Opinion
Case No. 98-3196-DES
April 30, 2001
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The court has referred this matter to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation on a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Based upon a complete review of the record, the court issues this report and recommendation:
Procedural History
On March 31, 1994, petitioner, armed with a gun, entered a convenience store with friend Corey Smith. As the clerk reached for her gun, petitioner shot her twice. As a result of gun shot wounds to the arm and face, the clerk died. Smith ran from the store carrying a package of gum. (See R.V, Transcript of Jury Trial, 648-653; see also State v. Brooks, No. 74,481 (Kan. October 25, 1996) slip op. 2).
Petitioner was charged in Wyandotte County Court with felony murder, aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The first trial, held September 1994, resulted in a hung jury. When petitioner arrived at the courthouse on December 5, 1994, for his second trial, he learned his codefendant had agreed to plead guilty. Petitioner then pled guilty to one count of felony murder on December 5, 1994 (with the State dismissing counts II and III). Petitioner was 16 years old at the time of the plea. On March 22, 1995, prior to sentencing, petitioner gave notice of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After a hearing, the court denied the motion. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.
Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea, claiming the plea was not freely and voluntarily given because the court did not accept the plea in compliance with K.S.A. 22-3210 and because petitioner was pressured by the circumstances and his stepfather's influence to accept the plea agreement. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. State v. Brooks, No. 74,481.
Petitioner filed a postconviction motion on June 9, 1998, in Wyandotte County District Court wherein he also challenged the voluntariness of his plea. That motion was denied by letter on November 23, 1998, the judge stating "the issue has been adjudicated by the Supreme Court on October 25, 1996."
Petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 17, 1998 (Doc. 1). Petitioner claims (1) the state court failed to satisfy the requirements of K.S.A. 22-3210 in accepting the guilty plea and (2) the plea was not voluntary but, rather, the result of time pressure and coercion from his stepfather.
Standard of Review
This petition for habeas relief was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and is, therefore, governed by AEDPA. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 120 S.Ct 1479, 1486 (2000); see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) and Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2000).
AEDPA altered the language of the statute governing habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) now provides that habeas relief on a claim "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" must be denied unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
The Supreme Court has provided some elucidation of the phrases "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of":
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and] [t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence."
Claims Presented
1. State court's compliance with K.S.A. 22-3210: Petitioner's claim that the district court failed to strictly comply with the requirements of K.S.A. 22-3210 is not a proper subject for habeas review. See Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000) (federal habeas actions are intended to correct errors relating to the United States Constitution, not errors of state law). See also Freeman v. Page, 443 F.2d 493, 497 (10th Cir. 1971) (noting U.S. Constitution does not require inquiry as to the underlying facts of the offenses charged before accepting a guilty plea) and Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147, 1151 (3rd Cir. 1996) ("[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not require an on-the-record development of the factual basis supporting a guilty plea before entry of the plea, and the failure of a state court to elicit a factual basis before accepting a guilty plea does not in itself provide a ground for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.").
K.S.A. 22-3210 requires that the court address the defendant personally and determine that the plea is made voluntarily and supported by a factual basis. Petitioner argues that the court did not comply with the state statute because it failed to ask specific questions (i.e., whether he was coerced or pressured to enter a guilty plea, whether he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty and why he referred to a "fake witness").
2. Voluntariness of guilty plea: Due process requires that a guilty plea be voluntarily and intelligently made. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). In order to satisfy due process, a criminal defendant must have a "full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence." Id. at 244. The circumstances surrounding the plea must be reviewed to determine whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970).
While the ultimate question of whether petitioner's plea is voluntary is governed by the review standards of § 2254(d), the state court's underlying factual findings are entitled to § 2254(e)'s presumption of correctness. Compare Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000).
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea, the state court heard testimony from petitioner's mother, petitioner's stepfather and his appointed counsel. See State v. Brooks, No. 74,481, slip op. 2-3 (summarizing testimony presented). The state court concluded petitioner's plea of guilty was voluntarily made. In reviewing the lower court's finding, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed petitioner's concerns that the trial court did not specifically ask whether his plea was coerced or pressured and did not specifically inquire as to whether the plea was freely given:
Although these direct questions might not have been asked by the trial court, Brooks assured the judge that his mind was clear, he understood the charges and any lesser included charges and offenses, he understood that he had the right to be tried by a jury and that by pleading guilty he was giving up that right, and he was aware of sentencing possibilities. In addition, he expressed satisfaction with his lawyer's assistance, he stated a factual basis for the guilty plea, and he agreed that the prosecutor's recital of facts would have been the evidence at a trial. Brooks has suggested no reason, and none is apparent, why the trial court could not have based a determination that the plea was made voluntarily on the questions and answers which were exchanged between defendant and judge.
State v. Brooks, No. 74,481, slip op. 6. The state court dismissed as insignificant petitioner's "fake witness" comment because it was never expounded upon within the motion to withdraw plea or at the hearing on the motion. State v. Brooks, No. 74,481, slip op. 8.
The state court rejected petitioner's argument that coercion by his stepfather rendered his plea involuntary. The court found the circumstances of this case indistinguishable from cases suggesting that personal considerations, even those having some psychological influence, "do not constitute the coercion required to vitiate an otherwise voluntary plea." State v. Brooks, No. 74,481, slip op. 8, citing Wippel v. State, 203 Kan. 207, 209 (1969).
Petitioner fails to identify any U.S. Supreme Court decision which is contrary to the decision reached by the state court or unreasonably applied by the state. Nor did the state court make an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) and (2).
Finding no Supreme Court authority which would support a conclusion that petitioner's guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent because of pressure from his family or the limited time he had to consider the plea, petitioner's claim for habeas relief must be denied. Compare Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting family pressure does not implicate the due process clause because it is not attributable to the state and that pressure resulting from deadlines is inherent in the plea bargaining process).
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS, THEREFORE, RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.
Any party objecting to the recommended disposition may serve and file with the clerk of the district court written objections within 10 days of service of this Report and Recommendation. Any objection filed must specify the parts of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made, and set forth the basis for such objections. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to timely file objections waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) and Soliz v. Chater, 82 F.3d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1996).
Any objections should be presented in a pleading entitled "Objections to Report and Recommendation" and filed with the clerk.