Opinion
Case No. 2:19-cv-02071-JTF-dkv
2019-11-20
Pamela BURNS, as the surviving parent of Paula Smith, deceased, and Also as Representative of the Heirs, Minor Children and Estate of Paula Smith, Deceased, and/or For the Use and Benefit of the Heirs, Minor children of Paula Smith, Deceased; and Delondre Harris, Individually and as Surviving Father/Representative of Minor Children of Paula Smith, Deceased., Plaintiffs, v. TAURUS INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURING, INC., and Taurus Holdings, Inc., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR., United States District Judge
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 28, 2019, (ECF No. 43), and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 5, 2019. (ECF No. 44.) Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike on July 18, 2019. (ECF No. 47.) Plaintiffs filed a Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on July 26, 2019. (ECF No. 50.) For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED .
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action was commenced by Plaintiffs alleging that Defendants are liable for the unintentional discharge of a Taurus PT 145 Millennium Pro .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol ("pistol"), resulting in the death of Paula Smith on January 27, 2018. (ECF No. 1.) Paula Smith and Plaintiff Delondre Harris were engaged in intimate activity on Paula Smith's bed, where Plaintiff Delondre Harris removed the pistol from his person and placed it on top of the foot of the bed. (Id. at 9–10 ¶ 30.) At some point, the pistol was knocked or bumped off the bed. (Id. at 10 ¶ 31.) Upon hitting the floor, the pistol discharged and struck Paula Smith in the head, thus killing her. (Id. at ¶ 32–33.) Allegedly, the manufactured safety devices failed. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Plaintiff Delondre Harris purchased the firearm from his father Michael Alexander on or about December 31, 2017, who had previously purchased the pistol in new condition from a retail seller in Shelby County, Tennessee. (Id. at 8 ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff Pamela Burns brought the lawsuit as the surviving parent of Paula Smith and as a representative of the heirs, minor children, and Estate of Paula Smith. (Id. at 1–2 ¶ 1.) The heirs include Pamela Burns and Paula Smith's minor children—David Bolton, Destiny Smith, and Darren Smith. (Id. ) Paula Smith was a resident of Fayette County, Tennessee. (Id. ) Plaintiff Delondre Harris brought the lawsuit individually for his claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress and as a representative and the father of Darren Smith, an heir of Paula Smith. (Id. at 2 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff Delondre Harris is a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. (Id. ) Defendants Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc. and Taurus Holdings, Inc. ("Defendants") are Florida corporations with their respective principal places of business in Miami, Florida. (Id. at 2 ¶ 4.)
Generally, Plaintiff Pamela Burns and Plaintiff Delondre Harris ("Plaintiffs") allege that Defendants designed, inspected, tested, developed, manufactured, marketed, advertised, distributed, and sold the pistol that caused the death of Paula Smith. (Id. at 7 ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants specifically designed and manufactured the pistol as having multiple safety devices, including the "Firing Pin Block" (also referred to as the "Automatic Safety" or the "Automatic Firing Pin Block Safety"), the "Manual Safety Lever," and the "Trigger Safety." (Id. at 8 ¶ 22.)
The Complaint contains ten (10) counts: (1) strict liability based on a design defect; (2) strict liability based on a manufacturing defect; (3) negligence; (4) negligent failure to warn; (5) strict liability failure to warn; (6) vicarious liability; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress to Plaintiff Delondre Harris; (8) gross negligence and reckless conduct; (9) combined and concurring conduct; and (10) estoppel and tolling of the statute of limitations based on Defendants acts of fraudulent concealment. (Id. at 11–30 ¶ 41–142.)
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss the Action Without Prejudice ("Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss") on June 20, 2019. (ECF No. 41.) Defendants then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 28, 2019, which is the basis of this Order. (ECF No. 43.) Plaintiffs filed, on July 5, 2019, a Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative to Stay the Proceedings Until the Pending Motion to Dismiss is Resolved ("Motion to Strike"). (ECF No. 44.) Defendants responded to Plaintiffs' Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss on July 5, 2019, (ECF No. 45), and Plaintiffs replied on July 11, 2019. (ECF No. 47.) Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike on July 18, 2019, (ECF No. 47). Plaintiffs filed a Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on July 26, 2019, (ECF No. 50), and Defendants replied on August 9, 2019. (ECF No. 53.)
