Opinion
2:23-cv-02067-BHH-MGB
06-29-2023
Lewis Brady, Plaintiff, v. Thomas Holmes; Rafael James; David Schwacke; M. Erica; M. Tupac; M. Gina; and Randy Demory, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Lewis Brady (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other South Carolina state law. (Dkt. No. 1.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Schwacke and James be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The instant Complaint is premised on a series of four events that took place in August 2022, beginning with what appears to be a “failure to protect” claim involving Defendant Thomas Holmes, an officer with the St. Stephens Police Department (Claim 1). According to the Complaint, on or around August 22, 2022, Plaintiff approached Officer Holmes “on foot” and reported that members of a gang were pursuing him in their vehicles with the intent to kill him. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff claims that Officer Holmes did not believe him and simply offered to have another officer drive Plaintiff home. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that racism “played a major role” in Officer Holmes' purported “failure to render aid” because he assumed that Plaintiff-a “black male”-was “hallucinating and on drugs.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks over $1 million in damages based on Officer Holmes' alleged conduct. (Id.)
Next, the Complaint challenges certain conditions of confinement Plaintiff experienced at the Hill-Finklea Detention Center (“Hill-Finklea”) in Berkeley County, South Carolina from August 23, 2022, through September 11, 2023 (Claim 2).(Id. at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he suffers from diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and high blood pressure and was designated as a “critical care inmate” while housed at the detention center. (Id.) Despite being notified of Plaintiff's conditions by medical staff, the Complaint alleges that Defendants M. Erica, M. Tupac, and M. Gina-dieticians contracted to perform food services at Hill-Finklea Detention Center- continued to serve him processed meats and other foods high in sodium, which caused various inflammation issues. (Id.) Plaintiff suggests that he sent an internal grievance regarding his diet and medical concerns to Defendant Randy Demory, the Director of Hill-Finklea Detention Center, although it is unclear whether Defendant Demory responded to, or even received, the grievance. (Id.)
State records show that Plaintiff was arrested on August 23, 2022, for failure to stop for a blue light (Case No. 2022A0810201613) and grand larceny (Case No. 2022A0820500212). See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/(limiting search to Berkeley County) (last visited June 22, 2023); see also see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (same). Plaintiff was “not indicted” on the first charge but pled guilty to the grand larceny offense on February 10, 2023. There is no indication that Officer Holmes was involved in Plaintiff's arrest and/or subsequent detention.
The Complaint's next claim involves Defendant David Schwacke, who served as Plaintiff's defense counsel in his criminal proceedings before the Berkeley County Court of General Sessions (Claim 3). Plaintiff claims that Defendant Schwacke denied his requests to file a motion for speedy trial, responding that “the courts [were] backed up because of COVID.” (Id.) The Complaint also appears to allege that Defendant Schwacke refused to show Plaintiff certain “material evidence” and “defense discovery” that would have supported a motion for speedy trial. Plaintiff seeks over $1 million in damages for “malpractice” and “negligence.” (Id.)
Finally, the Complaint alleges claims of “defamation of character” and “slander” against Defendant Rafael James, a news anchor with Live 5 News (Claim 4). (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant James “aired a program, live telecast as well as via internet” in August 2022 that falsely stated Plaintiff had been charged with kidnapping and attempted murder. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “no retraction was ever made,” despite the victim of these purported crimes notifying the Berkeley County Sheriff that Plaintiff was innocent. Once again, Plaintiff seeks over $1 million in damages. (Id.) This is the extent of the Complaint.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In screening this case, the undersigned determined that the Complaint alleged separate and distinct incidents against individuals who, for the most part, were unrelated. In other words, the Complaint essentially presented four separate lawsuits bundled into one omnibus pleading. Under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the joinder of several parties is permitted only if the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series thereof and contain a question of fact or law common to all the defendants. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a); see also Cooper v. South Carolina, No. 3:17-cv-3205-CMC-PJG, 2017 WL 6388042, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 14, 2017) (explaining that a plaintiff generally may not bring unrelated claims against various, unrelated parties in one lawsuit). Accordingly, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his claims must be severed into separate actions for purposes of judicial economy and in keeping with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (See Dkt. No. 4.) The order clarified that the instant case (Case No. 2:23-cv-02067-BHH-MGB) would be limited to Claim 1 against Defendant Holmes, while Claim 2 against Defendants Erica, Tupac, Gina, and Demory (the “Hill-Finklea Defendants”) would be docketed in a separate civil action and assigned a new case number. With respect to Claims 3 and 4, however, the undersigned found that severing the allegations against Defendants Schwacke and James into new lawsuits would be futile and inefficient, as they are plainly subject to dismissal and cannot be cured by amendment. This Report and Recommendation addresses those grounds for dismissal below.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
As stated above, the undersigned determined during initial review that Plaintiff's Complaint improperly attempted to join multiple unrelated claims and Defendants in one action. Accordingly, the undersigned severed Plaintiff's claims into separate lawsuits, ordering that the instant case be limited to Claim 1 against Defendant Holmes, and a new civil action be created to address Claim 2 against the Hill-Finklea Defendants. With respect to Defendants Schwacke and James, however, the undersigned ultimately found that severing Claims 3 and 4 into new civil actions would be futile because the Court would be unable to exercise jurisdiction over the same.
Indeed, there is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his or her pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, they possess only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992). There are two primary bases for exercising original federal jurisdiction: (1) “federal question,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) “diversity of citizenship,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The undersigned finds that neither basis would apply to a severed action involving Claim 3 or 4.
