the pursuit of an organized crime case against the [petitioner] (hereinafter referred to as the plea bargain agreement).(ECF No. 13-68 at 26-29).
17. [Petitioner] acknowledged in open court on March 27, 2017, prior to the entry of her pleas of guilty in the cases, that she was aware of and personally agreed to the express terms of the plea bargain agreement in each of the cases.
18. On March 27, 2017, [petitioner] also signed and filed a waiver of her right to trial by jury which was proven up and accepted by the court.
19. Prior to the acceptance of the pleas of guilty in the cases, the court confirmed with the [petitioner] that the [petitioner] was acknowledging that pursuant to the plea bargain agreement that the [petitioner] was waiving all appellate rights in the cases.
20. The office of the district attorney for the 216th Judicial District of Texas routinely requires the waiver of all appellate rights by defendants as part of a plea bargain agreement.
21. Prior to the acceptance of the pleas of guilty in the cases, the court confirmed that the [petitioner] was competent to stand trial.
22. Prior to the acceptance of the pleas of guilty in the cases, the court confirmed that the [petitioner] was satisfied with the legal representation in the cases of Richard Gentry.
23. Prior to the acceptance of the pleas of guilty in the cases, the court confirmed that the [petitioner] reviewed and discussed the defendant's plea of guilty, waivers, and stipulations of evidence and admonishments (the plea packet) with Richard Gentry.
24. Prior to the acceptance of the pleas of guilty in the cases, the court confirmed that the [petitioner] understood that she was stipulating to her guilt in each of the cases.
25. [Petitioner] was sentenced to a punishment within the terms of the plea bargain agreement on June 21, 2017.
The state habeas trial court concluded that petitioner was competent and that she "entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to the indictments in each of the cases." Id. at 29-30. These findings and conclusions were adopted by the TCCA when it denied petitioner's state habeas application and are entitled to a presumption of correctness unless they lack fair support in the record. Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735 (1990); Miller v. Thaler, 714 F.3d 897, 903 (5th Cir. 2013).
Petitioner fails to show that the state habeas court's ruling was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly establish law or that it was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence in the record. Petitioner's formal declarations in open court carry "a strong presumption of verity" and constitute a formidable barrier to any subsequent collateral attack. United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 729 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). Petitioner's signature on the guilty plea documents is also prima facie proof of the validity of the pleas and is entitled to "great evidentiary weight." Theriot v. Whitley, 18 F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abreo, 30 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Hobbs v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985)). Consequently, because petitioner has not provided any evidence or argument that would overcome these "strong presumptions of verity," this Court denies any allegation made by petitioner concerning the validity of her guilty pleas. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74 (finding "[t]he subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations which are unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal."). C. Petitioner's Claims Were Waived by the Guilty Pleas
By entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea, petitioner waived all non-jurisdictional defects preceding her plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265 (1973); United States v. Scruggs, 714 F.3d 258, 261-62 (5th Cir. 2013). This rule encompasses errors of constitutional dimension that do not affect the voluntariness of the plea, such as petitioner's claims concerning the purported defect in her indictments, her claims of pretrial governmental misconduct, and her vague Fourth Amendment objection. See United States v. Williams, 577 F.App'x 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (waiving claim that indictment was defective); United States v. Templet, 431 F.App'x 270, 271 (5th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); Franklin v. United States, 589 F.2d 192, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1979) ( "Franklin's claims regarding Miranda warnings, coerced confessions, perjury, and illegal searches and seizures are not jurisdictional in nature and thus do not require our consideration.").
The waiver likewise includes IATC claims unless the alleged ineffectiveness relates to the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1983) (waiving claims of ineffective assistance, except for claims related to voluntariness of plea). As such, the only claims that survive a guilty plea are those implicating the validity of the plea itself. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; United States v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2000).
Here, petitioner raises a variety of allegations attempting to demonstrate that her convictions and sentences violated her constitutional rights. With the exception of two allegations, however, petitioner fails to demonstrate how any of her allegations relate in any way to the voluntariness of her guilty pleas. And the two claims that are relevant to the voluntariness of her pleas—alleging that her pleas were induced by threats and made while she was taking drugs (claims 7 and 8 above)—are unsupported by any argument or evidence and are thus conclusory and fail to state a claim for federal habeas corpus relief. See Ford v. Davis, 910 F.3d at 235; Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d at 530. Accordingly, petitioner's claims are waived by her knowing, voluntarily, and intelligent guilty pleas. D. The Remaining IATC Claims
Although vague, petitioner does make some IATC allegations that, if successful, may implicate the voluntariness of her plea. Specifically, petitioner contends that her trial counsel, Richard Gentry, recklessly advised her to plead guilty without conducting a proper investigation and coerced her into accepting the pleas based on the threat of even more charges. Again, a valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects—including an IATC claim—unless the IATC claim goes to the voluntariness of the plea. Smith, 711 F.2d at 682. Thus, the Court considers petitioner's IATC claims to the extent they may implicate the voluntariness of her plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 56 (citing Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267).