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants advance the underlying argument that the pistol was purchased more than ten (10) years before Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, which means Plaintiffs' claims are barred by Tennessee's ten (10) year statute of repose for products liability actions. (ECF No. 43-5, 2.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment in federal court. Rule 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and a dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Thus, summary judgment will not be granted if the nonmoving party presents specific facts, both supported by the record and admissible at trial, that would allow a reasonable jury to find in its favor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) ; Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
To support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, a party may rely on materials in the record, including affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The district court does not have the duty to search the record for such evidence when not explicitly cited by the parties but may, on its own accord, consider other materials in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). In assessing the merits of a summary judgment motion, courts must remain aware that " ‘[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inference from the facts ... are jury functions, not those of a judge.’ " Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Indeed, if the evidence presented alone cannot "reasonably support a jury verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, the motion for summary judgment will be granted." Cox v. Kentucky DOT , 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995).
ANALYSIS
I. Evidentiary Rulings
Before addressing the merits of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must address Defendants' evidentiary objections raised in their Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 53.)
Deposition Transcript of Mark Kresser
Defendants contend that Exhibit C, the deposition transcript of Mark Kresser in the Netz v. Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc. case is inadmissible hearsay and not relevant. Defendants do not articulate why they feel this evidence is inadmissible hearsay or not relevant. (ECF No. 53, 8–9.) Mark Kresser is the president and CEO of many entities, including Defendants Taurus Holdings, Inc. ("Taurus Holdings") and Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc. ("TIMI"). Plaintiffs rely on this deposition transcript to establish the interconnectedness of Defendants Taurus Holdings and TIMI with other entities in the "Taurus family." As president and CEO, Mark Kresser is an employee of Defendants, and his deposition testimony from a previous case is admissible non-hearsay because it is an admission by a party-opponent. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (allowing a statement offered against an opposing party and was made "by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed"). Furthermore, the deposition transcript is relevant under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because it has the tendency of making the existence of Defendants' close relationship to Florida more probable than it would be without the deposition transcript. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence").
Materials Relating to Other Cases Filed Against Defendants
Defendants argue that Exhibits D–J are not relevant under Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Exhibit D is a copy of Florida Department of Corporation Records from 2013. Defendants are correct in asserting that the copy Plaintiff attached as Exhibit D is outdated. Thus, Exhibit D is not relevant, and the Court will not consider such evidence in ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Exhibit E is a copy of the Class Action Complaint filed against Defendants and other connected entities in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. This copy is relevant because it has the tendency of making the existence of Defendants' close relationship to Florida more probable than it would be without the deposition transcript. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Defendants only advance a general objection to the relevance of Exhibit E, arguing "object to admission of Plaintiffs' [Exhibit E] into evidence on summary judgment as not relevant" with no explanation or case law supporting their position.
Exhibit F is a copy of the Settlement Agreement and Release in the class action, which the Court does not find to be relevant to any matter to be decided on summary judgment.
Exhibit G is a copy of Taurus Class Actions Frequently Asked Questions, which again the Court does not find to be relevant to any matter to be decided on summary judgment.
Exhibit H is a copy of Defendant TIMI's Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens filed in the Netz v. Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc. case. This copy, which is easily accessible as a public record on the Miami-Dade County's clerk of court website, is relevant because it relates to whether Florida or another state (Washington) has a more significant connection to Defendant TIMI.
Exhibit I is a copy of the Florida court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens, which is also relevant because it tends to make Florida's relationship to Defendant TIMI more probable.
Exhibit J is a copy of the transcript of proceedings held before the judge who entered the order denying Defendant TIMI's motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens . The Court finds this evidence to be relevant because the reasoning of the judge tends to make Florida's relationship to Defendant TIMI more probable.