Turning first to federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff must assert a cause of action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, if the Court opened a separate civil action based on Claim 3 against Defendant Schwacke, the causes of action would be negligence and malpractice-both of which sound in state law. See Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1167 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that “the law governing legal malpractice represents a traditional exercise of state authority”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (noting that negligence is not cognizable for purposes of stating a constitutional violation). Likewise, if the Court opened a separate case based on Claim 4 against Defendant James, the sole cause of action would be defamation, which also sounds in state law. See Cannon v. Peck, 36 F.4th 547, 559 (4th Cir. 2022) (“At base, defamation is a state-law tort claim.”); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (“Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most states, but not a constitutional deprivation.”). Consequently, Plaintiff would be unable to invoke federal question jurisdiction with respect a severed action involving the claims against Defendant Schwacke or James.
To be sure, the undersigned also notes that even if the Court granted Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his causes of action, his allegations would not support a federal claim to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Indeed, § 1983 requires a showing that the alleged federal violations were committed by persons acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Stated differently, “[i]n order to be a proper party defendant in a § 1983 action, the defendant must be, or step into the role of, a public actor.” Palmore v. Wal-Mart, No. 9:08-cv-2484-GRA-BM, 2009 WL 1457136, at *3 (D.S.C. May 22, 2009), aff'd, 332 Fed.Appx. 863 (4th Cir. 2009). Neither Defendant Schwacke nor Defendant James qualifies as a state actor for purposes of § 1983. See, e.g., Bell v. Shearouse, No. 2:11-cv-506-HFF-BHH, 2011 WL 1625013, at *4 (Mar. 28, 2011) (finding “no federal jurisdiction under § 1983” to consider plaintiff's claims against his defense attorneys because they did not qualify as state actors), adopted, 2011 WL 1627967 (D.S.C. Apr. 28, 2011); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (stating that “a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law' within the meaning of § 1983”); Allen v. Glines, No. 1:19-cv-793, 2019 WL 6467810, at *3 (M.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 2019) (noting that newspapers and media outlets are not state actors amenable to suit under § 1983) (collecting cases), adopted, 2020 WL 353540 (M.D. N.C. Jan. 21, 2020), aff'd, 805 Fed.Appx. 247 (4th Cir. 2020).
With respect to the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires that a plaintiff demonstrate complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). In the instant case, Plaintiff, Defendant Schwacke, and Defendant James all appear to be citizens of South Carolina. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Thus, the Complaint does not establish complete diversity for purposes of § 1332, and Plaintiff would therefore be unable to invoke diversity jurisdiction over a severed action involving Defendant Schwacke or James.
Notwithstanding the above, the undersigned notes that if a federal district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims that are “so related” to the claims under the court's original jurisdiction “that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Accordingly, while the Court would not have original jurisdiction over a severed action solely involving Claim 3 or 4, the Court could theoretically consider such claims against Defendants Schwacke and James in conjunction with one of Plaintiff's surviving federal causes of action against Defendant Holmes and/or the Hill-Finklea Defendants. However, supplemental jurisdiction exists only if the state law claims arise out of “a common nucleus of operative fact” such that the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try the claims in one judicial proceeding. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). In other words, supplemental jurisdiction does not encompass claims that “do not grow out of a common nucleus of operative fact” and are “separately maintainable and determinable without any reference to the facts alleged or contentions stated in or with regard to” the federal claims. See Aursby v. Richardson, No. 7:21-cv-339, 2022 WL 4082487, at *9 (W.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2022) (referencing Hales v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 500 F.2d 836, 846-48 (4th Cir. 1974)), aff'd, No. 22-7103, 2023 WL 3645518 (4th Cir. May 25, 2023).
For the reasons stated above, Claims 3 and 4 against Defendants Schwacke and James plainly do not form part of the same case or controversy as the federal claims raised against the other Defendants in the instant case. For example, Defendant Schwacke's legal representation of Plaintiff is not factually related to or dependent on Defendant Holmes' purported treatment of Plaintiff (Claim 1) or the conditions of confinement Plaintiff experienced at the Hill-Finklea Detention Center (Claim 2). See, e.g., Chaney v. City of Chicago, 901 F.Supp. 266, 270 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that legal malpractice claim against public defender for not getting plaintiff out of prison quickly enough was not part of same case or controversy as civil rights claim against prison guard who beat plaintiff while plaintiff was incarcerated); Mooney v. Frazier, No. 3:08-cv-248, 2008 WL 11429652, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 18, 2008) (finding that claims for legal malpractice against attorney and law firm arose out of their legal representation and had nothing to do with plaintiff's allegedly improper arrest and indictment). The same can be said for Defendant James' alleged misrepresentations regarding Plaintiff's criminal history. See, e.g., Lee v. Singleton, No. 8:11-cv-2983-JMC-KFM, 2012 WL 1896062, at *19 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2012) (explaining that the issue of whether plaintiff was unlawfully arrested by state actor defendants was “completely unrelated to the issue of whether plaintiff was defamed by the media defendants”), adopted, 2012 WL 1895998 (D.S.C. May 24, 2012). Consequently, supplemental jurisdiction does not apply here. Because the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Schwacke or James-whether presented in a severed action or as part of Plaintiff's remaining lawsuits-the undersigned recommends that Claims 3 and 4 be summarily dismissed.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned is of the opinion that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his Complaint. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993). The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court decline to give Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint as it pertains to Defendants Schwacke and James; DISMISS Claims 3 and 4 against the same; and terminate Defendants Schwacke and James from the instant action.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.