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holding no abuse of discretion when divorce decree's language was "standard form language that is either required by the Texas Family Code or otherwise normally used in divorce decrees"
Summary of this case from In re Z.G.Opinion
No. 04-02-00933-CV.
Delivered and Filed: June 11, 2003.
Appeal from the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2002-CI-01134, Honorable David Berchelmann, Jr., Judge Presiding.
AFFIRMED.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Henry C. Briones appeals a final decree of divorce asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering supervised visitation, erroneously calculating child support, and accepting a libelous final divorce decree and a fraudulent home social study. Briones further contends that the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the issues in this appeal are settled by existing precedent, we affirm the trial court's judgment in this memorandum opinion. Tex.R.App.P. 47.4.
1. In Briones's fourth issue, he contends the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The clerk's record that was filed in this appeal contains the trial court's written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Briones's fourth issue is overruled.
2. In Briones's first, second, and fifth issues, Briones challenges the trial court's findings regarding visitation and child support and its admission into evidence of a home social study. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that it is in the child's best interest that Briones's visits be supervised "until the Court is satisfied that [Briones] will obey the Court's orders." The clerk's record contains orders documenting that Briones was held in contempt for failing to return the child on April 28, 2002. In addition, the trial court had previously modified its temporary orders to require supervised visitation based on Briones's failure to return the child on April 28, 2002, and June 16, 2002. The trial court further found that the parties stipulated to the amount of child support ordered.
Findings of fact in a case tried to the court have the same force and dignity as a jury's verdict upon special issues. Nelkin v. Panzer, 833 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.). If no reporter's record is made a part of the record on appeal, we presume that sufficient evidence was introduced to support the trial court's findings of fact and the judgment. Mays v. Pierce, 154 Tex. 487, 281 S.W.2d 79, 82 (1955); Nelkin, 833 S.W.2d at 268. Since no reporter's record was filed in this appeal, we presume the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's findings with regard to supervised visitation and child support. In addition, without a reporter's record, our record does not show that Briones made a complaint to the trial court stating the grounds for excluding the home social study and that the trial court ruled on the complaint or refused to rule on the complaint. See Tex.R.App.P. 33.1. Briones's first, second, and fifth issues are overruled.
3. In his third issue, Briones contends that the trial court abused its discretion in accepting a libelous final divorce decree. In his reply brief, Briones contends that the use of his name on pages 15 and 20 of the divorce decree "makes him look like a `criminal'[and] libels a WWII dead veteran's name also." Briones further asserts that the appellee's attorneys had no right "to injure [his] good name and reputation in this manner finding `cruel Treatment' and other atrocities." Finally, Briones contends that no evidence was presented to "support this libelous Decree or the contents, this was done in Bad faith to prejudice [him]." The only case cited by Briones as support for his contention addresses whether a trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of child support in a divorce decree. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 108 (Tex. 1990).
We must presume that the evidence supported the terms of the trial court's judgment. Mays v. Pierce, 281 S.W.2d at 82; Nelkin, 833 S.W.2d at 268. Furthermore, we have reviewed the language in the divorce decree and have determined that the language is standard form language that is either required by the Texas Family Code or otherwise normally used in divorce decrees. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.006 (Vernon 2002). Briones's third issue is overruled.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.