Copy of Defendant Forjas Taurus's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Netz Case
Defendants assert that Exhibit K, which is a copy of Defendant Forjas Taurus's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Netz case, is not relevant. The Court finds this evidence is relevant because it establishes the arguments with which the Florida court did not agree, ultimately relating to Florida's relationship with Defendants being more probable. As for Defendants' argument that Exhibit K is "incomplete" and thus should not be considered on summary judgment, the Court disagrees. Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that "[i]f a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part ... that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time." It is true that there are missing pages. However, the pages of the motion that deal with choice of law and Florida's relationship to Defendants Forjas Taurus and TIMI are present. The exhibit is not incomplete for the purpose the exhibit is being offered. Furthermore, Defendants make no attempt to introduce the remaining pages of the motion, which are easily accessible.
II. Choice of Law Analysis
The basis of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is that Tennessee's ten (10) year statute of repose in products liability actions bars Plaintiffs' lawsuit, and thus Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. (ECF No. 43-5, 6.) In support of that stance, Defendants rely upon the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") Trace Summary and Special Agent Faulkner's testimony to establish that the pistol was purchased by Plaintiff Harris' father more than ten (10) years prior to this lawsuit being filed. (ECF No. 43-5, 9.) While Plaintiffs dispute the admissibility and authenticity of the ATF Trace Summary, as well as Special Agent Faulkner being the proponent of the ATF Trace Summary's authenticity, Plaintiffs more fundamentally dispute the application Tennessee's statute of repose to this case. (ECF No. 50.) Plaintiffs contend that Florida's statute of repose, rather than Tennessee's statute of repose is applicable.
The threshold question, then, is what law governs this case. A court need only conduct a choice-of-law analysis when there is a true conflict between the laws of two states. Hataway v. McKinley , 830 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. 1992). Tennessee's statute of repose states:
(a) Any action against a manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person or property caused by its defective or unreasonably dangerous condition must be brought within the period fixed by §§ 28-3-104, 28-3-105, 28-3-202 and 47-2-725, but notwithstanding any exceptions to these provisions, it must be brought within six (6) years of the date of injury, in any event, the action must be brought within ten (10) years from the date on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption, or within one (1) year after the expiration of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is the shorter, except in the case of injury to minors whose action must be brought within a period of one (1) year after attaining the age of majority, whichever occurs sooner.
T.C.A. § 29-28-103(a). Florida's statute of repose states:
(2)(b) An action for products liability under § 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the date that the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, rather than running from any other date prescribed elsewhere in § 95.11(3), except as provided within this subsection. Under no circumstances may a claimant commence an action for products liability, including a wrongful death action or any other claim arising from personal injury or property damage caused by a product, to recover for harm allegedly caused by a product with an expected useful life of 10 years or less, if the harm was caused by exposure to or use of the product more than 12 years after delivery of the product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling or leasing the product or of using the product as a component in the manufacture of another product ...
Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2)(b). Here, there is a conflict because Tennessee's statute of repose would bar Plaintiffs' claims while Florida's statute of repose would not, assuming for purposes of this analysis only that the ATF Report is admissible. Thus, the Court must undertake a choice-of-law analysis. When a federal court sits in diversity, the court must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which the court sits. Performance Contracting Inc. v. DynaSteel Corp. , 750 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the choice-of-law rules to be applied are those of Tennessee.
Tennessee applies the "most significant relationship" approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Restatement (Second)") to choice-of-law questions. See Hataway , 830 S.W.2d at 59. Under this approach, in a tort action, "the law of the state where the injury occurred governs unless another state has ‘a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 [of the Restatement (Second) ] to the occurrence and the parties.’ " Nixon v. Waste Mgmt., Inc. , 156 F. App'x 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Those principles include: the needs of the interstate and international systems; the relevant policies of the forum; the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue; the protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the particular field of law; certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (Am. Law Inst. 1988). Before analyzing those various factors to determine which state has the most significant interest, the Court must consider the various contacts that Tennessee and Florida have with the controversy, including (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1988). While the law of the place of injury is typically the default rule to be applied, "the Restatement [ (Second) ] approach allows a court to apply the law of a state that legitimately has a stronger interest to the contrary ...." Hataway , 830 S.W.2d at 59.