The appropriate standard to evaluate the effectiveness of counsel with regard to a guilty plea is the familiar Strickland two-part test. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Under Strickland, petitioner must demonstrate (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) this deficiency prejudiced her defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690. To establish counsel's performance was deficient, a petitioner must first show that counsel's performance fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688-89. But, in the context of a guilty plea, proving Strickland's prejudice requirement turns "on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process." Hill, 474 U.S at 59. This means, "in a guilty plea scenario, a petitioner must prove not only that his attorney actually erred, but also that he would not have pled guilty but for the error" and, instead, "would have insisted upon going to trial." Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Young v. Spinner, 873 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 2017). This assessment will turn partially on "a prediction of what the outcome of a trial might have been." Id.
Petitioner argues that counsel was deficient for advising her to plead guilty without conducting a proper investigation and coercing her into accepting the pleas based on the threat of future criminal charges. The state habeas trial court expressly found as a matter of fact, however, that counsel's performance was neither "reckless" nor fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. This factual finding was fully supported by the affidavit of petitioner's trial counsel, Richard Gentry, which was presented to the state habeas trial court during petitioner's state habeas corpus proceeding. The TCCA rejected petitioner's state habeas corpus application on the merits without written order based on the trial court's factual findings made without a hearing .
Petitioner has failed to furnish this Court with any evidence, much less any clear and convincing evidence, showing the state habeas court's factual finding on this subject was incorrect. See Matamoras v. Stephens, 783 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing the presumption of correctness afforded a state habeas court's factual findings applies absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary); Ward v. Stephens, 777 F.3d 250, 268 (5th Cir. 2015) (same). Moreover, petitioner's conclusory and unsupported allegations that counsel coerced her into pleading guilty are not enough to establish deficient performance under Strickland. See United States v. Demik, 489 F.3d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[C]onclusory allegations are insufficient to raise cognizable claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.") (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000)). Therefore, petitioner fails to establish that her guilty plea was involuntary due to any alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance.
Regardless, even assuming counsel was deficient, petitioner still cannot show she would not have accepted the current pleas and would have instead insisted on going to trial but for counsel's errors. Armstead, 37 F.3d at 206. Again, such an assessment will turn partially on "a prediction of what the outcome of a trial might have been." Id.
The record is silent as to whether petitioner would have made the decision to plead not guilty and go to trial had counsel acted in a manner consistent with petitioner's allegations. In signing the waiver and stipulations of the trial court, however, the record does indicate that counsel fully explained petitioner's rights and the plea agreements to her, that petitioner understood the pleas were for four enhanced second-degree felonies with the possible sentence of up to twenty years of imprisonment, and that petitioner admitted she committed the offenses and the charged enhancement. Furthermore, as explained by the state court during petitioner's state habeas proceedings, it not objectively reasonable to assume petitioner would have rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial given that petitioner would have had to face an additional first-degree felony case along with a potential organized-crime prosecution. (ECF No. 13-68 at 27, 38). Thus, based on the record before the Court, it appears unlikely petitioner would have chosen to go to trial.
In light of the record evidence supporting the voluntariness of her guilty plea, in addition to the fact petitioner failed to prove counsel's performance was deficient or that her pleas were involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must find petitioner entered into her pleas voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Moreover, petitioner completely failed to prove that, but for her attorney's actions, she would have chosen to proceed to trial. Petitioner has therefore failed to establish a valid IATC claim. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Accordingly, federal habeas relief must be denied because petitioner fails to meet her burden of proof under the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
IV. Certificate of Appealability
The Court must now determine whether to issue a certificate of appealability (COA). See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)). A COA may issue only if a petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If a district court rejects a petitioner's constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate "that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). This requires a petitioner to show "that reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (citation omitted).
A district court may deny a COA sua sponte without requiring further briefing or argument. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000). For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that jurists of reason would not debate the conclusion that petitioner was not entitled to federal habeas relief. As such, a COA will not issue.
V. Conclusion and Order
Petitioner has failed to establish that the state court's rejection of the aforementioned claims on the merits during her state habeas proceedings was either (1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented during petitioner's state trial and habeas corpus proceedings. Accordingly, based on the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Federal habeas corpus relief is DENIED and petitioner Peggy Sue Butler's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
2. No Certificate of Appealability shall issue in this case;
3. Each member case listed above which was administratively closed on July 31, 2020, is REOPENED for the limited purpose of entering this Memorandum Opinion and Order and Judgment.
4. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED, and this case and each of the member cases are now CLOSED.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED this 29th day of January, 2021.
/s/_________
FRED BIERY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE