Opinion
Argued May 8, 1981
July 20, 1981.
Motor vehicles — Criminal conviction — Suspension of operator's license — Extenuating circumstances.
1. An underlying criminal conviction may not be attacked in a subsequent appeal from the suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license. [648]
2. In a case involving the suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license, the lower court is limited solely to a de novo review to determine whether the violation has actually occurred; it may not modify or reverse the action of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation because of extenuating circumstances. [649]
Argued May 8, 1981, before President Judge CRUMLISH and Judges ROGERS and WILLIAMS, JR., sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 1687 C.D. 1979, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County in the case of Mary P. Calloway v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, No. 134 April Term, 1979.
Suspension of motor vehicle operator's license by the Department of Transportation. Licensee appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County. Appeal sustained. BELL, J. Department of Transportation appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Reversed; suspension reinstated.
Harold H. Cramer, Assistant Attorney General, with him Ward T. Williams, Chief Counsel of Transportation, and Harvey Bartle, III, Acting Attorney General, for appellant.
Stephen P. McClosky, Phillips and Faldowski, for appellee.
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation appeals a Washington County Common Pleas Court decision reinstating driving privileges based upon extenuating circumstances. We reverse.
Mary P. Calloway was convicted on January 11, 1979, for having driven a motor vehicle on January 2, 1979, while already under license suspension. Although she successfully completed an examination in late December of 1978, Calloway was cited on January 2nd prior to receiving her license in the mail several days later. Upon receiving certification of the conviction, PennDOT revoked her operating privileges for a six-month period.
This Court has clearly held that an underlying criminal conviction may not be attacked in a subsequent suspension appeal which is civil in nature. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Grobes, 45 Pa. Commw. 151, 405 A.2d 588 (1979). The issue is only whether the licensee was in fact convicted, not whether she should have been convicted, and whether PennDOT has acted as required by statute. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Lea, 34 Pa. Commw. 310, 384 A.2d 269 (1978).
According to Section 1543(b) of the Vehicle Code, Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, as amended, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1543(b), upon receiving a certified record of the person's conviction for driving a vehicle while the operating privilege was suspended, PennDOT must revoke that privilege for an additional period of six months.
Calloway cites us to Commonwealth v. Emerick, 373 Pa. 388, 96 A.2d 370 (1953), for the proposition that economic hardship may serve to mitigate a license revocation. This is simply not the case. A lower court is limited solely to a de novo review to determine whether the violation has actually occurred, and may not modify or reverse PennDOT action based upon extenuating circumstances. Department of Transportation v. Verna, 23 Pa. Commw. 260, 351 A.2d 694 (1976). In fact, no compelling circumstances can be found here to mitigate the operation of a motor vehicle without a license.
Reversed.
ORDER
The Washington County Common Pleas Court order dated October 29, 1979, No. 134 April Term 1979, is reversed and the suspension of the motor vehicle operating privileges of Mary P. Calloway is reinstated.