In this case, the contacts Plaintiffs and Defendants have with Tennessee and Florida do not clearly favor either party. The place where the injury occurred is Tennessee because that is where Paula Smith was inadvertently shot and subsequently died. The conduct causing the injury—the inadvertent discharge of the gun—occurred in Tennessee. Similarly, the gun was purchased by Plaintiff Harris's father in Tennessee. Plaintiffs all reside in Tennessee. Florida, however, also has its own significant contacts to this case. Defendants TIMI and Taurus Holdings are Florida corporations with their respective principal places of business in Miami, Florida. (ECF No. 1, 2.) Defendant Taurus Holdings is a holding company for multiple other brands and companies, including Defendant TIMI. (ECF No. 50-5, 2.) Defendants, while they personally did not design or manufacture the pistol, purchased the pistol from Forjas Taurus, S.A. ("Forjas Taurus") in Brazil and imported the pistol into Florida for resale. (ECF No. 53, 13.) Forjas Taurus is not allowed to sell firearms directly to United States citizens or United States distributors. (ECF No. 53, 2.) As to the center of the parties' relationship, the Court finds that there is no real center of relationship. Defendant TIMI sold the pistol to Sports South, a firearms distributor located in Louisiana. (ECF No. 43-5, 3.) Sports South then sold the pistol to Guns & Ammo, a firearms retailer located in Tennessee. (Id. ) Plaintiff Harris's father purchased the pistol from Guns & Ammo and then sold the pistol to Plaintiff Harris. (Id. ) From these facts, the Court finds there is no direct relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants, and thus no place where their relationship is centered.
Because both Tennessee and Florida have significant contacts to this case and such contacts are inconclusive to answer the conflicts question, the Court will proceed to analyze the general principles articulated in § 6 of the Restatement (Second). The Court reemphasizes that Tennessee's default rule is to apply the law of the state where the injury occurred, unless another state has a more significant relationship to the case. Hataway , 830 S.W.2d at 59. Here, the Court finds that Florida ultimately has the more significant relationship to this case.
Before continuing with the Court's analysis of the § 6 factors, it is important to remember that the Court is "to evaluate contacts ‘according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue,’ " and this evaluation is to be "accomplished by carefully examining the policies behind the laws of the interested states and the interests of those states in the claim." MacDonald v. GMC , 110 F.3d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). While there are many cases regarding Tennessee's choice of law approach, ultimately, "[t]he Restatement test is a fact-driven approach that necessarily varies from case to case ...." Id. at 347.
Basic Policies Underlying Products Liability Law
Comment h to Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) makes clear the basic policies underlying products liability law is important in cases where "the policies of the interested states are largely the same but ... there are nevertheless minor differences between their relevant local law rules." Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. h (Am. Law Inst. 1988). When that situation arises in a case, "there is good reason for the court to apply the local law of the state which will best achieve the basic policy, or policies, underlying the particular field of law involved." Id.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-28-105 governs products liability law in Tennessee. That section is based upon, but is not identical to, section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In Tennessee, the two underlying purposes behind adopting strict liability in products liability actions are "(1) to encourage greater care in the manufacture of products that are distributed to the public, and (2) to relieve injured consumers from the burden of proving negligence on a manufacturer's part." Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp. , 897 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tenn. 1995).
Similar to Tennessee, Florida has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts doctrine of strict liability in products liability cases. Judge v. American Motors Corp. , 908 F.2d 1565, 1567–68 (11th Cir. 1990). Florida courts have consistently stated the underlying policy of strict liability as being to place the "cost of injuries or damage, either to persons or property" on the "makers of the products who put them into the channels of trade," as opposed to placing the cost on the injured person. See, e.g. Aubin v. Union Carbide Co. , 177 So. 3d 489, 503 (Fla. 2015) (citation omitted).
As for the statutes of repose, the Court notes that Tennessee's and Florida's statutes of repose are quite similar, with the only important difference being that Tennessee's timeline is ten years and Florida's timeline is twelve years. The policies underlying both Tennessee's and Florida's statutes of repose are also substantially similar. Tennessee's policy is to protect manufactures and sellers from indefinite exposure to liability by setting a timeframe for when product liability suits may be brought against them, as well as protecting consumers from high costs of products. See Wyeth , 540 F. Supp. 2d at 939. Similarly, Florida's policy is to promote finality and certainty of exposure to products liability claims. See Lamb , 631 F. Supp. at 1147. Because the policies of the interested states—Tennessee and Florida—are similar, there is "good reason" for the Court to apply the state's law that "best achieves" the basic policies underlying products liability law. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law § 6 cmt. h (Am. Law Inst. 1988).
