Opinion
7:01-CV-075-R
September 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on this day to be considered Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Objection thereto and the Court finds and orders as follows:
This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice at Iowa Park, Texas.
Plaintiff alleges that he was denied proper medical care for the treatment of blood and blood clots in his stools. See Complaint. He also claims that Defendant Escalera wrongfully and abusively accused him of faking his illness. Complaint p. 5. Bruton seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. Complaint p. 8.
In order to state a colorable claim for the denial of medical care under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must allege acts or omissions "sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976). "Deliberate indifference" under the Eighth Amendment occurs only where a prison official subjectively knows of and disregards a substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996). However, it is well established that negligent or erroneous medical treatment or judgment does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993). As long as jail medical personnel exercise professional medical judgment, their behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461-62 (1982). A disagreement over the appropriate medical treatment constitutes, at most, a possible claim of medical malpractice appropriately addressed under state law. E.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 107-08, 97 S.Ct. at 293; Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991); Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979).
The relevant medical records provide as follows: On February 9, 2001, Plaintiff complained to medical personnel that he thought be had a digestive tract or staph infection. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix p. 39. Three days later, he was seen in the medical department for his suspected infection. Id. Bruton complained of frequent trips to the bathroom and cramping. Id. It appears from the record that there were "bowel sounds present." Id. On February 16, 2001, Plaintiff was again seen for abdominal pain. Id. He was prescribed a 30-day regimen of antacid and Zantac 150mg. Id.; see also id. at pp. 22-23. On February 22, 2002, Plaintiff continued to complain of abdominal pain. Id. at p. 38. He was seen in the medical department on February 26, 2002 where he complained of dark stools and blood in stools. Id. The medical records for this day are mostly illegible, however, it appears that medication was prescribed for acne and stool samples were ordered for hemoccult testing. Id.
The first stool sample came back negative for blood. Id. The second and third stool samples tested positive for "pure blood" and finger prints were noted in the specimens. Id. On March 8, 2001, a specimen cup was given to Bruton to collect a stool sample. Id. at p. 36. The results indicated that the sample consisted of approximately "10cc fresh frank blood with clots." Id. Bruton stated that all bowel movements for a month had been blood and that he had no stools for a month. Id. Defendant Escalera explained to Plaintiff that it would be medically impossible for him to have no bowel movements for a month and still be alive and not sick. Id. She referred him to Dr. Ore who, upon rectal examination, found no stools but scheduled Plaintiff for another rectal examination. Id. Records from the follow-up examination do not appear in Defendants' or in Plaintiff's exhibits. On March 10, 2001, Plaintiff's stool sample was evaluated for ova and parasites. Id. at p. 30. The results were negative. Id.
In addition to the medical records, Defendants have provided the affidavit of Dr. Timothy J. Revell. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix pp. 49-50. Dr. Revell reviewed Plaintiff's medical records. He determined that one of Plaintiff's stool samples was negative and the second sample appeared to be a false positive based upon the fact that it showed gross blood with a fingerprint. In other words, it was blood but it did not originate from a stool sample. Dr. Revell states that Plaintiff's hemoglobin and hematocrit counts were within normal limits which would not be consistent with a person suffering profuse rectal bleeding for two months. Dr. Revell further states that digital and laboratory exams failed to indicate rectal bleeding. He notes that Plaintiff gained six pounds between November 1999 and July 2001. Therefore, Dr. Revel concludes, it appears from the records that Plaintiff's claim of rectal bleeding was fictitious.
Bruton does not dispute the accuracy of the medical records. See Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. However, he argues that, during the relevant time period, from February 2001 to May 2001, the medical records reflect that his weight dropped from 196 to 190. Id. at p. 4. He also cites the fact that he actually produced a blood sample with clots for analysis by the medical department and that this in itself raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not he actually suffered rectal bleeding. Id. at p. 3. In essence, Plaintiff argues that the medical evidence supports his claim because it demonstrates that he was actually sick and that Defendants failed to properly diagnose and treat him. Id.
Defendants do not dispute Bruton's claim that Anne Escalera believed he was not really sick. This determination, though it may not be accurate, is fairly supported by the medical records. The suspicious stool samples, along with normal blood counts, negative findings for ova and parasites, an apparently outrageous claim of no stools for an entire month and the fact that Plaintiff's weight remained substantially unchanged during this period of time do not constitute facts which, if known by a health care provider, would lead that provider to determine that there was a substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety. The Court motes that, pursuant to his early complaints, Plaintiff was treated with medication. It was later, after further examination and laboratory analysis, that Escalera stated her belief that Plaintiff's claims were fictitious. It is clear that Plaintiff was provided with medical care. In essence, Plaintiff challenges the diagnosis and the nature of the medical care provided to him at the Allred Unit rather than any lack of medical care. While Plaintiff may disagree with Defendants' assessment and treatment of his medical condition, such a disagreement is insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.
Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The merits of Plaintiff's medical care claim have been addressed herein because his allegations are inextricably intertwined with a key issue necessary to resolve the question of qualified immunity — i.e. whether there was a violation of a constitutional right. See Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from suit when performing discretionary functions unless their conduct violated statutory or constitutional rights, clearly established at the time of the alleged incident, of which a reasonable person would have known). it is clear from the facts of this case, as set forth by Plaintiff and viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, that Defendants' actions did not give rise to any issue of constitutional magnitude.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence illustrate that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving patty." Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986)). Substantive law provides that an issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant is not required to respond to the motion until the movant properly supports his motion with competent evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). However, once the movant has carried his burden of proof, the nonmovant may not sit idly by and wait for trial. Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 1988).
When a movant carries his initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that the entry of summary judgment is inappropriate. Celolex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). Although the nonmovant may satisfy this burden by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, "conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden," Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1429, as "the adverse party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Merely colorable evidence or evidence not significantly probative, however, will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. Furthermore, a mere scintilla of evidence will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant, but only when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts, thus creating an actual controversy. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In the absence of any proof, however, the Court does not assume that the nonmovant could or would prove the necessary facts. Id.
In making its determination on the motion, the Court looks at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). However, "the [Court's] function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The movant's motion for summary judgment will be granted if he meets his burden and the nonmovant fails to make the requisite showing that a genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Fed. R Civ. P. 56(c); Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1992).
The summary judgment evidence presented in this case establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, Plaintiff's Objections are OVERRULED and Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) mandates dismissal of any action filed in forma pauperis if the court determines that the claims raised therein are frivolous. An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989); Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863 (1991). In this case, Plaintiff's claims lack an arguable basis in law and are, therefore, frivolous.
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff and to Counsel for Defendants.
SO ORDERED.