Opinion
August 20, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Brown, J.).
Ordered that the order and judgment in action No. 1 is reversed, on the law, the plaintiffs' cross motion is denied, the defendants' motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the order and judgment in action No. 7 is reversed, on the law, the plaintiffs' cross motion is denied, the defendants' motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the defendants are awarded one bill of costs.
These appeals involve 11 related actions by various school districts in Suffolk County against tax officials of the towns in which they are located, seeking to recover monetary damages for their alleged repeated failure to disburse collected tax money in a timely fashion. Although it was conceded before the Supreme Court that all the money involved had, in fact, been disbursed, the Supreme Court denied the municipal defendants' motions to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a cause of action, and granted the plaintiff school districts partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. We reverse.
An action for moneys had and received is quasi contractual in nature and is not founded upon any contract, either express or implied. It is an obligation which the law creates in the absence of an agreement when one party possesses money that in equity and good conscience should not be retained and which belongs to another. It allows the plaintiff to recover money which has come into the hands of the defendant, under a theory of trust because it is against good conscience for the defendant to retain the funds (see, Parsa v State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 143; Buchanan v Town of Salina, 270 App. Div. 1074, affd 297 N.Y. 508; Miller v Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400; Strough v Board of Supervisors, 119 N.Y. 212; Roberts v Ely, 113 N.Y. 128). Although this action is grounded in equity and depends upon general principles of equity for the maintenance of the claim and broad considerations of right, justice, and morality apply, it is technically considered an action in law (see, Parsa v State of New York, supra, at 148).
Since no right of recovery under this theory exists where the money sought to be recovered has already been paid to the party claiming it (see, Peirson v Board of Supervisors, 155 N.Y. 105), and, as previously indicated, it is conceded by the parties and acknowledged by the court that the towns paid to the school districts the full sums owed to them, no action for moneys had and received lies. Accordingly, the complaints do not state a cognizable cause of action for moneys had and received. Moreover, since the plaintiff school districts have not asserted any damages which would otherwise be recoverable against the municipal defendants (see, Matter of City of New York v Tully, 55 N.Y.2d 960; Matter of Brodsky v Murphy, 25 N.Y.2d 518), the defendants' motions to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a cause of action should have been granted.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendants' remaining contentions. Brown, J.P., Kooper, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.