The Restatement (Second) identifies the two general policies behind tort law, including products liability law, as being (1) deterrence of other wrongdoers and (2) compensation of the injured person. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law § 145 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1988). Viewing these policies quite broadly, application of Tennessee law in this case would not promote either policy because Defendants would not be deterred from future wrongdoing as Tennessee's statute of repose would bar this action and Plaintiffs would have no opportunity to be compensated for the alleged wrongful death of Paula Smith. Conversely, these overarching policies would be better served if the Court applied Florida law because the Florida statute of repose would not bar the claim, meaning Defendants and similar companies would be deterred from future wrongdoing if they were to be found liable and Plaintiffs would be compensated if they prevailed. Application of Florida law will "best achieve" the underlying policies set forth by comment c to § 145 of the Restatement (Second).
Relevant Policies of Tennessee
The Tennessee General Assembly perceived a crisis in the area of products liability, thus prompting them to enact a statute of repose. Penley v. Honda Motor Co. , 31 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tenn. 2000). As such, the purpose and policy behind Tennessee's statute of repose was " ‘to provide a reasonable time within which action may be commenced against manufacturers and/or sellers while limiting the time to a specific period of time for which product liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated.’ " Montgomery v. Wyeth , 540 F. Supp. 2d 933, 939 (E.D. Tenn. 2008) (citation omitted). The Tennessee General Assembly attempted to indirectly reverse the rising costs of production and consumer prices. Penley , 31 S.W.3d at 187 ("[T]he General Assembly perceived that uncertainty as to future liability increased the premiums for product liability insurance, which in turn increased the costs of production and ultimately consumer prices.").
Relevant Policies of Florida
Florida also has a statute of repose. See Fla. Stat. § 95.031(2). Florida courts have noted that Florida's purpose in enacting its statute of repose is to "encourage diligence in the prosecution of claims, eliminate the potential of abuse from a stale claim, and ultimately foster certainty and finality in liability." Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft , 631 F.Supp. 1144, 1147 (S.D. Fla. 1986). The Florida legislature recognized the expanding liability that manufacturers and sellers face and enacted the statute of repose to curtail such perpetual liability. Id. at 1148 (citation omitted).
Interests of Tennessee and Florida in the Determination of This Case
Looking first to Tennessee's interest in the determination of this case, courts have previously held that Tennessee has an interest in applying its statute of repose to products liability claims, even when the manufacturer or seller of the product is not domiciled in Tennessee and when application of the statute of repose would bar a Tennessee plaintiff's claims. See Montgomery v. Wyeth , 580 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2009) ("... Tennessee has a strong interest in applying its statute of repose in products liability actions, even when that forecloses a claim by a Tennessee plaintiff."). This interest was considered "strong" in Montgomery because the other option of substantive law to apply was the law of Georgia, which happened to be merely the state where the plaintiff purchased the product from a random third-party vendor. Id. at 463. The parties never argued, and thus the court never considered, whether the states where the defendant was incorporated or maintained its principal place of business had any interest in having their substantive law, including statutes of repose, apply to the case. When comparing the interests of the state where the injury occurred to the interests of the state where the product was purchased from a third-party vendor, it is not surprising that the state where the injury occurred had a more significant interest in having its substantive law apply. Thus, the state of the place of injury's interest would, under those circumstances, be viewed as "strong." But that conclusion by the Sixth Circuit does not necessarily mean that Tennessee's interest in having its statute of repose apply in products liability cases is always "strong" to the extent of always defeating another state's interest in having its statute of repose apply. That is why courts must conduct a careful choice of law analysis to determine which state has the more significant relationship to, and thus the greater interest in, the case. This Court does not automatically presume that Tennessee always has a "strong" interest in having its statute of repose apply.
In their Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53), Defendants rely heavily on Montgomery v. Wyeth. Defendants, however, fail to recognize the significant differences between Montgomery and this case—mainly, that the court in Montgomery never analyzed whether the state of incorporation and principal place of business had a more significant relationship than Tennessee.
After reviewing the record, the Court is unable to conclude that Tennessee has a strong interest in applying its substantive law, including its statute of repose, to this case. Tennessee has no connection to Defendants, besides one of their firearms discharging in Tennessee. The gun was imported from Brazil to Florida by Defendant TIMI, (ECF No. 43-2, 7), and then sold to Sports South, Inc. in Louisiana. (ECF No. 43-2, 51.) Defendants received no income or other benefits from Tennessee because Defendants never transacted any business with either Tennessee or Plaintiffs. Cf. Std. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co. , No. 10-11164, 2012 WL 13005951, at *3, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190997 at *7 (E.D. Mich. 2012) ("Accordingly, after thorough review, the Court is satisfied that Tennessee has an obvious and substantial interest in shielding Defendants from open-ended products liability claims. In addition to the facts regarding the incident, the Court finds it compelling that Defendant generates substantial commerce within Tennessee, and directly employs numerous Tennessee residents."). Tennessee, when compared to Florida, has a minimal interest in shielding Defendants from ongoing liability stemming from allegedly defective products and enabling Defendants to have lower products liability insurance rates because Tennessee has no meaningful connection to Defendants.
Turning next to Florida's interest in the determination of this case, it is true that "Florida possesses no particular interest in assuring that non-residents are more richly compensated in Florida than in their own courts." Medina v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , No. 02-22133-CIV-COOKE/McALILEY, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18916, at *28 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2005) (citing Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , 177 F.3d 1272, 1301 (11th Cir. 1999) ). Defendants correctly state that proposition. (ECF No. 53, 15.) However, that proposition is not relevant in this case because the law at issue—a statute of repose—is not an inherently compensatory law. Rather, a statute of repose works not to ensure compensation of individuals but rather to protect manufacturers and sellers from "exposure ... to liability for endless periods of time." Kush v. Lloyd , 616 So. 2d 415, 421–22 (Fla. 1992). Thus, the Florida cases that stand for such a proposition are not relevant to the Court's analysis. It is irrelevant whether Plaintiffs—Tennessee residents—are afforded the benefit of Florida's statute of repose because Florida did not enact the statute of repose to protect plaintiffs, residents and non-residents alike.
Florida does, however, have an interest in shielding manufacturers and sellers from indefinite exposure to products liability actions. This interest is nearly identical to Tennessee's interest. Unlike Tennessee, Florida does have a significant connection to Defendants and has a strong interest in applying its laws to Defendants. Defendants are incorporated in and have their principal places of business in Florida. Defendants import their firearms, including the pistol at issue, into Florida from Brazil, where it was designed and manufactured by Forjas Taurus—the very company that owns Defendant Taurus Holdings, who in turn owns Defendant TIMI. (ECF No. 50-5, 11.) Once the firearms are imported to Florida, they are then sold to certain firearms distributors. One could say that Florida is the "hub" of Defendants' firearms business. All, or at least the substantial majority of, activity surrounding this firearms operation stems from Florida. In the Court's view, Florida has a greater interest in governing the liability and ensuring the proper protection of Defendants than Tennessee, whose only connection to Defendants is the fact that one of the thousands of firearms imported into Florida, and subsequently shipped out of Florida, ended up in the bedroom of Paula Smith and Plaintiff Harris.
See Hemphill v. Smith & Wesson Corp. , 95-82, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 726 (Hampden County Superior Court Sept. 10, 1996), a Massachusetts case that is nearly identical to this case. In Hemphill , a firearm discharged while the plaintiff was cleaning it. The plaintiff was a resident of Illinois and the injury occurred in Illinois. The defendant was incorporated in Massachusetts. The court, after conducting a thorough Restatement (Second) choice of law analysis, concluded that Massachusetts's substantive law, including its lack of any statute of repose, should apply. The court reasoned that Massachusetts had the stronger interest in holding its resident defendants, such as Smith & Wesson Corporation, accountable. Id. at *10.
The state of incorporation and the principal place of business, which in this case is Florida, can adequately determine for itself how best to protect resident manufacturers and sellers from high costs of product liability insurance premiums. The district court in Montgomery reasoned, "... while Georgia does have an interest in regulating a product sold there, Tennessee has an interest in regulating a product used here ...." Montgomery v. Wyeth , 540 F. Supp. 2d 933, 945 (E.D. Tenn. 2008). Using the same reasoning, this Court finds that while Tennessee has an interest in regulating a firearm possessed by Tennessee residents, Florida has an interest in regulating firearms (1) imported into Florida by Florida corporations that happened to be owned by the manufacturer of the very firearms that the Florida corporations are importing and (2) distributed out of Florida to other distributors. Florida is not merely the place where the product is sold; Florida is the center of the Defendants firearms business. Furthermore, Tennessee's interest in regulating a product used in Tennessee is adequately protected by application of Florida law. Florida's statute of repose just as effectively provides definiteness to manufacturers and sellers, who are subject to Florida law, about their products liability exposure.
Another consideration the Court finds helpful in determining that Florida has a more significant interest than Tennessee is that there are currently, and have previously been, many cases in Florida against Defendants and various other entities connected to Defendants. As a general observation, none of the cases were dismissed due to Florida lacking an interest in the case or due to another state's law applying. Two cases in particular are of interest to the Court—(1) Taurus Int'l Mfg. v. Friend , 217 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) and (2) Netz v. Taurus Int'l Mfg., Inc. et al. , Case No. 13-014439-CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.). In Friend , the trial court denied Taurus' motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens on the grounds that "Miami-Dade County was plaintiff's initial forum choice, and it is Taurus' headquarters where Taurus markets, distributes, and services firearms." 217 So. 3d at 1134. In Netz , the court held a hearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens . During the hearing and in response to Taurus' counsel's statement that "Washington has a greater interest [than Florida]," the judge questioned Taurus' stance, asking:
Wait a minute. There's a company in this state, in fact, in the very county where this court is sitting, in a location not too far from here, where guns are manufactured and distributed, that has alleged[ly] caused some serious injury due to some defect to Mr. Netz. You don't think this community, this state should have a public interest in what this company is filtering out within this community, throughout this state, and into various parts of the country?
(ECF No. 50-12, 40–41.) Ultimately, that court denied Taurus' motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens .
Furthermore, there are cases filed in other states, including Michigan, against Defendants and various other entities connected to Defendants in which the courts have found that they did not have personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants "have no presence of any kind in Michigan, including employees, offices, or personal property; no leaseholds or other real property interests in Michigan; no license to conduct business in Michigan; never advertised or solicited business in Michigan; never sold, shipped, or distributed anything in Michigan; and never made a penny from sales in Michigan. Most importantly, neither defendant ‘has ever transacted any business’ in Michigan or with plaintiff.’ " Fear v. Taurus Int'l Mfg. , No. 16-CV-10715, 2017 WL 4422345, at *2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217287, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2017) (citation omitted); see also J.B. Custom, Inc. v. Amadea Rossi, S.A. , No. 1:10-CV-326, 2011 WL 124509, at *5, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3623, at *15–16 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 13, 2011) (finding that Indiana did not have personal jurisdiction over Defendants TIMI and Braztech International LLC, but that "[t]here is no question that the Southern District of Florida would be an appropriate venue for TIMI and Braztech"). Similarly, Defendants in this case have no presence in Tennessee; no employees, offices, or personal property in Tennessee; no leaseholds or other real property interests in Tennessee; and no license to conduct business in Tennessee. See Fear , 2017 WL 4422345, at *2, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 217287, at *5. Defendants have never sold, shipped, or distributed anything in Tennessee. See id. Defendants also did not "make a penny" from sales in Tennessee in this case. See id. Lastly, Defendants never " ‘transacted any business' in [Tennessee] or with [Plaintiffs]." Id.
Throughout the Court's review of conflicts law, courts sometimes too easily apply the forum's substantive law because in a large majority of cases, the forum is the state where the injury occurred. While it is usually true that the place of injury is often the determinative factor in a products liability case, it is also true that the place of injury is not always the decisive factor. The facts of each case must be reviewed and addressed.
Defendants, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, cite to four cases to support their argument that "state and federal courts in Tennessee routinely hold in products cases that the state of the defendant's incorporation or location of its headquarters—standing alone—is not a more significant contact than that of the plaintiff's injury location." (ECF No. 53, 12.) After review, the Court does not find those cases instructive on the outcome of this case. Defendants first cite In re Bridgestone/Firestone , 138 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). There, the court undertook a forum non conveniens analysis and determined that Mexican law should apply because "Tennessee's only link to the litigation is Firestone's maintenance of its principal place of business in Davidson County and the conspiratorial activities that allegedly took place therein. Mexico has more numerous, and more significant, links to the instant cases. It is the site of the accidents, the residence of all plaintiffs, and the center of the relationships between all parties." Id. at 208. Contrastingly, in this case, while Tennessee is the site of the accident and the residence of Plaintiffs, it is not the center of relationship between the parties. Significantly, as noted above, there is no center of relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants. Defendants also cite Harwell v. American Medical Systems, Inc. , 803 F. Supp. 1287 (M.D. Tenn. 1992). In that case, the court cited the applicable Restatement (Second) choice of law rules for Tennessee and provided a one-sentence conclusory statement that Tennessee substantive law should apply. The court wrote, "With Mr. Harwell's surgery and injuries occurring in Tennessee, the Court concludes that Tennessee law should apply to Mr. Harwell's tort claims." Id. at 1295. There was no examination of the policies behind the laws of the interested states. More specifically, the court did not address the laws and policy of Minnesota, the other interested state. See MacDonald , 110 F.3d at 343 (explaining the requirement of conducting a careful examination of relevant policies and interests). Similarly, the court in McKinnie v. Lundell Mfg. Co. concluded, without conducting a careful examination of the relevant policies and interests, that "[b]ecause the injury occurred in Tennessee, and because no other state has a more significant relationship to the events and parties in this case, Tennessee law governs this products liability action." 825 F. Supp. 834, 836 (W.D. Tenn. 1993). Lastly, Defendants cite Bearden v. Honeywell Int'l Inc. , No. 3:09-01035, 2010 WL 1223936 (M.D. Tenn. March 24, 2010). There, the court conducted a more thorough choice of law analysis. Essentially, the court found that Tennessee law should apply because "[t]he fact that Honeywell is based in New Jersey is not enough to overcome the ‘default rule’ that ‘the law of the place where the injury occurred [applies] when each state has an almost equal relationship to the litigation.’ " Id. at *8 (citing Hataway , 830 S.W.2d at 59 ).
Courts must "evaluate contacts ‘according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.’ " MacDonald , 110 F.3d at 343 (emphasis added). In doing so, courts must "carefully examin[e] the policies behind the laws of the interested states and the interests of those states in the claim." Id. This naturally leads to variance in outcomes from case-to-case, which explains why this Court finds Florida, the hub of business for Defendants, has a more significant interest in the outcome of this case. In this regard, this Court has conducted a full fact-driven review and analysis. The record clearly indicates that Florida, rather than Tennessee, has a more significant relationship to and interest in this case.
The Remaining § 6 Factors
Section 6(2)(a), concerning the needs of the interstate and international systems, encourages choice of law rules to "seek to further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate commercial intercourse between them." Application of this factor to the case does not point in any particular direction because there was no "commercial intercourse" between Florida and Tennessee.
Section 6(2)(d), which concerns protection of justified expectations, has little relevance here because there is no evidence that Defendants, when importing firearms from Brazil into Florida and subsequently distributing them into the marketplace, justifiably expected certain law to apply. Similarly, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs justifiably expected a certain state's law to apply.
Section 6(2)(f), which requires the Court to examine which state's law best promotes "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result," is more useful to this case. As previously explained, there are many cases in the Florida courts involving Defendants and the various other entities in Defendants' web of businesses. In those cases, Florida law is being applied. Thus, uniformity of result is achieved if Florida law is applied in this case.
Section 6(2)(g), concerning ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied, is not a concern to the Court in this case. The Court can easily apply Florida law just as it could easily apply Tennessee law.
III. Remaining Issues for Summary Judgment
Because the Court concludes that Florida substantive law applies to this case, the applicable statute of repose is twelve (12) years. Plaintiffs, then, still have a valid claim. Accordingly, there is no need for the Court to examine the admissibility and authenticity of the ATF Trace Report that Defendants offer to prove the date of purchase of the pistol. (See ECF No. 43-4, 5–7.)
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendants TIMI and Taurus Holdings' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED .
IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of November 2019.